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
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
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
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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 19

No. 3

THE MYTH OF THE CONTINENTS

By Eugene Staley

IN earlier writings as well as in his latest book Charles A. Beard reads from (or into?) American history the lesson that "continentalism" represents the predestined course of our foreign policy. Jerome Frank, writing a chapter on "Disintegrated Europe and Integrated America," argues that the basic issue in Europe, and the cause of unfortunate developments in Germany and Italy, has been "the absence of continental integration." In America, he continues, we have continental integration, "and therefore the possibility of relative self-sufficiency." Stuart Chase embroiders still further Frank's theme of "disintegrated Europe, integrated America," collects figures to explore the possibilities of various "continental economic units," and, in the last sentence of his book, urges the United States to avoid economic and political entanglements in the affairs of other nations which, "in the nature of their geographical deficiencies, must quarrel, until some day they too achieve continental unity."¹

The Western Hemisphere complex, so conspicuous in discussions of American foreign policy, has often been associated with ideas of "continental" unity and "continental" solidarity. A noteworthy instance occurred in a symposium at the meeting of the American Political Science Association a year ago where Clarence Streit's plan for Interdemocracy Federal Union was up for discussion. A distinguished political scientist — a student of municipal government — based his criticism on the view that the natural political and economic grouping is the "continental" one. He therefore favored solidarity with Latin American countries as against overseas countries.

There is, of course, a tremendous literature on the theme that "Europe" must unite. Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan Europe*; the efforts of practical statesmen like Briand, Herriot and others to promote European union; and more recently a new flood of books, articles, plans and speeches advocating a "United States of Europe" or some sort of European federation all carry a continental emphasis. Sometimes there is an explicit argument to explain why continents, as such, must be united. Thus, H. N. Brailsford writes, "Air power has made inevitable the unification of continents."² More often than not, however, this point is simply taken for granted.

On the other hand, there are strong trends in current political action and thought, as well as existing economic and political connections, which cut directly across continental lines. Public opinion and official policy in the United States are today influenced very decidedly by the realization that our own ability to defend ourselves depends in no small measure on what happens in Europe and Asia. The British Commonwealth of Nations, so long as it stands, will continue to be a practical challenge to the thesis that continental units are the natural ones. The war emergency has publicized the fact that the economic affiliations of much of South America, as well as the cultural affiliations of Latin America in general, are with Europe — distinctly un-continental. In the realm of thought about the future, particularly in the discussion of war and peace aims, continental lines are being as regularly disregarded by some as they are being emphasized by others. Proposals like "Union Now," and the more moderate proposals of those who, while doubting the feasibility of complete federal union, nevertheless envisage some kind of a permanent bond between the United States and other democratic nations, reject the continental principles in favor of an ocean-linked unity.

One general theme runs like a red thread through most of these discussions, by continentalists and non-continentalists alike. That is the conviction that the day of the small, completely independent, sovereign national state is past. There will be in the future — and ought to be — *larger* politico-economic units of some kind. This, in the view of the present writer, has to be accepted as unquestionably sound. But is the natural progression from small, sovereign states to *continental* groupings? There is

² H. N. Brailsford, "From England to America: A Message." New York: Whittlesey House,

reason for making an examination of this question now, for the words "continent" and "continental" seem to be acquiring strong emotional and symbolic values which may even affect policy. Is this a well-founded development, or have we here an instance of the fascination (not to say the tyranny) of certain words? What are the general characteristics that mark off continental from non-continental, overseas, or maritime groupings? What is to be said for permanent supra-national groupings of a continental sort as compared with non-continental, maritime, or oceanic groupings? With respect to the defense problem of the United States, what are the relative virtues of a policy which stresses "continental" defense lines (admitting aid to Britain largely because it buys time for preparation), as against a policy which allies us with overseas friends in all-out resistance to the totalitarian challenge and in joint maintenance of dominant world sea power? ^a

II

There is only one universal characteristic which distinguishes continental from non-continental groupings — the existence of land connections (or barriers) instead of sea connections (or barriers) between the members of the group. What political or economic consequences, if any, follow from this difference?

Distance has human significance only in terms of the barriers it interposes against the exchange of messages (communication), the movement of persons (travel), and the movement of goods (transport). How does *over-land* distance compare with *over-water* distance in these three respects?

Obviously, the answer depends on the character of the particular lands and seas involved (land areas differ more than sea areas in the obstacles they offer) and on the technology of the times. Nowadays, communication, which permits exchange of intelligence, impressions and feelings, takes place over water and over land with practically the same speed, cost and convenience. Radio waves and the air mail pay little attention to continental lines. So far as travel is concerned, surface travel on land today is swifter where there are good railway lines and highways than surface travel by ship, and it is hard to generalize about the

^a Wherever "sea power" is mentioned in this article the term must be understood to include the necessary complement of air-power required under modern conditions in order to hold command of the surface of the seas and in order to defend the bases — military and industrial — on which sea power rests.

differences in expense and convenience. But if one travels by air — and that will surely be the standard method of long-distance travel in the future — there is no important difference even today between over-land and over-water distance. Stratosphere flying will probably soon abolish what little difference does now exist. This leaves land and water distances about equally significant, in human terms, except for transportation of goods.

The transport of goods (freight) should certainly not be ranked below communication or travel in its fundamental importance for determining the “naturalness” of economic connections between different places. If freight can move easily and cheaply between two regions their economies are much more likely to become integrated, interdependent and complementary than if the movement of goods between them is difficult and costly. Now, it happens that for heavy, bulky goods, which are the staple items of inter-regional trade, water transport is much cheaper than land transport over equal distances. This has been true for centuries. It is one of the reasons why the great trading centers of the world are typically located on rivers, or lakes, or on the seacoast. It is still true today. Rumanian oil, in time of peace, moves to Germany by the long overseas route around Spain to Hamburg, instead of over the much closer “continental” connection. Italy, though linked by several railway lines to continental Europe, imported 20,000,000 tons of goods by sea in 1938 and only 4,000,000 tons by land. Coal from Germany moves overseas to Italy when there is no blockade. South American international trade, even to places on the same continent, is largely by sea.

Let us compare, in practical terms, the cost-distance from such a center as New York City to inland “continental” points and to overseas points. Using prewar rates in all cases (effective as of August 1, 1939), the “wheat-distance” between Kansas City and New York, expressed as the cost of shipping 100 pounds of wheat in carload lots, was $33\frac{1}{2}$ cents to $42\frac{1}{2}$ cents, while it was only 13 cents from New York to Liverpool. In mileage, Liverpool was three times as far as Kansas City; but Kansas City was nearly three times farther than Liverpool when it came to economic relations in wheat. The overseas route from Singapore to New York is more than twenty-five times longer, in miles, than the rail route from New York to Akron, Ohio. Yet the distance measured in freight cost for transporting a 240 pound bale or case of crude rubber was \$1.50 from Singapore and \$1.03 to Akron.

In other words, Akron was two-thirds as far away from New York as Singapore, in "crude-rubber distance."⁴

In summary, for two places a given number of miles apart it makes very little difference under modern conditions whether land or water stretches between them, so far as communication and travel are concerned. For the transportation of heavy goods, however, which is a major aspect of economic connections, the two places would be effectively closer to each other, measured in "cost-distance," if there were water between them than if there were land. *Given the same separation in miles, there is less economic distance across water than across land.*

But are not places on the same continent or in the same "hemisphere" closer to each other in miles than places on different continents or in different "hemispheres"? It is a temptation to suppose so. Ex-Governor Philip La Follette of Wisconsin warned his countrymen not long ago to beware lest we find ourselves fighting "not in this hemisphere where we can be supreme, but fighting with expeditionary forces four thousand miles away in Europe and six thousand miles away in Asia." Will the reader at this point be good enough to examine a globe?⁵ Attach a string to a pin at Madison, Wisconsin — Governor La Follette's home town — and measure how far from home he might have to go if he were sent to defend important points "in this hemisphere where we can be supreme," as compared with other points on the supposedly distant continents of Europe and Asia. Note the following facts:

It is farther from Madison to Buenos Aires in a direct line ("great circle" distance) than from Madison to Bengasi. Ankara is about as far as Buenos Aires. Actually, by the regularly travelled routes, Buenos Aires is considerably farther away than either of these points in Africa or Asia, because of the "bulge" of Brazil.

No capital in Europe, including Moscow, is as far from Madison as is Buenos Aires, and only one European capital (Athens) is as far as Rio de Janeiro. Again, this is direct-line distance, and by actually travelled routes Europe is relatively closer.

Gibraltar is closer to Madison than is the capital of Bolivia, closer than Tacna or Arica, and closer than any major city in Brazil or any place at all in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay.

Gibraltar, incidentally, is not merely closer to the entire South Atlantic coast of South America than is Madison, but is closer by sea than the *nearest*

⁴ I am indebted to Mr. William M. Gavigan, of Funch, Edye and Company, steamship agents and ship brokers, for the rate data used in these comparisons.

⁵ This is not a rhetorical request; it is meant seriously. Illusions persist in the minds of all of us from the old school-book device of flat maps which break the world into "hemispheres" that have no objective existence whatever in nature.

point in the United States (Miami). In the same way, advanced European bases at Dakar, Bathurst, and Freetown on the coast of Africa are nearer to southern South America than our most advanced Caribbean bases.

If the Nazis were to capture the British naval base at Scapa Flow in Scotland they would be closer to Madison than if they were established at Lima, Peru.

As for Asia, Manchukuo is closer to Madison than is Buenos Aires. For those to whom "continental" land connections seem especially important, it may be added that a Japanese flying over the shortest route from Manchukuo to Madison (a great circle via Bering Strait) need hardly lose sight of land.

Points on the same land-mass may be as far apart in miles as places on opposite sides of an ocean, and may be still farther apart in economic distance measured by transport costs. On the other hand, there is likely to be a greater continuity of human habitation between them than between the overseas points. How shall we weigh this characteristic in appraising the significance of continental as opposed to overseas politico-economic groupings? One might argue that the continuity permits conquest and culture to spread by easy stages, and hence that each land-mass could be expected to have more political and cultural unity, more history and tradition in common, than would exist between places on separate continents. Actually, every continent has natural barriers — deserts, mountains, swamps, jungles — which are almost uninhabited and which may be more difficult to cross than the ocean. The sea, especially in earlier centuries, has offered one of the main means of contact between peoples on the same continent, so that the peripheral areas often developed more traits in common with each other and with other continents than with land-locked regions. Thus, the political and economic system of the coastland states of Europe spread more effectively to relatively vacant areas like America and Australia than to parts of eastern and southern Europe.

It is no accident that early civilizations developed in river valleys and that the great center of ancient times is spoken of as "the Mediterranean world" and not the European or the African world. Nor is it without significance that Europe, having the most broken coastline, best adapted for sea-borne traffic, became the originator of modern world culture and world politics, while Africa, most "continental" of all land areas because of its smooth contours and difficulty of access by sea, remained the "Dark Continent."⁶ In short, land connections, which would

⁶ For each mile of coastline Europe has 289 square miles of surface, North America 407, Australia 534, South America 689, Asia 763, Africa 1420. (Derwent Whittlesey, "The Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography." New York: Henry Holt, 1939, p. 308.)

appear to establish easy contact between peoples on the same continent, may be barriers as well as connections, while bodies of water, appearing superficially on the map as barriers, may actually be most important connecting links. Because this has been so distinctly true in the past, the existing patterns of culture, tradition, political affiliation, and economic interdependence which confront us in the world of today are as often oceanic as they are continental.

III

We in this country can give the "continental" doctrine an immediate and practical test by applying it to the grand strategy of United States defense. In general, the same people who talk about "continental integration" draw a line around the so-called Western Hemisphere and refuse to concede that the United States has any vital interest outside — except that limited aid to Britain may be desirable in order to gain time for perfecting defenses within the "hemisphere." It should be noted, however, that our relations with the Western Hemisphere countries to the south of us are not really "continental" in any significant practical sense. A land connection is afforded by the Isthmus of Panama, but no one ever travels, or sends messages, or transports goods between North and South America *overland*. In fact, all Latin America, not merely South America, is overseas to us, with the partial exception of Mexico. Latin America is susceptible of defense by the United States only if the United States controls the sea routes, including routes which are problems of high-seas defense.

If the Western Hemisphere, then, is to be considered as one unit for defense purposes, or for other purposes, it provides an instance not of continental but of *maritime* solidarity. The practical issue today, in reality, is between two kinds of maritime solidarity. Some would make our area of maritime solidarity quasi-continental — that is, confined to North and South America and their immediate vicinities — while others would team up with Britain in a world-girdling maritime defense group.

Which grouping offers us the best line of defense? The technology of warfare and the nature of the enemy's strategy in attack have an important bearing on that question. Recent developments in warfare include far more than the efficient use of machines. The "extended strategy" of the Nazis — to use their own term — involves: (1) isolating the opponent by outmanœuvring

him on the chessboard of international politics, placing him, without allies, in front of vastly superior economic and military force; (2) creating confusion and fomenting an uprising from within; (3) undermining the enemy's will to resist, by propaganda stressing the goodness of Nazi purposes, the hopelessness of resisting, and by fear — the "war of nerves"; (4) last of all, outright military attack. Against this strategy there must likewise be an "extended defense"! What grouping is best for the purpose?

Certain basic facts about the problem of defending the Western Hemisphere are now fairly well known. The American people have realized with a shock that the Monroe Doctrine has rested in the past not merely on our own power, but on the existence and the friendliness of the British Navy. If the British Navy were to be captured, or sunk, or scattered, we would face a combined Axis naval superiority that might amount to two or three to one against us. The "two-ocean navy" our Congress has voted cannot be completed before 1946. Furthermore, can we assume that a victorious Axis would be unable to match our new vessels, or to outmatch them? The estimated annual shipbuilding capacity of countries now under Nazi rule (Germany, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France), plus that of Japan, plus that of Italy, was about 3,200,000 gross tons at the outbreak of war. In the event of a Nazi conquest of the British Isles, additional equipment rated at an annual capacity of about 2,500,000 gross tons would be in the hands of the totalitarians. The grand total so amassed is 5,700,000 gross tons, as of September 1939. It seems reasonable to assume that since then new installations and destruction by bombing may have offset each other. Over against this annual capacity of nearly 6,000,000 gross tons the United States had an estimated shipbuilding capacity (including navy yards) of perhaps 800,000 gross tons at the outbreak of war, and this had been pushed up to 1,500,000 gross tons as of January 1, 1941. Experts hold that by building new yards we can probably increase this capacity at the rate of about 1,000,000 tons a year. If that is a good estimate, it would take us more than four years to overtake totalitarian shipbuilding capacity, *supposing that they stood still*. In the meantime, we should start with something like a 4 to 1 shipbuilding ratio against us. This must be a most disquieting fact if we hope to defend, single-handed, distant overseas areas like the South Atlantic coast of South America.

The power of a naval force decreases with the distance it must

operate from its bases. Recall, then, what was pointed out above: that the sea-distance from the southeastern coast of South America (including important cities like Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires) is shorter to Gibraltar than to Miami, shorter to Dakar than to our most advanced Caribbean base at Trinidad. Furthermore, look on the globe at the British islands in the South Atlantic — Ascension, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, the Falklands — which might become Axis outposts in case Britain lost control of the seas around Europe.

But why plan to defend southern South America, since it is so far away? If Britain should be conquered, why not “write off” that part of the Western Hemisphere, let the Axis take it if they want it, and retire to a shortened defense line running across the continent at the equator or at the level of the “bulge”? We might actually have to give serious consideration to this scheme of “quarter-sphere” defense if Britain were defeated. But there are grave weaknesses in such a defense line.

First, the tradition that the Monroe Doctrine applies to the whole of both Americas is so strong that it might not be feasible to reconcile public opinion in the United States to such a policy.

Second, this retreat from our often-announced intention to keep trespassers off both the Americas would be a psychological defeat of the first magnitude, important in the war of nerves.

Third, we should be abandoning as potential allies the most developed and progressive countries in South America, the only ones capable of contributing largely to a common defense.

Fourth, these countries exercise important leadership throughout Latin America. By abandoning them we should forfeit whatever good will and friendly coöperation we might otherwise expect from Latin American countries closer home, and we should present the Axis with unexcelled political and cultural outposts for penetration into the vital Caribbean area, which everybody agrees we must defend at all costs. This is important, in view of the fact that the most effective “secret weapon” of the Nazis thus far has been internal dissension and fifth-column activities.

Fifth, strategic raw materials like Brazilian manganese and Bolivian tin lie south of such a “quarter-sphere” defense line, and this would be an important consideration if the world oceans were closed to us — which we would have to expect, unless we yielded to Axis demands.

Sixth, and finally, if we allow the Axis to establish strong posi-

tions "below the bulge," connected to Europe by the sea-lanes of the South Atlantic which they would control, aviation bases could be pushed northwest across the continent to threaten directly the most vital and vulnerable link in our ability to defend North America — the Panama Canal. Already, in fact, Axis-dominated "commercial" companies, according to a revealing article in the last issue of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, are pushing in this very direction, into remote areas that offer little commercial traffic, but might provide numbers of secret landing fields.⁷ Relatively small Axis forces, hopping over the jungles in the air, could conceivably establish such a serious menace to the Canal that we would be forced to send an expeditionary force to root them out. And what permanent security would this bring us, supposing we were successful, unless we were prepared to maintain forces throughout a large part of South America?

In sum, South America is overseas to us, and important parts of it are farther from our bases than from the bases of European powers. The problem of defending South America is a *maritime*, not a continental problem, and if command of the seas in the South Atlantic passes to hostile powers we could neither establish bases there ourselves nor prevent them from ensconcing themselves on the Continent. Once they were there, only a major expeditionary force could root them out or prevent them from gradually working northward by successive jumps overland. Those soporific calculations about the number of ships an invader would have to have in order to send an expeditionary force from Europe to the United States, and about the perils to which such a force would be exposed from land-based defenders, *would apply to us in reverse, once command of the South Atlantic had passed to the Axis*. For strategy of the Nazis could place us before the dilemma, either of trying to drive them out of South America, or of letting them work northward to the Canal. In fact, the Nazis would know how to create a situation, after taking over important Latin American countries by "consent," without using any military force at all, where we would have to be the attackers.

Colonel Lindbergh testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that aviation has increased the vulnerability of any country to attack from forces on the same continent, but has decreased the vulnerability of a whole continent to attack from

⁷ Melvin Hall and Walter Peck, "Wings for the Trojan Horse," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, January 1941.

without — that is, by way of the seas. Presumably, this was intended to support the isolationist thesis that the United States has little to fear regardless of who wins in Europe. The hollowness of the argument is exposed by the considerations advanced above. The advantage of land-based aviation against sea attack would be our advantage only if we can assume that the United States can count on getting and holding and supplying bases in that distant overseas territory on the east coast of South America, and that we can prevent the Axis from doing so. This is a most unlikely assumption, if control of the high seas, and especially of the South Atlantic, passes to the Axis by the defeat of Britain. In other words, once control of the high seas passed from our friends to our enemies we would eventually be exposed to land-based, *continental* attacks by relatively small units of the *Luftwaffe* on the Panama Canal region, which is vital to the naval power on which defense of our own coast depends. On our side, we could find a remedy only by a major effort involving probably the transport of troops a long distance *overseas* in an area where the advantage of established positions and nearness to bases might be all against us.

These doubts about the security of a defense system limited to the Western Hemisphere are strengthened by consideration of the economic problems of defending against totalitarian attack. The great bargaining weakness of a Western Hemisphere economic bloc as over against an Axis-dominated world would arise from the surpluses of products competitive with our own which are produced in Latin America, especially in the temperate climate of southern South America.⁸ In 1937 continental Europe and the United Kingdom absorbed considerably more than two billion dollars' worth of Western Hemisphere exports, principally petroleum, cotton, wheat, copper, meats, corn, tobacco and linseed. Important Latin American groups depend for their income on selling such goods abroad. It is easy to write glibly about diverting production to products needed in the United States, disposing of surpluses by hemisphere stamp plans, raising living standards throughout the hemisphere by fostering industrial development, and creating cartels to limit production and to barter with Hitler. These are the things we must try to do if Britain collapses and we have to make a stand on the line of hemisphere defense. Some of them are worth doing anyway. But rechanneling of production

⁸ Cf. Alvin H. Hansen, "Hemisphere Solidarity," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1940.

takes time, and it meets social and political resistances. Messrs. Bidwell and Uppgren have rightly emphasized that by stimulating Bolivian tin-mining or Brazilian rubber production we would not automatically reemploy the gauchos of the Argentine pampas, or the wheat farmers of Alberta and Saskatchewan, or the tobacco growers in Virginia and North Carolina.⁹

It is not at all clear that the Latin American countries would feel inclined to undergo difficult economic readjustments for the sake of fitting into the defense plan of the United States and thereby antagonizing the Axis. Hitler, if he had defeated Britain, could probably offer them more than we could, while demanding less from them in the way of readjustment of established patterns of production, and he could also threaten them more effectively.

If Britain can be kept in the picture, on the other hand, even if Hitler manages to hold what he has in Europe (in some kind of a stalemate or truce), the economic problem of defending the Americas becomes much more manageable. The reason is that a large volume of foodstuffs and raw materials of a sort competitive with United States production, and which we therefore do not care to import, regularly flows from such countries as Argentina and Uruguay to Britain, to be paid for by goods and services which Britain furnishes to Empire countries and to others. Some of these countries in turn sell large export surpluses in the United States (for example, rubber and tin from the East Indies), and the United States sells more than it buys in Argentina. Britain is the pivot of this triangular and multi-angular trade on which the disposal of a considerable part of South American surpluses depends. Let Britain's economic life be destroyed, or let it come under the domination of Hitler's New Order, and the effect on the economic defense of the Americas is analogous to the effect the sinking or capture of the British fleet would have on the naval defense of the Americas.

A defense area limited to the Western Hemisphere has another important economic disadvantage as compared with a world-girdling defense area based on joint British and American sea power. *We* would be the blockaded party. The Nazis, controlling the overseas trade routes of the world, except those in the immediate vicinity of our bases, would have on their side the quiet, undramatic, but steady weight of advantage in economic power

⁹ Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Uppgren, "A Trade Policy for National Defense," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, January 1941.

for defense or aggression conferred by the ability to draw upon the best and cheapest sources of materials in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the islands of the seas, and probably portions of South America. We, and not they, would have to waste part of our productive power making substitutes and adapting our industry to inferior materials. To be sure, the United States, together with the adjacent areas that our navy could protect, is better equipped than any other region to withstand a siege. But the engineers, mechanics, machine-tools, materials and inventors used to build synthetic rubber plants, or to establish our own tin smelters, or to develop *Ersatz* materials could not be used at the same time for producing planes and tanks, nor for producing civilian goods. The side which controls the world oceans, and which thus enjoys access by sea to allies and neutrals alike, has an inestimable long-run advantage in the scales of economic power.

Recently the editors of *Fortune* captioned a pair of world charts: "U.S.A. — Compact, Easily Defended; British Empire — Diffuse, Vulnerable." The theory implied in these captions has certain commonly accepted elements of truth. But in them may also lurk a dangerous fallacy — particularly dangerous under new techniques of warfare used so skillfully by the totalitarian Powers. The "diffuse, vulnerable" area, *if its communications can be maintained by dominant sea power*, is in a position to unite its allies and divide its enemies. It can nip in the bud, so to speak, threats to its position which may arise from any one of many different quarters — provided it acts resolutely and in time. The "compact, easily defended" area, on the other hand, may not be able to take action against the increasing power of a potential enemy until every ally has been "mopped up," until the enemy has gathered his forces without interference and has chosen the most advantageous moment for attack. The "diffuse-vulnerable" area, always supposing it holds command of the seas, can base its military effort on the economic resources of most of the world, including the materials and the industrial man-power of allied and non-belligerent countries far out of reach of the adversary. Finally, compactness may be no particular advantage, and even a great disadvantage, in the psychological phases of modern warfare. There is an important psychological as well as material difference between surrounding the enemy and being surrounded by the enemy. In the case of the United States, this is the difference between joining with allies from all the rest of the world to

help keep Hitler caged in Europe and trying to resist a Hitler who controls all the world except our immediate neighborhood. "Compact — easily defended; diffuse — vulnerable" tacitly assumes that the land connects, that the sea divides. Such a slogan dramatizes inaccuracies of thinking that might prove as dangerous to us as the "Maginot mentality" proved to France, as little conducive to survival as the rigid strength of the mastodon in competition with the flexibility and adaptability of other animals and man.

Incidentally, if we were forced to defend the Western Hemisphere against attack by an Axis-dominated world, and if we were successful in fighting off the attack, what would be the next move for us? Would we ever again feel secure? Would we ever again be able to organize our life on anything but a military basis from top to bottom? Would we ever be able to devote less than a quarter or a third or a half of our national income to defense purposes, unless we were able to put the enemy back across the water, to reconquer the strategic strong-points commanding access to the seas of the world, and, in effect, to reconstitute the command of the world's oceans which we now have if we act together with Britain?

The Western Hemisphere defense plan is a static plan, and either the hemisphere or the "quarter-sphere" defense lines would, on the whole, be weak compared with the maritime defense line available to us so long as Britain survives. The United States should regard Western Hemisphere defense lines as distinctly secondary, to be prepared for emergency use if the first line breaks and we are forced to fall back for a last-ditch stand. It is less risky to stand now for all-out defense, together with Britain, of the seas and the strong-points commanding the seas of the whole world — Singapore, Hawaii, Panama, Gibraltar, Suez, and Britain itself — than to let Britain go down and then to try to defend the Western Hemisphere practically alone.

GERMAN STRATEGY: 1914

By X

A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF is not in a position to begin a war as a chess player may begin a game with a new gambit. He has to take over a play which has been opened by others, that is, the statesmen, and then carry it through according to the rules of the game. His strategical opportunities are thereby limited. In the long history of war more campaigns have been lost on account of a wrong political start than by subsequent strategical mistakes. More wars have been won by the *élan*, the passion, and the will to sacrifice of whole nations than by the genius of commanders.

It is in the political preparations and the use of political opportunities that we find the outstanding distinctions to be made between the strategical situation which faced Germany in 1914 and that which faced her in 1940. The German Army and German leaders of 1940 profited by mistakes of the past even more fully in the political field than they did in the field of purely military operations.

In 1914 the war began with the political odds against Germany. Close collaboration between the Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff was needed urgently after the Bülow period, but it did not exist. The Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, clung to the hope of reaching an understanding with England. The Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, had no such hope. He had no political imagination and he lacked the ability to foresee the psychological and political effects of his strategical manœuvres. He wavered between the fear that the Austro-Hungarian Empire might break up if the war were postponed and the fear that the German Army would not be ready for its superhuman task before 1916. He was perturbed by the shift of the French General Staff in 1911 from a defensive to an offensive strategy. His only idea of parrying this threat was to speed up mobilization and to plan to attack Liège on the fifth day after mobilization. His whole plan was rigid and bound to a strict timetable. His army commanders likewise became academicians. No last-minute change to meet unforeseen alterations of the political scene was possible.

In the summer of 1914 the rulers of Germany were not able to

show any flexibility of mind in meeting the changed conditions created by the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and by the early Russian mobilization. Neither the Chief of the General Staff nor the Chancellor was able to take advantage of Britain's hesitation to define her obligation under the Belgian Neutrality Pact of 1839. If the British Cabinet had decided that the German passage through the valleys of the Meuse and Sambre did not violate that Treaty, then General von Moltke would have been justified, at least politically, in carrying out the plan to attack Liège on the fifth day after the beginning of mobilization. Since a majority of the British Cabinet decided for the opposite interpretation, as any good judge of the prevailing temperament could have foreseen, the premature attack on Liège became a major political mistake even though only a minor military one. It took the Chancellor by surprise. Germany was brought into a disastrous impasse, diplomatically and politically, without gaining any decisive military advantage.¹

The combination of constructive military and political imagination in one and the same man is extremely rare in history. Frederick the Great had it. Napoleon had it. In 1866 and 1871 no one man in Prussia had it. However, William I managed to prevent the frequent differences of Bismarck and Moltke from attaining serious proportions. Again in 1914, as we have just seen, no one German had it. In France, too, in 1940, there was no such combination in one person, and no personality capable of enforcing close collaboration between the political and army leaders.

There is a striking parallel between the way in which the strategical position of Germany slowly deteriorated before 1914 and that in which France's did before 1940. In each case the process was due to neglect of political opportunities. It seems to be an inevitable psychological sequence that the fibre of a victorious nation softens in time, while that of a defeated nation stiffens. No statesman or general can isolate himself from the mentality which surrounds him. In the words of Moltke, an army is never so weak as on the evening of the day when it has been victorious. The same holds true for a nation which assumes that a lasting political superiority can be guaranteed by a "total peace." Such a nation underestimates the jealousy of former allies and neutrals. It will try to postpone new military risks at all costs. It will accept a series of diplomatic defeats. But even-

¹ Cf. General Wilhelm Groener, "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen," p. 216.

tually there will be a violent reaction within the nation itself which may force the political and military leaders to give battle at a moment when it would be wiser to accept one more diplomatic defeat.

Of course, there is no comparison in magnitude between the diplomatic defeats of France in the decade preceding this war and those of Germany in the two decades before 1914. The descent of French power and prestige in the years before 1939 was without parallel in its swiftness. In the summer of 1931 Germany still was totally disarmed, Great Britain had voluntarily disarmed, and all Europe, with the exception of France, was near economic collapse. At that moment France's military alliances with the Little Entente and Poland made her appear so overwhelmingly strong that the French thought it possible to dictate their own financial and political terms to the rest of Europe. Here was the beginning of the estrangement of Anglo-Saxon public opinion from France. At the same time the countries of southeastern Europe began to realize that their economic future lay not in France but in Germany. The European financial débâcle, for which French politics were partly responsible, was bound to have repercussions in France as well. Nations which face the consequences of such crises immediately and courageously, in spite of violent internal reactions, will be stronger in the end than those which try to escape by purely monetary expedients.

The fall of the Doumergue Cabinet in 1934 and the failure to pass urgent reforms were symptomatic of the illness from which France was suffering. Everywhere on his diplomatic tour of Europe Barthou encountered skepticism regarding France's ability to solve her internal problems and to meet her military obligations to her allies. This skepticism was increased by France's failure to oppose the military reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. The sacrifice of Locarno was a turning point in European history. The French General Staff hesitated to act unless the Government authorized a full mobilization. The mere order for total mobilization would have been sufficient at that moment to bring about the collapse of the Hitler régime. From then on the deterioration of the European order was rapid. The sanctions against Italy left Mussolini dependent on Germany for economic support. The financial consequences of the Spanish war, and the German occupation of Austria, increased this de-

pendence. Germany's rearmament proceeded at full speed. Britain and France still procrastinated.

The German occupation of Austria directly threatened the strategical position of Czechoslovakia, and hence the existence of the Little Entente. Instead of facing the facts, the French indulged in utopian legislative controversies and changes of government. The consequence was social unrest among all classes of the population, a condition unfavorable for any military action in a modern war. On the basis of our present knowledge, we cannot say definitely that France, Britain and Czechoslovakia were in a military position to make war successfully at the time of Munich. From the purely military point of view it would certainly not have been wise to start the war only to save a few Sudeten German counties for Czechoslovakia. But the Siegfried Line had not yet been completed. For the Allies to sacrifice half Czechoslovakia's military strength to the Nazis, and then to await the completion of the Siegfried Line, was tantamount to suicide.

The final occupation of Prague completely altered the military balance of power in Europe. Five Czechoslovak *panzer* divisions, and forty other Czechoslovak divisions, disappeared from the list of potential Allied forces in the event of war with Germany. With the Czech arms thus acquired, Germany was able to arm forty divisions which until then not only had not been well trained but had not even been fully equipped. The actual shift in favor of Germany in the military balance was therefore equivalent to eighty divisions. Nor was that all. Poland's strategical position became precarious. France, which four years earlier could have mobilized half of continental Europe against Germany, was thus isolated. In case war came before 1941, she now could rely only on the Poles putting up a desperate struggle for a short while and on weak assistance from Great Britain. From this moment European politics were a race for time. The Chief of the French General Staff must indeed have been depressed as he counted over how many of his military trumps had been discarded in the vacillations of French and British politics.

The breakdown of the Locarno guarantees had already created for the French Chief of Staff conditions similar to those which faced the German Chief of Staff in the decade before the war of 1914. It narrowed the scope and possibilities of strategical action by France and Great Britain. Thus General Gamelin must have

seen that in the event of war he was like a chess player who has lost his queen. After the occupation of Prague and the completion of the Siegfried Line he must have been fully aware that an offensive against Germany was no longer feasible. He knew, too, that he was unable to bring any decisive support to the last remaining pillar of the French system of continental alliances, Poland. It would be interesting to know positively whether General Gamelin favored giving guarantees to Rumania and Poland in the spring of 1939, or whether he was opposed. If, aware that he could not bring any effective help to save Poland from destruction, he did not foresee the disastrous consequences of the guarantee which Britain and France gave her, he is primarily responsible for his own subsequent defeat.

To guarantee the frontiers of Poland and Rumania, and *then* to start negotiations in Moscow, was a slap in the face for any Russian Government. No Russian Government could have omitted to utilize the opportunity of a war between Germany and Poland in order to recover Bessarabia, the Baltic countries, and the Curzon Line in Poland. In case of war, whether or not Great Britain and France had given the guarantees in question, Russia would certainly have been forced, with or without Hitler's consent, to occupy Poland up to the Curzon Line and at least some of the Baltic areas. Of course, lacking a previous agreement with Germany, she might have hesitated to march into Finland or Rumania. The point is that for Britain and France to guarantee Poland and Rumania, without simultaneously mobilizing British and French forces, could not save Poland and could not ward off the danger of a Russian agreement with Germany.

Why did the Polish General Staff decide not to retreat at once from the Corridor salient to the Rawka-Bzura-Pilica line? Was the Chief of the French General Staff told that Polish strategy had been shifted to the offensive? Was he aware that the Poles did not have enough military strength to carry offensive operations through without a simultaneous French offensive? He could at least have ordered the bombing of the armament plants in western Germany, for which the airdromes in eastern France offered excellent bases. He could also have harassed the Siegfried Line more seriously than was actually done. He should have threatened to resign if the British and French Governments were not willing to bring all possible pressure to bear on the Belgian Government to permit the occupation of the Belgian fortifica-

tions by combined French and British troops. Polish neutrality having been violated, the violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer have meant very much in the moral judgment of the world. Instead, the French left the German Army more or less unmolested, and Germany gained time to build up her armaments and increase enormously the number of her divisions. In the Allied camp nobody had imagination enough to foresee the consequences of a simple technical differential. Germany's war production had been in high gear for two years. That of France and England had not. The Allies were not able to bring their production to full capacity even in the eight months following the outbreak of war. Between the end of the Polish campaign and May 1940 each month added three times as much to the German armament output as to that of the Allies.

II

The topographical conditions of northwestern Europe do not admit many variations in war between Germany on the one side and Great Britain and France on the other. But the complete change in the meaning and importance of space and time in military strategy as a result of the development of mechanized warfare greatly reduced the chances of an Allied victory unless Allied troops had already occupied Belgium before Germany could shift her whole military strength to the West. When the German General Staff struck in the spring of 1940 their numerical and geographical advantages had reached their highest point.

No German commander since the Napoleonic wars had enjoyed such favorable conditions for undertaking an offensive against France. No danger threatened from the East, as had been the case in 1914. Strategically, Germany can survive a European war only because she has the "inner line." In 1914 she began to make full use of it only after the first battles had been waged in France. In 1940, as a result of preceding diplomatic moves, the German General Staff was able to reap all the advantages of the inner line even before the Battle of France started. The maximum number of divisions was available, ready for attack on any given day. The road to Russia and the Balkans remained open, so that the Allied blockade could not be truly effective. Once the Allied Supreme War Council had decided against occupying Belgium while the Polish campaign was still in progress, even the best French military plans might have ended in failure. Because the

French and British Governments had followed such an unimaginative policy in recent years General Gamelin was compelled to make a "back to the wall" fight, just as, for similar reasons, the German Army had been forced to do in 1914. If Britain and France, together with Poland and Czechoslovakia, had been prepared for modern warfare and had struck in 1938, Germany's position would have been utterly hopeless, as her armament industry was exposed to air attack from all directions. She would have been the besieged fortress from the very beginning of the war. The policy of the Allies, however, permitted the reverse to occur.

Only with this fact in mind can we make a fair comparison between 1914 and 1940 in their purely military aspect. The limited strategical possibilities in northwestern Europe have been studied many times. There is no leading General Staff officer in France or Germany who does not know by rote all the major and minor variations of a campaign in that eternal battlefield. Thus the actual lines of the German Army's advance in Holland and Belgium and France could not have surprised anybody. The accounts of brilliant German strategy in Belgium might be justified if they were restricted to the efficiency of the German organization, the daring of the troops, and the fact that the German General Staff had profited by the mistakes of 1914. But beyond that they are a myth.

There can be no doubt that the French General Staff, in the general disposition of their forces, foresaw the possible lines of advance as clearly as the German General Staff did. Both were aware of the fact that fortifications of the type which existed along the Dutch and Belgian frontiers facing Germany could not resist for more than a few days. Only a Maginot Line from Utrecht to Montmédy, strongly manned, could have resisted for a longer period. It is always possible to filter even large forces through fortifications of the Liège type. Thus the main questions posed for the Chief of the Allied forces were these: "How long can these fortifications resist? What will be the probable daily rate of advance of the German divisions after they have filtered or broken through? After that has happened, when and where will it be most opportune for us to meet them?" The questions were the same, with a few notable exceptions, in 1914 and 1940. In 1914 the German Commander-in-Chief had to take into consideration a French offensive southeast of Metz. In 1940 a French


offensive in that area was impossible. Furthermore, the transference of reconnoitering from the cavalry to the air forces, and the mechanized speed of the spearhead forces, had made the time factor much more decisive in 1940 than it had been in 1914.

After operations had begun in 1914 between Metz and the Scheldt, even a break-through by one army would not necessarily have meant a major defeat for the other. In 1940, however, the audacious use of mechanized divisions could prevent a retreating army from undertaking a successful reorganization within a distance of one hundred miles. Joffre won the Battle of the Marne because he had an opportunity to retreat far enough, the pursuer being unable to follow at the same pace. Ludendorff in August 1918, facing for the first time a modern combined air and tank attack, failed to see that a retreat undertaken for the purpose of regrouping his armies had to be a long one if it was to be successful. In Joffre's case, a retreat of one hundred miles was sufficient to gain decisive strategical advantages. To achieve the same results in 1940, a commander would have had to retreat until the inherent weakness of *panzer* and motorized divisions — namely, their length on the road (four times that of a normal division) and the enormous difficulties of fuel supply — slowed down the pursuit or halted it.

Mechanized warfare is not a German invention. The British developed it at the end of 1917, and the classic exposition of it was made by Field Marshal Lord Milne in 1927 in an address to the officers of the British Tank Corps. Italian and French generals as well have written understanding essays about it. No more astute analysis of the problems involved in this new type of warfare exists than was presented in a series of articles by a French General Staff officer which appeared in *Le Temps* between November 1939 and February 1940. These articles, dealing with the Polish campaign, sharply criticized the Polish General Staff for their failure to understand the full significance of the new type of attack. It is all the greater mystery that the mistakes made in Poland were repeated a few months later in France.

With the caution due in the absence of really detailed and authentic documentation, we can yet say one thing about the strategy of General Gamelin and, afterwards, of General Weygand. They did not fully appreciate the importance of the change in the time factor introduced by mechanization. The German

Army had an immense advantage in that none of its generals had ranked higher than staff captains or battalion commanders in 1917 and 1918. They had fought in the front line and seen with their own eyes the effect of the combined air, tank and artillery attack of the British at that time. They knew from personal experience that one cause for the German disaster was the fact that even divisional commanders were too far behind the lines and



that the transmission of information and orders by radio was still undeveloped. This time the divisional commanders rode in the first groups of attacking tanks, where they were able to utilize sudden opportunities as they were presented and at the same time could keep the commanders of the armies constantly informed. In contrast, General Gamelin, though he himself was in the right position, received information of the serious extent of

the break-through at the Meuse only after a delay of 24 hours. Regardless of all this, the fact remains that, due to the nature of the available terrain, neither side produced any strategy which ought to have come as a surprise to anyone who had followed the evolution of military thought in the years since the last war.

With the exception of Bohemia, France has the best natural strategical frontiers in continental Europe. The only weak part is between the Meuse and the Channel. Invasion is extremely difficult in either direction in the Rhine valley if that sector is defended. A French advance would pile up at the Black Forest; a German one at the Vosges. The creation of the Maginot Line made even a German occupation of the plains of Alsace-Lorraine out of the question. The possibility of a German break-through between the Vosges and the Ardennes as far as Montmédy could be dismissed for the same reasons. But deep fortifications of the Maginot type are impossible between the Sambre and the Lys, a tributary of the Scheldt, because of the nature of the soil. Criticism of the failure to extend the French Maginot Line to the coast, therefore, is not well founded. It is correct, however, if it is restricted to the line of the Meuse between Sedan and Givet. This line, with the exception of certain densely wooded areas, should have been thoroughly fortified. The experience of 1914 ought to have made this absolutely clear. But even such fortifications would not have been adequate without an extension into Belgian territory between Givet and Namur. If the Meuse had been fortified in this sector the Germans would have been forced to concentrate their attack on the fifty mile gap between Namur and Antwerp. A line of fortifications along those fifty miles, though it would have been difficult to build at certain points because of the nature of the soil, would of course have provided an ideal basis for a purely defensive war, even if Holland were overrun. It would have been shorter by fifty miles than any line along the French-Belgian frontier. But political obstacles — among them Belgian timidity and naïve optimism — prevented the construction of such a line in peacetime. The same political obstacles operated to prevent its construction and occupation by French and British troops after the war had started.

Specific figures of the strength of the Allied and German Armies on May 10, when the attack in the Low Countries began, are not yet available. The maximum strength of the western German armies was hardly greater than it had been in 1914, that of the

French troops probably about the same as it had been then. But since 1914 the French line had been extended by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. In a way the Maginot Line made up for the longer frontier. On the other hand, the immobilization of an important part of the French Army so far to the east left the Germans a good chance of being able to wheel the bulk of their army through Belgium and northern France into the rear of the Maginot Line—a better chance than had attended their similar attempt in 1914.

III

The political prestige of having military control of Alsace-Lorraine has always been the bait which has lured the French out of their best strategical lines of defense. It was so in 1870 and again in 1914. This point must be clearly understood. General von Schlieffen² was willing in case of war to allow the French to occupy the whole of Alsace-Lorraine. General Groener, a member of the General Staff in 1914 who had been in close contact with Schlieffen, and later Minister of Communications and Minister of National Defense in the German Republic, went even further and advised allowing the French the Saar and the whole Palatinate so that the bulk of the French troops should be immobilized there. In this way the chances for the successful execution of the ideal plan for a war in France—that is to say, the bottling up of the whole French Army from the rear in the fortified area of Lorraine—would have been greatly increased.³

To ward off such a danger the French High Command had to do everything possible to strengthen their centre and left wing. Two alternatives were open. The French troops along the French-Belgian frontier could remain on the defensive or they could advance to meet the German attack on the Antwerp-Namur-Sedan line. The first course was preferable, but it would leave the Belgian Army to its fate. We may fairly assume that General Gamelin would have preferred this alternative, but that the Supreme War Council could hardly allow him to adopt it. A

² Chief of Staff of the German Army, 1891-1907. His military writings between the time of his retirement and his death in 1913 were published in that year under the title, "Gesammelte Schriften."

³ In 1940 French territory extended much farther to the east than it had in 1914. This fact operated to produce exactly the same effect as the French offensive had in 1914, namely to reduce the number of French troops available for the defense of the line Antwerp-Montmédy. Joffre's decision to carry out an offensive in Lorraine forced him to give up the idea of occupying the line Antwerp-Namur. Cf. Groener, "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen."

German occupation of the Dutch and Belgian Channel ports would have been of vital concern to Great Britain. Nevertheless, the second alternative, if it had been taken at the very beginning of the war, might have saved the Channel ports as well as the Belgian Army. But to carry it out after the German armies had begun the invasion of Holland and Belgium was tremendously risky. General Gamelin must have known it. The advance into Belgium could have succeeded only if the first line of French-Belgian and Dutch fortifications had held up the invader for at least four days, or if the French had had available another strong army to advance from the south, through the Ardennes towards the Meuse.

The Dutch provinces of Limburg and North Brabant and the Belgian Ardennes are topographically the two areas which condition the speed of any German advance through Belgium. The Liège area is of only secondary importance. The speedy capture of Liège in 1914 was a great and daring feat, but strategically it was not decisive. Unless the German right-wing army infringed the neutrality of Holland it was confined to the few roads in the ten-mile strip between the northern outskirts of Liège and the southern frontier of Dutch Limburg. This retarded the advance of the army, which had to cover greater distances than any of the other German armies wheeling around the hinge of Metz. The roads through the Liège area itself had to be reserved for the Second German Army, on the southern flank of the First Army.

The careful wording of General Groener's studies⁴ does not permit us to say definitely whether his own strategical ideas in 1914 were influenced also by political considerations. But his strong condemnation of the attack on Liège for political as well as military reasons suggests certain definite conclusions. He preferred to mass even stronger forces than Schlieffen planned all along the frontier of Dutch Limburg, in the belief that such a threat would force the French to invade Belgium before the Germans. Once Belgian neutrality had been violated by the Allies, there need no longer have been any hesitation on the part of the Germans to march through Dutch Limburg. This would have given General von Kluck, the commander of the north-wing army, strongest of all the German armies, the possibility of advancing on a broad front. Instead, Kluck was unable to de-

⁴ *Op. cit.*, also "Der Feldherr wider Willen," 1931.

ploy until after his army had passed in deep formation through the narrow strip between Liège and Maastricht. Had he been able to use the Limburg route, he would have gained three precious days and thus have been well in advance of the Allied schedule. In consequence he might have enveloped the northern wing of the Allied Armies at Mons and prevented them from escaping to the south.

The true students of Schlieffen, most notably General Groener, without losing sight of their object of luring the French Army back into the fortified area of Lorraine, advised cutting off segments of the Allied armies in the course of the grand manoeuvre. That aim was not achieved in 1914. But the lessons of the failure influenced the dispositions of the German General Staff in 1940.

Dutch Limburg is like an appendix hanging down from the southeastern corner of Holland. Opposite Maeseyck, the vital point in crossing the Meuse, it is barely three and one-half miles wide; yet its length is such that a whole army can pass across it on a broad front. A break-through into Belgium via Dutch Limburg reduces the importance of the fortified Liège area, including one of the strongest fortifications in Europe, Fort Eben Emael, as well as of the whole Albert Canal. A break-through therefore might endanger also the best line of defense for a Belgian-British-French army, the so-called K-W Line between Antwerp and Namur — unless, that is, it has been occupied soon enough by Allied troops. On account of the geographical configuration of Limburg, the Dutch have no chance whatsoever of holding a German army there for more than a few hours. In September 1938 they fortified a marshy strip a mile wide along the northern bank of the Meuse with a bunker line. The bunkers, on account of the nature of the soil, had to be raised well above ground. They could be destroyed by direct fire from the sandy hills on the German side at the very moment when motorized German troops crossed the frontier. So, indeed, it happened. The Meuse bridge at Maeseyck was captured by motorcyclists fifteen minutes after the beginning of the German advance. A few hours later, even before Eben Emael was captured, the bulk of the German troops were streaming into Belgium towards the Albert Canal, and the following day they crossed the Canal at several points. On the first day, too, German motorized troops crossed the line of the Meuse further north. This movement proved to be decisive in the conquest of Holland; it also endan-

gered the fortified area of Antwerp. The complete occupation of Holland by the Nazis was a threat against Britain. Actually it had little or no significance for the decisive campaign in France.

Thus the march through Dutch Limburg and Brabant reversed the situation of 1914, given the fact that the British and French decided to occupy the Antwerp-Namur line after the beginning of the German invasion. In 1914 the right wing of the German Army had to go as far as Mons in order to overtake the main forces of the Allied left wing. In 1940 the Germans contacted them as early as the third day. Thus the German lines of communication on this occasion were much shorter than they had been in 1914, a decided advantage. But if the German General Staff expected to envelop the Allied forces in eastern Belgium, making escape through Dunkerque impossible, they failed, as neither side moved fast enough. General Gamelin might even have profited from the only military advantage to be gained by moving into Belgium, namely the use of the Belgian divisions intact on the shortest possible front, if he had been able to attack the left flank of the German troops advancing through the Belgian Ardennes.

Whether or not the Allies moved into Belgium, their decisive manœuvre to check the Germans would have been to attack from the south into the German flank in the Ardennes. Apparently the French General Staff did not even consider such a move. Why? In 1914 the advance of the French Fourth Army in that direction contributed more to slowing up the German advance than Joffre realized at the time. Postwar German studies demonstrate this very clearly. But General Gamelin could call upon only nine British divisions (in addition, in case he advanced to occupy the Antwerp-Namur line, he could expect the support of a dozen Belgian divisions). Thus he might well have hesitated to start a flank attack in the Ardennes, which would have called for at least ten first-class divisions. Perhaps he did not expect a thrust of *panzer* divisions through the Ardennes. The Ardennes present a densely wooded mountainous terrain, most unfavorable to the passage of *panzer* divisions, and there are few east and west roads. The country is such that if the Allies had had superiority in the air the advance of the *panzer* divisions there would have ended in a German catastrophe. The French, however, failed to reconnoitre properly, either in the air or by means of ground troops. The small detachments of light motorized cavalry which they sent forward were easily dispersed by the Germans. On account

of this failure the advance of the strong *panzer* divisions remained unknown to the French General Staff until too late.

This neglect by the French command is the more remarkable in the light of General Groener's postwar writings. He considered the sharp southward turn of the German army in the Ardennes in 1914 one of the fatal mistakes of the last war. In his view, it should have held its westward course and thus insured a general southwestern direction of the main body of the German armies marching through Belgium. In fact, his chart of such an advance is a preview of the whole scheme of invasion in 1940. General Groener made this plan even though he could not have foreseen that the French would leave the Meuse passages insufficiently covered at some of the very same points which had been unprotected in 1914.

In articles published in January and February 1940, the military correspondent of *Le Temps*, basing his prognostications on General Groener's principal ideas, though without fully understanding them clearly, predicted the main lines of the German advance. He assumed that three German army groups would invade Belgium—a very strong one with *panzer* divisions would force the defenses of the Albert Canal, a second would advance slowly between Luxembourg and Liège, a third, again with very strong armored forces, would move through Luxembourg and the Ardennes to the Meuse. He perceived that both wings would be exposed to the counter-attacks of French-British forces. The provisions made by the French High Command to repulse the attack of the northern German army group undoubtedly met this situation fairly. The advance by French *élite* troops and one or two large motorized units from between Lille and the Channel was well timed and well organized. But it remains a mystery how the long-anticipated thrust through southern Belgium could have been met by counter-attacks (as the contributor to *Le Temps* predicted that it would) on the basis of the dispositions actually made by the French General Staff. The only possible explanation is that the French High Command did not take into account the possibility of the daring advance of German *panzer* divisions along the southern road from Luxembourg to Sedan, paralleling the Maginot Line at a distance often of no more than ten miles.

This failure will remain one of the most amazing facts in modern military history. Articles published in the official organ of the

German Army as late as the spring and summer of 1939 expressed apprehension about the risks which German motorized forces might run in advancing on that line. Even hastily constructed field fortifications twenty miles north of the Maginot Line, strengthened by sufficient field batteries, could have stopped the German advance in that region, or at least have slowed it down. This would have permitted General Corap's army to arrive in time to close the gap between Namur and Montmédy. There has been much discussion of the disastrous psychological effect of the Maginot Line on French strategy. It seems to be justified only when it refers to events in this area. Some French army group and divisional commanders plainly forgot the necessity of keeping permanent contact with the enemy at all points, and of trying to harass him. Even if such activity had resulted only in securing a clear picture of the strength and direction of his advance, the benefits would still have been very great. 80. 632

IV

Did the German High Command foresee the ease with which their troops would cross the Meuse south of Namur and at Sedan? Did the actual crossing change their plans? We still do not know. We do know, however, that the organization of the entire German Army from Montmédy to Antwerp into two army groups prevented a repetition of the mistakes which occurred in 1914 as a result of a lack of cohesion between the Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies and General von Bülow's army group on the extreme right wing. The German commanders were over-worried, on that occasion, about a possible French counter-attack from the south into the Belgian Ardennes. They tried to meet this danger by a tactical frontal attack. In wheeling to the south they neglected the central operative idea.

General Groener had contemplated the possibility of achieving a main break-through at the Meuse in a western direction; but since he could not count on large armored units he discounted its practicability.⁵ Nevertheless, his plan to hold all the German armies west of Metz to a strictly southwesterly direction, despite the danger of a French counter-attack from the south into the Belgian Ardennes, left the way open for the execution of such a manœuvre should the opportunity arise. This was the significant advance of the German General Staff over the original Schlieffen plan.

⁵ Cf. Groener, "Der Feldherr wider Willen," p. 239.

In 1914 the German cavalry failed utterly to fulfill its task. In 1940 the *panzer* and motorized divisions seem to have been under a unified command within each of the two army groups. This arrangement, and not simply the perfect composition and the new tactics of these modern cavalry units, was responsible for their decisive successes. The French do not seem to have understood all the possibilities of the new arm. Their tanks were not concentrated under a single command, but were placed in relatively small units at the disposal of divisional and army group commanders.

The initial successes of the German *panzer* and motorized divisions enabled them to advance in the two directions where they could make use of their striking power to the fullest extent. Topographically speaking, there are two lines of advance into France which present hardly any obstacles to motorized divisions once they have crossed the Meuse. The area between the Argonne and the Seine is open country, and so is the area between the Meuse and Abbeville. Both regions offer ideal conditions for operations (such as the military correspondent of *Le Temps* described in February 1940) by autonomous mechanized divisions fighting in isolation from the main armies.

Exactly what happened in the first two days following the rapid destruction of General Corap's army is not yet known. The Allies' only possible chance of recovery was to retreat at almost any price from Belgium to the lower Somme and simultaneously to attack from the Verdun area towards Rethel, into the flank of the German army group advancing directly towards Laon. The first manœuvre risked losing the entire British Expeditionary Force. The second was impossible because there was no reserve army available for the purpose. Even two modern tank divisions in reserve south of Montmédy could have dealt a shattering blow to the German advance. They were lacking. The inability of the French High Command to execute either of these manœuvres should have convinced it, at the latest by May 24, fourteen days after the beginning of the German attack, that desperate decisions were necessary.

The plan of General von Schlieffen was that the German armies should arrive in full force at the Abbeville-Verdun line on the seventeenth day after the beginning of the attack. In 1940, although the bulk of the German Army was unable to reach the Abbeville-Verdun line on the seventeenth day in accordance with the

Schlieffen plan, motorized divisions had already advanced beyond that line and had cut off large detachments of Allied troops.

The French replaced General Gamelin by General Weygand on May 19. They were unfortunate even in their choice of the moment to change the High Command. The shift entailed a four-day lull in planning operations at a decisive time, and the time lost was never made up. When General Weygand finally found himself able to issue new orders it was already too late to withdraw the French left wing to the lower Seine. The Somme-Aisne-Montmédy line was actually the shortest line of defense. But when General Weygand had failed to halt the Germans by May 25 only one manœuvre remained feasible — to retreat all the way back to the line Loire-Dijon-Belfort. That would have meant sacrificing Paris and the Maginot Line, with an enormous amount of immovable artillery. Such a long retreat might have had a disastrous effect upon French morale. But the choice was between certain disaster and possible survival, and the risk would have been worth taking. General Weygand's decision to make his new stand on the Seine turned the Maginot Line from an advantage to France into a disadvantage.

After the surrender of Belgium and the escape of the British and French forces from Dunkerque, though without their arms, the further advance of the German armies proceeded exactly in accordance with the ideal Schlieffen plan as developed by General Groener. He had taken into account the possibility of a resumption of French resistance along the line Seine-Oise-Verdun.⁶ He presupposed that the French would protect the crossings of the lower Seine with relatively weak forces. In his view, the weakest link in the French line would be the Oise flank, despite its support by the fortress of Paris. He thought the Germans ought to attack across the Oise and across the Seine at the same time. If in meeting these attacks the French were to weaken their front further to the east, along the Aisne, then the Germans could break through on that front between Soissons and Rheims. If the French neglected to strengthen the Oise-Aisne front, the breakthrough could be made between Soissons and Creil.

Here we reach a very important point in General Groener's calculations. In order to carry out their manœuvre successfully, the Germans had to be on the heels of the French at the Aisne, but

⁶ "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen," p. 228 *et seq.*

they must be careful not to attack prematurely.⁷ In the Groener plan the German cavalry would reach Rouen and Les Andelys (on the Seine) on the twenty-fourth day of the attack. They would be followed by the infantry, spreading west to Beauvais and beyond. On the twenty-seventh day they would cross the Seine at those points. At the same time, an attack on the fortified Lorraine area from the east would be begun. In the actual event — in the Battle of France, 1940 — Beauvais was reached on the twenty-fourth day of the attack. On the twenty-seventh day, the lower Seine was crossed at Rouen and Les Andelys, the points indicated by General Groener.

The French decision to make a final stand on the line Seine-Oise-Verdun came, as already mentioned, too late. Looking ahead, General Groener believed that under conditions like those which prevailed in 1940 even the Marne line would not be tenable. He envisaged a wheeling movement of the German right wing, south and southeast through Dreux and Chartres, and then turning eastward to cut off Paris from Orléans. The plan was carried out to the letter in 1940.

General Groener foresaw that the French Commander-in-Chief would then face a desperate decision. Would he defend the upper Seine, a decision which offered certain advantages if coupled with an attack on the German right wing from the Loire? Or would he sacrifice the whole fortified area in Lorraine and retreat to the Loire and a line running across to the Jura Mountains on the Swiss-French frontier? The decision would depend upon his temperament. A French counter-attack centering on Chartres could slow up the German advance, but Groener was doubtful whether one could be made because of the probable inability of the French to concentrate sufficient forces for the purpose. He thought the best strategy for France would be to take up the Loire-Jura line, as the German armies would be approaching exhaustion and would have to allow the French a breathing-spell in which they might reorganize their forces. In any case, France would be in a stronger position to negotiate an Armistice.

In this article we have mentioned the difficulties of supplying

⁷ Evidently when the manoeuvre was actually carried out the French General Staff did not understand what was going on. On May 25 the official report regarding the situation on the Aisne read, "Since yesterday we have dominated the enemy."

the enormous quantities of fuel required by motorized divisions. But no attempt has been made to evaluate the effect of German air attack on the French morale or the French lines of communication. Nor is any opinion offered regarding the activities of the Fifth Column. A comparative study of strategy, based on exact data, leads one to conclude that these factors have been overestimated in their actual bearing on the outcome of the war in France.

French strategy was under an evil star before the war began. If it is true that General Gamelin sent an ultimatum to the Belgians via the Quai d'Orsay the middle of January 1940, to the effect that the Allies should either be permitted to occupy Belgium at once or should plan not to enter Belgium at all, then he foresaw all. If he expected to await the German attack on the French-Belgian frontier, without preparing an attack from the south into the flank of the German columns proceeding across the Belgian Ardennes, then he faced carrying on a sterile defensive. But in that event, even though the Germans might have broken through at the Meuse or elsewhere, thus creating disorder in the Allied lines, the envelopment of the British and French forces in Belgium might have been prevented. Probably it would have been necessary to sacrifice the Channel ports; but though that would have been a serious blow to Britain it need not have greatly affected the campaign in France.

Afterwards, an early retreat to the Seine-Oise-Aisne-Montmédy line, and the concentration meanwhile of strong reserve armies in Paris and between the Marne and Verdun, might have set the stage for holding up the German advance. To retreat to the Loire and to abandon Paris and the Maginot Line would have injured a French commander and French prestige. Yet that became precisely what had to be done. This was the innate danger in the French strategical position. The French Army clung to the Maginot Line and became too extended, with too few men per kilometer.

The Germans won not simply because they possessed superior numbers and had mastered a more modern tactical use of mechanized forces in the air and on land. The political mistakes of the Allies had lost them the war in France even before it began. Moreover, the German High Command and the Army Commanders, most of whom had received their previous promotions from General Groener while he was Minister of National Defense

from 1928 to 1932, avoided all the major mistakes of 1914.⁸ There was a clear strategical plan. There was a logical subdivision of the army into groups suitable to the new type of warfare. In the mechanized divisions, further, there was daring as well as a capacity to check it when this became necessary in the orderly development of the general plan of operations. In all these particulars the situation of the German Army was the reverse of what it had been in 1914.

German strategy in France, as conceived by General von Schlieffen and developed by General Groener, was completely successful. If the Germans had captured the entire body of French and British troops at the Channel ports, instead of their arms only, the outcome of the war would very likely have been decided last summer. We should refrain from vilifying the leaders of the French Army, or from questioning the gallantry of the common French soldiers, whose exploits in isolated detachments are among the most heroic in history. France was not lost mainly through her army. France was lost mainly through her politics in the period between the two wars. The events still to come will prove whether the Channel is to be a second Marne, and whether France is still to be saved through the resistance of Britain.

⁸ General von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army in 1940, was a Staff Captain in 1914, and was selected for vital liaison work between Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. Cf. Reichsarchiv, *Der Weltkrieg*, p. 353.

FOOD AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT IN EUROPE

By Karl Brandt

TO Americans the word "food" has fairly simple connotations. Food satisfies man's most basic and urgent need, and so seems eminently an affair of civilian economy. It is "our daily bread" of the Lord's prayer — the stuff that keeps people from going hungry. Whether a person gets his share or not generally depends upon his income and food prices. For two decades, moreover, our government has been worried by the presence of too much rather than too little food. It has tried to master the unwieldy food surplus in order to help the farmer, and has made a virtue of necessity by distributing surplus supplies free of charge among the needy and unemployed.

In the course of the public debate in this country regarding the European food problem Americans have shown that they are thinking too largely in conventional physical terms. They speak about shortages created by the hostilities on land and sea, about food losses and destruction, about the consequent threat of famine to civilians, and about how to transfer enough from our land of plenty to relieve the stricken areas. Such thinking is natural enough in a democratic country where there is an abundance of the consumer goods typical of a competitive price economy. But the resulting picture is incomplete. The American public is not yet aware of the full implications of what is really going on in connection with Europe's production, distribution and consumption of food.

II

In the totalitarian state food has ceased to be simply food as we all know it — a commodity of civilian origin and destination. It has acquired new and different aspects. It has become a complete chest of tools in the workshop of the modern tyrant. Even statistically food has been driven underground. Information on how much is harvested, imported, exported, lost or fed to the people is now a military secret, guarded almost as carefully as the blueprints of a new bomber. Hence, a survey of Europe's food situation cannot at the present time be nearly so accurate as one compiled before the war. The economist must patch together

incomplete statistics and bits of circumstantial evidence drawn from a multitude of unconventional sources.

In this total war, every nation considers food and feed essential factors in their struggle for eventual victory, along with coal, oil, electric energy, fibres, minerals and metals. They know that thrift and foresight must be used in connection with them all. The German totalitarian state in particular, in preparing for war, made its food control a model system for all the phases of its rigid, thoroughgoing, centralized, planned economy.¹

From the moment the Nazis seized the reins in Germany they copied the Soviets in transforming food from an economic end into a political means. Food became an instrument for executing domestic policies, for forcing the integration of the race, for persuading farmers to coöperate, for breaking the backbone of processing industries, for weaning a "degenerate" and mis-educated people away from luxuries and unheroic attitudes. The granting of food became a premium for accomplishment and the withholding of it became a punishment for failure or dissent. Food could establish equality or set up distinctions, it could "liquidate" inferior individuals and groups, it could play Santa Claus or the big bad wolf. Since food is an inescapable necessity for the human animal, the Nazis saw what a beautiful instrument it could be for manœuvring and disciplining the masses. Their control of food put their thumb at the throat of every man and woman, of children as well as of the aged.

During the Third Reich's six years of peace and eighteen months of war numberless legislative and administrative decrees have given effect to this new concept of food as an all-round political instrument. The concept is entirely harmonious, of course, with the philosophy underlying the totalitarian state. If man's destiny lies in the survival of the fittest group in perennial warfare, and if his virtues flower under the enforced discipline of military command rather than in a harmonious relaxation of self-respecting citizens, then obviously it becomes a postulate of statesmanship that food is a political and military instrument. Once this idea has been conceived, it is only a matter of time before the Lord's gift of bread turns into Mephisto's rod, coaxing or cajoling, crushing or breaking, in the hands of der Führer, Il Duce, El Caudillo and the master of the Kremlin.

¹ Karl Brandt, "The German Fat Plan and Its Economic Setting." Stanford University, California: Food Research Institute, 1938.

In the struggle of the democratic nations to survive they must understand all the techniques of their opponents, including their food policy. They must, so long as the war continues, resist aggression in every field by taking countermeasures in that same field. To fight the war strictly as gentlemen may mean the death of all gentlemen.

III

The result of efficiently engineering a nation's food policy is to give the entire food economy unprecedented elasticity. It is freer than in a "free economy," because it is relatively well protected against disturbance and can ignore both increasing costs of production and popular resentment arising from higher prices and consumer controls. Today, it is safe to say, the Germans are fairly well-fed, despite a lack of some commodities; and they will probably continue to be well-fed so long as they do not lose control of the conquered continent.

The Nazi régime started its *Erzeugungsschlacht*, or battle of production, in 1934, in imitation of Mussolini's earlier *battaglia del grano*. Food imports were curtailed, farm prices for food were raised, dealers' margins were narrowed, and consumer prices were raised moderately. Agriculture, the food processing industries, and trade were studied and reassembled in accordance with the blueprint of the food cartel. Every living soul, whether farmer or laborer, grain dealer or milk retailer, thereby became a soldier in the Reich Food Estate, subject to the equivalent of martial law and bound to obey it on penalty of losing his freedom or his neck.

This revolutionary reconstruction of the Food Estate was undertaken to prepare it to withstand the test of war. The next step was to condition the consumer psychologically, to change his eating habits and the customs of kitchen management. The masterminds who planned total war anticipated shortages and hardships. Hence, they put their best nutrition specialists, dieticians, economists and psychologists to work to devise a streamlined rationing system that would feed the people sufficiently well, that would permit the regulation of the carry-over through a tightening or loosening of the national belt, and that would be proof against bootlegging. On the morning of the day the war against Poland began, September 1, 1939, ration cards were distributed to the German population. Rationing had been tried out long before with textiles and all sorts of other materials, and

animal husbandmen had been subjected to feed rationing. In Germany, rationing is not an indication of existing real shortages of foodstuffs. It is an engineering and political science.

Addressing the German workers at the Rheinmetall-Borsig works in Berlin on December 10, 1940, Hitler² elaborated on the food rationing system. "We want to avoid one person having more of the most vital commodities than another," he said. "Not everybody is in a position to buy a Titian, even if he had the money." And he added: "But in the case of food, everybody must be served." This is the socialistic refrain. But although such an égalitarian policy aims at preventing the rich from gorging or hoarding food, it establishes a class distinction between the various groups of recipients of rationing cards. First comes the "warrior caste," embracing the armed forces, the Gestapo, and to some extent the party militia. Next come the most skilled and essential laborers. Further down the scale come the unemployables, the aged, the incurably sick. At the bottom come those to whom it is an act of grace to give any rations at all: prisoners, inmates of insane asylums and concentration camps, and Jews. Food cards express the quotation of the utility of citizens to Leviathan.

Allotments of higher rations are one means of promotion. They signify approval for laborers who pass from the unskilled to the skilled category, or from easier to harder work. One of the basic considerations is, of course, the actual caloric requirement for maintenance of any useful person's physical fitness. But a multitude of entirely different and partly contradictory calculations — including consideration of larger economic problems and astute political estimates — also come into play.

Rations may be lowered simply to accumulate greater reserves. Temporary limitations may be used to impress the people with the seriousness of the general situation, even when actual supplies on hand would allow more generous rations. Or extra rations may be granted to bolster morale in a difficult moment, even though stores thereby are drastically reduced. Cutting off luxuries prepares the people for being thankful later when a trickle of them reappears — some coffee, a little whipped cream, candies or chocolate. After the French collapse, when the German masses remained apathetic, special rations of modest luxuries were distributed to create an atmosphere of cheer and enthusiasm.

² *Facts in Review*, January 20, 1941, p. 22.

When the Ministry of Propaganda or the Gestapo deems it advisable to play a more radical tune it turns the wrath of the masses against the "capitalists" by starting single meal campaigns. Or a plan for compulsory public kitchens turns up, with the hint that a Spartan cuisine would have a good educational influence on epicureans. Hoarding or bootlegging food, or violation of the rationing laws, carries the death penalty, or in minor cases a term in a concentration camp.

IV

Food has also served the Nazis as an instrument for outmanœuvring their political opponents in neutral countries and for exacting complaisance. In fact, control of foodstuffs, including annual staple crops such as grain and sugar, or perishables such as milk, eggs, meat, fruits and vegetables, is the main way in which the Nazis overcome patriotic resistance. It works particularly well in agricultural countries. Agriculture is relatively less elastic than industry. If the demand slumps, prices crash and farmers default on taxes and interest. Countries with a large agricultural export are therefore most vulnerable in the game of squeeze, and the Nazi strategists have exploited the fact.

The technique used to force an agricultural country to yield, first to economic domination and later to military and political domination, is incredibly adaptable. One method is to concentrate in one hand all the foreign food purchases for the whole German nation, 80-million strong. This single authority offers to buy a gigantic volume of goods in the country in question at fairy-tale prices; it sets the conditions, political or otherwise; it sees that its tempting offers become known through agents and by radio and the newspapers; and then it sits back to wait for the farmers to "turn the heat" on their governments, knowing that in all agrarian export countries the farm bloc is the most powerful of all political pressure groups. Payment is arranged through a clearing arrangement with the national bank, which has to provide the interim payments to the farmers in national currency. Once the nation in question is in the grip of a big and powerful debtor it has to do as it is told — or lose everything.

Knowing the inner structure of their victims, all their weak spots, the German experts in foreign trade, food and feedstuffs have had an easy time preparing for "peaceful conquest." By outbidding competing countries with arbitrarily chosen higher

prices; by granting subsidized credits and clearing agreements; by buying on a national scale in certain selected transactions; and by the simultaneous use of diplomatic and military pressure, Germany succeeded, between 1933 and 1939, in forcing the proportion of exports taken by her from Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary and Turkey from a former low of 15 percent to a high of 40 percent. Simultaneously she forced these countries to raise the percentage of their purchases in Germany, so that instead of representing 19 percent of their imports¹ these represented 46 percent.

Since actual warfare began, these forms of pressure have been supplemented by various schemes resulting in the inflation of the currencies of the neutral or conquered countries. The ratio between the mark and the currencies in question is arbitrarily fixed, and so are the prices offered by the German Government for foodstuffs. Indeed, nominally neutral countries like Hungary and Bulgaria which have a food surplus have established rationing in order to force larger exports of food to Germany. Thus you may live in a neutral country that has food aplenty, but this does not guarantee that you will be allowed to eat it. If the food squeeze exercised from Germany becomes strong enough, not only the urban population but even the farmers themselves may have to suffer from malnutrition due to an unbalanced diet (though perhaps sufficient in calories), until for some reason of strategy the pressure is relaxed.

All the Balkan countries which, as I write, are still neutral — Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the European part of Turkey — are in the same boat so far as food is concerned. If they resist Germany, their food surpluses will cause them grave trouble; if they play ball with her their bread basket still will be hung high. Sweden and Switzerland are in a better strategic position, even though from a military standpoint they are at Germany's mercy, because both are food deficit countries. Switzerland will be able to adjust her agricultural production. And Sweden is so important both as a source of industrial raw materials and as a purchaser of German industrial goods that certain needed food imports are permitted by the Germans to pass from occupied Denmark into Sweden. Moreover, as neutrals, both Switzerland and Sweden benefit from receiving British navicerts and from German willingness to let them import through the blockade.

¹ *Wochenberichte*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, XIII, September 3, 1940, page 105.

Incidentally, if this German technique were ever tried against the Latin American countries, it would work magnificently in most cases. It also would work well against Canada, Australia, New Zealand. If Hitler should occupy the British Isles, thereby gaining control over Europe's normal purchases, amounting to an average of 2.5 billion dollars a year in the Western Hemisphere alone, he could throw every one of those countries into political convulsions and stir up violent hatred against the United States. To do this he would not need to make a single military move.

v

It is in the conquered and occupied countries, of course, that the totalitarian food strategy is applied in its fullest extent. Central Poland, before the war part and parcel of an agricultural surplus producing country, is exposed to the worst suffering. The hatred and contempt which the Germans feel for the Poles has led them deliberately to aim at wiping Poland out as a national entity. This central area has been severed from the annexed parts of West Poland, and into it are being dumped increasing numbers of people considered undesirable. The food situation there, as a result, grows worse and worse. Only the large potato crop and American relief activities prevent complete disaster.

Czechoslovakia, with its strong industrial backbone, receives different treatment, because it belongs in the orbit of the "Greater Reich." In fact, the food situation in the Czech and Slovak areas does not differ much from that in the Reich and Austria.

Norway has had a hard time because its supplies of grain, leguminous vegetables, sugar, fats and fruits are short under the blockade, even though in normal times she is able to export annually 200,000 tons of fats, 85 percent of her catch of fish and 65 percent of her potato crop. Her fisheries still yield enough for her to send train loads daily to the Reich.

Denmark fares best among all the occupied nations. Although the Danes still stubbornly maintain their tariff border, the area is, for all practical purposes, incorporated into the Reich. Food and feed are rationed. In 1940 chickens and pigs were cut down to half. Cattle were also cut heavily, though the herd of dairy cows was kept almost normal. All the butter, bacon, eggs, and cattle that can possibly be spared are sold to Germany. Instead of exerting direct pressure in Denmark, which might diminish the supply at the source, Germany has resorted to the methods of an

otherwise greatly despised liberal economy — she has raised prices to such a height that foodstuffs are produced and flow freely southward over the border. Indeed, for the last quarter of 1940 the German fat monopoly raised its prices per ton for Danish butter from 2,400 kroner in 1938 and 2,750 kroner in August 1939 to 4,500 kroner.⁴ For the first quarter of 1941, the price has been boosted to 5,000 kroner for the first 8,000 tons, 4,250 kroner for the next 4,000 tons. Thus Denmark has a real export boom. By December 31, 1940, her former debit on clearing account had turned into a 1.5 billion kroner balance in her favor.⁵

The Dutch likewise find themselves in a favorable situation, even though, like the Danes, they have lost their British market. Their state, a model of intensive and up-to-date farming, has been closely integrated with Germany. Huge shipments of Dutch vegetables, butter, cheese and meat roll eastwards day and night. The incentives are skyrocketing prices, paid in depreciating guilders, and the withdrawal of German duties. Dutch farmers desperately need an outlet. German purchases prevent wholesale bankruptcy. The only risk from the point of view of the Germans is that stubborn Dutch political resistance might force them to impose penalties. But they will avoid this if possible, because, as in the case of Denmark, Holland is too valuable an asset in the Reich's wartime food economy to be ruined.

Belgium, as the European country with the greatest density of population and next to Switzerland the highest degree of industrialization, is probably in the worst straits of any of the occupied territories. However, there is a great difference between Germany's treatment of the Belgians and the Poles. Immediately after the occupation of Belgium the German authorities began to coöperate with the Belgian administration in planning adjustments in the production, distribution and consumption of food. Belgium is short of fats, fluid milk, grain and potatoes; but she has an excellent sugar-beet crop and some milk and vegetables. While Norway, Denmark and Holland have bread rations of roughly 80, 90 and 89 ounces per capita per week, the Belgian ration is only 56 ounces.⁶ To promote efficiency, industrial workers are allowed up to 112 ounces. Some food is said to be passing

⁴ This price applied to the first 12,000 tons. Beyond that the price was 4,750 kroner. Cf. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 15, 1940.

⁵ *New York Times*, February 2, 1941.

⁶ *Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute*, January 1941, p. 238. This issue gives detailed bread rations for 12 countries.

into Belgium with navicerts through the British blockade. But the minimum supply of staple food needed can be arranged only by Germany, by transport either from Soviet Russia or the Balkans or out of her own reserves.

In occupied France food is strictly under German control, but the situation is much better than in Belgium, the wheat-bread ration being 87 ounces a week. The occupied region contains France's main wheat, sugar-beet and dairy areas. But these are also the principal scene of the present Battle of England. R.A.F. bombings, German military movements and civilian evacuations disrupt transport, trade and administration so that local shortages are common.

Industrial unemployment is widespread in Belgium, Holland and occupied France, while in Germany, with German war industries booming and German armies spread out all over the Continent, there is a desperate shortage of skilled labor. Consequently, Germany is eager to import as many mechanical workers as she can, especially from the Lowlands, France and the Scandinavian countries where skilled labor is particularly well-trained and hard-working. Food is the lure used to secure them. German employment agencies offer jobs in Germany to unemployed Belgian, Dutch and French workers. If these refuse they lose their rationing cards. Sometimes rationing cards are withheld from workmen — who then are informed that plenty of food can be had in such-and-such a German industrial center.

Unoccupied France has been manœuvred into an exceedingly difficult situation. Vast numbers of refugees are crowded into a small area which is ill prepared to secure or distribute the supplies necessary. Communications and transport are strained, the civilian administration is overburdened, hoarding and bootlegging produce inequalities and, in many spots, shortages. Rationing, so far, has been badly organized and remains largely ineffective. In view of this the reduced (though still not alarmingly low) ration of 74 ounces of wheat bread does not mean very much one way or another.

The territory under the Vichy Government produces winter vegetables, fruit and wine, but is short of grain and fats. Wheat came normally from northeast France, now occupied, and the former imports of tropical vegetable fats — normally from 500,000 to 600,000 metric tons net annually — are no longer available. While the chess game between Pétain and Hitler continues, the

Germans have no intention of relieving the food situation in unoccupied France. Indeed, food is one of the men in the game. Thus the French people read that Germany has promised to ship 100,000 tons of potatoes from Germany to Paris.⁷

All the occupied areas have to support vast German armed forces. On the other hand, Germany feeds, on German supplies, probably an equal number of prisoners of war and drafted foreign laborers. There still remains a large net profit for Germany in this account, however, since prisoners receive the smallest and German soldiers the highest per capita ration. Moreover, German soldiers buy and send home all the bootlegged and non-rationed food they can find.

VI

In general, we see, the European food situation no longer can be measured in ratios of physically available supply and more or less urgent demand. Although crops and stocks still act as delimiting factors, the civilian food ration is determined largely with an eye on other matters. The most orderly and satisfactory situation, of course, prevails within the boundaries of "Greater Germany." In Italy, too, bread is free of cards. In the neutral, the non-belligerent and the conquered countries every sort of condition prevails, from one roughly approximating that in Germany down to real stringency.

It would be going too far, however, to say that conditions everywhere are strictly what the German conqueror wants them to be. He took six years to build his totalitarian power economy at home. It works there with the precision of a carefully built and solicitously tended machine. But in the conquered territories he had hurriedly to superimpose similar methods upon radically different economic systems. Neither the psychological coördination and control, nor the technical execution, approaches the perfection achieved in Germany proper. This is why there is general disorder in the European transportation system, universal disruption of wholesale and retail trade, speculation, and a lack of information regarding stocks. All these factors hamper the proper distribution of the food which is available and assigned for use.

The longer Nazi legions and administrators rule the Continent

⁷ By the end of November, she had actually shipped 8,000 tons. Potatoes, be it noted, are free from rationing in unoccupied territory.

the more order they will restore. Since the threat of undernourishment, or even actual starvation, is the canker that destroys public morale, all governments, conqueror and conquered alike, concentrate their energies on banishing this fear. And they have made remarkable progress. The point to remember is that the commanders of the German army of occupation, with the keys to the big granaries in their pockets, will tighten or relax their grip not in accordance with the size of available supplies of food but according to the dictates of broad political strategy.

VII

Late this spring, probably, will come the critical period in Europe's food problem in this war. Thereafter the food situation will tend to become less tense even in such hard-pressed areas as Poland, Belgium, unoccupied France and Spain. With the coming harvest, if the weather favors, the energetic German drive to work out necessary adjustments may well begin to show astonishing results.

The yield of the Danubian basin and the Balkan countries in food and feed crops is not likely, in general, to increase substantially (except for a larger oilseed output, especially in Hungary). Yet the more advanced agricultural methods introduced by the Germans will give new proof of their efficiency and will exploit all the latent skill of the farmers. Practically all of the northern and the middle parts of central and western Europe will show increased agricultural production. The acreage devoted to potatoes, sugar beets and mangels will be drastically increased, and more calories will be produced on the same acreage of cultivated land.⁸

All these root and hoe crops require an increase in draft power, in manual labor and in fertilizer. These things can be provided. The armies of the occupied nations will be demobilized, horses will be turned back to the farmers, oxen will be used where horses are too few, nitrogen and potash fertilizers are plentiful, and industrial unemployment prevails. Nothing is more sensible, then, than to turn to more hoe crops.

Indications are that Greater Germany and all the occupied areas except Norway are preparing to do so. Even Belgium expects to be self-supporting in grain in the new crop year by boost-

⁸ Potatoes yield two or three times as many starch calories per acre as does wheat or rye; sugar beets from four to six times as many.

ing the wheat area from 160,000 to 260,000 hectares, and the potato acreage from 147,000 to 177,000 hectares. At the same time, the extremely productive small family gardens in the suburbs of all the European cities will turn out more small fruit and vegetables in due season. True, in Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark the poultry flocks have been cut by emergency slaughtering to less than one half, and the hog population has been reduced considerably. More calves and young cattle have been slaughtered than under ordinary conditions. But these inroads have not, contrary to press reports, reached alarming proportions; and as feed supplies improve, the number of chickens and pigs may well increase again fairly quickly. In the Danubian countries the stock has definitely been increased.

If in 1941 the war does not turn into a sweeping movement of invading armies on the Continent itself, and if a general crop failure does not occur, we are probably safe in assuming that the threat of famine will gradually vanish, though a dearth of fats will still persist, and eggs, fluid milk and cream will continue to be scarce. The need for activity by the Red Cross and by local relief associations in the various nations will persist, especially on behalf of children, the poor and prisoners. Finland, Spain and unoccupied France have already received some overseas supplies under British navicert; recently French convoys from North Africa reached Marseilles without being molested by the British. Finland has obtained 20,000 tons of edible oils, bacon and pork from the United States. Moreover, the United States and Great Britain have agreed to a more flexible treatment of medical supplies and concentrated foods shipped under navicerts.

This appraisal of the European food situation may seem over-optimistic. But pessimists often forget that the continent's total import deficit in foodstuffs before the war did not amount to more than 5 percent of its bread-grain requirements or 6 percent (10.5 million tons) of bread and feed-grain requirements combined. The real shortage is in fats—1.3 to 1.4 million tons. Germany today has an untouched war reserve of 6.5 million tons of grain, and this alone would permit her to adjust the situation in countries of greatest need without seriously depleting her stocks. The fat deficit will persist, but it will decrease as potatoes, sugar beets and mangels become available for feeding hogs, cows and sheep, and as more oilseeds, such as rape, are grown. A herd of 100 million pigs now consumes tremendous amounts of feed

which could be used as human food. Before starvation gripped the population this herd, along with cattle and sheep, would be slaughtered and eaten. Furthermore, exceptionally high prices of food and feed in all areas outside of Germany will certainly stimulate increased production and will enforce the utmost thrift in consumption. At present the greatest pressure seems destined to fall on England because of her shipping losses.

The Nazis consider themselves complete masters of the European food situation. On September 30, 1940, Walter Darré, German Secretary of Agriculture, stated that there would be "no special difficulties to overcome" in occupied countries, and that the available food supply was greatly underestimated abroad.⁹ He did not think it necessary to lay any blame for food shortages on the British, though he naturally would have been tempted to do so. On January 7, 1941, the German Ambassador in Madrid, Dr. Eberhard von Stohrer, insisted that Spain did not need a hundred-million dollar credit from the United States, because Germany was in a position to carry out an offer to provide her with all the gasoline and other supplies she needed from Rumania and Russia.¹⁰ On February 11, 1941, the radio brought the news that a joint German-Belgian commission had negotiated food shipments from Soviet Russia to Belgium. In February Russia offered Norway to barter a million tons of Russian grain for Norwegian aluminum. Immediately Germany interfered. The Nazis do not object to relief supplies coming in to Europe if they have no political implications. But they consider the regulation of Europe, including feeding it, their affair — their self-assumed right as well as obligation. It is a key factor in their New Order.

In conclusion, it may be worth while to reflect upon the rôle played by food in the World War. Food alone did not win that war. In October 1918, General Ludendorff forced the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, to sue for peace within 24 hours. He did this because the German Army had lost the battle of Amiens and would have been thrown back to the Rhine by Christmas. Certainly the food stringency was one of the factors which had exhausted the fighting stamina of the nation as a whole. Yet even in November 1918 the front-line troops still were well fed. The Nazis have laid their plans well. They are

⁹ *New York Times*, October 1, 1940, p. 9.

¹⁰ *New York Times*, January 8, 1941, p. 5.

determined that no shortage of food will arise to create even as much difficulty for their juggernaut as it did for the Kaiser's. Our sympathies must not be allowed to distort our judgment about the rôle of food in the tremendous struggle ahead. Appraisals of the food and raw material situation made before the commencement of the Battle of Norway and the Battle of France still hold.¹¹

The Nazis will think twice before spreading pestilence and starvation in western Europe so long as they can avoid it easily. But if their plans go awry, if starvation does impend, they would and could manage so that famine would proceed in concentric rings from the extremest rim toward the German center of the fortress. In this process they would dispose of the lives of the 150 million hostages they now hold without batting an eye. This is their true advantage from the conquest of the Continent.

The blockade impedes the wheels of Hitler's war machine; but that machine is not going to be halted for lack of food or raw materials. The present Nazi domain contains too large resources for that, so long as they are exploited by the skilful politico-economists who drew up the blueprints of the Nazi economic tyranny. The Nazi machine will be defeated only by superior diplomacy, superior steadfastness and superior military strength.

¹¹ Karl Brandt, "Germany Behind the Blockade," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April 1940.

DEMOSTHENES REDIVIVUS

A PAGE FROM THE RECORD OF ISOLATIONISM

By Frederick H. Cramer

WE WRITE of the year 355 B.C. Pericles was dead, but his Acropolis stood. So did Athenian democracy. The age of the great tragic poets was past, but the age of the great philosophers had arrived. There lived in Athens Plato, an old man by now, his young and brilliant disciple Aristotle, and a very old man born at the height of the great Periclean age, Isocrates. The political power of Athens might be on the wane, but her magic cultural fires were still burning brightly. Her ancient rival Sparta was already rapidly sinking into well-deserved obscurity, while her neighbor Thebes, after a brief period of hegemony in Greek affairs, had lost her great political leaders, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. On the whole, the Greek world presented a spectacle familiar to all Athenians for many generations: a multitude of small states, mostly under republican governments, some local leagues, and a few major Powers, none of which had proved itself capable of securing a permanent ascendancy over the others. The political picture seemed, therefore, one of relative stability and even stagnation.

But in the realm of economics, progress towards an intensely capitalistic social order had greatly changed the standard of living and expanded the commercial interests of the leading bourgeoisie in all except the most backward Greek states. This trend was especially noticeable at Athens, always the most international-minded among the Greek cities. The widening horizons of thought and culture in Athens helped swell the chorus of those who asked for a political unit larger than the age-old city-state. Isocrates, for one, had been foremost in advocating a closer federation among the Greek states, a Pan Hellenic "union now." But his appeal had been without results.

Yet the trend of social and economic developments was inescapably toward some sort of unification. Twice it had seemed the destiny of Athens to effect a large-scale federation of democratic states through a confederacy for common defense. But twice Athens had failed to solve the problem created by her pre-eminent power within the confederacy: she had proved so harsh

a master that time and again her "allies" had wrecked it by rebellious secession. The Delic League, the first of Athens' two attempts, had died in the Peloponnesian War. A second confederacy, again under Athenian leadership, had come into being as the power of Sparta weakened. But now, in 355 B.C., Athens was faced once more with her failure to make democracy work within her federation. Its most important members, among them Rhodes and Byzantium, had risen in rebellion against the overbearing sister-republic. After securing foreign allies, they had — in 357 B.C. — successfully defied Athenian efforts to bring them back into the confederacy by force of arms.

In consequence, the economy as well as the prestige of Athens had received a serious blow. Retrenchment became the order of the day. The ambitious imperialistic policy, no longer popular among the people, gave way before the growing strength of isolationist sentiment; and this sentiment was carefully fostered by the wealthier class, resentful of the heavy burden of taxes and civic duties imposed upon it by the war. Thus, for the first time in its history, a policy of political isolation became the guiding principle of Athenian statesmanship.

II

It would be very simple to continue by saying that after the abdication of Athens some other Power was destined to achieve the political unification of the Greek world and that consequently Philip of Macedon, by completing the task which the city-states had failed to accomplish, was but the willing tool of the *Weltgeist*. Generations of German historians from Droysen to Drerup and Kahrstedt have made this point. Observing that Germany was unified, not by the liberals, but by the armies of Prussia, these historians, all too prone to generalize, concluded that the Athenian democracy — because it was a democracy — had been foredoomed to failure at a similar task and that only brute force, as personified in the military and political genius of King Philip, could succeed. It is significant that the latest German writer on this subject, Jaeger, has thoroughly disagreed with the general school of thought among German historians on this point, and it is perhaps even more worthy of note that the French historians up to Clemenceau and Cloché never adopted the defeatist point of view with regard to Athenian policies between 355 and 338 B.C. At any rate, it is impossible to maintain that Athens went

unseeing towards her doom, that once having adopted isolationist policies she never had an opportunity to make a stand before being engulfed by the Macedonian tidal wave of the future.

Never did the gods present the ancient world with a more agonizing, a more dramatic, combat between the two irrevocably conflicting principles of policy: isolationism or collective action. That Athens, the foremost democracy of antiquity, was the protagonist in this drama makes the lesson the more poignant, the more significant, for us today. One boon the gods did grant Athens, however, even though they failed to save her. They gave her a man to speak up for democracy, to speak up with the fervor of a biblical prophet and warn his fellow citizens to prepare while there was yet time. It was he who saw in Philip of Macedon a deadly menace long before his countrymen had understood that this time they were dealing with no mere ambitious semi-barbarian chieftain far away in the north. It was he, Demosthenes, who long before the Macedonian giant was bestriding the trembling Greek world warned that this was no time for bickering between the democratic city-states, no time for any one of them to remain aloof whenever in the Hellenic orbit a democracy sought to overthrow a dictatorial régime or was attacked by an aggressor Power. It was Demosthenes, the Athenian, who spoke up for the very Rhodians who but recently had fought their way out of the Athenian confederacy. Let us hear in his own words Demosthenes' appeal to the Athenian assembly to come to the aid of the democrats of Rhodes in their struggle against an oligarchic tyranny. And let us remember that not Spain in 1936 but ancient Rhodes formed the subject of his discourse:

Seeing that Chios and Mytilene are ruled by oligarchs, and that Rhodes and, I might almost say, all the world are now being seduced into this form of slavery, I am surprised that none of you conceives that *our* constitution too is in danger, nor draws the conclusion that if all other states are organized on oligarchical principles, it is impossible that they should leave your democracy alone. For they know that none but you will bring freedom back again, and of course they want to destroy the source from which they are expecting ruin to themselves. . . . When men overthrow free constitutions . . . I urge you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom. . . . You, living under a democracy, should show the same sympathy for democracies in distress as you would expect others to show for you, if ever — which God forbid! — you were in the same plight.¹

¹ All quotations from the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines in this article are taken from the Loeb Classics edition (Greek and English version).

This ringing challenge to Athenian isolationism by a young man of barely thirty years was no mere tirade. Demosthenes knew full well that he was going counter to the convictions of the majority of the assembly, not only because they favored an isolationist foreign policy in general but also because of their natural unwillingness, in this particular instance, to aid those very Rhodians who so recently had fought a bitter war against them. But Demosthenes saw beyond the present:

I observe that some of you are wont to dismiss Philip as a person of no account, but to speak with awe of the King [of Persia] as formidable. . . . If we are not to stand up to the one because he is contemptible, and if we yield to the other because he is formidable, against whom, Athenians, shall we ever marshal our forces?

It is worthy of note that Demosthenes, who probably penned his *First Philippic* in the same year (351 B.C.), did not share the widespread notion that Philip was contemptible. Launching a frontal attack against the organized isolationist forces then dominating Athenian politics, Demosthenes declared, in this same speech *For the Liberty of the Rhodians*:

You have got to defeat in your debates the faction that deliberately opposes the interests of your city. . . . Owing to this opposition, you can get nothing done without a struggle. . . . There are many politicians who recklessly take up this position.

Demosthenes distinguished sharply between the two groups furnishing the isolationist leadership: the "honest fools" and their anti-democratic allies. But as in our day, the isolationists succeeded without much trouble in defeating the farsighted program of lining up all the Greek democracies in a common defense front against their enemies wherever they might attack.

III

Undaunted, Demosthenes continued his attacks. If Athens was unwilling to seek solidarity among the democracies, let her at least, he pleaded, beware of a menace rising in the far north, a menace that in time would imperil both the political power and the democratic institutions of Athens. Seeing this clearly, Demosthenes demanded from the assembly a policy aimed to check Macedon's rising military power while it was still vulnerable:

If in the past their [the isolationists'] advice had been sound, there would be no need for deliberation today. . . . Your affairs are in this evil plight just

because you, men of Athens, utterly fail to do your duty. . . . Do not believe that his [Philip's] present power is fixed and unchangeable like that of a god. No, men of Athens, he is a mark for the hatred and fear and envy even of those who now seem devoted to him. One must assume that even his adherents are subject to the same passions as other men. At present, however, all these feelings are repressed and have no outlet, thanks to your indolence and apathy, which I urge you to throw off at once.

At this juncture the logical policy for Athens would have been to arm in order to cope with any emergency that might arise — and this was the keynote struck throughout this *First Philippic*. But, asked the isolationists, why arm? Macedonia was far away. The only ones to feel the Macedonian sword had been barbarian Balkan tribes and a few Greek colonies on the Chalcidic shores. Other Macedonian kings had had their fling in that remote region without any threat to Greece proper. Against this comfortable interpretation of history Demosthenes exclaimed:

Observe, Athenians, the height to which the fellow's insolence has soared: he leaves you no choice of action or inaction; he blusters and talks big, according to all accounts; he cannot rest content with what he has conquered; he is always taking in more, everywhere casting his net round us, while we sit idle and do nothing.

When, Athenians, will you take the necessary action? What are you waiting for? Until you are compelled, I presume. . . . Or are you content to run around and ask one another, "Is there any news today? . . ." "Is Philip dead?" you ask. "No, indeed, but he is very ill." And what is that to you? Even if something happens to him, you will soon raise up a second Philip, if that is the way you attend to your affairs; for even this Philip has not grown great through his own unaided strength so much as through our carelessness.

It must have been difficult for any honest isolationist to close his ears to this logic. But there was still the other group, the appeasers, hell-bent on peace at any price. They would concede that Philip might be a pretty important fellow, but surely he would never be able to invade Athens. Was not Macedonia very far away? To this Demosthenes replied:

If Philip did nothing more, but were willing to rest satisfied with what he has already captured and subdued, I believe some of you would be quite content with what must bring the deepest disgrace upon us and brand us as a nation of cowards. But by always attempting something new, always grasping at more power, he may possibly rouse even you, if you have not utterly abandoned hope. . . . Surely it is obvious that he will not stop, unless someone stops him. And is that what we are to wait for?

Two main problems faced the anti-isolationists in their campaign to get Athens to adopt an adequate defense program: the

cost and the method. Rearmament meant higher taxes. It meant the curtailment of numerous services and amenities provided by the Athenian republic for its citizens. It meant, in short, lowering the living standard of the mass of the voters. At the same time, it also meant the introduction of compulsory military service in order to provide the necessary manpower. True, in former times it had been the duty of every Athenian citizen to bear arms for his country. The hoplites who had won the day at Marathon, the crews and marines who had triumphed at Salamis, had been Athenian citizens conscripted for the defense of their democracy. But those were the dim days of the glorious past. In the prosperous present, Athens preferred to hire mercenaries whenever fighting men were needed.

Nor is it difficult to understand the dogged way in which the average voter, no less than the isolationists and appeasers, opposed the defense program, with its threat to conscript both manpower and capital. Anyone who has followed the debates in the United States Congress can readily picture the epithets hurled against Demosthenes by the assembly — “interventionist,” “warmonger,” “revolutionary.” How, they asked, could he prove that Philip harbored any designs against the security of Athens? As for them, they were convinced that no sensible person would suspect Philip of plotting to dominate the whole Greek world. Why then, they demanded, should Athens embark on a costly war overseas? Demosthenes replied:

Truly, men of Athens, I do think that Philip is drunk with the magnitude of his achievements and dreams of further triumphs, when, elated by his success, he finds that there is none to bar his way; but I cannot for a moment believe that he is deliberately acting in such a way that all the fools of Athens know what he is going to do next. . . . But if, putting rumors aside, we recognize that this man is *our* enemy, who has for years been robbing and insulting us, that wherever we once hoped to find help we have found hindrance, that the future lies in our own hands, and if we refuse to fight now in Thrace, we shall perhaps be forced to fight here at home — if, I say, we recognize these facts, then we shall have done with idle words and shall come to a right decision. Our business is not to speculate on what the future may bring forth, but to be certain that it will bring disaster, unless you face the facts and consent to do your duty.

“*Consent to do your duty*” — is there a better way to describe the working of the democratic process in times of stress? But the people of Athens did *not* consent. They did not think it their duty to make the financial and personal sacrifices necessary to safe-

guard their democracy. They saw no emergency. Their standard of living was too dear to them. And consequently they dismissed the warning of the *First Philippic* as the hysteria of a well-meaning but misguided citizen. Athenian isolationism had put another feather in its cap.

IV

While the Athenians wrangled over their defense problem, Philip blithely continued his mopping-up operations among his neighbors. His military machine had reached such a state of efficiency that it was ready for combat with major Powers beyond the orbit of Macedon. The last neighbor capable of offering any resistance to his expansion was Olynthos, a city not far from the site of modern Salonika. Now it so happened that at that time the democratic government of Olynthos was beset by numerous enemies both within and without. Pursuing his customary policy, Philip exploited this situation to the full. When he deemed the strength of his Fifth Column within Olynthos to be sufficient, he struck:

I wonder — exclaimed Demosthenes in his *First Olynthiac* — if any one of you in this audience watches and notes the steps by which Philip, weak at first, has grown so powerful. First he seized Amphipolis, next Pydna, then Potidaea, after that Methone, lastly he invaded Thessaly. Then having settled Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, and the rest of that country to suit his purposes, off he went to Thrace, and there, after evicting some of the chiefs and installing others, he fell sick. On his recovery, he did not relapse into inactivity, but instantly assailed Olynthos.

Immediately, Olynthos appealed to her sister democracy for aid. Once more, a battle royal ensued at Athens between the isolationists and their foes led by Demosthenes. But this time it was not unfriendly Rhodes appealing for democratic solidarity. This time it was Olynthos, the last major bulwark against Macedonian penetration into the heart of Greece. One would have thought that the men of Athens, observing the steady march of Philip, could no longer have blinded themselves to the effects a defeat of Olynthos must have on their own city. Yet, with the doggedness of the doomed, they continued to insist that anything was better than to commit the mortal sin of preventive war. No Athenian boys were to be ploughed under on overseas battlefields! And what did the spokesman of the "warmongers" reply?

The present crisis . . . calls on you, almost with an audible voice. . . . But, I confess, our attitude puzzles me. My own idea would be to vote for

an expedition at once, to make instant preparations for its dispatch, thus avoiding our previous blunder. . . . Our chief ground for alarm is that this man [Philip], so unscrupulous, so quick to seize his opportunity . . . misrepresenting us and our failure to intervene, may divert to his own purpose and wrest from us something of vital importance.

Quite clearly these were the arguments of an interventionist. For the defense of Athens herself, Demosthenes advocated a military expedition overseas. But again the isolationist chorus uttered the familiar refrain: "Beware of interventionist propaganda. The Olynthian war is but another imperialist struggle in which both sides strive for selfish aims. Hands off!" To be sure, no Athenian isolationist went so far as to introduce a resolution into the assembly requiring both belligerents to state their war aims — after all, in 2300 years the world has progressed in every field, even in that of pure folly! But the strength of the sentiment of "hands-off, it's only another imperialist war," can be gauged from the effort of the interventionists to overcome it. Declared their leader:

The eyes of the Olynthians are opened to the fact that they are now fighting not for glory, not for a strip of territory, but to avert the overthrow and enslavement of their fatherland. They know how he [Philip] treated those . . . who betrayed their country . . . and those who opened their gates to him. And a despotism, I take it, is as a rule mistrusted by free countries, especially when they are near neighbors. . . . Make up your minds; rouse your spirits; put your heart into the war, now or never. Pay your contributions cheerfully; serve in person; leave nothing to chance. You have no longer the shadow of an excuse for shirking your duty. . . . You must not let slip the opportunity that offers, nor make the blunder you have so often made before. . . . If we had . . . shown the required zeal in marching to the help of the first that appealed, we should have found Philip today much more humble and accommodating.

Unfortunately we always neglect the present chance and imagine that the future will right itself, and so . . . Philip has to thank us for his prosperity. We have raised him to a greater height than ever ruler of Macedon reached before. Today this opportunity comes to us from the Olynthians unsought, a fairer opportunity than we have ever had before. . . . If we leave these men too in the lurch . . . and then Olynthos is crushed by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him from marching henceforward just where he pleases.

But it took real vision to perceive the truth of these words. The law of human inertia, the psychological habit of assuming that it *cannot* happen because it *has not* happened, has always been the most powerful prop of isolationism. Why should the Athenians move a finger? The present was so sweet, and life was so comfortable. But, admonished Demosthenes:

We may find that we have paid a heavy price for our indolence, and because we consult our own pleasure in everything, may hereafter come to be forced to do many of the difficult things for which we had no liking, and may finally endanger our possessions here in Athens itself.

Philip, he conceded, had risen higher than any of his Macedonian predecessors. But had his position become so secure, was he already so powerful that resistance would be futile? Did he represent the inevitable wave of the future?

His present prospects are not so bright or satisfactory as they seem and as a superficial observer might pronounce them; nor would he ever have provoked this war had he thought that he would be bound to fight himself. He hoped that on his first entry he would carry all before him, and he finds himself completely mistaken. This unforeseen result confounds and discourages him. . . . We must assume that [the recently subjugated nations] would prefer freedom and independence to slavery. They are not accustomed to acknowledge a master, and Philip by all accounts is a particularly harsh one. . . . Look then, Athenians, upon his difficulties as your opportunity. Be prompt to take up the challenge. Send embassies when necessary. Take the field in person. Rouse all the other states. Reflect how eagerly Philip would march against you, if he had such a chance as we have, and if the war were on *our* frontiers. Are you not ashamed if, having the opportunity, you lack the courage to do to him what he would certainly do to you if he could?

Do not forget that you can today choose whether you must fight there or Philip must fight here. If Olynthos holds out, you will fight there, to the detriment of *his* territory, while you enjoy in security the land that is your home. But if he takes Olynthos, who is to prevent his marching hither? . . . "But, my friend," cries someone, "he will not wish to attack us." Nay, it would be a crowning absurdity if, having the power, he should lack the will to carry out the threat which today he utters at the risk of his reputation for sanity.

It is the duty of all of you to grasp the significance of these facts, and to send out an expedition that shall thrust back the war into Macedon. It is the duty of the well-to-do that spending but a fraction of the wealth they so happily possess they may enjoy the residue in security; of our fighters, that gaining experience of war on Philip's soil, they may prove the formidable guardians of an inviolate fatherland; of the statesmen, that they may give a ready account of their stewardship.

"All aid to Olynthos," such was the quintessence of these concluding passages of the *First Olynthiac*. Not merely aid short-of-war, but all-out aid. And not out of the goodness of the Athenian heart, not for platonic love of democracy abroad, but in order to protect Athenian democracy at home by defending it abroad. But would Demosthenes at last convince the assembly? It almost seemed so. Resolutions were passed for an Athenian alliance with Olynthos, the raising of an expeditionary force, and the estab-

ishment of a special war chest. But the isolationists, hard pressed though they were, did not give up. They went to work and cut down the "all-aid-to-Olynthos" program to a mere trickle of men and arms. Demosthenes, far from taking this cold sabotage supinely, insisted on reminding the Athenian assembly once more of what was at stake:

That Philip has found men willing to fight him, situated at his frontiers and possessed of considerable power, above all so determined that they regard any accommodation with him as both delusive and fatal to their own country — this has all the appearance of a superhuman, a divine beneficence. So the time has come, men of Athens, to look to it that we do not prove more unfriendly to ourselves than circumstances have been, for we shall show ourselves the meanest of mankind, if we abandon . . . the very allies that fortune has raised for us and the chances she throws in our way.

To those average voters who followed the isolationists in believing that Philip was just another local upstart, Demosthenes declared in his *Second Olynthiac*:

Glory is his sole object and ambition; in action and in danger he has elected to suffer whatever may befall him, putting before a life of safety the distinction of achieving what no other king of Macedon ever achieved. But his subjects have no share in the glory that results. They are perpetually buffeted and wearied and distressed by these expeditions north and south, never suffered to give their time to their business or private affairs, never able to dispose of such produce as they can raise. . . . Philip . . . wants to have the credit himself of every action, among his many faults being an insatiable ambition.

No, Philip was no ordinary local dictator. His aims already encompassed the whole of Greece; tomorrow the world itself would be the limit of his ambition. This was no time for politicians to haggle, for democratic complacency, for worrying about taxation and debt-limits, for heated debates on the division of powers. In the words of Demosthenes:

We sit here doing nothing. But one who is himself idle cannot possibly call upon his friends . . . to work for him. No wonder that Philip, sharing himself in the toils of the campaign, present at every action, neglecting no chance and wasting no season, gets the better of us, while we procrastinate and pass resolutions and ask questions The outcome is strife and contention among yourselves, some taking this side and some that, while the interests of the state suffer If you authorize one class of men to issue orders . . . and force another class to equip the navy and pay the war-tax and serve in the field, while yet a third class has no other public duty than to vote the condemnation of the latter, you will never get anything essential done at the right time. There will always be some class with a grievance, who will fail you, and then it will be your privilege to punish them instead of the enemy.

That third class, always voting in condemnation of others' policies — who were they but the inveterate isolationists opposing every effort to cope effectively with the Macedonian menace? It is significant that Demosthenes did not accuse them of voting against their better knowledge. Instead, he bent all his strength to establish a common national front against the evergrowing Macedonian threat. Once more, a shortlived burst of energy followed his heroic appeal for unity. Further levies were raised to go to the aid of Olynthos. But the whole defense program was struck a death blow when the financial measures proposed to implement it were declared unconstitutional. And yet this unconstitutional program, had it been executed, would probably have saved the democratic constitution of Athens.

Meanwhile, the defenders of that city were fighting on two fronts: against Philip who was hammering at their gates, and against his fifth column, the anti-democratic elements who were undermining morale from within. In the end, these Quislings induced a sizable body of Olynthian troops to go over to Philip. But before this came to pass, the anti-isolationist forces at Athens gathered for a last attempt to rescue Olynthos. Their spokesman, Demosthenes, must have felt sick at heart to hold forth on the same topic again, with the same arguments and against the same odds. The tone of his *Third Olynthiac* is more somber than that of the first two, the glow of his words of a darker hue; but the flame of his patriotism shines forth as brightly as ever:

I observe that the speeches are all about punishing Philip, while our affairs have reached a stage at which it must be our first concern to avoid disaster ourselves. . . . Athens once had the chance both of establishing her power and of punishing Philip. . . . Now, however, I am persuaded that we must be content to secure the first, that of saving our allies. . . . Never was there a crisis that demanded more careful handling than the present. . . . The popularity-hunting of some of our orators has led us into this desperate predicament. . . .

Well, what is done cannot be undone; but now . . . what remains, men of Athens, but to help them with *all* your power and energy? I see no alternative. For . . . if we shirk our responsibilities, I see not a little danger, men of Athens, for the future, if the Thebans maintain their present attitude towards us, and the Phocians have come to the end of their money, and there is nothing to hinder Philip, when he has crushed his present foe, from turning his arms against Attica. But surely if any one of you would postpone the necessary action till then he must prefer to see danger at his very doors, rather than hear of it far away, and to beg help for himself, when he might be lending help

to others now; for I suppose we all realize that that is what it will come to, if we throw away our present chances. . . . Our statesmen in peace have lost us the allies we gained in war.

"But," says an objector, "if our foreign policy has failed, there is great improvement in domestic affairs." And to what can you point in proof? To the walls we are whitewashing, the streets we are paving, the water-works, and the balderdash? Look rather at the men whose statesmanship has produced these results!

Let the benighted isolationists point with pride to their achievements — their roads, their W.P.A. and their relief appropriations — but let the people of Athens realize that they are in for a rude awakening. Already a certain malaise had spread through the nation. There was lightning on the horizon, and the sound of battle, where democratic Olynthos stood fighting for her very life against the rising tide of Macedonian militarism. The Athenians, becoming restless, began to compare the glorious days of the past, of Miltiades and Themistocles, with the ominous present. They asked, why did things then go well that now went amiss? Replied Demosthenes:

Because then the people, having the courage to act and to fight, controlled the politicians. . . . Now, on the contrary, the politicians hold the purse-strings and manage everything, while you, the people, robbed of nerve and sinew, stripped of wealth and of allies, have sunk to the level of lackeys and hangers-on, content if the politicians gratify you with a dole. . . . They have mewed you up . . . and entice you with these baits, that they may keep you tame and subservient to the whip. . . . If, therefore, even at the eleventh hour, you can shake off these habits, and consent to fight and act as becomes Athenians and to devote the abundant resources that you have at home to the attainment of success abroad . . . I call on you to do that for yourselves . . . and not to desert that post of honor, men of Athens, which your ancestors through many glorious hazards won and bequeathed to you.

A poorly stifled yawn from the isolationists! Why does this fellow always bring up those old stories? War, after all, is rapidly going out of fashion. And if there is fighting to be done, one can hire mercenaries to do it. Beware, this spokesman of the war-mongers is dangerous. Does he not advocate a general conscription of the male population for forced labor as well as for military service? Such regimentation is undemocratic. Let's vote it down.

And so they did. Not until two years later was a special war tax introduced. To save their *face* the Athenians did indeed dispatch a somewhat greater military force to the aid of Olynthos, but only to have it arrive on the scene of battle just in time to learn that Olynthos had fallen, that it had been wiped off the

face of the earth, that its inhabitants had been sold into slavery, that another democracy had been obliterated. Now had come the time for the Athenian isolationists to reap the rewards of their folly — and they were not to their liking. Now they at last awakened to the fact that Athens was the next in line. Hurriedly, embassies were dispatched to her neighbors, the Peloponnesian states, asking their support in the crisis now so close at hand. The ambassadors met with an icy reception. In vain did they plead. The Athenian record was too devastating. Most of the states preferred Philip's assurances of peace to an alliance with a democracy that had let down the other democracies one after another. Completely isolated, Athens had no choice. Trying to make the best of it, she substituted for her policy of isolationism the even more fatal one of appeasement.

v

Olynthos had fallen. Its citizens filled the slave-marts of Greece. The Greeks were shocked; but their capitalists bought the slaves, splendid men, women and children. A few, among them Demosthenes, redeemed as many of these unfortunates as their private funds would permit. Even the young and coming isolationist Aeschines professed his shocked bewilderment upon encountering a gang of Olynthian slaves with their new master. But he evidently failed to make a proper connection between cause and effect. Athens, thanks to her isolationist policy, now had no choice but to give in, and Demosthenes participated in the first embassy sent to inquire of Philip the terms on which he would make peace — a strictly negotiated peace, of course.

Upon its return to Athens the embassy reported that Philip's terms formed no cause for alarm. Athens herself had nothing to fear. Indeed, Philip was even more gracious than might have been expected. Having perceived that Athenian policy until very recently had aimed at carefully staying out of wars and entangling alliances, Philip was only too glad to encourage this tendency and to assist its advocates, the Athenian isolationists, to achieve their goal even more completely than they might have wished. For the main clause of the proposed treaty demanded that Athens should cease to take any interest in the fate of those Greek states then engaged in war with Philip, that in other words she should just forget about her natural allies, especially the Phocians. Now it so happened that it was the Phocians who controlled the all-

important pass of Thermopylae, the only route for a major invasion, on land, against Athens. But, despite the all-pervading enthusiasm for appeasement, the Athenian assembly refused to swallow this clause. After ratifying the remainder of the treaty, they sent a second embassy to Philip in the hope of obtaining his assent to disregard this provision for enforcing Athenian isolation and making it complete.

Demosthenes did not share the illusions of his fellow-citizens — he knew Philip too well. Nevertheless, to preserve at least the appearance of national unity, he again went along with the others. The ambassadors fared ill. Even while they were on their way, Philip had achieved another major victory, this time in Thrace. The countryside through which they travelled showed signs of great military preparations — against the Phocians, they were told. When they saw Philip, he was amiable, but non-committal. The isolationist majority understood him to promise not to extend his military operations into the heart of Greece, *i.e.* against the Phocians, without consulting the Athenians. Yet how could any Athenian seriously have entertained such a thought? Even the manner in which Philip finally ratified the treaty, *with* that sinister clause in it, ought to have warned the ambassadors to beware: only after they had trailed him as far as Pherae in Thessaly did he deign to go through the formalities of ratification.

Back again to Athens travelled the weary men. In a desperate appeal Demosthenes denounced the sham-treaty, warned against this sort of appeasement and beseeched the Athenians not to leave the Phocians to the tender mercies of Philip. He did not speak for love of the Phocians; he spoke for love of Athens. Did not the Phocians control the all-important defile of Thermopylae, the gateway to Athens? And what if Philip went back on his vague oral promise not to attack Phocis without first consulting Athens? Could anyone seriously trust him in a life-and-death matter like this?

But against Demosthenes rose Aeschines, the glib appeaser. In eloquent terms he praised the value of peace, of that peace he had brought home, truly a peace with honor. Philip, he exclaimed, was a gentleman. He would never go back on his word. And thus, within three days after the return of the embassy, the Athenians formally advised the Phocians to surrender their stronghold, Delphi, the religious center of Greece. The Phocians understood. They knew that they were lost. But if Athens had calculated that

the Phocians, feeling themselves completely forsaken, would quietly surrender Delphi to her while still maintaining a garrison at Thermopylae, she was quickly and disastrously disillusioned. Within a week the Phocians did indeed surrender, but to Philip; and they surrendered not merely Delphi but Thermopylae as well. Those who lived through the agony of Munich will sympathize with Demosthenes and his friends. But for the moment nothing could be done. The peace with Philip stood, bearing the name of Philocrates, a member of the embassy. It is fitting that he was discovered shortly afterwards to be in Philip's pay.

In the depth of defeat the anti-isolationists did not give up. For the first time, a strong undercurrent of popular feeling came to their aid. Now, when the Phocians were being punished by Philip with unheard of severity, when the Macedonian armies controlled the roads leading towards the Athenian border, when Athens stood humiliated before the world, the Athenians belatedly realized to what a pass their isolationism had brought them. Demands for a thorough house-cleaning grew. Yet Aeschines, like his counterparts among the modern isolationists, was quick to discover in the policy of his opponents insidious perils to democratic institutions and in himself a paragon of democratic virtue. In his speech *Against Timarchos* he declared:

Autocracies and oligarchies are administered according to the temper of their lords, but democratic states according to established laws. . . . Therefore you, who have a government based upon equality and law, must guard against those [Demosthenes and his friends] whose words violate the laws or whose lives have defied them. . . . Did you not put to death Socrates, the sophist, fellow citizens, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias . . . who put down democracy, and after that, shall Demosthenes succeed . . . Demosthenes who takes such vengeance on private citizens and friends of the people for their freedom of speech? . . . He will . . . find fault with the peace which was brought about through Philocrates and myself, until he shall call out such bursts of applause from the jurors that I will not even face him in the court-room . . . but will consider myself lucky if I get off with a moderate fine instead of being punished with death.

These words clearly marked the beginning of the twilight of Athenian isolationism. The only problem that remained was this: Had Athens still time to undo what her isolationists had done?

A final showdown had manifestly become inevitable. The years from 346 to 340 B.C. were characterized by the indefatigable efforts of the Athenians to escape from their self-built prison of isolation. Once more, Demosthenes visited the Peloponnesian

states in an attempt to line them up with Athens for "the day" to come. He failed. Protests against his activities were delivered in Athens, not only from Philip, but from Greek states like Argos and Messene who feared a rapprochement between Athens and Sparta, their hereditary enemy. Demosthenes was put on the defensive. But he rose to the occasion. He used the opportunity thus offered to rivet into the minds of the Athenians the realization that the peace they were enjoying was but an armistice, a long armistice, at the end of which a reckoning was bound to come:

If anyone views with confidence the present power of Philip and the extent of his dominions, if anyone imagines that all this imports no danger to our city and that you are not the object of his preparations, I must express my astonishment, and beg you all alike to listen to a brief statement of the considerations that have led me to form the opposite conclusion and to regard Philip as our enemy. . . .

Guided in his calculations by ambition and the desire of universal dominion, regardless of the claims of peace and quietness and justice, Philip rightly saw that to our state and our national character he could offer nothing, he could do nothing that would tempt you from selfish motives to sacrifice to him any of the other Greek states, but that you, reverencing justice, shrinking from the discredit involved in such transactions, and exercising due and proper forethought, would resist any such attempt on his part as stoutly as if you were actually at war with him. . . . By his very acts you stand judged the one and only power in the world incapable of abandoning the common rights of the Greeks at any price, incapable of bartering your devotion to their cause for any favor or any profit. . . .

Everything, if correctly observed, points to the fact that all his intrigues are directed against Athens. . . . He knows, then, these two facts — that he is intriguing against you and that you are aware of it. Assuming that you are intelligent, he thinks you are bound to hate him, and he is on the alert, expecting some blow to fall, if you can seize an opportunity and if he cannot get in his blow first. That is why he is wide-awake and ready to strike, and why he is courting certain people to the detriment of our country. He imagines that their cupidity will lead them to accept the present situation while their natural dullness will prevent them from foreseeing anything that may follow. . . .

But there is one common bulwark which the instinct of sensible men possesses within itself, a good and safe one for all, but invaluable for democracies against tyrants. And what is that bulwark? It is mistrust. Guard that; hold fast to that. If you preserve it, no harm can touch you. What is your object? . . . Freedom. Then do you not see that Philip's very titles are utterly irreconcilable with that? For . . . every despot is the sworn foe of freedom and of law. Beware . . . lest, seeking to be rid of war, you find a master.

But the process of awakening the Athenians to the threat to their freedom was painfully slow. It was a far cry from the days of Marathon. Demosthenes sensed the gathering storm. He

knew that peace between the forces of despotism and democracy is only an armistice. He differed sharply from the genial appeasers who still believed that the peace of Philocrates had warded off the danger of a finish fight between democratic Athens and despot Philip. To offset this complacency Demosthenes warned:

You . . . are compassed about with plots and snares, you will . . . find to your surprise that, through having nothing done in time, you have submitted to everything. . . . It would indeed have been fair . . . to call upon those who conveyed to you Philip's promises, on the strength of which you were induced to conclude the peace. . . . Yes, and there are others who ought to be called upon. Whom do I mean? The men who, when peace was made and when I . . . spoke out and protested . . . told you that I, being a teetotaler, was naturally a disagreeable, cross-grained fellow, and that Philip . . . would do just what you would pray for. . . .

I do not wish to indulge in idle talk. But I think that one day Philip's policy will cause you more distress than it does now, for I see the plot thickening. I hope I may prove a false prophet, but I fear the catastrophe is even now only too near. . . . While the danger is in the future and gathering head, while we can still hear one another speak, I want to remind each one of you, who . . . it is that has forced you to take counsel, not for your rights and interests abroad, but for your possessions here at home and for the war in Attica, a war which will bring distress on every one of us, when it does come, but which really dates from that very day. For if you had not been hoodwinked then, there would be no anxiety in Athens, because Philip could never, of course, have gained command of the sea . . . nor could have marched past Thermopylae and Phocis. . . . May all the gods forbid that my warnings should ever be brought to the sternest test!

It was not to be. The conflict had become irrepressible, and gradually the majority of the Athenian voters were coming to recognize that the issue had to be faced. The three years which probably intervened between the *Second Philippic* and the *Third Philippic* (presumably delivered in 341 B.C.) mark a definite turning of the tide. Aeschines, apparently brought to trial at last, escaped conviction by so slim a margin that the verdict amounted to a moral condemnation. Philocrates shortly after the *Second Philippic* had been unmasked as a paid traitor and in 343 B.C. had fled into exile. The salutary effect of this house-cleaning was noticeable. The war fund, established in the Olynthic crisis but never supported with sufficient appropriations, was not set up in earnest. This time, when Byzantium (another city that had forcibly seceded from the Athenian confederacy a decade before) appealed for aid against Philip, the response of Athens was quite different from that which met the appeal from Rhodes. The

assembly now listened with sympathetic attention to the plea of Demosthenes to keep Philip busy near the Dardanelles and thus prevent him from becoming active in central Greece:

Since the conclusion of the peace . . . all our interests have been completely betrayed and sacrificed . . . I do not think they could have been in a worse condition than they are to-day. Perhaps, indeed, this condition of our affairs may be attributed to many causes and not just to one or two, but a careful examination will convince you that it is above all due to those who study to win your favor rather than to give you the best advice. Some of them, . . . interested in maintaining a system which brings them credit and influence, have no thought for the future, while others, by blaming and traducing those in authority, make it their sole aim that our state shall concentrate on punishing her own citizens, while Philip shall be free to say and do whatever he pleases . . .

If indeed Athens can remain at peace and if the choice rests with us . . . I personally feel that we are bound to do so . . . ; but if there is another person concerned, with sword in hand and a mighty force at his back, who imposes on you with the name of peace but himself indulges in acts of war, what is left but to defend ourselves? If you choose to follow his example and profess that you are at peace, I raise no objection. But if anyone mistakes for peace an arrangement which will enable Philip, when he has seized everything else, to march upon us, such a man has taken leave of his senses, and the peace that he talks of is one that you observe towards Philip, but not Philip towards you. That is the advantage which he is purchasing by all his expenditure of money — that *he* should be at war with *you*, but that *you* should not be at war with *him* . . .

Today we call this the “softening-up process.” We know it well. But it is no new invention. For years Philip had engaged in it. He had won most of his Greek successes by first undermining the will-to-resist of each of his prospective victims. Nor did he, in the best Blitzkrieg manner, always deign to make an open declaration of war when the softening-up process had been completed. On this point Demosthenes admonished his countrymen:

If we are going to wait for him to acknowledge a state of war with us, we are indeed the simplest of mortals, for even if he marches straight against Attica and the Piraeus, he will not admit it, if we may judge from his treatment of the other states. For take the case of the Olynthians; when he was five miles from their city, he told them there must be one of two things, either they must cease to reside in Olynthos, or he in Macedon, though on all previous occasions, when accused of hostile intentions, he indignantly sent ambassadors to justify his conduct. Again, when he was marching against the Phocians, he still pretended that they were his allies, and Phocian ambassadors accompanied him on his march And then again quite lately, after entering Thessaly as a friend and ally, he seized Pherae and still retains it. . . . And do you imagine that . . . in your case he will give warning of

hostilities, especially when you are so eager to be deceived? . . . Is there any intelligent man who would let words rather than deeds decide the question who is at peace and who is at war with him? . . . When he lays hands on Megara, sets up tyrannies in Euboea, makes his way, as now, into Thrace, hatches plots in the Peloponnese, and carries out all these operations with his armed force, he is breaking the peace and making war upon you.

I say that you will be wise if you defend yourselves now, but if you let the opportunity pass, you will not be able to act even when you desire to. . . let your deliberations embrace *all* the Greek states and the great danger that besets them.

The steps of Philip's rise to power were built from the ruins of scores of cities and states. The tragic failure of the Greek states to realize that he was no mere local despot bent on local aggrandizement explains more than anything else why they persevered in their suicidal isolationism until it was too late. His systematic progress had been made possible by this very epidemic of isolationism. This issue between voluntary coöperation and collective slavery has never been more clearly presented, never more brilliantly illuminated, than by Demosthenes, the Athenian.

Neither the Greek nor the barbarian world is big enough for the fellow's ambition. And we Greeks see and hear all this, and yet we do not send embassies to one another and express our indignation. We are in such a miserable position, we have so entrenched ourselves in our different cities, that to this very day we can do nothing that our interest or our duty demands; we cannot combine, we cannot take any common pledge of help or friendship; but we idly watch the growing power of this man, each bent (or so it seems to me) on profiting by the interval afforded by another's ruin, taking not a thought, making not an effort for the salvation of Greece. For that Philip, like the recurrence or attack of a fever or some other disease, is threatening even those who think themselves out of reach, of that not one of you is ignorant . . .

Yet the Greeks see all this and suffer it. They seem to watch him just as they would watch a hailstorm, each praying that it may not come their way, but none making an effort to stay its course. . . . We hesitate one and all, we play the coward, we keep an eye on our neighbors, distrusting one another rather than our common foe. Yet if he treats us all with such brutality, what do you think he will do when he has got each of us separately into his clutches?

The misguided narrowness of the Greek city-states must be set aside for a larger conception, a wider union, a federation however loosely knit of all those with common political, cultural, and social ideals. And lest the armchair generals bemuse the Athenians into thinking that according to the accepted rules of warfare no serious danger could befall them, Demosthenes proclaimed:

For my own part, while practically all the arts have made a great advance and we are living to-day in a very different world from the old one, I

consider that nothing has been more revolutionized and improved than the art of war . . . In those days . . . they were so old-fashioned, or rather such good citizens, that they never used money to buy an advantage from anyone, but their fighting was of the fair and open kind. But now you must surely see that most disasters are due to traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle . . .

Since, however, you all know this, you must take it into account and not let the war pass into your own country; you must not come to grief through keeping your eyes fixed on the simple strategy of . . . old . . . but arrange your *political* affairs and your *military* preparations so that your line of defense may be as far away from Athens as possible, give him no chance of stirring from his base, and never come to close grips with him . . .

But it is not enough . . . to oppose him with active military measures. . . . You must reflect that it is impossible to defeat the enemies of our city until you have chastised those who within our very walls make themselves their servants. . . . You have granted to these men more security for the pursuance of their policy than to your own defenders. Yet mark what troubles are in store for those who lend an ear to such counsellors . . .

Perhaps you wonder why the people of Olynthos and Eretria and Oreus were more favorably inclined to Philip's advocates than to their own. The explanation is the same as at Athens, that the patriots, however much they desire it, cannot sometimes say anything agreeable, for they are obliged to consider the safety of the state; but the others by their very efforts to be agreeable are playing into Philip's hands. The patriots demanded a war subsidy, the others denied its necessity; the patriots bade them fight on and mistrust Philip, the others bade them keep the peace, until they fell into the snare. . . . It is the same tale everywhere, one party speaking to please their audience, the other giving advice that would have ensured their safety. But at the last there were many things that the people were induced to concede, not for their own gratification nor through ignorance, but gradually yielding because they thought that their discomfiture was inevitable and complete. And . . . that is what I certainly fear will be your experience

Demosthenes warned that there was no ready-made panacea for the plight in which Athens now found herself. Above all, he said, it would be sheer madness to rely upon Philip's good nature.

It is folly and cowardice to cherish such hopes, to follow ill counsel and refuse to perform any fraction of your duties, to lend an ear to the advocates of your enemies and imagine that your city is so great that no conceivable danger can befall it. Ay, and a disgrace too it is to have to say when all is over, "Why! Who would have thought it? For of course we ought to have done this or that, and not so and so." Many things could be named by the Olynthians to-day, which would have saved them from destruction if only they had then foreseen it. . . .

So we too, Athenians, as long as we are safe, blessed with a very great city, ample advantages, and the fairest repute — what are we to do? Perhaps some of my hearers have long been eager to ask that question. I solemnly promise that I will answer it and will also move a resolution, for which you can vote

if so disposed. To begin with ourselves, we must make provision for our defense, I mean with war-galleys, funds, and men; for even if all other states succumb to slavery, we surely must fight the battle of liberty. Then having completed all these preparations and made our purpose clear, we must lose no time in calling upon the other Greeks . . . so that if you win them over, you may have someone to share your dangers and your expenses . . .

I do not, however, suggest that you should invite the rest, unless you are ready to do for yourselves what is necessary. . . . But I do contend that we must send supplies to the forces in the Chersonese and satisfy all their demands, and while we make preparations ourselves, we must summon, collect, instruct, and exhort the rest of the Greeks. That is the duty of a city with a reputation such as yours enjoys. But if you imagine that Greece will be saved by Chalcidians or Megarians, while you run away from the task, you are wrong. For they may think themselves lucky if they can save themselves separately. But this is a task for you; it was for you that your ancestors won this proud privilege and bequeathed it to you at great and manifold risk. But if every man sits idle, consulting his own pleasure and careful to avoid his own duty, not only will he find no one to do it for him, but I fear that those duties that we wish to shirk may all be forced upon us at once.

There is nothing to add to this eloquent appeal. It produced results, at last. In the words of Plutarch:

But when things came at last to war, . . . the first action he [Demosthenes] put them upon was the reducing of Euboea, which by the treachery of the tyrants, was brought under subjection to Philip. And on his proposition, the decree was voted, and they crossed over thither and chased the Macedonians out of the island. The next was the relief of the Byzantines and the Perinthians, whom the Macedonians at that time were attacking. He persuaded the people to lay aside their enmity against these cities, to forget the offences committed in the Confederate war, and to send them such succors as eventually saved and secured them. Not long after, he undertook an embassy through the states of Greece, which he solicited and so far incensed against Philip that, a few only excepted, he brought them all into a general league. . . . But the hardest task was yet behind, left for Demosthenes, to draw the Thebans into this confederacy with the rest. . . . Now the Thebans, in their consultations, were well enough aware what suited best with their own interest, but everyone had before his eyes the terrors of war.

Thus, to the very last, isolationist pacifism stood in the way of joint action. Demosthenes, however, achieved his greatest triumph by winning even the Thebans over to the side of Athens. But it was too late. The new-born league had no time to implement its treaties. Near the small town of Chaeronea in central Greece the united armies of Thebes and Athens went down to defeat in 338 B.C. Too long had the forces of isolationism, appeasement and reaction been at work. And thus fell Athens.

LIBERALISM IN JAPAN

By Sir George Sansom

WE who live in democratic states find it hard to understand why it is that people in authoritarian states have in the last decade given up their liberties with so very little struggle. We generally like to believe that they have been tricked into surrender and that, given some help and encouragement from outside, when the time is ripe they will strive to regain the freedom they have lost, will work and fight if need be for a kind of government comparable to our own. In extreme cases we suppose that the economic difficulties and political repression prevalent in these totalitarian states must have produced a potential revolutionary force, and that therefore only a little more hardship, a little more tyranny, are required to bring about an uprising. This belief may turn out to be correct; but so far there is very scanty evidence for it. In authoritarian countries there is no chance for the individual foreign observer to gain accurate knowledge of what the people are thinking. He cannot carry out a poll of opinion. He can only guess at public sentiment from a few haphazard samples; and since he can only guess at what people feel, he is not likely to be a useful prophet as to how they will act.

All these obstacles to political and social diagnosis are multiplied when we come to deal with a country like Japan, with its acute differences in tradition, language, thought and behavior. This no doubt is why the evidence which comes from foreign observers as to the present political temper and aspirations of the Japanese people is extremely various and contradictory. The foreign policy of the Japanese Government is clear enough, and it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the issues between it and the governments of democratic states are now strategical rather than political. What is not so clear is the internal situation in Japan. To understand that, it is necessary for us to rid our minds of a number of misconceptions which arise because we think in terms of our own vocabulary when we discuss Far Eastern affairs. We are inclined to postulate the existence of a numerous class of "liberals," and we are misled by our own use of the word "liberal" into supposing that there is in Japan a school of political thought which approves of democratic institutions and thus somehow corresponds, if only in miniature, to those

great majorities in the United States or Great Britain which believe in representative government, in freedom of speech and thought, and in a great measure of individual enterprise. A further assumption, no less unjustified, allows us to picture this liberal element in Japanese life as a force hostile to what is called the "military party," as prepared at the appropriate moment to reverse the present totalitarian trend and by some kind of revolutionary process to set up a new, enlightened and prosperous régime with which the democracies can talk business.

There is little in Japan's past history to justify such assumptions. It is true enough that since the Restoration of 1868 there have been short phases of liberalism in internal politics in Japan, but it was liberalism of a type long obsolete in Occidental countries, and events have shown that it had in it no power of growth because it was a borrowed thing, out of harmony with Japan's traditional ways of thinking.

It is by examining those traditional ways that we are most likely to arrive at some knowledge of what the people of Japan are likely to be thinking today. No official reticence can conceal history from the observer. The facts are quite clear. From 1615 or thereabouts Japan was ruled by a feudal oligarchy, which anticipated in many respects the methods of government used by modern totalitarian states. The distinguishing features were there — the rule of a self-constituted élite, the disabilities imposed upon certain classes, the restriction of personal liberty, the sumptuary laws, the monopolies, the censorship, the secret police, and the doctrine that the individual exists for the State. When in 1868 this régime was overthrown it was replaced not by a popular government but by a powerful bureaucracy which — with the adaptations made necessary by Japan's entry into the modern world of international commerce and industry — perpetuated the essential features of totalitarianism. Lest this should be thought a fanciful reading of Japan's political history, it may be well to quote a Japanese authority. Mr. Shiratori, formerly Japanese Ambassador to Rome, and a vigorous proponent of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo pact, wrote in 1938:

The tide has turned against that liberalism and democracy that once swept over the nation. The once widely accepted theory of government which sees in parliament the real center of power has now been completely rejected and the country is fast reverting to totalitarianism, which has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past thirty centuries. . . . It

makes our hearts warm to see ideas that have influenced our race for centuries in the past embodied in the systems of modern states of Europe.

After making full discount for the extravagance of language which seems to be needed for the expression of totalitarian thought, one can perceive in these statements some useful evidence. In the first place, it is to be noted that Mr. Shiratori was not speaking for the so-called military party. It is a mistake to suppose that there is a split between military and civilian opinion in Japan. Certainly the army has played the greatest part in the development of a planned economy for war purposes, and though opinion is by no means uniform throughout the fighting services the army has been the most important single body in the promotion of a certain kind of national socialist doctrine. But totalitarian ways of thinking have for years past been gaining strength in other branches of government. They have strong adherents in the Departments of the Interior and Education, while the planned and controlled economy which must form the basis of any totalitarian state was originated in the Department of Commerce shortly after the Manchurian adventure of 1931. It is therefore fair to say that for the best part of a decade the most active, if not the most numerous, elements in the bureaucracy have been consciously building up a totalitarian system. The process was hastened, as it was facilitated, by the exigencies of war; but it cannot be said that it encountered any effective opposition either from within the official class or from the parliamentarians who might have been expected to resist it. The bankers and industrialists did, it is true, make some mild objections from time to time, but they retreated little by little and are today under effective control. They have not, perhaps, been so fully subjected to official orders as the German industrialists, but for practical purposes they are now integrated in the machinery of state.

One may safely say of the political and economic itinerary followed by Japan since 1931 that among the ruling classes of Japan there were undoubtedly differences of opinion as to method and timing, as to the route and the speed, but no fundamental disagreement as to destination — Japanese hegemony over Eastern Asia. As for the general public, it was helpless. For even if it had had the will to resist, lacking an effective parliamentary system it had no means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Government. But there is nothing to show that the Japanese

people did at any particular period in fact desire to resist. The building up of the now almost perfected system of autocratic government was a gradual process, and the points at which resistance might suitably have been offered were not obvious to a public which, far from being in the habit of fighting for its rights, was traditionally disciplined and obedient. Even in a highly developed democracy considerable alertness and insight on the part of the public are required to detect a crucial situation in internal affairs, and those qualities are usually possessed by leaders rather than by the rank and file. In Japan there is no habit of mistrust of authority, no strong disposition to criticize, no protestant tradition, but rather an old ingrained spirit of conformity. Consequently there has not developed in the past an effective body of popular opinion or an experience of popular leadership. So that, even supposing the present rulers of Japan to have imposed their new system on the country against the popular will, it is difficult to imagine how that popular will could have expressed itself in action. Neither the political nor the social traditions of Japan have been such as to encourage ideological revolt.

This is not to say that the Japanese people are docile and obedient to the point of timidity, or even of indifference to political issues. Their history shows many instances where brave men have suffered misery and death in defense of their political or religious beliefs. But we should be deceiving ourselves if we thought that the present-day Japanese are fundamentally opposed to autocratic forms of government and are awaiting the day when they can reverse the current totalitarian trend and set up democratic institutions. The mass of the people have very little knowledge of what democracy means; and conversation with highly educated and enlightened Japanese of a liberal turn of mind usually reveals that, whatever dissatisfaction they may feel with the present régime, they would not propose as a remedy a further attempt to build up a parliamentary government, even of the nineteenth-century model, on a social foundation which is not suited to receive it. Such attempts have been made in the past, but have failed. Liberalism has never secured a firm foothold in Japan, and it has never, even in its short seasons of success, been a force working against an expansionist foreign policy. The truth seems to be that what we in our countries call a democratic outlook is organically related to Christianity; and perhaps it is not seriously falsifying the picture to say crudely that the

essential difference between Japan and Western democracies is that Japan is not a Christian country. She has a highly developed social organism, supported by an admirable social ethic; but it emphasizes the duty of the citizen to the community, not the duty of the individual to himself, and still less the community's duties to the individual.

Given these conditions it is easy to understand how the Japanese people have now come to accept a form of government of which they do not necessarily approve. But it is not easy to judge the measure of their disapproval. Since the beginning of the war against China, they have been subjected to a gradually increasing degree of restriction and discomfort which today begins to amount to hardship — but not to unbearable hardship. Some essential commodities including foodstuffs are rationed, and there are shortages of others. They have been harried by a propaganda campaign for "National Spiritual Mobilization" which seems not to have evoked any enthusiastic response. And they have to tolerate a great deal of petty regulation and interference exercised not only by officials but also by a vast army of private busybodies. There is a rigid censorship; there is even a high official whose title is Thought Controller. The powers of the police and the gendarmerie combined operate with something like the methods of the Gestapo, though not perhaps with its sinister and comprehensive efficiency; and in general there is a good deal of the espionage and secret denunciation which characterize life under autocracy.

On *a priori* grounds, therefore, one would be inclined to say that there must be a great deal of popular dissatisfaction in Japan, and no doubt there is. But there has so far been no sign whatever of active discontent, to say nothing of concerted popular opposition. Probably the best and briefest way to describe the frame of mind of the Japanese people today is to say that they accept the present situation reluctantly but patiently, that they have no great enthusiasm for the New Order at home, but that they are not disposed to resist it and, even if they were so disposed, they have not the necessary political training and experience or the requisite political leaders.

It must always be remembered in thinking of Japan that it is a geographically isolated country, inhabited by a very homogeneous people, and that these are factors which make for national unity, for solidarity against the outside world. Racial conscious-

ness does not have to be created. It is there in the nature of things. And, although it is much to the credit of the Japanese that as individuals they are normally free from xenophobia and welcome foreigners in their country with spontaneous kindness, it cannot be denied that the very marked differences of race and color, language and tradition between them and Western peoples make it easy for a feeling of "encirclement" to arise, and for antagonism against Westerners to be fostered. Such feelings are indeed more natural and rational than the international hatreds that have been stimulated in Europe by far less defensible racial doctrines. One is thus bound to conclude that there is so far in Japan no sign of a trend of popular opinion or an intellectual movement which might in propitious circumstances produce a strong reaction against the present form of government because of the foreign policy now being pursued. Judging from past history one would be disposed to argue that Japan has shown herself immune to social revolution. The political reform of 1868 was in essence not a revolution but a restoration; it came from above and not from below and as a social revolution it was incomplete, if not abortive. Since that date there have been a few small popular risings, but these were very limited in scope and should properly be described as sporadic local riots rather than as national movements. They certainly cannot be taken as evidence that there is a potential factor of social revolution in the temper of the Japanese public. The rising of May 1932 was to some extent agrarian in origin, but essentially it was a reactionary putsch. The attempted coup d'état of February 1936 was definitely a military mutiny with political aims; far from having any popular origin, it was stimulated by the results of a parliamentary election, which were thought by certain military groups to be a verdict against the costly expansionist policy promoted by the army.

It would appear then that the present strains upon the political, economic and social structure of Japan are not sufficient in kind or in intensity to provoke any hostile popular reaction; and if a reaction is to come it is improbable that it will be other than a popular reaction. Other forces that might, at one time or another, have resisted Japan's march along the totalitarian road seem definitely to have conformed, or at least to have abandoned any hope of stemming the advance. The first position which the liberals might have defended was provided by a constitutional issue as to the powers of the Diet. It centered on the so-called

“organic theory,” which maintained that Parliament exercised its functions as an independent organ of the State and not as an instrument of the Emperor. The chief proponent of this theory was a courageous liberal professor, Dr. Minobe, who was attacked by reactionary elements in the government, deprived of his seat in the Diet and his chair at the University, while his books were banned. When this battle was lost by the liberals of the academic and parliamentary worlds, the purely juridical obstacles to the development of an authoritarian state were swept away. A similar surrender was forced upon the leading industrialists and bankers, who submitted to successive steps in a planned economy which in the end left them denuded of most of the power which they had formerly held. Since this class favored *laissez-faire* principles — which obviously could not survive under the degree of regulation of manufacturing, trade and foreign exchange required for the prosecution of the war — it was destined sooner or later to abandon its position.

As for the bureaucracy, its older members were as a rule reluctant to go along with the army leaders, who were all for rapid and drastic changes, each of them a step towards a centralized, corporate state designed principally for waging war. They struggled and temporized, but little by little they gave way to the new forces, some of them explaining rather apologetically that it was a mistake to endanger national unity by clashing head-on with the extremists. The best thing, they felt, was to step aside and let the momentum of the radical movement exhaust itself. This “wave of the future” reading of political history in the making naturally ended in the complete victory of the forces which the liberals had not sufficient conviction and drive to check or even to moderate. The methods of *jujitsu*, when applied to politics, apparently do not work; a true resultant of opposed forces can be obtained only when opponents strike blow for blow, and thus hammer out a solution. All the same, it must be remembered that even had the cautious and liberal elements in the bureaucracy, in industry and finance and among the intelligentsia put up a fight they would have had to meet strong opposition within their own spheres, for the prospects of a new order attracted great numbers of ambitious young men, who were not only temperamentally disposed to vigorous action but were also tempted by the prospect of ousting their seniors, gaining promotion and exercising power.

Such liberal forces as might have stood out against the new leaders of Japan are therefore now in retreat. Some have merely gone to ground, some have been won over, and others are co-operating, unwillingly perhaps and with private reservations, but coöperating none the less. Consequently, there is effective unity on the home front in Japan today. The question then arises: What will be the reaction of the Japanese people if further strains are imposed upon them by further overseas adventures? This is not an easy question to answer for it at once involves us in speculation as to what Japan's plans are. However, we may assume one of two things: either she will continue her southward expansion so gradually as not to involve herself in the European war; or she will become a direct participant in that conflict, thereby turning the Pacific into a belligerent zone.

Let us assume for a moment that she chooses the first alternative and preserves her non-belligerency. In that event the problem is mainly economic, and the reaction of the Japanese people will depend largely upon the nation's economic balance sheet as it affects their life and work. The material cost to Japan of her current program, which presumably does not involve any excessive new burden of expenditure, is likely to be offset by certain material as well as psychological gains. The shortage of rice resulting from two bad crops can be made good by imports from Indo-China and Thailand, and other advantages of this nature will accrue from her growing influence in those regions. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that her immense investments in Manchuria are at last beginning to show a return, for it is reported that promising iron-ore deposits are now being worked and that the exploitation of certain other supplies from Manchuria as well as China is being better organized. It is true that embargoes and the loss of foreign trade because of the war in Europe have seriously damaged Japan's economic fabric; but it looks as if good temporary repairs had been made. We may therefore expect, in the absence of any strong evidence to the contrary, that so long as Japan maintains her non-belligerency she will have no great difficulty in supplying her people with an adequate minimum of commodities on the simple and inexpensive standard to which they are conditioned. After all, this is an elementary precaution which any efficient government must take; and despite some blunders, such as a needless irritation of public sentiment in the shape of rather silly sumptuary rules, it has

gradually schooled Japanese people during the last few years to accept wartime discomforts and annoyances which, until recent months at least, had not yet reached the degree of hardship already being suffered without complaint by other nations in far more desperate plights. Judging by past events, what might possibly goad the Japanese masses into some kind of revolt would be a grave food shortage definitely attributable to mistaken government policies. But of this there seems little likelihood.

As for psychological fatigue and sheer war-weariness, one guess is as good as another. Yet there is no obvious reason why one should expect the Japanese people to break under a strain which by the most up-to-date standards of frightfulness is mild indeed. If the plans of the Japanese Government go wrong, if it should turn out that the gaps in the national economy cannot be repaired by drawing upon supplies in Southeastern Asia — where negotiations are now going on — then a new set of domestic conditions would arise and the people might justly become angry with their rulers and turn upon them. But all this is mere speculation, and nobody can foretell what form the popular reaction might take. It might easily produce not a popular uprising but a still more drastic and repressive government.

The case is different if we assume that Japan becomes involved in a large-scale war in the Pacific without first extricating herself from China. But here also questions of strategy rather than of politics are at issue, for the degree of strain to which Japan's economic and social structure would be subjected must depend upon the nature of the conflict. It is for strategists to predict what form that conflict would take, and what military and economic results it would produce. On these points a layman's views are of little value. Should the struggle develop as a distant and protracted blockade of Japan, it might in the long run damage her internal economy enough to produce violent opposition to the present régime. But nobody who is aware of the loyalty and unity of the Japanese people will expect them, under those circumstances, to crack under any but the most intolerable strain. Unless and until such a point were reached, the effect of hostile action against Japan would be to close the ranks of the Japanese. As evidence on this point it is useful to recall that, as the war against China developed, the Japanese authorities used strong propaganda to direct popular animosity, not against the Chinese, but against third Powers, notably Great Britain. They knew that there was

no national enthusiasm for the war against China but only a disciplined resignation to it; but they also knew that they could stimulate war feeling by crying that Japan was in reality being attacked by the British. The anti-British campaigns, which have grown in intensity as the war has dragged on, cannot be fully explained on any other grounds.

Should hostilities develop into large-scale naval actions, their results would no doubt speedily determine the fate of the present Japanese Government. For it is clear that while it would gain strength in direct proportion to its success in successfully resisting enemy attacks, so also would it fall if Japan were defeated. It would be rapidly ejected, being perhaps replaced by an administration more popular and representative; but it might just as likely be succeeded by an emergency government of anything but popular complexion. One cannot judge of the strength of political forces until they have been tested in political conflict, any more than one can judge of the strength of armies until they have given battle.

From the arguments set forth above it would appear that we cannot forecast in the near future any important change in the policy of the Japanese Government because of the pressure of public opinion. There may be modifications here and there in policy at home and abroad, and some of these may be dictated by regard for popular sentiment; but they will be only the minor concessions of a prudent autocracy concerned to maintain a united home front, and not changes made at popular instigation. Similarly, we may conclude that, so long as hostilities are in progress, the Japanese people will remain united even under very great strain. It would be unwise to count upon a social revolution in Japan to bring about her military defeat. A military defeat might well contribute to a social revolution — but that is a vastly different matter. We have very little precedent for judging what form such a social revolution would take. It might include violence and civil disturbance; but it might equally well be achieved by one of those feats of compromise for which the Japanese have a remarkable aptitude. This is all that can be safely predicated of Japan's future political development, save that the defeat of totalitarian states in Europe will be more cogent than any other argument in persuading Japan to revise her present principles of government.

NEW YORK LOOKS ABROAD

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

YEARS ago, I remember, an employee at the New York Customs House was filling out some paper for me. He asked where I had been born. "New York," I replied. "Yes," he said, "but which town?" Apparently it didn't cross his mind that I might have been born in New York City. His instinctive reaction was reasonable enough. For a century the tides of European immigration into the United States had channelled through the Narrows and dispersed on the piers of Chelsea, Weehawken and Brooklyn. Each tide had left such a deposit in the port of arrival that native New Yorkers had become the exception. When Peter Stuyvesant surrendered New Amsterdam to the English in 1664 it was a place of less than 1,500 souls. At the close of the Revolution the population was still only a little over 22,000. In each succeeding decade or so the figure doubled, until by a hundred years ago it reached 312,000. Today it is over seven millions. If we add the population of nine adjacent counties whose daily life centers almost wholly in the city, the total passes the twelve million mark — one-tenth of the nation.

Even in its beginnings New York was a mosaic. Eighteen languages were spoken in the streets of New Amsterdam, including Dutch, French, Swedish, English, German, Polish, Bohemian, Portuguese and Italian. Religious discrimination was rare. There was no witch hunting. Indeed, many persons who found New England insupportable moved to Long Island and the shores of Pelham Bay in order to enjoy the religious freedom of the New Netherlands. The town's cosmopolitan and easy-going character was not materially altered by nearly a century of English rule. As in the other British colonies, political institutions took shape along Anglo-Saxon lines, but the population remained mixed and kept the traits usual in a place where many races congregate — liveliness, bustle, resourcefulness and, on the whole, tolerance.

The ethnic picture did not alter much immediately after the

Editor's Note. Earlier articles in this series have been: "The Pacific Coast Looks Abroad," by Chester H. Rowell, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, January 1940; "The Middle West Looks Abroad," by W. W. Waymack, April 1940; and "The South Looks Abroad," by Virginus Dabney, October 1940.

British troops and their Tory friends quit New York in 1783. The war left surprisingly little bad feeling on either side, and most of the early arrivals in the following years were English and Scotch. The waves of mass immigration from other lands did not commence until the forties and fifties. The first to arrive in quantities were the Irish, escaping their poverty-stricken isle, especially following the potato famine of 1845. The Germans began to come in real numbers about the same time, most of them peasants and artisans, but some of them intellectuals fleeing what would now be called the "white" counter-revolution after 1848.¹ Then came the wave of Italians, beginning in the '80s and reaching a high point in the opening years of the twentieth century.

By this time the Irish were becoming contractors and politicians, and the Italians took over from them the job of digging the ditches, carrying the hods and laying the rails to accommodate America's expanding industry. In New York, as in other towns, many of the Italians opened up little shops. So did the Jews. Many Jews had come earlier to the United States from Germany, not for racial reasons, but moved by the same general impulses which influenced other Germans. The later Jewish immigration was mainly from Russia, following that country's adoption of restrictive laws in 1882 and as pogroms became more and more frequent. The peasants who emigrated from Russia, Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe usually went on to the mines or factories in Pennsylvania or Ohio, or to the agricultural plains of the west. But the Jews tended to stay in New York. Many of those who did not open shops entered the rapidly expanding garment trade, which today, as a result, is one of the city's greatest industries, clothing three-quarters of the women of America and making four-fifths of their furs and feathers and jewelry.²

The Irish and the Italians and the Jews came in such swarms that New York became the greatest Irish city in the world,

¹ There was another wave of German immigration after the Franco-Prussian War, this time largely of industrial workers. The early Socialist movement in the United States was mainly the creation of the German element. Until the '50s the Germans in New York were mostly Democrats, but they then became Republicans because they opposed slavery and favored homestead legislation. The Irish on the whole remained Democrats. Many of them fought in the Union Army. Other Irish elements were anti-abolitionist out of fear that Negro freedmen would take over their unskilled labor jobs. They were chiefly responsible for the Draft Riots of 1863. (Cf. Carl Wittke, "We Who Built America." New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939, p. 170 and 221.)

² On the life of the various national groups in New York see an interesting article in *Fortune* for July 1939.

ahead of Dublin, the greatest Italian city in the world, ahead of Rome, and the world's Jewish "capital," with half of all the Jews in America and over an eighth of the total in the world. Today three out of every four people you meet in the street in New York are immigrants or the children of immigrants. This compares with a 1930 census figure for the United States as a whole of one out of three.

The surprising thing is that in spite of such apparently overwhelming dilutions the population matrix of New York should have retained a predominantly English character. The hardy Dutch strain also persists. Remarkably enough, the names of the original settlers from Holland still figure in contemporary New York life along with the names of the respectable English families that were conspicuous in the city's business and banking in the early nineteenth century. The old stock does not hold its own, of course, to the same extent as in Boston, where until recently all seven members of the Harvard Corporation belonged to families which had served the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for six or seven generations. Nevertheless, many trustees and directors of New York organizations have names that figured, or might easily have figured, on the annual reports of similar organizations in the years before or just after the Revolution.

Despite this, the steady evolution of the city has until recently been towards a complication of racial characteristics rather than towards their simplification. Even apparently dyed-in-the-wool New Yorkers add to the diversity, for they almost invariably turn out to have been born in Louisiana or Minnesota or New Mexico, which means that they have transplanted here at least something of their distinctive racial strains and cultural backgrounds. In addition to the nationalities already mentioned, we have experienced large or considerable immigrations of Hungarians, Czechs, Greeks, Scandinavians, Syrians, Croatians, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. We have a Chinatown, a great Negro quarter, and districts where the shop signs are predominantly in Spanish or Armenian or any one of a dozen other languages. Many of these people read of events back in the "old country," as well as of doings in the local colony, in papers printed in their own language. At the present time, approximately 200 foreign language newspapers and magazines are published in New York. They are of all political persuasions. Some of them are religious organs, for the church means a great deal to a newcomer in a strange land.

A few have ideological leanings — Fascist, Nazi, Communist. But the largest and most successful newspapers, though in several cases radical, profess to be thoroughly American.

Now that mass immigration to the United States has been stopped, the melting-pot process, working inexorably with each day's births and deaths, will gradually overcome the results which such an enormous and prolonged and diversified influx of humanity has had on the character of the city. The dribblets of refugees from Hitler's terror at present reaching our shores will not interfere with the process. Many of them are individually eminent in art, literature and science, and hence would be conspicuous wherever they happened to be. But they merely add to the cosmopolitan appearance of contemporary New York life. Their numbers are negligible in a city of over seven millions. Nature and the public school system will accomplish their work thoroughly in another generation or so.

In the meanwhile, however, New York remains without doubt the largest and most self-consciously diverse conglomeration of races and tongues ever gathered together in one spot on the earth's surface. This precludes any simple statement about what is in its mind when it "looks abroad." It does not forget its own earlier self — its Dutch and British childhood, its sedate early nineteenth century adolescence. It is not unconscious of the blood it has drawn from every state in the Union. Its heart is continuously tugged at, too, by memories of "old countries" all over the globe — Midlands factory town and Hamburg waterfront, steppe and pampas, ghetto and mountain chalet, fjord and loch and blue Mediterranean bay. New York is Cosmopolis. To it nothing anywhere — no event, no idea — is wholly alien. This may be a weakness or a strength. Critics will at any rate agree that it is New York's outstanding characteristic.

II

It would be wrong, however, to imagine that the people of New York examine events abroad with especial interest only out of a vague nostalgia or as propagandists for a particular race or political system. Their material occupations, intellectual interests and pleasures have international ramifications which remind them constantly of their dependence on foreign markets and of their debt to foreign cultures.

The cotton picker in Alabama, the automobile worker in

Michigan, the wheat farmer in Kansas, all depend on exports for part of their daily work. Hence economic conditions in foreign lands affect their economic conditions. Earlier articles in this series have indicated that realization of the fact seems to be making progress all over the country, even in regions usually considered obdurately isolationist. But the process, like any educational process, is bound to be slow. The man in the cotton or wheat field can hardly see even as far as the cotton factor in Memphis or the wheat trader in Chicago. The miner or glass worker can only with the greatest difficulty look beyond Pittsburgh, Detroit and Cleveland to the final destinations of the various highly specialized finished products for which his labor has been responsible. They do not even see the cargo-ships that put in to American harbors to carry those products abroad. Thus their experience is very different from that of people who live in a busy seaport and receive daily visual demonstrations of the meaning to them all, directly or at second hand, of foreign commerce and the banking, factoring, railroading, trucking and unloading which make that commerce possible. Of all American seaports New York is the greatest, and the people of no other American city, as a result, are more keenly aware that their daily business pulse beats as part of the world blood stream.

New York is the greatest port not merely in the United States but in the world. In the old days a multitude of sailing ships used to whiten the harbor with their sails, and their masts and rigging formed a forest along its shores. "City of ships!" cried Walt Whitman, "City of the world! City of the sea!" The sailing ships were gradually replaced by liners and freighters and tankers, and these have just been supplemented by the transatlantic "Clippers" of Pan American Airways, today almost the last mail connection between the Old World and the New. In a normal year 10,000 vessels come to New York's 695 piers.³ They carry 35 percent of the nation's exports and 50 percent of the nation's imports. The President of the Merchants' Association has estimated that over 700,000 of the city's population, that is to say 10 percent, depend in one way or another on foreign trade for their livelihood.⁴ In addition, the produce exchanges of New York deal in commodities from all parts of the world, and the Stock Exchange as of January 1, 1941, listed 323 bonds and stocks

³ Cf. report by R. B. Rankin, of the New York Municipal Reference Library, 1929.

⁴ *Bankers Magazine*, January 1939.

of foreign governments and foreign industrial companies. Each year New York banks clear checks from all over the world to a total of more than 160 billion dollars.

Over the years, the vessels visiting the port of New York carried not only cargoes which made profits for New York shippers, handlers and financiers, they also carried passengers with news and ideas. Assiduous reporters questioned these travellers about everything under the sun. Was the cholera spreading in France? Had Dickens really called us half-civilized when he got home from his American trip? Was Napoleon III (who once had lived in Eighth Street) set on making war? Would Woodrow Wilson compromise on Fiume? Does Mussolini sleep badly at night? The travellers brought news, too, about the outlook for the franc, for Brazil's coffee crop, for the Danubian wheat harvest, for the oil output in the Caucasus. The New York newspapers report all this fully, as well as the more prosaic details about shipping and mails. The two great morning dailies also print a greater volume of cable and wireless news from other countries than is supplied to the population of any other city in the world.

To New York, too, come the world's leading artists and singers, and in New York the cooks of every nation have set up their restaurants. Until the outbreak of the present war, the great shops showed goods not just from France, Germany and England, but from Dalmatia, Bali, Mexico, Syria, South Africa and innumerable other places. And in their little neighborhood shops the various foreign "colonies" found their own home delicacies, just as they could in many cases see in neighborhood theaters their own imported movies. Thus by a thousand channels the daily life of New York is exposed, for good or ill, to the impact of foreign cultures, whether in art, food, music, science, dress-making, literature or journalism.

In one poignant respect this is more true today than at any time since the cessation of mass immigration twenty years ago. The Europe of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini offers little room except a cell or a coffin for persons who will not conform to the Nazi or Communist mold. Many of the European leaders who struggled in the past twenty years to win or keep the right to think, write, speak, worship and work freely are now in concentration camps or dead. Some are cowed, others silently bide their time. But week by week a few manage to escape to England, Africa, Palestine, or some other refuge where, if their age and strength permit,

they can reënlist in the old struggle. Polish and Czech legions are camped today in Scotland and Palestine, and Polish fliers down Nazi planes over the Channel; "Free French" troops press forward with the Australians into Libya and span thousands of miles of jungle and desert from Gabon to Chad in order to take the fleeing Italians on another flank; Belgians who still believe in British victory organize in the Belgian Congo to help fight for it; hardy Norwegian and Dutch seamen man their own and English ships to keep England victualled and munitioned. But there are many for whom such feats are physically impossible, and some of these make their way across the Atlantic. The few who are permitted to come to the United States under our present laws land mostly in New York.

It is no new experience to New York to receive them. New York has a habit of tolerance, a confidence in its ability to fuse many strains and talents into a single whole, which goes back, as I have already suggested, to the city's very beginnings. Dozens of examples could be cited to show why New York from the start had intimate reason to know the value and meaning of religious and political tolerance. The wife of Governor Stuyvesant, Judith Bayard by name, was a member of a French Huguenot family which had sought refuge in Holland, and her grandfather had gone through the siege of Breda. Many of the Huguenot settlers in New York and its vicinity had tasted oppression even more directly. Those who settled New Rochelle gave it the name of their native Protestant stronghold, famous for all time for its heroic resistance to Richelieu. But these are merely characteristic of the many New York families and groups, of all races and in all periods, who had been oppressed at home and who sought liberty in the New World. The disorders and persecutions of the Thirty Years' War, the suppression of the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 in Scotland, the general misery caused by the Napoleonic upheaval, Irish resentment against the abuses of absentee landlordism and alien government, the aftermath of '48 in Germany and in the Hapsburg Empire, the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the reactionary decrees of the Tsarist Government from '81 onwards, the nationalistic ferment throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans — all these and many other similar developments made millions of Europeans want to leave their ancestral homes and led them to turn hopeful eyes across the Atlantic.

New York, the port where so many of these people landed and where so many of them stayed, finds no difficulty in imagining what has been endured by the later refugees who now are fleeing similar troubles in Europe. The statesmen, socialists, priests and pastors of the German Republic, the Austrian legitimists and labor leaders, the Jewish rabbis, bankers and journalists, the "Free French" who will not surrender either to Hitler or to his French servants, the Czech and Polish patriots, the representatives of Norwegian and Dutch royalty, the anti-Fascist Italians, the former officials of the Spanish Republic, the anti-Bolshevik Latvians and Finns, do not tell us a new story. What we hear from Ignace Jan Paderewski, Count Sforza, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Julio del Vayo, Alexis Léger, Paul van Zeeland and Otto of Hapsburg our parents and grandparents heard from Louis Napoleon, Carl Schurz, Louis Kossuth, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. The chapter our generation writes in New York's history is like the other chapters. And it is a history, we like to think, no less typically American than any tale of the western frontier.

III

The whole story still has not been told. New York does not look abroad only through immigrant eyes or in terms of foreign business, shipping and culture. From its skyscrapers its office workers and business executives look out across the fortified Narrows onto a sea which they do not think of as a vast and empty expanse on a map — a barrier — but as a busy highway. They know that this highway runs both ways, and they have begun to comprehend that sea power regulates its traffic.

New York also looks up into the skies. It knows that in case of war the whole Eastern seaboard would be more exposed than inland cities to enemy attack not only from the sea but from the air. It knows that its importance as the country's chief port and business and financial center would single it out in enemy eyes as a particularly valuable objective, while its population density and the concentration of its industries would make it a good target. This is no less true now than it was in the last war. An abundance of skilled labor has attracted many of the greatest defense industries to the New York area, stretching along the coast from Bridgeport to Bayonne, where the largest graving dock in the country is now to be constructed. The Brooklyn Navy Yard,

always a principal naval base, is being expanded rapidly to permit the construction of 45,000 ton battleships. Further, since the city depends largely for power on a few giant stations within its own limits, its ability to move and work would be gravely handicapped if they were destroyed. Its great bridges and its aqueducts are also vulnerable. Experts say that the New York skyscrapers are not particularly susceptible to damage by bombs. But so-called aerial torpedoes of the type employed in some of the German raids on London might be very effective against our tall buildings, as their impact is lateral.

At present the risk of direct air attack on New York from across the Atlantic is not very great. But the words "at present" and "from across the Atlantic" must be emphasized. We do not know what improvements in airplane design are possible, and there are other means of reaching our shores than by flying all the way.

The closest point to America in what might be called Europe proper is Ireland: from Foynes to New York is about 3,000 miles.⁵ Our own best Martin bomber can fly about 5,300 miles. But this is without bomb load. Its limit with a 3-ton load is about 1,200 miles. In the present war, the longest known bombing raids so far have been those from England on Venice, a distance of about 800 miles, or a round trip of 1,600 miles, one way fully loaded, the return unloaded. Mr. T. P. Wright, of the Curtiss-Wright Company, predicted last year that the range of civil airplanes would be increased about 30 percent in the next ten years — 15 percent by speed increases resulting in savings in fuel, 10 percent by reductions in specific fuel consumption, and 5 percent by reductions in structural weight.⁶ Presumably these advances might be made more quickly under pressure of war conditions, and might be improved upon for special types of bombers to say 50 percent.

But even if the range of an enemy plane comparable to the Martin bomber were at once increased by the full 50 percent, it still would be able to travel something less than 1,800 miles with a 3-ton bomb load, and could not undertake a round-trip raid totalling more than, say, 2,200 or 2,400 miles. That is not sufficient even to enable a "suicide squad" to make a one-way trip,

⁵ The shortest distance across the southern Atlantic, from Bathurst to Natal, is 1,835 miles. Obviously German or Italian bases in northern Brazil or in French, Dutch or British Guiana would jeopardize the security of the Panama Canal, and hence of the whole United States. But that is a problem with which this article is not concerned.

⁶ *Aviation*. March 1940.

with a full complement of bombs, across the full width of the North Atlantic. The range would be increased, however, if the plane carried fewer or lighter missiles. Incendiary bombs are comparatively light. So are machine guns and their ammunition; and strafing by machine gunners can cause great havoc in crowded areas, as the civilian populations of several countries can testify. Incidentally, the German planes which raided Iceland in February did not drop bombs but did use machine guns. There also remains the possibility that the invention of some revolutionary type of engine may decrease the fuel load and hence extend the operating radius of fully loaded bombing planes to an unforeseen degree. We cannot count on this *not* happening.

What about possible enemy bases closer than Ireland? The Azores are 2,380 miles from New York, considerably nearer than Ireland, and air conditions on this route are more favorable than they are further north. Even so, a round trip from the Azores to New York and back is not practicable for a heavily loaded bomber of any present standard type that we know about. The chief danger to the United States from a German occupation of the Azores would be that planes operating from there would prey on American shipping and spot our naval movements. Iceland and Labrador lie much closer to our shores. According to Stefansson and other Arctic experts, climatic conditions there hinder their use as regular air bases rather less than is commonly supposed. They certainly might serve as "stepping stones" for enemy aircraft. An enemy established in Newfoundland would of course be a direct menace. The Canadians have now improved their defenses of that territory. We also are beginning to construct a base there under the Anglo-American agreement of September 2, 1940.

Unfortunately, bases do not tell the whole story. So long as the United States does not have a navy able to command both the Atlantic and the Pacific against any possible combination of hostile navies its coasts remain vulnerable to attack by planes launched from aircraft carriers in midocean. New Yorkers may be permitted to examine this problem with less detachment than their cousins in Montana, Minnesota and Missouri.

The present German and Italian fleets together would be no match for the whole American Navy. But this statement fails to take two vital factors into account. One is the present and possible future rôle of the British Navy and the remaining units of

the French Navy. The other is the present and possible future rôle of the Japanese Navy. If a friendly British fleet no longer guarded the Atlantic, and if the greater part of the American Navy were detained by urgent business in the Pacific, then a hostile German-Italian fleet, reinforced perhaps by captured British and French units, would command the Atlantic. Enemy raiders could sink shipping up and down our coast and enemy submarines would lurk off Sandy Hook, the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, and other Atlantic gateways. Above all, individual enemy units could easily operate far enough out in the Atlantic to launch planes for surprise air attacks on New York and other great coastal centers.

In these circumstances the portions of the American naval force which were free for service in the Atlantic would of course hamper the movement of enemy warships in nearby waters; and our growing air fleet would of course attempt to locate and destroy the enemy aircraft carriers and would engage any of their planes that dared approach our shores. Even so, shipping in and out of New York harbor would be subject to sporadic attack by surface raiders and to fairly regular submarine attack, and the city itself would have to expect to undergo bombing raids from the air.

IV

Although the northern and middle Atlantic seaboard would be the first to suffer from enemy action in case of war, the people living here seem to be at least abreast of the country as a whole in their willingness to assume the risks of war in defense of what they consider the national interest. Nor are they discouraged at the prospect of contributing their share for national defense. It is a very large share. Federal collection districts do not coincide exactly with New York City limits. But roughly one can say that though only about one-twentieth of the population of the United States live in New York City proper they contribute about one-fifth of the total sum raised through the individual Federal income tax.

The Gallup Poll provides us with interesting indications of New York opinion on these matters. So does the record of the New York delegation in Congress on repeal of the arms embargo and on the lend-lease bill.

The findings of the poll published on December 29, 1940,

showed that although the vast majority of Americans want the United States to stay out of the war if possible, 60 percent of those consulted felt that it was more important to help England than to stay out. The area which includes New York (New England and the Middle Atlantic states) was not so strongly of this opinion as either the Southern states (75 percent favorable to helping England even at the risk of war) or the Western states (65 percent favorable). Nevertheless it favored the bolder course by 62 percent. The areas which reduced the national percentage were the East Central and the West Central states, which voted in favor of aid to Britain at the risk of war by only 54 percent.

American opinion on the lend-lease bill, as revealed in the Gallup Poll published February 12, 1941, was divided along somewhat similar lines. The national average was favorable to the bill by 54 percent (with 15 percent giving qualified answers, 22 percent replying "no," and 9 percent having no opinion). The vote of the area which includes New York almost exactly coincided with the national vote.⁷

In May 1940, at the beginning of "all-out" war in Europe, only 36 percent of the people had favored help to England at the risk of war, while 64 percent had favored staying out at any cost. In the eight months from May to December 1940 the two points of view changed places almost exactly. Doubtless the influence of the newspapers and magazines published in New York, and of New York columnists and publicists, helped bring about this evolution in national opinion. *The New York Times* and *The New York Herald Tribune* are in a sense national organs, with nationwide influence. *The Times*, in particular, is read by editorial writers everywhere. Although both of these papers opposed the New Deal and the third term, they have supported the broad lines of President Roosevelt's foreign policy, especially aid to Britain. So also, in general, have weeklies as different as *Time* and *Life*, *The New Republic* and *The Nation*. Radio commentators speaking from New York, especially Raymond Gram Swing, Dorothy Thompson and Elmer Davis, have pointed out the relationship of daily events in Europe to our long-range national interests. So have various organizations which carry on country-

⁷ On the matter of defense expenditures New York opinion has coincided fairly closely with the average national opinion. On May 27, 1940, the Gallup Poll asked whether voters favored President Roosevelt's recent request to Congress to increase defense appropriations by another billion dollars. The country favored the increase by 86 percent. The area including New York was for it by 87 percent.

wide educational work in international relations and which have their headquarters in New York — the Foreign Policy Association, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the American Association for Adult Education, the League of Nations Association, etc. The newsreel releases, most of which are edited in New York, usually lean over backwards to avoid being accused of partisanship. The "March of Time," however, is not afraid to be definitely anti-Nazi, and several of its releases have been effective arguments for a vigorous defense of American democracy.

Along with the discussion of foreign issues in the press and over the air has gone a lively exchange of proclamations, "open letters" and newspaper advertisements signed by conflicting groups of American publicists, business men and professors. Many of these have been stimulated by rival organizations established during the past year to argue or deny that the United States has a cultural, moral, political, economic and financial stake in Hitler's defeat. New York has become the center of this verbal warfare. Thus the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies established its national headquarters in New York, even though its chairman hailed from Kansas — the editor of the *Emporia Gazette*, William Allen White. A rival organization, the America First Committee, supported by Henry Ford and headed by General Robert E. Wood, soon afterwards set up headquarters in Chicago. But it has looked to New York for professional advertising counsellors and it has enlisted the support of certain New York business men who enjoy the prospect of profitable transactions with a Hitlerized Europe — without, needless to say, having bothered to inform themselves about what happened to their counterparts in German business and industry once these had helped install Hitler in power. Like the William Allen White group, the Chicago committee carried its case to the New York public by means of full-page advertisements in the papers. One of these, appealing to Americans to "stop our Government's sending its planes, guns and ships to belligerents across the sea," appeared in *The New York Times* on October 3.

But it was the No Foreign War Committee that was meant to act as the shock troops of the isolationist army. Following the example of the William Allen White group its backers imported a "country editor," Verne Marshall, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and opened up headquarters in a New York hotel. The new organization also undertook an educational campaign by means of adver-

tisements in the New York newspapers. Fortunately for those having a different conception of American interests, Mr. Marshall managed to make every mistake of judgment that they could wish, ending up by revealing that one of the chief backers of the No Foreign War Committee was an international oil speculator who had been engaged in various deals with the Nazi Government. Its other backers hurriedly began disowning it. Colonel Lindbergh announced on January 17, 1941, that though he had "attended a number of conferences" when the Committee was being formed by Mr. Marshall, he did not agree with its "methods and policies," and he cancelled the speech which was to have opened the campaign in St. Louis. The chief result of the semi-eclipse of the No Foreign War Committee was to force isolationist strategists who had planned to stay in the background to assume a rather more public rôle. The staff work continues to be directed partly from Chicago and partly from Washington, but the real center of activity is New York, where Ex-President Hoover, one of the chief isolationist strategists, has established personal headquarters at the Waldorf-Astoria.

Coming to New York on February 20, 1941, to drum up opposition to the lend-lease bill, Senators Wheeler and Nye, respectively from Montana and North Dakota, told a Mecca Temple rally of the America First Committee and the Keep America Out of War Congress that the bill's purpose was to put the United States into the war. Senator Wheeler said that "the great mass of Americans, whether they live in New York City or in Butte, Montana," are against fighting for "empty meaningless slogans." Both Senators attacked "international bankers." Norman Thomas, Socialist, also spoke. Anti-Semitic cries from the audience had to be rebuked by the Chairman, John T. Flynn, Scripps-Howard columnist. The names of President Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie and Secretary of War Stimson were loudly booed, as was that of Winston Churchill. Mention of England also elicited boos and hisses. If there was any unfriendly demonstration at mention of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin it was too small to be heard over the radio, which however reproduced plainly the catcalls against England.⁸

New Yorkers look on all this activity as merely tit for tat. They

⁸ Cf. *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune* and *New York Post* February 21, 1941. Senator Wheeler (*New York Times*, February 23) denounced as "untrue" the suggestion that the meeting had been "un-American." But he entered no specific denial regarding any of the individual grounds for criticism noted above.

cannot resent the West's attempts to indoctrinate them with isolationist dogma when so many channels of publicity radiate from New York. They do find it mildly amusing, however, that not the "effete East" but the "virile West" gives an impression of pessimism about the country's ability to survive whatever grim ordeals may lie ahead, and that descendants of the pioneers rather than their more sedentary cousins most often imply that they consider any peace better than any war. Recalling repeated warnings that the rest of the country is violently allergic to advice and pressure from New York, they are tempted to ask why gentlemen from Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and California should expect the big bad metropolis not to be just as suspicious of Western propaganda as the West is when what it calls "a Wall Street representative" visits what he calls "the sticks."

Now I myself never happen to have heard New Yorkers express annoyance over efforts by the rest of the country to educate them, though it is true that I have heard complaints that so many of the professors have such a poor record as prophets. The people who assure us today with the utmost confidence that the British fleet is not a factor in the American scheme of defense are often the same who assured us just as confidently that there was not going to be a war. As recently as the summer of 1939 the Administration tried to change the Neutrality Law so as to permit Britain and France to buy arms in this country. The successful opposition of the isolationists was based on the argument that the move was unnecessary, because warnings of impending war were poppycock; that if war should by any chance actually materialize we would be indifferent to the result; and that anyway we would run more risks in letting the British and French buy arms from us than we would run in coping single-handed with the Nazis following an Allied defeat. The late Senator Borah of Idaho made the classic claim at this time that he had better sources of information about the real situation in Europe (where he had never so much as set foot) than President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull and the whole foreign service of the United States Government. Senator Nye of North Dakota on July 29 made an attack in the Senate on those who saw war coming in Europe. "The information of our scaremongers," he said, "has obviously been bad — very, very bad." On August 17 he expressed the opinion that the refusal of Congress to repeal the arms embargo had made a European war less likely than ever.

War in Europe took the isolationists by surprise, then, when it came only a few weeks later, but they remained undaunted. Some said it was a "phony" war; it didn't follow the familiar World War pattern and apparently too few people were killed in the early stages to make it seem "real." Others, including Henry Ford, laid responsibility for the war on "greedy financial groups" in Europe. Hitler and Mussolini, in Mr. Ford's eyes, were mere "puppets." Others put the responsibility on President Roosevelt because he had not placed the influence of the United States Government behind further efforts at appeasement. Often the persons who said this were the same who had criticized Neville Chamberlain for his "betrayal" of the Czechs at Munich. Senator Nye, who had fought the arms embargo against Spain, fought the repeal of the arms embargo against Great Britain and France. Some Senators, including the late Mr. Lundeen of Minnesota, called the war imperialistic, and in the same breath suggested that while the British and French were occupied with the Nazis the United States ought to seize their possessions in the Caribbean. Colonel Lindbergh, a rigid isolationist towards Europe (and Asia?), proclaimed the whole Western Hemisphere "our domain" and suggested that Canadians had no right to draw part of it into a European war "simply because they prefer the Crown of England to American independence." Senator Wheeler, of Montana, deprecated attempts to "involve" us in foreign affairs. But he suggested that the President ought to "insist" that a "just peace" be worked out in Europe, and he contributed his own sketch of what the arrangement ought to be.

Once the war had actually begun the American public rejected these confusing counsels. A new resolution to repeal the arms embargo so as to permit sales on a cash and carry basis was introduced in Congress and this time approved. It passed the Senate on October 27, 1939, by 63 to 30 votes, and the House on November 3 by 244 to 171 votes. In general the chief opposition to this first decision that our interests would be served by an Allied victory came from the Middle West and West. Of the 63 "yeas" in the Senate, 24 were from the Atlantic seaboard states, 15 from

⁹ Mr. Ford's annoyed surprise that, in spite of his very great wealth, most Americans didn't accept his judgment has led him gradually to go even further. In a recent statement from his Georgia plantation he expressed the opinion that the people of Europe deserve indiscriminately to suffer because they are so "stupid." He implied that he hoped they would go on fighting until both sides collapse (what a change from the days of the Peace Ship!), and added the "sincere hope" that neither England nor the Nazis would win. If Mr. Ford read the *Daily Worker* he might be interested to find how closely his arguments parallel the Communist "party line."

of those the Southern states not included in that category, and 24 from the Central, Mountain and Pacific states. Of the 30 "nays," 9 were from the Atlantic seaboard states, 1 was from the remaining Southern states, and 20 were from the Central, Mountain and Pacific states. In other words, 48 out of the 63 affirmative votes in the Senate came from the Atlantic seaboard and the South, while 20 of the 30 negative votes came from the Middle West and West. Both New York Senators, Messrs. Wagner and Mead, voted "yea."¹⁰

In the House the geographical division was less marked. However, of the 24 Members of Congress representing districts wholly or partially in New York City, 15 voted "yea" and 4 "nay" (with 2 paired for, 2 paired against, and one not recorded), approximately 3 to 1 in favor of permitting the sale of arms. The most prominent Congressman from New York City to vote "nay" was Mr. Bruce Barton. In this, however, he was in accord with the Republican Leader in the House, Mr. Martin of Massachusetts, and the ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fish, representing a constituency in the Hudson Valley.¹¹

On the occasion of a more recent test, when the so-called lend-lease bill came up for action in the House on February 8, 1941, the New York City delegation evinced an even stronger desire to aid Britain than it had shown in November 1939, recording 17 "yeas" and 5 "nays" (one member did not vote and there was one vacancy due to the death of Kenneth Simpson). In the upper house, the same Senators in general who had opposed raising the arms embargo were against this measure. Again both the Senators from New York favored it. Testifying in favor of the bill, Mayor La Guardia remarked on February 11: "I want to be realistic and take no chances. My city won't be bombed if the British fleet holds out." These two sentences indicate only one

¹⁰ The final line-up revealed that two survivors of the death guard which had helped prevent the establishment of a strong League of Nations in 1920 — Senators Johnson of California and Borah of Idaho — were still ensconced in their same old dugouts, while two who had meanwhile died — Senators Lodge of Massachusetts and La Follette of Wisconsin — had left sons to carry on the old isolationist fight. Senator Clark, of Missouri, a son of President Wilson's rival, the late Champ Clark, also voted against the amendment of the Neutrality Law. Senator Norris, however, who voted against our entry into the war in 1917 and against the League in 1920, voted "yea" on this occasion, saying that he thought repeal of the arms embargo would increase the likelihood we could stay out of war.

¹¹ Some of Mr. Fish's constituents seem to have thought he should have known better. In 1938 he won his seat by a majority of 30,900 votes. In 1940 he was reelected by a majority of only 8,976 votes.

of the reasons why most New York legislators favor aid to Britain. But it is a strong reason. As the Mayor said on the same occasion: "It's very little comfort to the cities on the Atlantic Coast and the Pacific Coast that this country is a citadel which can never be conquered, when you explain to them that the citadel is west of the Alleghanies and east of the Rockies."

It should not be imagined from all this that New York does not contain fairly important elements which favor appeasement on one ground or another. Some are simply pacifist, either because they are of abounding and indiscriminating good will, or because they think there is nothing worse than war and death, or because they say (ignoring history from Carthage to Yorktown and Appomattox) that "war never settles anything." Some are defeatist. Some whose "property nerve" is particularly sensitive would like the war "fixed up" on any terms. Some hate President Roosevelt so much that they cannot favor any course he favors. Some hate England so much that they hate President Roosevelt. Some agree with Colonel Lindbergh in preferring peace now to a British victory later. Some join Mr. Ford in wishing that both sides would be defeated and "punished," one for seeking to conquer and despoil its rivals, the other for daring to resist being conquered and despoiled. Obviously most of the people who hold such views are not pro-Nazis or pro-Fascists. The furthest one might go is to say that many of them are Nazi and Fascist "fellow travellers" who in the moral realm are not interested in differentiations between the dictatorships and the democracies and who in the physical realm consider that American political, military and economic interests would not be affected by the victory of the former and the defeat of the latter.

In addition, of course, New York contains groups which are definitely Nazi and Fascist. There also are the Communists. No clear distinction needs to be made between these three at the present time. As earlier in France, England, Norway and the Low Countries, so today in the United States they agree in exploiting the natural fear and hate of war which exist in all civilized nations. Each supplements the activities of the others in spreading dissension, confusion and suspicion by raising irrelevant issues. Each attempts to delay and hamstring effective defense moves. Each doubtless contributes its quota of spies and

saboteurs and prepares fifth column activities for the possible day of formal conflict.

The Nazis and Fascists usually do not say openly that they are anti-democratic, merely that they wish to revise and rejuvenate the good old American traditions so as to permit collaboration between the United States and the "New Order" in Europe. Even the members of the German-American Bund wrap themselves in the American flag and quote from the Founding Fathers. The Bund's headquarters are in New York and its organ *The Free American* (with the subtitle *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*) is published here. Many of its summer camps infest New Jersey and Long Island, to the intense annoyance of the natives. But it is a national organization with well-known methods and aims and need not receive full treatment in this article.

The Communists follow a different tactic in that they by now have pretty well abandoned their former pretense of being devoted to democracy. They gloss over what they are for and emphasize what they are against. They are against "tyranny, imperialism and war" — provided, of course, it is not Communist tyranny, Communist imperialism and Communist war. The national headquarters of the Communist Party of the United States are in New York, in charge of Earl Browder, formerly Secretary of the Party and twice its candidate for President, recently sentenced to jail for passport fraud. The *Daily Worker* (circulation about 48,000) ought perhaps to have been mentioned earlier among the local newspapers having national circulation and influence. Like the weekly *New Masses* it follows a strict party line — except in the intervals when it is left momentarily breathless by one of Stalin's unexpected aberrations. The bewilderment of New York Communists and fellow travellers following the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 23, 1939, was so acute that at first they could only ignore it. After a day or so they hailed it as a move to insure peace. A week later, having lined up his Bolshevik partner, and having arranged the division of booty, Hitler drove into Poland.

Something like 250,000 residents of New York were born in Germany and some 350,000 were born in Italy. These are not all pro-Nazi or pro-Fascist by any means. Each racial group is composed of two vocal wings and a largely inert mass in the center, which tends to shift its sympathies in accordance with the prevailing news from Europe.

The largest German-language newspaper, the *Staats-Zeitung und Herald* (circulation 48,000), which belongs to the Ridder family, is conscious of the sharp antagonisms dividing the German-American community and avoids discussing the issue of German aggression or dictatorship. At least once (November 11, 1938) it condemned race hatred, and on another occasion (September 27, 1939) it indirectly criticized the Bund by deprecating relations between American citizens of German descent and official representatives of a foreign power. Usually it does not criticize the Nazi régime; but it does not praise it either. The general mass of German-Americans are more inclined to favor Hitler than the mass of Italians are to favor Mussolini. This is partly because even those who do not approve Hitler's tyrannical methods cannot help being dazzled by his successes. They try to think of him in German rather than Nazi terms. Moreover, the Nazi Government has been exceedingly busy here. The German Library of Information, with headquarters in New York, distributes printed matter widely. Nazi agents trace out with infinite care the relationships of every individual in the German-American community; and those with families in the old country are given to understand that any incautious statement or action will result in immediate retaliatory actions against those relatives by the Gestapo. Attempts to counteract these activities are being made by various liberal organizations, among them the German-American Congress for Democracy, the American Friends of German Freedom, the German Labor Delegation, etc.

The number of Germans who wish to take definite steps to transform the American Government along Nazi lines seems to be smaller than might be expected. Thus when the Republicans of the 18th Congressional District, which includes the German colony in the Yorkville neighborhood, had an opportunity last autumn to vote in the primaries for Joseph E. McWilliams, running on a frankly Nazi program praising Hitler's methods and attacking "Jewish Internationalism, Jewish Conniving, Jewish Machinations, Jewish Communism and Jewish War-mongering," they gave him only 242 votes against 568 for the anti-Nazi "regular" Republican nominee.¹²

The Italians who admire Mussolini are less vocal than Hitler's

¹² Mr. McWilliams, a native of Oklahoma, calls his group the "Christian Mobilizers." They have had connections with both the German-American Bund and Father Coughlin's "Christian Front." He has been fined for disturbing the peace, and spent a time in Bellevue Hospital, but was discharged as not being insane or feeble-minded (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 26, 1940).

admirers are, and the Italian colony as a whole has begun to look on the glories of Fascism with a slightly jaundiced eye. *Il Progresso Italo-Americano*, owned by Mr. Generoso Pope, and having a circulation of about 80,000, reveals an ambiguity in editorial and news policy which doubtless reflects the mixed feelings of its readers. Some of Mussolini's earlier admirers had already become lukewarm following the adoption of anti-Semitic legislation in Italy. Stories of food shortages at home were worrying, too. And the price of imported delicacies — olive oil, cheese, salami — shot up to unpopular heights. Then came the reversal of Fascist fortunes in Ethiopia and North Africa, the Greek victories in Albania, and the British bombing of Italian ports. New York Italians now tell inquiring reporters that Mussolini is more a Fascist than an Italian, and his picture has begun to come down off the walls of Italian barber shops and fruit stores along Mulberry Street. The Mazzini Society attempts to accelerate this awakening; so does the liberal New York monthly, *Il Mondo*.

Various reasons can be given for the fact that the Italian Government never succeeded in organizing the Italian community in New York with real German efficiency, despite the co-operation of various cultural and sports societies, the arrangement of friendly news and comment in the Italian language over local radio stations, the release of free news "shorts" to movie houses, and other propagandistic efforts. The most appealing reason is that Italians have a stronger traditional liking for liberty — the liberty of Mazzini and Garibaldi — than do the Germans. Also, though many simple workmen of Italian descent were pleased to hear of the earlier Italian successes, they had not felt a conscious need for them the way Germans living abroad thirsted for the rehabilitation of the German race through German arms. Italians have never been much bothered by theories of racial superiority or inferiority. They do not suffer from the German inferiority complex and do not feel the passionate German urge to "belong" to a nation of conquering heroes.

Two other of New York's component racial elements deserve mention.

The Jews naturally hate régimes which discriminate against their race, especially the Nazi régime which has robbed, beaten, jailed and murdered their brothers in Germany. They are anti-Nazi almost to a man and the vast majority are in favor of helping England. Governor Lehman has stated their position frankly on a

number of occasions. Now and then one encounters a professional Zionist who is less than 100 percent for Britain. And occasionally an American of Jewish blood is diffident about urging a bold attitude towards the war for fear that his inevitably strong racial prejudices will seem to have swayed his sober judgment as a citizen, or for fear of attracting Jew-baiters into fresh excesses. On the whole, however, New York Jews have been influenced by the same fundamental motives that move other sober and patriotic Americans. And the extent of their charity towards sufferers from the Hitler terror, Jew and Christian alike, often puts Christians to shame.

The reactions of the Irish-American community are also of interest and of great political importance. One section might be described as lukewarm with regard to helping England. Another section, not more numerous, perhaps, but more influential, has urged that every means be used to defeat Hitler, and that this involves putting aside old grudges and assisting Britain to the limit. New York's leading Roman Catholic layman, Alfred E. Smith, is of this opinion. So are "fighting Irishmen" like General O'Ryan and Colonel Donovan. There is a third contingent, small but vocal, which hates King William III (who died in 1702) to such an extent that it loves the enemy of any English king even when that enemy is Hitler. This minority includes the Irish-American followers of Father Coughlin, himself foreign born..

The other day a minor judge in Queens named Herbert A. O'Brien, long identified with Father Coughlin's "Christian Front," caused something of a stir by stating, in the course of testimony against the lend-lease bill in Washington, that racial antipathies were being so aggravated in New York by the European war that violence was to be expected. The real purpose of his testimony appeared in his statement that the lend-lease bill "will get us into two wars — a civil war will start almost at once." In other words, Judge O'Brien had set out to frighten the innocent, but not by revealing a situation which he deprecated so much as by threatening that it might be intensified. Mayor La Guardia dismissed the O'Brien scare by saying that if he had known the Senate was interested in stories of the kind he could have provided "several better ones from the psychopathic wards."

More might be written about the attitude of New York's racial groups towards the war. The reactions of our variegated social, business and political elements could also be examined in

more detail. Obviously New York in these days is under a very special strain. But so far there is no evidence that either foreign agents, or foreign-born elements that might most naturally be tempted to listen to them, or native-born Nazi, Fascist or Communist fellow-travellers, or respectable people who have come to doubt the merits of the American way of life or the desirability and feasibility of defending it, have succeeded in making any real dent in New York's fundamental Americanism. On the contrary, I believe, New York stands at least as robustly on American traditional foundations as any other part of the Union, and faces at least as willingly whatever sacrifices may be necessary to defend and preserve the Union's freedom and well-being.

VI

Do the times produce the men or do the men make the times? Both. Repeatedly in recent years the principles and policies of three native New Yorkers — President Roosevelt, Governor Lehman and Mayor La Guardia — have received the approval of the New York electorate. The three have sometimes differed on social and administrative policies. On American foreign policy they have differed not at all. Did they exercise conscious leadership in developing the sentiment of their city which so strongly favors the preservation of American democracy against all its enemies, foreign and domestic? Of course. Did they often draw unconsciously upon New York's store of vitality and courage and respond instinctively to the urgings of its deepest historic traditions? Again of course.

In New York, a city with roots spreading in every direction, tapping every sort of soil, there has been no serious question or conflict, either in the minds of the majority of the people or of their leaders, as to what are their paramount interests and duties in the present international crisis. Significantly, when the representative of one of New York's early Dutch families "looks abroad" he urges the same unyielding attitude toward the threats of the twentieth century barbarians as does a member of a cultivated New York family of Jewish bankers and philanthropists and the son of an Italian immigrant who himself served overseas in the last war. New York is Cosmopolis. But there is more cohesion than a casual observer might suspect in its union of bloods and talents.

WAR BY RADIO

By John B. Whitton

RADIO, as the most effective method of disseminating propaganda, has taken its place alongside diplomacy, economic pressure and military power as one of the accepted instruments of foreign policy. In this Russia was the pioneer, sending round the world glowing accounts of the Soviet régime. Hitler took it over. Just as he tested out his new airplanes in Spain, so he experimented in the Saar and Austria with radio techniques later to serve him in France and Britain.¹ In the Sudetenland he made the Germans conscious of Czech "tyranny" by impassioned radio messages from Munich. Italian short-wave programs from Bari meanwhile stirred up the Arabs against the British. And there have been many messages from Rome and Berlin designed to turn the people of Latin America against the United States.

Prior to the present conflict, radio propaganda was peculiarly a weapon of *totalitarian* power politics. But since the war actually began all the belligerents, totalitarian and democratic states alike, have made departments of radio propaganda integral parts of their war machines.² On the home front, both armed forces and the public are exhorted to unity and spurred on to sacrifice. To neutral countries are transmitted skits, topical talks and news, while enemy firesides and cantonments are bombarded with arguments, facts and allegations calculated to weaken morale.

I. RADIO PROPAGANDA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR

Radio propaganda has been employed, not merely as a gradual process of molding the minds of peoples, often far from the scene of conflict; it also has become an instrument in actual battle. Thus the Nazis have used the radio as a dynamic weapon, a practical aid to attack and invasion. On the eve of battle the enemy's morale is weakened when radio broadcasts from Germany demonstrate that German spies are everywhere, seeing all, knowing all, reporting all.

Thus a French hydroplane unit located near Paris, and which

¹ Thomas Grandin, "The Political Use of the Radio," *Geneva Studies*, August 1939.

² Harold N. Graves, Jr., "European Radio and the War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1941.

was suffering from German bombing, learned from the "Traitor of Stuttgart" the first news of the decision to transfer its camp. It was even informed of the exact location of the new headquarters and of the exact time of departure. A food riot in Caen was similarly announced to the French people a few moments after it had occurred. Inhabitants of a British town in the Midlands were horrified when told by the Zeezen radio the location of an arms factory in their midst, the exact number of workers, the precise location of the air shelters. Two French generals, as they sat down to dinner in the Maginot Line, were furnished by Stuttgart with an exact description of the menu.

Similarly, the radio may sow confusion and panic during an attack. As the Germans advanced toward Paris they used French wave lengths to warn the inhabitants of towns and villages, in stentorian and terrifying tones, to flee for their lives before the German tanks and bombers were upon them. Thus hundreds of thousands of panic-stricken refugees were cast upon the roads with all their impedimenta, making it extremely difficult for French reinforcements to be moved up.

Again the strategy of terror succeeded after Leopold surrendered. While the Germans were rapidly advancing into Northern France they exhorted the French, over various wave lengths, so powerful and so numerous as almost to monopolize the ether, to abandon what was represented as a hopeless battle and to call on their government to surrender. Thus on May 28, 1940, the Princeton Listening Center recorded this message as sent in French from the Nazis to the French people:

Beneath the force of Germany's crushing action, the King of the Belgians took the decision to put an end to a resistance which had become senseless . . . French soldiers, French citizens, the capitulation of Belgium makes the military situation of France as follows: The northern part of the Maginot Line has been flanked. It no longer exists! The west part of the line has lost its value. . . . Spare your country and try to save your lives. Force your government to make peace or drive it out. Stop the rich, the profiteers, and the merchants, the Jews and the English from escaping. Otherwise they will not fail to leave you in the lurch.

The cause of the British was pictured as desperate, their surrender only a matter of days. "Act quickly," urged the German radio. "Leave the fleeing English to look after themselves. Those cowards, who have no word of honor, do not deserve any better." The acceptance by the French of the Armistice of Compiègne

seems to have been due in large part to a general conviction that Britain's collapse was imminent. The radio certainly played a part in engendering this state of mind.

Meanwhile the French transmitters did little to bolster the weakening morale of French soldiers and civilians. Premier Reynaud frequently spoke on the radio, but instead of following the British practice of admitting the truth, bad as it was, simply and calmly, he often came out with it in dramatic, alarming tones. There was little sustained effort to inspire unity and courage. Music almost disappeared from the air, except for the "Marseillaise;" but that phonograph record was played so often it became worn and scratched, giving a mournful impression. The general French apathy with respect to the war — its origins, execution and objectives — of course had a variety of causes, many of them much more fundamental than an uninspired radio policy; but it must bear its share of the blame.

The major defect of the French programs was their dullness, in striking contrast with Goebbels' command that the first rule for Nazi broadcasting is that it must be interesting. Many of the French prewar skits and the light music were eliminated as undignified for wartime, while news items were cut to the bone by a narrow censorship and often were held up until long after they had become known over the foreign radio. Furthermore, explanations as to why the war was necessary were meagre, there were few direct attacks on Nazi Germany, and, in contrast with the German radio, even martial music was rarely heard on the air.

The reasons for this situation are several. Reflecting the defensive spirit of the French Government and army command, the policy adopted by the radio was uninspired and negative. The propaganda department was inadequate. M. Giraudoux, chosen as director, was an outstanding author and playwright, but he knew little about administration or propaganda technique and he put his activities on too high an intellectual plane. His staff was poorly coördinated and was hampered by frequent changes in personnel and policy, while the radio division was under-staffed and lacked adequate modern equipment. Unlike the BBC, the French never set up an efficient service to monitor foreign radio propaganda.

As a consequence of the paucity and tardiness of the news heard over the French radio, and the depressing nature of the entertainment, the French people regularly tuned in to foreign

stations. Stuttgart was heard in many parts of France, although jammed at Paris through the use of an obsolete transmitter. For some reason, however, the Nazi broadcasts from Hamburg were not ordinarily jammed. In general, there was considerable listening to Nazi stations. This was especially the case among the soldiers, who had little or nothing to do in the Maginot Line during the long winter months.

There is much evidence to the effect that German radio propaganda had considerable effect on public opinion in France, but more among the civilian population than among the soldiers. The soldiers appear to have tuned in to the German stations mainly for amusement and diversion, and listened with contempt to the efforts to break down their morale or turn them against the British. In the opinion of the most competent observers, however, this contempt tended to decrease under the constant bombardment of propaganda, and as we look back it seems remarkable that the French Government did nothing to forbid or to discourage listening to German stations. Several of the Nazis' propaganda themes might be mentioned here as examples. In the attempt to divide the Allies, the Nazi radio inserted these words at the end of many programs: "*Les Anglais donnent leurs machines, les Français leurs poitrines*" — the English give their machines, the French their breasts. Again and again it was said, "The English will fight to the last Frenchman." No one, it was alleged, ever saw an Englishman at the front, for they all were back of the lines spending their time with the wives of the French soldiers.

Apparently the radio propaganda addressed to the civilian population was more effective, although it is always extremely difficult to measure the exact effect of propaganda. There were insistent appeals to the masses calculated to shake their confidence and loyalty and engender doubts as to France's aims in the war or as to her ability to win it. Attacks on the "capitalists" and "plutocrats" were especially emphasized. There was a great amount of anti-parliamentary and anti-Semitic propaganda. Finally, as part of the strategy of terror, the French were reminded of the superior might of the Germans, represented as unconquerable, and they were told to beware of the terrible attacks and bombardments which were sure to come. Thus, besieged with dangerous thoughts from abroad, and unsupported at home by an imaginative and inspiring radio policy, the French — both

soldiers and civilians — had lost a radio war to the Germans even before the military *Blitzkrieg* had begun.

When the invasion came, the German radio was adapted, as already noted, to the needs of conquest. But after it was complete the radio became a two-edged sword. For though the Germans, using all the French stations, can bombard the conquered people with anti-British propaganda, they cannot effectively prevent the French from listening to Churchill or de Gaulle from London, or to Roosevelt, whose speeches are re-broadcast by the BBC. The British had already sought to keep up the spirits of Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians after their conquest, by sending them regular programs in their own languages. And since the Compiègne Armistice they have transmitted daily messages to the beleaguered French people, and not without effect, as shown by the following story. In Paris, at the end of last September, an American visited the *Bon Marché* in search of a pair of shoes and was astonished to discover a long line of customers in front of the shoe department. He inquired as to the cause, and was told that the previous night de Gaulle had advised all Frenchmen to buy as many pairs of shoes as possible to keep them from falling into the hands of the Nazis who, he alleged, were going to requisition all remaining stocks.

II. PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY TERRITORY

The miracle of radio has made it much easier than before to spread propaganda in enemy territory. The methods formerly used, such as dropping leaflets from airplanes or free balloons, were very limited in range and influence. Radio, however, penetrates the enemy frontier without difficulty — in fact, it circles the earth seven times in a single second.

The Nazis early prohibited Germans from listening to foreign stations. The British did not; indeed, the British newspapers very obligingly noted the hours when the famous Lord Haw Haw could be heard. Lately in England, however, such listening has been discouraged as "unpatriotic." Incidentally, each side announces over the radio the names of newly captured prisoners of war in order to encourage people in the enemy territory to listen to its broadcasts.

In the campaign against enemy morale, enemy civilians are told of the corruption of their leaders in peace and their inefficiency in war. Thus the BBC told the Germans: "And now, about

Goebbels. . . . You know that modest way of his? This probably accounts for the fact that he has told you too little about his castle . . . on the Bergensee, the walls of which are decorated with marble, and also a country house . . . on the Langensee, and also a 50-room mansion in Berlin." Similar opulence was charged against Goering, Himmler, Ley and Ribbentrop, who, it was alleged, were making a rather broad interpretation of the Lebensraum slogan.³

The effort to sow doubt, confusion and dissension in enemy territory — what might be called dissolvent propaganda — is attempted by all the belligerents. Every effort is made to prove that the enemy's cause is lost. Social, economic and financial conditions are represented as grave, if not hopeless. The Germans asked the French and British, "Why go to war over Danzig?" Fying the laboring classes they said, "Why sacrifice your lives to save a decadent plutocracy?" This last appeal is used by the British, too, in their broadcasts to Germany. Thus the BBC, on July 8, 1940, maintained that Germany's new order "means eternal class struggle, and this is the new order which Hitler believes will last for more than a thousand years . . . an age-old capitalistic manœuvre designed to break the solidarity of the workers."

The German attacks on the Jews, an ever-recurring theme, are apparently designed in part to turn class against class in Britain (and in France and the United States), and at the same time to elicit in certain foreign quarters admiration for Hitler as the outstanding champion of anti-Semitism. Berlin has said to the British: "They [the Jews] live to subjugate the world's energy and wealth, and without any regard to national rights and aspirations, without any concern for human feelings or elementary decency." And to the Americans: "Germany does not need to express either anti-Semitism or its racial doctrine, for both are accepted . . . as a rule of life in America."

In the bitter struggle to win over neutrals, notably the United States as the main prize, radio has played an important rôle. Here the foreign propagandist is really put on his mettle, for he cannot count on the censor to keep embarrassing facts from the public, nor on the police to suppress listening to the enemy. If Zeezen sends Americans a false or exaggerated account of a sea

³ It is interesting to note that the BBC makes no such personal attacks on Hitler, criticizing him as a leader, not as a man.

battle, refutation from the BBC or from American radio chains is inevitable. In this matter American news analysts have done much to counteract untrue belligerent propaganda. Also, if the foreign propagandist is to hold his radio audience, he must understand the life, the customs and the literature of the people he is attempting to reach, and must take account of their local point of view. Finally, he must realize that, as a result of faulty techniques employed by both belligerents in the last war — notably the exaggerated use of atrocity stories — the public has become propaganda-conscious. This condition has led to the use of a more veiled approach.

One method of soliciting neutral sympathy is to demonstrate the superiority of your cause over that of the enemy, to show that your aims are sincere and idealistic, those of the enemy hypocritical and aggressive. Thus, over the BBC the Reverend Pat McCormick has told us: "Britain and all that Britain stands for can never die; she is bound to win the day in the end, because she stands for the right, the good, the true and the noble." A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, reminds us how the security of the American continent might have been weakened if Britain had let the French fleet fall into German hands. In contrast, Dr. Otto Koischwitz, alias "Dr. Anders," sends this message to Americans: "The German people are willing to endure the hardships of war. They do not need any intangible, vague, changeable, so-called ideal war aim. They defend the most elemental, the most primitive, the indisputable right of existence."

On another occasion the Nazis said: "Germany now fights for its existence as an independent nation. Germany fights for a living space. . . . This refers to the space required by a nation for peaceful economic development and within which it can tolerate no intriguing and no counter-alliances. Germany's living space is Central Europe, allotted to it by nature. To keep opponents out of this space is not aggression."

With respect to the conduct of the war, each side has harped on the alleged evil practices of the other. The British stress the atrocities in Poland, various inhuman acts of sea warfare, the plundering of occupied territories, the bombing of open towns. Thus on December 5, 1940, the Princeton Listening Center heard Major Hastings tell Americans: "Now, as I am speaking, the bombs are dropping. Five miles high, they are, five miles. Assassination as at Coventry, deliberate, thoroughgoing, painstaking

assassination. Tomorrow there will be another tale of smashed and suffocated and mangled men, women and children, and another gratified grunt from the Nazis."

The Germans, on their part, emphasize the illegality of British control measures, the illegal boarding of the *Altmark*, the bombing of civilians. Here is a sample: "Our assumption was, of course, that even England would not murder civilians, including women and children, for the mere pleasure of so doing. . . . Every crime against German civilians is being carefully noted and when the time comes to present the account, the cost to Britain will be terrible indeed." Apropos of the British action against the French fleet at Oran, E. D. Ward from Berlin compared it "to that Herod, who in his mad rage at his inability to lay hands on the Christ Child, ordered the slaying of the innocents."

During the first months of the war, when the Nazis were making efforts to prevent too great a deterioration in relations between Germany and the United States, they often reminded us of German heroes who had fought in our wars, such as General Herkimer, or those who had taken a prominent part in American life, such as Dr. Muhlenburg, Pennsylvania preacher. As the United States revealed its desire for a British victory, the Nazi propaganda bureau adopted other themes, appealing more to materialistic self-interest, plus a note of intimidation, to be described in a moment.

While the belligerent uses the radio to stress his affinity with the neutral in ideals and interests he tries at the same time to drive a wedge between the neutral and the enemy. Germany has sent out over the air to the United States a series of historical sketches describing the disputes and wars between this country and England, from the Boston tea party down to the war debts. One of the favorite Nazi themes is the allegation that Britain, today as in 1917, has plotted to draw the United States into the European war. "Change the names, the dates, the serial number," says E. D. Ward, "and you have the same story that was written 22 years ago." From the other side of the Channel, British speakers point out to Americans the vast chasm separating Nazi totalitarianism from our concepts of democracy, and stress the incompatibility between the German invasion of Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium and American views on international morality.

III. THE RADIO FIGHT FOR AMERICAN SUPPORT

In the radio war, as in the economic, diplomatic and military fields, the policy of the dictatorships has been dynamic and aggressive, that of the democracies passive and defensive, at least until the Battle of Flanders. Long before the present war, the dictatorships had the upper hand. The Russians sent Communist propaganda to the democratic countries, but the latter, despite fears awakened by this campaign, did little by radio to counteract it. The Nazis, in an effort to influence the plebiscite in the Saar, bombarded the voters there with violent pro-German propaganda, which the French hardly attempted to meet. Similarly, the British waited nearly two years before responding in kind to the Italian radio campaigns among the Arabs, who were urged to revolt against their English "oppressors."

When the present war broke out, the initiative was immediately assumed by the Nazis and maintained for many months. Utilizing excellent equipment and a highly-integrated organization which was the result of years of experience, the Nazi radio was soon sending North American audiences 11 hours of programs each day, and promising us, in the words of a Berlin speaker, "regardless of the war, a choice assortment of broadcasting viands, sparkling musical champagne and other tasty delicacies, such as operettas, variety entertainments, dance music and comic bits." Sandwiched between operas and orchestral music, lively news talks and skits were offered to the American public. The Germans were the first to use American men and women for this purpose. All of them were familiar with American life, and some, like the Iowan Fred W. Kaltenbach, talked to the "folks back in Iowa" in a Midwestern drawl. From the first these speakers conducted an energetic campaign over alleged British crimes and misdemeanors and warned us to beware of being drawn into the war. Violent criticisms were hurled against certain groups and institutions in the United States, notably capitalists, Jews, newspapers and "politicians." At the same time, every effort was made to solicit our sympathy, and to show that our material interests would not suffer from a German victory.

Since the summer of 1940, but with increasing intensity these past few months, the Nazi radio has adopted a much more critical tone in its radio campaign in the United States. No longer do the German spokesmen try to curry our sympathy; rather,

they spread dissension and confusion, to foment lack of confidence and turn class against class. There has been an intensification of the anti-Semitic campaign. For the first time, the Nazi propagandists seem to feel on the defensive; their main fight now is to nullify the efforts to increase American aid to Britain. As part of this fight, they even resort to direct intimidation, warning us that if we continue to aid Britain we will live to regret it; that since American traders refuse to do business with the Nazis now they will not be able to do so after the war; and that hence the country will suffer losses, a lower standard of living, etc. Accompanying the menaces are assurances that Hitler has no designs on Latin America, and above all no plans for aggression against the United States. Judging by the vast increase in the number of attacks on the United States, its leaders and its institutions, and by the fact that there is now but little difference between the Nazi radio policy toward Britain and that toward the United States, we must conclude that already the Germans are considering us more as an enemy than as a neutral.

British radio propaganda, although more generously financed and better organized than the French, was nevertheless relatively dull and uninspired before the coming of the *Blitzkrieg*. According to a recent study published by the Princeton Listening Center:

Listeners in the United States were accorded the same treatment as Dominion and colonial audiences. Broadcasting to Americans, who were accustomed to hear minor events reported as if they heralded the imminent collapse of the solar system, London stations relied solely on the Overseas Service, inaugurated for Empire listeners in 1932. It was paced in the same rhythm as the leisurely Home Service; much time was devoted to descriptions of the war effort of the Dominions and Colonies and the activity of Empire troops in the mother country. American listeners might well have agreed with Lord Strabolgi, British Labor peer, who complained last February about the "dullness, repetition and paucity" of news radiated by the BBC.

Since the end of May 1940, however, British radio broadcasts to the United States have been more frequent and more lively. Programs especially prepared for, and beamed to, this country were enriched by additional speakers of first rank, and came to include J. B. Priestley, Wickham Steed, Leslie Howard, Somerset Maugham and others. This use of outstanding men known already to the American public for books or scientific achievements gave the British a notable advantage over the Germans, whose radio speakers are as a rule men and women unknown in America and sometimes inclined to use language and to speak in a tone

hardly in harmony with American taste. The BBC has also added interesting skits and stunts, long a feature of German programs. Americans accustomed to the dignified and reserved BBC speakers must have been considerably surprised by the announcement, illustrative of the new policy: "Don't forget Princess Elizabeth at 7:45 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, next Sunday!"

This improvement in radio organization after the Battle of Flanders was paralleled by a notable change in propaganda technique. Prior to that time, the British seemed content to stress the inevitability of British victory, implying that aid could be given freely to the Allies without fear of German reprisals. The British even boasted that they intended to refrain from propaganda entirely. But with their backs to the wall, the British adopted a new policy. Their radio themes suddenly became dynamic. They stressed that Britain's and America's destiny were inseparable, that the United States was next on Hitler's list. As Britain was America's first line of defense, it was right that the greatest reliance should be placed on the moral and material support of the United States. In contrast with the German radio, which sought to divide the American public, the British radio aimed to unite American opinion, unite it in support of Britain. Its speakers have tried to inspire confidence, to create a community of interest and feeling between the two peoples.

The French, at the outbreak of the war, gave little attention to public opinion in America, apparently leaving the effort to gain American support almost entirely to the British. Their programs for American consumption were confined mainly to a factual summary of the news, and programs of music, plays and other literature on a high intellectual level, often actually pedantic, lacking the interest and the appeal of the German or even of the British renditions. Many faults of technique, too, were evident, for example the use of French speakers who translated the news extemporaneously and literally, in rather poor English, sometimes in an effeminate tone not at all suited to a country at war. Little effort was made to fit the programs to American tastes. Following the invasion of Denmark, however, the French made belated efforts to reform their entire radio policy. Although improvement in their domestic programs was small, great progress was perceptible in their overseas offerings, especially after the attack on Holland. In fact, for a brief period, lasting until the collapse, the French put on a series of programs which were the most attrac-

tive of all European broadcasts heard in the United States. News flashes were interspersed between regular programs, military bands occasionally replaced stringed quartets, and refugees and American Legion representatives were put on the air. *Paris-Mondial* was the first station in the democratic countries to use American speakers as a regular part of its programs.

Looking back on the eighteen months of radio warfare, we are impelled to conclude that the Nazi radio, despite the advantages of greater experience, superior organization, and a more imaginative and more energetic policy, has made much less of an impression on the American public than the British.

In the first place, the "climate" of radio propaganda has been more favorable to the British. As shown by the Gallup Polls, public opinion in the United States has been overwhelmingly in favor of Britain. Our people generally accepted the view that alike from the economic, the military, and the cultural point of view our interests are usually parallel, often identical. Naturally one will give a more sympathetic ear to his business partner and friend, than to his business competitor and enemy. In Winston Churchill, too, the British have had a spokesman without a peer elsewhere for confident, measured eloquence interspersed with flashes of irony and wit. Moreover, the elementary facts of the war are such as to predispose the American listener against anyone pleading the German cause. In the last war, the Germans could never live down the rape of Belgium, the submarine warfare, the use of poisonous gas. Similarly no amount of opera or diverting chats by Lord Haw Haw from Berlin can explain away the Jewish pogroms or the ruthless destruction of Rotterdam.

In the second place, there is the practical matter of the radio audience. Here, too, the British enjoy great advantages. From scattered evidence it would appear that not more than 10 or 15 percent of American listeners regularly tune in on short-wave broadcasts from Europe. Probably most of the listeners to German and Italian short-wave signals are immigrants or members of the first generation of American-born. As a matter of fact, most students of the subject believe that the main object of Nazi and Fascist radio propaganda is to maintain or cultivate the loyalty of these groups, and, at the same time, to send directions to sympathizers and "Fifth Columnists" as to the kind of propaganda these are to spread throughout the country. Such listeners, however, represent only a small fraction of the American public. On

the other hand, many of the British short-wave programs are re-broadcast in this country. By the fall of 1940, a total of 88 American stations were relaying BBC news, and one of the major American chains, the Mutual Broadcasting System, was giving re-broadcasts of BBC news, and even a certain number of topical talks. In addition, Canadian stations easily audible in many parts of the United States were giving more complete renditions of London transmissions, and naturally their own views on the war, practically identical with those of England herself. This immensely valuable avenue of approach — the Canadian radio — cannot be matched by the Germans.

Another advantage enjoyed by the British over the German radio is a reputation for reliability. German and Italian broadcasts are marked by numerous cases of misrepresentation, misstatement or downright falsehood, but it is rare that one finds the BBC wandering from the truth. The BBC may not always give the whole truth, and it may suppress or postpone the announcement of particularly bad news. And, naturally, it will present the most favorable interpretations of events and causes. But, by and large, its broadcasts have maintained a high degree of accuracy. The German and British radios are as different as the lawyer who manufactures evidence, and the one who, while making out the best possible case for his client, refrains from directly unethical practices. There is much evidence to the effect that the American public considers the reports from London as much more reliable than news from Berlin. And it is likely that if the BBC maintains its present policy, Americans will tend to ascribe even greater credibility to the BBC news, and that our resistance to British reports, so prevalent among a people fearful of propaganda, will tend to diminish.

This propaganda phobia is a grave obstacle to clear thinking. The tendency to ignore everything coming out from a belligerent country as "mere propaganda" is folly. The crucial question is whether the fact is true and the appeal is sound. I have seen students at the movies squirm in their seats, protesting, "This is propaganda," when views of bombed Coventry were shown. We must not allow ourselves to be taken in by specious arguments. But we must not let ourselves mistrust the truth out of laziness or in order to spare ourselves the pain of acting on our considered decisions.

OUR HERITAGE FROM THE LAW OF ROME

By C. H. McIlwain

WE in England and America have inherited a long-standing tradition, and we keep repeating it without criticism, that Roman Law on its political side is the synonym of absolutism. It is time that we began to examine that tradition. When we find Nazi Germany repudiating Roman Law because it stands in the way of a program for the slavery of the world under the heel of its "Aryan" masters, we must ask why the most despotic, repulsive and oppressive system ever proposed for mankind includes among its first principles this repudiation of Roman Law.

It is not because the Nazi leaders have not seen the problem. They have seen it far more clearly than we have, and they have come to the settled conclusion that their yoke can never be imposed on the world until the universalism, the rationalism, the individualism of Roman Law are replaced by the tribal myth of Aryanism. They are forced to repudiate the catholicity of all previous European culture for a narrow tribalism which alone can justify their domination of the world. The Nazis reject Roman Law, an important element in that culture, because it is essentially universal; and because, like all universal systems, it is individualistic. To be more specific, they reject it because it recognizes what we used to call "the rights of man," and because Nazism can advance in no other way than by trampling on all those rights. If Roman Law is the despotic system we have usually assumed it to be, why should the Nazis not use it instead of rejecting it? Why should they be forced to omit it entirely as they do from their "new order" for the world? One cannot vindicate the intelligence of the Nazi leaders without questioning their sincerity. Men who could see so clearly the political implications of Roman Law for their theories of Aryan superiority could hardly be oblivious of the absurdity of the latter theory or of its completely unhistorical character. If we assume their intelligence we cannot give them credit for honesty. Here, however, we are concerned only with the correctness of their estimate of the character of Roman Law. We must therefore examine critically our own traditions concerning the political influence

of the jurisprudence of Rome, for if the Nazi interpretation is right, ours is certainly wrong.

I

In 1605 John Cowell, a doctor of the Civil law, and later Regius Professor of that subject at Cambridge, set forth the law of England in an interesting little book in Latin modeled on the "Institutes" of Justinian, arranged in the same order, and combining English and Roman legal principles. In his dedication Dr. Cowell says that many years of study have convinced him that "our common law, as we call it, is nothing else than a mixture of the Roman and the feudal." And he adds that the bitter controversies between the respective advocates of the Civil and the common law in England would have been ended long before, and the two laws themselves combined in a single system, but for the fact that these advocates have had a greater zeal for their own private profit than for "the public glory of their country." This is a rather remarkable and a rather startling statement about the common law, and it includes a biting indictment of the common lawyers. Little wonder that Sir Edward Coke should have referred to Dr. Cowell as "Dr. Cow-heel," or that Cowell's law dictionary, the "Interpreter," published in 1607, was attacked in Parliament in 1610. For tactical reasons this parliamentary attack was ostensibly aimed at Cowell's definitions of "King," "prerogative," and "subsidy." But the real animus of Coke and the rest of the common lawyers in the House of Commons was against Cowell's insistence on the Roman element in the English common law — such things, as he says in one of the definitions in his "Interpreter," as "have as yet no apparent acceptance amongst our Lawyers, but only a hidden use;" against his belief that both laws "be rayseed of one Foundation, and differ more in language and termes then in substance, and therefore were they reduced to one method (as they easily might) to bee attained (in a manner) with all one paines;" and against his insinuation that it was the "private profit" of the common lawyers alone that led them to oppose such a reduction. We are immediately concerned here with the meaning and the correctness of Cowell's assertion that the English common law is a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal, and with the reasons for the contrary view held by the common lawyers of the time and by a majority of these ever since. If we can answer the questions thus raised,

we shall have accounted in some measure at least for our Heritage of Roman Law.

There is hardly a modern book — hardly an English book at least — on the Renaissance, that does not attribute the growing absolutism of that time more or less directly to the Roman Law. In the main the authors of such books seem to have taken at its face value the statement of Sir John Fortescue in the fifteenth century that the central and most fundamental principle of Roman Law is expressed in the absolutist maxim “what has pleased the prince has the force of a *lex*,” and that wherever actual absolutism is found it is an application of this maxim. Fortescue deals with this subject in more than one place in his various works, but his “*De Laudibus Legum Angliae*” (or “Praises of the Laws of England”) alone is responsible for the later development of the English ideas on this subject, as it alone among his writings was in print before the eighteenth century. In Chapter XXIV of “*De Laudibus*” Fortescue calls the doctrines just referred to “the chief principles among the civil laws” (*inter leges civiles praecipua Sententia*).

Almost all historians of England and of English law since Fortescue have followed him in asserting that Roman Law spells absolutism, and that England is freer than other countries because her law is less a Roman one than theirs. We may agree that England at the end of the fifteenth century was less despotic than France, as Fortescue says; we may believe that this difference became still wider in later times; but this is not necessarily to accept Fortescue’s explanation of the causes of these differences. In 1605 when Cowell wrote, the rights of the subject in England were no doubt far safer from royal interference than similar rights were in France; and it is no less certain that these rights were defined by the common law and found their chief defenders in the common lawyers — that law, as one member of the House of Commons aptly put it in 1610, was “the wall betwixt the King and his subjects.” But does it necessarily follow from this that Cowell was wrong in saying, as he did, that this English common law was a mixture of Roman and feudal principles?

Answers to the questions whether Fortescue was right in saying that absolutism was the “central principle” of the Roman Law, and whether Cowell was right in his assertion that our English common law is a “mixture” of the Roman and the feudal,

may possibly lead us to the answer to our own question: What is our heritage from the law of Rome?

Anyone who studies the development of our law between the Norman conquest and the Renaissance, and compares this with what went on in the same period on the Continent, in France particularly, finds an amazing similarity between English and continental institutions, including the strong influence of Roman Law, before the fourteenth century; and thereafter a remarkable change in England which led at length to bitter hostility between the common lawyers and the civilians. No such change as this took place in France, where the development of Roman Law was unbroken. But it did take place in England. Thus by the last quarter of the fifteenth century Fortescue thinks he finds despotism to be the central principle of the Roman Law, and the chief proof of it he believes to be the government of France which is a regal or despotic (*despoticum*) rule; while England's is by contrast a rule regal and "constitutional" (*politicum*). For him, France was a despotism because she had stuck to the central principle of the Romans that what has pleased the prince has the force of law; while England had developed a constitutional government in defiance of this Roman principle.

There is no question of the difference between England and France that had come about by Fortescue's time, but there is a very great question as to the part played by Roman Law in making that difference. Furthermore, there is no question that Fortescue retains, and carries further, principles of constitutional government which can be found two or three centuries earlier in England; but this does not necessarily mean that he retains the same attitude toward Roman Law, or the same definition of Roman political principles, held by his predecessors at that time. He was right in pointing out the growing contrast between England and France; wrong, I believe, in attributing this difference to Roman legal principles. He was right in his contention that the English rule was freer and less despotic than that of France in his day; right, too, in his implication that England no longer applied Roman Law to the same extent as in France. But in his assertion that Roman Law means absolutism and his implication that English liberty is the result of the discarding of Roman Law — there, I believe that history proves him and those who have followed him to be clearly wrong.

Probably the strongest proof that earlier English lawyers had

a conception of the political aspect of Roman Law different from that of Fortescue is to be found in the great book of Bracton on "The Laws and Customs of England," finished soon after the middle of the thirteenth century. To Bracton the maxim that the will of the prince has the force of law is not, as it was later for Fortescue, a statement of absolutism and at the same time the "central principle" of Roman jurisprudence. On the contrary, he finds that central principle, I think, in a notable passage from Papinian in which a law is said to be, not the will of the prince, but the "common engagement of the republic" — a passage which Bracton quotes with approval and clearly believes to apply to his own country as much as to Rome. He is acquainted, of course, with the famous maxim that what has pleased the prince has the force of law, but he thinks that if it applies to England at all it is because the passage of Justinian's "Institutes" in which it occurs is in reality a reference only to the popular origin of the Emperor's authority, which in no way implies its arbitrary character. In fact, Bracton regards the *Lex Regia* to which the "Institutes" refer here as the Roman equivalent of the English coronation oath in which the kings at their accession swore (or were soon to swear) to govern according to the laws chosen by the people. For him Roman Law clearly means a constitutional rule, not a despotic one. He cites more than one passage of the Roman Law books indicating that fact and apparently finds none which denies it, and for him England is therefore like Rome in the enjoyment of such a constitutional form of government.

Bracton does not distinguish the essentials of English constitutionalism from those of Roman constitutionalism. To him they are more alike than unlike. In neither of them does he find absolutism "the central principle;" in both that central principle is rather that the the people alone, and not the prince, is the source of all legal authority. No one who reads Bracton with attention can doubt his constitutionalism; no one can deny his reliance on Roman legal principles; and no one has ever been able to show that in this Bracton does not faithfully represent the legal thinking of his day. What we now know from the recently published cases decided in the earlier thirteenth century confirms the view that Martin of Pattishall, William of Raleigh, and the other earlier English judges whose decisions Bracton cites so often in his book, held the same fundamental constitutional position

as he, and placed the same reliance on Roman jurisprudence in support of it. Bracton was by no means the first — he was nearer to the last — of those English lawyers and judges who identified the essentials of English and Roman constitutionalism. And that tradition may be traced back safely as far as Glanvill, in the reign of Henry II, when the mediæval revival of Roman Law was still in its early stages. Bracton is thus a standing proof of the fallacy of our current notion that English law from the beginning has been less influenced by Roman jurisprudence and Roman political ideas than continental; and that it is for that reason a more constitutional and a less despotic system.

If corroboration of Bracton's evidence were needed, we might find it in the history of canon law in England from the Conquest to the thirteenth century. The recent careful examination by Dr. Zachary Brooke of the English manuscripts of the canonical books in this period fully warrants his conclusions, in opposition to Stubbs and the earlier Anglican nationalist writers, that "the law of the Church, the whole law and not a selected part of it, was the law of the English Church;" and further, that "there is no shred of evidence to show that the English Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was governed by laws selected by itself." When we remember that the English judges in this important period in the formation of our common law were all ecclesiastics, and when we consider the common Roman features of the canon and the civil law, the importance of these facts in the building of the general principles of the common law itself, public as well as private, will at once become evident.

For a generation or more English historians almost without exception had accepted without due examination or criticism the view set forth by Bishop Stubbs in the celebrated Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission of 1883, that the canon law in its entirety was never in force in mediæval England, but only such part of it as the Church of England saw fit to receive. Stubbs was led to this belief by the undoubted fact that in England, as in other particular provinces of the universal Church as well, there did exist certain traditional rules and even certain "constitutions" which were peculiar to the country, had no application outside it, and were therefore no part of the "common law" of the Church Universal. From this fact he drew the unnecessary inference that no part of the canon law was in force in England if the *Ecclesia Anglicana* did not receive it. He re-

garded canon law as a foreign law, and if it was employed in any jurisdiction in England it was only because this was an "indulged jurisdiction," as Sir Matthew Hale called it in the seventeenth century in his "History of the Common Law." But between the thirteenth century and the seventeenth the whole notion of a "common law" had undergone considerable change. In the seventeenth century Lord Hale was entirely justified in regarding such courts as that of the Admiralty as "indulged jurisdiction." Other courts whose procedure also followed the Civil rather than the common law had been abolished by statute, such as the Court of Star Chamber and the High Commission for Ecclesiastical Causes; and such courts as remained in reality existed only by sufferance of the sovereign authority in the state. In the seventeenth century they were "indulged" by Parliament, and for this reason to Stubbs the Civil law which they followed had always been "indulged" by the English Church. Now this is a *non sequitur*, and a serious one. In the Middle Ages and afterward, in secular matters as well as ecclesiastical, a law, in order to be "common" need not be necessarily exclusive: it was a subsidiary rule which merely underlay particular rules which differed from it, not one which overrode them unless they were utterly inconsistent with it. Common law and particular law stood side by side, the former assumed by the Courts without specific proof, the latter accepted as valid if proved and not against reason common law or statute. The existence of ecclesiastical rules peculiar to England in the Middle Ages is therefore no valid basis for the conclusion that England repudiated the law common to the whole Church. Common law is merely the system to which recourse is had when no particular law applies, it in no sense excludes all particular law. For example, in Germany after the reception of Roman Law, German custom was not abolished, it merely ceased to be the reservoir on which the judges drew in cases where no such custom was applicable.

Probably it was a clearer understanding of what a common law thus always implied -- or rather, what it did not imply -- which led Maitland to reject the generally accepted view that canon law was merely "indulged" in mediæval England. If this rejection is supported by the facts of the time, as I believe it is, this has an important bearing on the larger question of the influence of Roman law on the development of our legal institutions, public and private, in the most critical of all the periods in their devel-

opment. The insular character of English canon law cannot be dated before the sixteenth century; the insular attitude toward Roman Law not before the fourteenth.

Our attention has hitherto been directed toward England alone, and Bracton has been taken as the most likely index of the extent and character of the Roman Law influence upon our political institutions and ideas about the middle of the thirteenth century. If now we should compare his book in this respect with the writings across the Channel most nearly comparable in time and in subject matter, the impression of the importance of Roman Law in England would, I believe, be heightened rather than lessened. The continental book that naturally occurs to one as probably the fairest basis of such a comparison is the "*Summa De Legibus*," written by an unknown author about the same time as Bracton's book, and dealing with Norman institutions in much the same way as he was dealing with those of England. But any comparison of the two books, even an incomplete one, would soon show that the influence of Roman Law is stronger and more pervasive in the English book than in the Norman one.

What has been said thus far applies to England from the eleventh or twelfth century down to probably the end of the thirteenth, or possibly a little later; but it would be unsafe on the existing evidence to extend it much further. This, however, is far enough to prove its fundamental importance; for the period between the eleventh and the thirteenth century is beyond question the most decisive by far in the whole evolution of our legal institutions and ideas. We talk about "the Renaissance" and its influence on our political institutions and our law, and they were no doubt of the greatest importance; but we sometimes forget that some three or four centuries earlier there was a true "Renaissance" whose influence on our law and politics was far more fundamental and more lasting. It was then, and not later, that our common law, our notions of the relations of law and government, in fact our whole conception of the state, took much of the form that they retain to this day.

II

To make my point I have had to include some tiresome history, for this is a historical question. But if that history is correctly stated, the inferences to be drawn from it are clear. I shall try to state them in a series of short propositions.

Our heritage from Roman Law is very great, and it has not been appreciated. Dr. Cowell was right in saying that our common law was a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal. The common lawyers who opposed him were right in defending the common law as "the wall betwixt the King and his subjects." But they were wrong, as Fortescue before them was wrong, in holding that the central political principle of the Roman Law was the despotism of the maxim that what pleases the Prince has the force of a *lex*; and wrong also in believing that the English common law could include none of it. I am here not attempting to defend all of Cowell's inferences or some of his definitions. I am asserting only that in his statement that the common law of England is a mixture of the Roman and the feudal he was far nearer than his opponents were to the views of the great builders of our common law in the most critical period of its evolution, such as Glanvill and Bracton, and, in fact, all the judges before the fourteenth century.

Those early judges saw, as their English successors could not see, that the central principle of Roman Law is not to be found in absolutism. Unlike Fortescue and the later lawyers, they did not interpret the maxim of Justinian's "Institutes" as a statement of despotic power, but rather as a reference to the fact that all the authority of a prince must come ultimately from the people. If Bracton saw any "central" principle in Roman Law, it was not absolutism but the doctrine of Papinian, that all law is the "common engagement of the republic," a doctrine which Bracton quotes and applies without reserve to his own country. He had a greater knowledge and a clearer vision of the political meaning of Roman Law than Fortescue or Fortescue's successors. To him it was not so much Roman as universal, and its central principle was that law is the creation of the people alone whenever and wherever it is found. Sir Edward Coke, narrowminded conservative though he was, was one of the great heroes in the history of our constitutionalism, for in his day the common law was the only "wall" against the despotism of the Stuarts. And the party he was opposing, to which Cowell belonged, we must also admit, was striving with might and main to "leape over or breake downe this wall," as one of its opponents charged in the House of Commons. Cowell owed his advancement to Archbishop Bancroft, the leader of this party; his books were written at Bancroft's suggestion, and the "Interpreter" itself was dedicated to him.

Yet in this there is no invalidation necessarily of Cowell's contention that the common law itself was a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal. It is this alone that I am arguing, for it is in the "mixture" that we find our greatest inheritance from Roman Law. Coke was defending against Cowell the liberties of England enshrined in the common law; but Cowell, it seems to me, was in some respects the better historian of the early development of that law.

There is nothing very new in this argument. It may be found stated in far better terms than mine in some of the pamphlets written against the non-jurors and their doctrines of non-resistance immediately after the English Revolution, especially in some "Reflections Upon the Opinions of Some Modern Divines," in which the author proves with great learning that the *Lex Regia* of Rome, like the common law of England, "did not overthrow the Propriety of the Subject." This would, and it did, refute the specific doctrine of Cowell's "Interpreter" that an English king could take a subsidy without consent. But it corroborated Cowell's general contention that the English law is a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal; for the English principle of no taxation without representation is an outgrowth of the mixing of feudal custom and the principles of the Roman Law in the period of Granvill and Bracton. And in estimating the extent and the nature of this "mixture" in our modern liberty we must not overlook the fact that this "Propriety of the Subject," which the Roman and the common law both put beyond the ruler's reach, as the pamphleteer said, included far more than our modern mere "property rights." In the feudal period when this "wall" was built against the encroachment of government, "propriety" included most of those rights of the subject which we call personal as well as proprietary; it protected the integrity of the status of the serf as well as the feudal immunity of his lord. Thus this "wall," built of local materials, the customary law of the country, but fashioned on a plan that owed much to Roman jurisprudence, marked off a field in England, as it had in Rome, into which the power of the prince could not lawfully intrude. And this field in the Middle Ages included not alone the territorial fiefs of the King's subjects, but their immunities, or liberties, or franchises, as they were called, as well as their dignities, their offices, and their personal status.

It is not too much to say that most of the safeguards of the

individual which we prize today have their origin in these feudal immunities or liberties. They began in local English customs which undoubtedly preceded the revival of Roman Law in England; but the principles on which these diverse customs were fused and made "common," and above all the legal remedies gradually evolved to prevent or punish their breach, came in large part from the Roman Law. And they were devised by men who revered that law as their successors did not, and who even regarded it as a system almost synonymous with human reason. In the universal principles of this Roman Law, as these founders of our common law saw them, the central principle was certainly not despotism. John of Salisbury, a contemporary of Granvill, quotes much from Justinian's law books; but I recall no quotation of the well-known maxims of absolutism. Instead we find the famous *Digna Vox* of the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian — "Indeed it is on the authority of the law that our own authority depends."

The recent developments in this present World War have done more than merely wake us up to the deadly threat that a totalitarian victory would hold to our whole way of life. They have brought home to every man, except to those hopelessly blind or selfishly indifferent, the necessity for action, and immediate action, if our own fate is not to be the fate of Denmark and Norway, of Holland and Belgium and France. And they have done even more than that. These developments, together with the official pronouncements of the totalitarian adventurers themselves, have convinced all thinking men at last — and it has taken much to do it — that the present struggle is far more than any mere battle for the domination of Europe or even of the world. It now stands out, confessedly and openly, as an attempt to set up a "new order" in the world, an order in which the traditions of the race, in culture, law, morality, and religion, are all to be thrown down and supplanted by a complete *étatisme*, maintained by brute force and designed to crush all initiative, to override every individual right, and to substitute for the law in which this right is enshrined the naked will of the ruler alone. This ruler is represented in this "new order" as the living voice of a culture that is tribal and not universal. He is the "leader" of a race of masters with a divine though heathen right to a rule which they now mean to exercise over a subjugated world of slaves. The official statements of the present Nazi leaders leave

no doubt that nothing less than this is the program they propose to enforce upon every part of the world when once it has been overrun by their military power or subdued by their economic power.

The "new order," then, would be a cultural as well as a political revolution. It would destroy at a blow traditions honored and cherished, even if not always lived up to, for more than two thousand years. Roman Law is far from being the whole of this great inheritance. But it is an important part, and a part, I am convinced, which our particular Anglo-Saxon tradition in its later interpretation has sometimes led us to overlook or underrate.

The appalling recrudescence in the last few years of an absolutism that we fondly thought the world had renounced forever makes somewhat clearer than before our duty and also our debt to the Law of Rome. This crisis in the world's history is the most serious in a thousand years. Because Nazi tribalism rejects the universality of Roman Law we know the better that at all costs we must maintain it; because the despotism of present-day Germany overrides all the private rights that the Roman and the English law protect, we are the more conscious of the value of these rights and the more determined that they shall not perish from the earth.



THE MEXICAN ARMY

By Virginia Prewett

MEXICO'S army is not a parade-ground army. Nor is it large or highly mechanized when judged in comparison with the armed forces of Great Powers. Yet, it serves the Mexican nation in the multiple capacity as guarantor of the stability of the constituted government, keeper of the public peace, and active collaborator in the country's public works program — and it does this at a cost per man that is approximately one-eighth of what in times of peace the United States has been accustomed to spend on its armed forces. Mexico's army is a working army, and on its various internal fronts it wages a peacetime campaign all the year round.

During the past twenty years the Mexican Army has been undergoing a process of transformation, both in mission and in organization. From a force of revolutionary irregulars that set up and pulled down governments at the will of its commanding generals it has grown into a national institution fulfilling the orthodox function of protecting the nation against its enemies. From 1920 till the present these enemies have been internal ones: rebels and bandits. Now, however, the Army has a new mission — to defend the country against external aggression. Since the Havana Conference of last July, this has come to include Hemisphere Defense.

In order to discuss Mexico's rôle in Hemisphere Defense, we must first examine her strategic position and what opportunities it offers for invasion by non-American Powers.

On the east, Mexico is protected from direct attack by the firm control which the United States exercises over the approaches to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. To the south the rough terrain and impenetrable jungle along the Guatemalan border — through which there is only one major line of communication, the railroad line running down to Suchiate — protect Mexico in that quarter. In any event, Guatemala, with less than three million inhabitants, is not regarded in Mexico as a potential threat. A more immediate danger lies in the large number of German coffee planters, many of them naturalized Mexican citizens married to Mexican wives, who could carry on subversive activities from their settlements along the Guatemalan border in the state of Chiapas. In this region, where roads are scarce and

communications difficult, the Francisco Sarabia Company operates 6,470 kilometers of airlines, partially staffed by Germans who too have become naturalized Mexicans.

Mexico is most exposed, then, on the west, where over two thousand miles of unprotected and virtually unpatrolled seacoast stretch from the United States to Guatemala. The ports of Guaymas, Mazatlán, Manzanillo, Acapulco and Salina Cruz, spaced fairly evenly along this coast, are without up-to-date defenses and, on paper at least, are wide open to invasion. The Mexican Navy, consisting of two 1,600-ton transports, four 1,300-ton gunboats and ten 183-ton coast-guard boats, is scarcely adequate as a scouting force, much less as a defense for Mexico's two coasts. If, therefore, the American Navy should for any reason be unable to lend a hand in the protection of Mexico's western ports, these might quite conceivably fall into hostile hands and become bases for an invasion of the United States itself.

An even more immediate possibility is that at small and secret enemy stations along Mexico's wild and rugged west coast, sea raiders, particularly submarines, could refuel in order to strike surprise blows at our Pacific coast bases or, more important still, at the Panama Canal. The Japanese have had a fishing industry on this coast for many years and are said to know these waters better than anybody else in the world. They have colonies composed of naturalized Mexican citizens married to Mexicans, all up and down the coast. They also own oil companies, organized under Mexican law, as well as oil concessions. From the desert regions of northwestern Mexico, sabotage activities against the United States could easily be organized. Such vital cogs in our defense machine as Randolph Field, Kelly Field, Boulder Dam, the naval bases at San Francisco, San Pedro and San Diego, the aviation industry of Southern California, are all within striking distance of Mexico.

Another point of great strategic importance is the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, where the Gulf of Mexico is less than two hundred miles from the Pacific. From New Orleans to Puerto México on the Gulf is only 795 miles. Both Puerto México and Salina Cruz, the corresponding harbor on the Pacific side, can be made into first-class ports, though the latter receives a sand drift from the Pacific and would have to be dredged extensively. If the railroad connecting the two ports were converted into a multiple-track way and a highway built parallel to it, there would exist a new and

up-to-date shortcut from the Atlantic to the Pacific some fifteen hundred miles north of Panama. Completion of the Mexican link of the Pan American Highway, now passable in good weather almost to Salina Cruz, would make it possible to reach this port overland from American soil in 24 hours — and Salina Cruz, it must be remembered, is halfway between San Diego and the Panama Canal. This port, though not so large as Magdalena Bay or even Acapulco, both of which have been discussed as possible naval bases on the Pacific, can with dredging and other improvements be made into an adequate refueling station which by pipeline could be plentifully supplied with oil from the fields on the other side of the isthmus. In any long-term plan for the coordinated defense of this hemisphere, these developments, made within the framework of a military agreement with Mexico, seem to be inevitable. In particular, Mexico is strategically very important because of her supply of many metals and minerals vital to American war industries. Should the United States find itself at war, every mine, every oil field, every railroad and every highway in Mexico would have its place in Hemisphere Defense.

Obviously, then, the part assigned to Mexico's Army in any general plan for the protection of this hemisphere is important. Upon it would rest the duty of insuring the stability of the existing government by preventing armed revolution, of policing the interior of the country against sabotage, and of protecting its coasts against invasion. Armed revolt has not been successful since Obregón overthrew Carranza in 1920, after which time the United States adopted a policy of denying the sale of arms to Mexican rebels. But this is in itself no guarantee that part of the Army might not revolt should there arise within the country a serious political division in which one side received effective support from foreign Powers. Indeed, European or Asiatic Powers might help to start such a revolt in the knowledge that it would cripple our Hemisphere Defense plans. This would alarm American opinion and oblige the United States to divert a considerable portion of its armed forces to border duty; it might also be the signal for outbreaks in other Latin American countries where well-organized European minority groups hold strategic positions. If a disturbance in Mexico could be used to force actual intervention from the United States, this would be a major tactical victory for the enemy, for it could be used as proof positive of our "imperialistic" designs on Latin America.

It is therefore vital that the Mexican Army, if it is to fulfil its mission as a defender of the constituted government, must stress the duty of the individual officers and men to maintain loyalty to the Army as a permanent, non-political institution. This evolution away from the old idea that the Army was a means for advancing the political fortunes of its leaders has, since Calles' time, been assiduously fostered by the Government. Today Mexico's Army is, in every sense of the word, a new institution.

The break with the old Díaz army, begun in 1910 when this ornamental body first disintegrated before the impact of the Madero movement and then went over to it, was completed when the reactionary elements that had reassembled around Huerta were defeated and dispersed by Carranza. Carranza's Constitutionalist Army of eighty thousand men was in fact a combination of several armies, each one held together by personal loyalty to its commander, and all of them united by the common desire of their chiefs to overthrow Huerta. Enrollment was voluntary and informal; rank and promotion depended directly on pleasing the chief; equipment was heterogeneous and there was no regulation uniform. Though there were some Díaz-trained officers scattered throughout the various corps, tactics were on the whole pragmatical and unorthodox. These armies lived off the country. Their number rose and fell with the temperature of the political moment. They were, in fact, little more than loosely-organized forces of irregulars.

This evolution towards a line army has been the result of giving the officers instruction in military science and in orthodox methods of organization and discipline. Along with this has gone the inculcation of the idea that the Army is the servant rather than the creator of the government. This process would have been interminably slow had it not been paralleled by other processes: first, the elimination — by a series of purges — of the officers who adhered to the old conception of the Army as primarily a revolutionary instrument: and secondly, the establishment of the precedent that an officer's career profited by his remaining loyal to the constituted government in times of rebellion.

The first of these purges came soon after the victory over Huerta, when Villa separated from the main body of the Constitutionalist Army. The process of evolution by education began soon afterwards. While Carranza was reorganizing the Government, Obregón began to reorganize the Army. An important step,

taken in 1917, was the founding of the *Academia de Estado Mayor* (General Staff School), staffed by men who had received technical training under Díaz. In 1920, this school was converted into the *Colegio Militar*, the time of instruction was increased from eighteen months to three years, and separate courses were established for infantry, cavalry and artillery. The second purge took place in 1923 when the rebellion of de la Huerta was put down. Many of the officers who supported him were shot, many others went into exile, and the way was thus cleared for the young officers coming from the military school. A better selected and educated body of officers made it possible in turn for stricter norms of discipline to be imposed on the men in the ranks.

Under Calles, Secretary of War Joaquín Amaro began to whip the rank and file into shape. Recruiting standards were raised and an effort made to improve the equipment, the living conditions and the morale of the men. In 1924, the nation was divided into thirty-three small military zones and a policy of shifting commands was begun. This served to prevent any one general from establishing personal influence over too large a sector of the Army. In 1925, Mexico began to send military missions to study in France, Spain, Italy and the United States. Upon their return these officers acted as instructors and advisers to the Command. In 1926, the first step toward the creation of a general staff was taken when the *Comisión de Estudios Militares* was created. In 1927, another purge took place when Generals Serrano, Gómez, Aguirre, Amado and a large number of their adherents were eliminated after the failure of their attempt at revolt.

But the old revolutionary pattern persisted, and in 1929 General Escobar in Coahuila, in agreement with Generals Manso in Sonora and Caveo in Chihuahua, attempted to overthrow the Calles' dictatorship then being exercised through President Portes Gil. The defeat of these rebels by loyal forces under Generals Almazán, Cárdenas, Cedillo and Miguel Acosta provided another precedent for the new tradition that officers must support the existing government against attempts to change it by military force. When under Calles the Army was used to put down the Catholic rebellions in Jalisco and Michoacán, commanding generals were given further opportunities for appreciating the advantages of remaining loyal.

In the early 30's, the process of evolution by education was speeded up. At the same time an attempt to standardize the

Army's equipment was begun with the remodeling of the old arms factory at Mexico City and by improvements in the country's powder and small arms plants. In 1932, the *Escuela Superior de Guerra*, Mexico's War College, was organized. The *Comisión de Estudios Militares* was strengthened and given the best technical brains the Army had developed. Soon after, the *Escuela de Aplicación* was organized for infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineers. The latter gives advanced courses, similar to those of our branch schools in the United States, for captains about to be promoted and for young majors. In 1935, infantry officers below the rank of colonel were given an examination and those who did not pass were put on the list for the schools. Courses of study for non-commissioned officers were also instituted. In 1936, the promotion of field and junior officers was put on the basis of an examination formulated by the *Comisión de Estudios Militares*. In 1937, it was made unlawful for a commissioned officer to have a civilian occupation. Also in 1937, after it had been found that police duty in remote districts required more junior officers than the schools were producing, the *Centro de Instrucción de Jefes y Oficiales* was set up in order to prepare non-commissioned officers of proven merit for service as officers. Thus, as in the old revolutionary army, it is now possible for an enlisted man to reach the higher ranks; but the modern route of advancement is by proving one's capacity to absorb education and technical training rather than by displaying personal loyalty to a particular chief.

That this evolution is gradually changing the psychology of the Army is shown by the fact that in each successive military rebellion since de la Huerta's in 1923, fewer and fewer Army elements have taken part. The last revolt, led by General Saturnino Cedillo in 1938-39, scarcely deserves the name of military rebellion, so few were the men who followed him. It is, however, true that the rapid and arbitrary promotions made in the revolutionary years have left a large number of men in the higher ranks who are still as much politicians as soldiers. To cope with this evil the Cárdenas Government had a law passed reducing the time of active service for these officers from 35 to 25 years; as a result a large number went on the retired list. For political reasons, they were recalled in 1939; but the law still stands and can be put into effect whenever the political crisis has passed.

In 1938, the office of Secretary of War was changed to that of Minister of National Defense, and its duties became more purely

administrative. At the same time the *Comisión de Estudios Militares* became the *Dirección Técnica Militar*, to supply technical advice and planning. Plans for an orthodox general staff have been completed and will be carried out in the near future. The 1939-40 presidential campaign found the Army divided in its loyalties. The government party, the PRM, had a well-organized military sector which supported Ávila Camacho, while thirty-four officers of the active list were given extended leave to campaign for Almazán. But now that the election is over, President Ávila Camacho has stated repeatedly — and his re-statement of it in his inaugural address received applause — that the political activity of Army officers will be discouraged. The “military sector” of the new Congress has already merged with the “popular sector.”

Mexico's combat troops at present number around 42,000 men; another 10,000 are included in administrative and service bodies. Fifty battalions of infantry numbering 22,600 men, and forty cavalry regiments numbering 19,000, two artillery regiments numbering 1,300, two battalions of engineers, seven aviation squadrons, and an experimental anti-aircraft battery and tank corps make up the effectives.

The basic unit of the infantry company is the “pelotón” or squad of nine privates, a corporal and a sergeant. Eight men in each squad are armed with a Mauser-type *musquetón*, a rifle manufactured at the National Arms Factory in Mexico City that dates from the time of Díaz. However, this gun has been improved and its universal use is a step toward the standardization of equipment. The ninth private of the squad is armed with a light Mendoza machine-gun, the product of a Mexican inventor and also made at the National Arms Factory. This is considered a good gun, is simple in construction and does not heat up. Three squads make up a platoon of thirty-three men; and three platoons make a company, officered by a first and a second captain, three lieutenants and three sub-lieutenants. The high proportion of junior officers is a carry-over from the days of the levy army before and during the Díaz dictatorship. The proportion has been preserved because patrol duty in small detachments requires many junior officers. Into the infantry battalion go three line companies and a light company of machine-gunners, numbering around fifty men. The latter are equipped with six of the heavier Mendozas, a 7-mm. machine-gun, and two 60-mm. Brandt mortars.

The cavalry regiment follows this same general organization. Troops of 100 men each are officered by first and second captains, three lieutenants and three sub-lieutenants. Three troops make a squadron, staffed by a colonel or brigadier, a major, a captain adjutant and two sub-lieutenants who act as sub-adjutants. The personnel of the supply and administrative services bring the cavalry regiment to 400 men. The Mexican cavalry horse is of Spanish-Arabian descent, acclimated to Mexico during the centuries that have elapsed since it was first brought over. It is a small animal, but tough and admirably suited to the country's rough terrain and varied climate. Mexico's two artillery regiments are permanently stationed at the nation's capital. Their equipment was formerly the old French 75, but this is now being replaced by a modified adaptation of the same gun.

Not since the Escobar rebellion in 1929 has Mexico's Army been organized into the conventional divisions; instead it has been distributed among the country's thirty-three military zones as local situations and the nature of the terrain have required. Within the military zones, regiments or battalions are divided among the principal towns. Two thirds of each of these units are then sent on 30-day tours of duty among smaller towns to protect highways and railways and in general to maintain order. The section remaining at the base is occupied with parade-ground training and construction work. This plan, while practical from the point of view of police duty, is not conducive to combat efficiency or to that parade-ground perfection on which officers of many Latin-American countries, notably Cuba, place so much emphasis. It is for this reason that Mexican military authorities are anxious to lessen the Army's police duties.

During the past few years the accent in the Army has been on work. Official reports from the Ministry of National Defense tell a running story of thousands of civic projects, large and small, completed by Mexico's soldiers. Roads have been built and kept in repair, drainage and irrigation projects have been completed, reforestation undertaken, the improvement and beautification of towns carried out. Schools have been erected and staffed with teachers from the Army. The Army has built hospitals and airports. Mexico now has 307 of the latter, 68 of them under military control. Construction of six major army posts has been started, and those at Mexico City and Monterrey are nearing completion. Others will be at Torreón, Irapuato, Pachuca and

Cuernavaca. The most important single work now under construction is the Military Hospital at the capital, a building which when completed will be the largest and most modern hospital in the nation.

Mexican Army officers coöperate with local authorities in applying the agrarian laws, in establishing the limits of the *ejidos* (communal peasant communities) and in dividing land to be distributed among the peasants. Army officers are also in charge of the reserves, a body (first instituted in 1937) which now numbers on paper approximately 60,000 men. Reserve stocks of second-class weapons and some two million rounds of small arms ammunition are held for their use. All over the nation these reserves have built highways, secondary roads, telephone lines, bridges, playgrounds, schools, and have assisted in building airports. This use of Mexico's soldiers as laborers has undoubtedly been as immediately practical as their use as policemen; but it is also open to question whether this work has added to their combat efficiency, which after all is the primary quality needed by a body whose chief purpose is national defense.

Another work of vital national importance that the Army is doing is to make a military map of the country. Mexico is a big nation, nearly four times as large as France, and it has regions as yet practically unexplored. The first step towards evaluating the resources of these regions is to obtain detailed information about their physical characteristics, and this information the Army is slowly and patiently assembling. The Mexican Air Force, although small in number and possessing only twenty-five planes fit for active service, carries out aerial exploration for this map and also compiles meteorological data.

The Mexican nation is proud of its air tradition. As long ago as 1915 two nephews of General Carranza who had learned to fly in the United States bombed Guaymas from the air, one of the first uses of the airplane for this purpose. A school of aviation was founded in Mexico in 1917, was enlarged in 1932 and is now located at Vera Cruz in order to give pilots flight training at low altitudes. In accordance with the Army's policy of organizing a national supply of war materials, a contract for the construction of airplane fuselages was made with the Canadian Car and Foundry Company early in 1939 and a factory was installed at Valbuena, near the capital. Production on a small scale was to have begun this year, but it has been impossible to carry out the

plan because the entire output of airplane motors in the United States is now going to the American and British air forces.

The development of the Mexican Army's artillery, like that of its air force, has been limited by the nation's internal necessities and financial resources. The two existing artillery regiments are enough to meet any demands for domestic pacification. Their purpose, like that of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank units, has been more experimental than anything else: they have given the Army Command a clear-cut idea of what types of material are best suited to Mexico's special needs.

The Mexican Army may therefore be said to be sufficiently well organized and equipped to meet the demands now being made upon it. Just what would be its potential value in Hemisphere Defense is a matter of some conjecture since in the past there has been little expectation that it would be called upon to repel an invasion in force. It is, however, part of the plan of Mexico's National Defense Ministry and of the Ávila Camacho Administration to develop the Army so that it will provide an effective rampart against any threat the nation may have to meet.

A first step will be the introduction of compulsory military service. The law providing for this has already been passed, and the first classes will be called up in 1942. Compulsory military training will serve Hemisphere Defense in two important particulars, high Mexican Army circles believe. It will create a trained reserve that can quickly be called into service against invaders, revolutionaries and saboteurs. Second, and equally important, military training is expected to instill into Mexico's young manhood a clear conception of its duty to the nation, thus creating a psychological bulwark against subversive influences. Furthermore, the enlargement of the Mexican Army would give the younger officers more opportunity for activity and advancement, and this should reduce dissatisfaction among them and consequently the danger of rebellion.

The existing facilities for training — barracks, parade grounds, camps and the like — are not nearly large enough to accommodate all the young men eligible for service. The provisional general staff is, therefore, planning to begin by replacing the existing volunteer troops with those called up under the compulsory plan. It is estimated that about twelve thousand can be called in 1942 and that by the end of 1944, the entire volunteer army will be replaced by the new contingents. At the same time, the changes

to be made in the Army's organization and the enlargement of its construction program will permit the gradual increase of the total combat force in training. For instance, the projected reorganization of the company so that it will have only one captain, two lieutenants and two sub-lieutenants would at once release a considerable number of officers for training draftees.

As new units are formed and as funds are made available, the Army will be organized into the conventional divisions and an effort will be made to emphasize its national defense rather than its police functions. Mixed divisions will probably consist of four infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment, one field or mountain artillery regiment, with engineer, signal corps, quartermaster and ordnance companies. In Mexico's mountainous country, where roads suitable for a highly mechanized force are few, the rapid motorization of the Army is not judged to be desirable. To give troop movements speed and mobility, a high proportion of cavalry will be preserved and cavalry divisions will be organized. In all, the plans call for six or eight light cavalry and mixed divisions of approximately eight thousand men to be organized by the time the present volunteer rank and file has vanished through the expiration of its enlistment. Meanwhile, two armies will coexist in Mexico, the dwindling volunteer body and the increasing compulsory-service body. Until facilities are such that compulsory service can be made universal, young men will be called up from the sections of the country that are danger spots, where it is thought most desirable to have a trained reserve on ready call.

In its new mission of Hemisphere Defense, one of the first duties of the Mexican Army will be that of scouting and coast protection, particularly along the Pacific shore. Since the disembarkation of troops and material is one of the most difficult of all military operations, it is believed that comparatively small units could prevent it from taking place on Mexican shores unless invasion by large forces should be attempted. Furthermore, the physiography of Mexico, with its high coastal mountain ranges through which the roads are few and easy to defend, theoretically makes penetration into the heart of the country a difficult military problem. When the Mexican Army has been developed and expanded according to the present plan and equipped with the modern apparatus of war, and when the ports of Salina Cruz, Acapulco, Manzanillo, San Blas, Mazatlán, Guaymas and the islands of Santa Margarita and Ensenada are fortified with coast

defense artillery, and provided with an adequate patrol of aërial and light naval units, Mexico will be in a position to repel invasion from the Pacific, at least until effective help reaches her from the United States.

But this program of expansion will cost large sums and Mexico's financial resources are scarcely adequate for carrying the burden unaided. To put it into effect she will therefore need assistance from the United States. Provision for such assistance will very likely be included in the arrangements for military coöperation now being negotiated by the two governments. The fact that such negotiations were under way, though frequently rumored ever since President Ávila Camacho took office on December 1, was officially admitted only on March 4, 1941.¹ According to this announcement, the military talks were initiated under the terms of the Declaration on Reciprocal Assistance and Coöperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas, adopted at the Havana Conference on July 30, 1940. The concluding paragraph of this Declaration states:

All the signatory nations, or two or more of them according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize coöperation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions such as those referred to in this declaration.

The course these conversations will take may in part depend on the progress made by the negotiations for a final settlement of the other disputes outstanding between the two countries, notably that in regard to the oil expropriations.

It is too early to say whether the instrument chosen to carry out Mexican-American military coöperation will be similar to the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, as many have suggested. But whatever form it takes, its value to both nations will be obvious. For Mexico, it would mean financial backing to carry out the expansion of her Army and to install proper coast defenses. For the United States, it would represent a long step forward in the direction of insuring our own invulnerability and in furthering our policy of Hemisphere Defense.

¹ It is interesting to note that Foreign Minister Matsuoka of Japan declared in the House of Representatives at Tokyo on February 17 that he expected the United States and Mexico to complete a military agreement.

STALEMATE IN CHINA

By Owen Lattimore

NOW that the war in China is nearing the end of its fourth year we have settled down to the habit of thinking of it as not only a stalemate but a permanent stalemate. We may be wrong. Forces already at work in Asia, and forces hitherto latent but capable of coming into operation now that China and Japan are more and more being left to themselves, may break the stalemate in the Far East before the struggle is over in Europe.

The degree to which China and Japan are now being forced to test, develop and improvise from their own resources fixes the main outlines of the present picture. The Chinese and the Japanese fought each other to a standstill after several years in which both were able to draw on outside munitions and resources — the Japanese much more than the Chinese. Will the stalemate hold now that no outside Power can supply the finished munitions or war materials to enable either to force a decision in a few months? For the first time since 1937 no outside Power can do much more than urge the desirability of its own particular views or policies. Negative pressure can be applied. Decisive aid cannot be supplied.

For Japan this means an uneasy choice between using her accumulated but largely irreplaceable stocks in a prolonged war against China, or temporizing with China and proceeding to gamble her whole future in Southeastern Asia. A great deal, obviously, depends on China. Will she accept a compromise peace that would suit Germany, thereby enabling Japan to turn south against the Dutch East Indies and Singapore? Or will she split up in civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communists, which would incalculably increase the freedom of manoeuvre of both Germany and Japan? Or will she endure indefinitely the stalemate, which would suit the present trend of Anglo-American policy? Or will she choose to find a way to break the stalemate on her own terms and primarily to her own advantage? These questions open up a range of possibilities that can best be understood if we first examine the strategic geography of China, her economic geography, her internal political tensions.

No conquest of the whole of China has ever succeeded without the conqueror having in his possession three strategic keys. This

is as true of conquests by armies gathered within China as it is of invasions from beyond the Great Wall. The three keys are: the province of Shansi, the crossing of the Yellow River at T'ungkuan, and the Han River valley. As far as I know, American students of the war in China have failed to realize that after three and a half years of hostilities not one of these keys is held by Japan.

The three keys of strategic geography control China in the following ways:

The northern mountains of Shansi offer the only good "defense in depth" against an invasion of North China from Inner Mongolia, and by far the best base for a counter-attack against Inner Mongolia. The eastern mountains of Shansi dominate the North China plain, and are the only safe position from which either to defend or threaten that plain if Manchuria and Jehol are in hostile hands. The southern Shansi mountains flank the approaches to T'ungkuan, the second key of strategy. All of these mountains are held by Chinese forces, which are able to keep the Japanese garrisons in the central basin of Shansi under perpetual siege.

T'ungkuan stands at the great "elbow" where the Yellow River, after flowing almost straight from north to south, turns at right angles to the east. The crossing of the Yellow River at this point offers the only good passage between the major plain of North China and the inner basin of Shensi. Command of the T'ungkuan passage is absolutely necessary for the movement either of large bodies of troops or of economic transport on a large scale, if the deep hinterland of China is to be controlled. Only from Shensi can Szechwan, on the south, be invaded. The approaches are not easy, but they are beyond all comparison easier than an attack up the Yangtze gorges.

The Han River valley, from the southern mountains of Shensi to the Yangtze at Hankow, is the only way of turning the T'ungkuan position, as T'ungkuan is the only way of turning the Shansi position. The founder of the great Han dynasty won an empire by marching up this valley at the end of the third century B.C., while the Mongols turned the T'ungkuan position by marching down it in the thirteenth century. These comparisons are a sufficient commentary on the fact that major Japanese forces have failed in at least four determined attempts to advance up the Han valley in the past year.

Against the importance of these three keys must be set the impressive but still not decisive successes of the Japanese. South of the Great Wall, in the fertile plains astride the lower Yellow River and the lower Yangtze, they have penetrated and partly occupied ten Chinese provinces. Here they have both coastal control and communication by land between their main lines of invasion. They also hold footholds in the three southern provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kuangsi; but here their garrisons cannot communicate freely by land as well as by sea. Though they have nothing like full control, the Japanese have deeply penetrated an area which compares formidably with the area left to Free China. Chiang Kai-shek has full control of only the five provinces of Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, Kweichow and Yunnan, together with almost all of Kwangsi and — through the Eighth Route Army — the commanding strategic positions in Shansi. In addition he has authority, but not direct control, over the border regions of Ninghsia (the western extension of Inner Mongolia), Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan, and the three provinces into which Tibet is officially divided.

Japan also controls the four greatest cities of China, which in 1937 were the most prosperous ports and the centers of China's finance and nascent industry. These are Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Canton, with a total urban population of about seven million. (Peking, with nearly a million inhabitants, is not so important either strategically or economically.) Moreover the provinces most affected by the Japanese invasion are notable for their natural fertility, high agricultural production and dense population. Chekiang and Kiangsu, on the Yangtze, have densities of 554 and 813 inhabitants to the square mile, and Shansi and Hopei in the Yellow River drainage area have densities of 183 and 583.¹

China has a total population of very nearly 440 million. Leaving out of consideration Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the extreme southern provinces in which Japan has only footholds, the Japanese have penetrated and partly occupied, in the Yangtze and Yellow River valleys, about one quarter of China's territory, with a population approaching 250 million. Putting it very conservatively, and allowing for 40 to 60 million people who have fled to Free China, the area directly invaded contains about half of

¹ Warren H. Chen, "An Estimate of the Population of China," *XIX^e Session de l'Institut International de Statistique, Tokio, 1930*, Shanghai, 1930.

the Chinese people. Japan does not control them all, for the wide guerilla areas must be taken into account. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the number of Chinese that Japan does control south of the Great Wall. In order to make due allowance for the magnitude of the problem faced by the Chinese in freeing their country, it would be best to work on the assumption that Japan has more control than the Chinese Government does over about 150 million people in China Proper. It is remarkable enough that China could suffer losses like these without being stunned. It is even more remarkable that Japan, supposedly a country of imperial stature, could win so much and still fall short of victory.

Japan's failure to make even a passable colonial conquest out of all the raw material of empire in the rich areas of China she has penetrated is only partly explained by the fact that she has been defeated in every attempt to grasp the three keys of strategy in Shansi, at the T'ungkuan crossing and in the Han valley. An important German criticism of Japan's military mistakes, obviously based on the opinions of the German military advisors withdrawn from China by Hitler in 1938, adds other details.² Instead of striking at China once for all with really overwhelming forces, Japan attempted in the summer of 1937 to finesse a cheap conquest. Enough men were sent to China for a break-through, but not enough to round up and annihilate the Chinese armies, which time and again evaded encirclement. The consequences of the original mistake multiplied by geometrical progression. Each time that reinforcements were brought in, the problem had already grown beyond the proportions that could be handled by the total Japanese forces in the field. The Japanese now have at least a million men in China -- and they are enough only to maintain a stalemate. To double the number and attempt to break the stalemate would demand a prodigious effort. The men could be found -- even trained men; but to equip and maintain them on the scale of a huge campaign would take the last ounce of Japan's reserve strength. So desperate an effort Japan is not yet prepared to make.

Even so, a military analysis does not explain everything. To attribute the mistakes and failures of Japan entirely to a second-rate general staff or gross over-confidence is inadequate. Some-

² See Wolf Schenke, "Vast Area as an Instrument of War," *Amerasia*, January 1939. (Originally published as "Raum als Waffe," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, September, 1938.)

thing else lay behind Japan's initial willingness to gamble on a quick, cheap conquest. Japan desperately needed success with the minimum loss of manpower and expenditure of money and material, because neither her wealth nor her industrial resources warranted a major war. Unconsciously, and perhaps to a certain extent consciously, the military experimentalists who gambled and won in Manchuria in 1931 and in Jehol in 1933 and in Inner Mongolia in 1935 had been living and planning and thinking in an atmosphere of taking chances and trusting to the luck of the Imperial Army.

When the analysis has been carried to this point it is easy to understand the interaction of economic and strategic geography. The part of China in which Japan holds areas of control and partial control is the part which has always yielded the largest revenues, because of its high agricultural development both in food crops and in technological crops like cotton, silk and soybeans. But Japan — more nearly self-sufficient in food than in anything else — did not need an agrarian empire. Even China's cotton and silk were not entirely satisfactory for Japan's needs, for technical reasons such as the unevenness of their quality.³ What Japan needed therefore was to get hold of China's crops as cheaply as possible in order to convert them into free exchange on the world market. With this money Japan hoped to buy, in other markets, the raw materials needed for her existing export and munitions industries. With the surplus, she could gradually improve and standardize the quality of Chinese cotton and silk and purchase machinery both to round out and diversify Japanese industry and to establish a subordinate colonial industry in Manchuria and China. Only in this way could the raw material resources and horsepower capacities of the "Manchukuo-China-Japan bloc" be diversified enough to give Japan anything like an "autarchic" empire.

Such a program needed time, stability in China, and a tranquil world market. It was essential to carry out a stage-by-stage development in such a manner that each stage would be profitable in itself and help to finance the next stage. This explains both why Japan is hampered as well as benefited by a world war concurrent with the China war, and why the guerillas in the part of China that Japan has penetrated but does not control are even more important economically than they are militarily. They keep agri-

³ North China cotton is rough in fiber and short in staple.

culture down to a level which provides food for the farmers whom the guerillas organize, but not an exportable surplus for Japan. In spite of her net of garrisons Japan can neither draw a revenue of land tax and grain tax, like the conquerors of China in the past, nor set up a modern and profitable colonial economy of exchange between the raw materials of industry and the finished products of manufacture.

Invaded China and Free China must be studied in comparison, not in isolation. In parts of Szechwan, Yunnan and Shensi, Free China has an intensively developed irrigated agriculture. These areas provide the surplus of grain traditionally necessary to a strong Chinese government. Much greater areas, however, are eccentric to the traditional Chinese structure of heavy production per acre and close settlement per square mile, and permit only "extensive" or mixed or marginal farming, or grazing, or the exploitation of forests or minerals. Free China's mineral resources, though as yet only haphazardly worked, include tin, tungsten and at least a certain amount of oil, in addition to coal and iron in quantities much larger than are accessible to Japan in Invaded China.

Thus Japan, with a greater industrial capacity and a much larger force of skilled labor and trained technicians, has access only to that part of China with the highest agricultural potential and the lowest industrial potential, while China, which is critically short of skilled labor and technicians, holds by far the most important mineral and industrial reserves. When such conditions are part of the complex which in its military aspect is a stalemate, everything depends, in making comparisons, on whether it is assumed that the balance will be constant or that there are trends of change inherent in the balance. It need hardly be pointed out that a country like Japan, with a relatively high productive capacity but poor raw material resources, is extremely vulnerable to the dwindling of supplies for its industrial plant. On the other hand a country like Free China, with varied and ample raw materials, can always in time increase its inadequate industrial plant, even under the anxious conditions of a military stalemate.

It is important in this connection that the undeveloped areas of Free China, totalling hundreds of thousands of square miles, have always been underpopulated rather than overpopulated. Americans, who habitually think of all China within the Great Wall as overpopulated, are almost universally oblivious to this

fact. Yet it is a key fact in the present situation. Refugees from Invaded China to Free China, estimated at from 40 to 60 million, are not burdening an overpopulated land but bringing needed labor to all kinds of latent opportunities. This is because the old China not only neglected mining and failed to develop industry, but avoided as far as possible any farming that could not be done with close cultivation and as much irrigation as possible. Failure to develop the thinly-peopled hinterland was mainly due to a strong social tradition with a fixed psychology of its own.

In this respect the present emergency is bringing about revolutionary changes. Though China is pitifully short of technically trained men, the ideas and possibilities of the Western world and the twentieth century have penetrated China much more deeply than actual machines and practices. When it is known that mining and manufacture are things that can be done, and that the traditional Chinese farming methods are not the only methods, men's minds and ambitions are stimulated. New ways of using land are especially potent in a time of invasion and emergency. They help to break up the old standards of land tenure and the rigid and often downright vicious landlord-tenant relationship which hampers the improvement of Chinese agricultural economy. Agricultural reforms, when the focus of attention is the changing of a social system established for centuries, are often resisted as politically subversive. The same reforms, when attention is focused on new kinds of profit, can be quite differently regarded — especially when the opprobrium for shattering the old social system is largely directed against a foreign invader.

Strategic and economic geography lead to political geography. From the deep hinterland, guarded by the three strategic strongholds of Shansi, the T'ungkuan crossing and the Han valley, Free China can harass the Japanese and make it impossible for them either to exploit the old agricultural economy of Invaded China or to create a new colonial economy. Within Free China, at the same time, the Chinese can begin what the Japanese cannot accomplish: they can diversify and modernize their own economy, make machinery, teach new methods of production, and create the social and political organization indispensable for the maintenance of modern armies and efficient governments. This will not happen suddenly in a series of miracles. It will be slowed up by political quarrels, social conservatism, lack of primary equipment, and the fact that millions and millions of people

are illiterate. Nevertheless a way out of the stalemate can be found in Free China and not in Invaded China, and this is bound to shape the future. Unskilled labor will be an especially potent factor. Labor, in the quantities in which it is available in China, can to a remarkable extent take the place not only of machinery but of capital. The Japanese cannot use Chinese forced labor efficiently, because this kind of labor has its own techniques of sabotage. The Chinese themselves can employ forced labor, however, because the usage is anciently accepted. They are a people who know how to coördinate human labor by the tens of thousands; they work well and smoothly at what they understand; and when their enthusiasm has been won, they work with a sustained devotion.

Finally, the China of today should not be divided simply into Free China and Invaded China. There is also a third category — Marginal China. The geographical focus of this Marginal China is in the guerilla areas where the Japanese have penetrated without winning control. It has also an economic focus in the margin between the traditional agriculture of China and all the new kinds of economic activity; a military focus in the margin between the conscript soldier and the guerilla volunteer; and a political focus in the margin between the official Kuomintang or Nationalist Party and such minority parties and groups as the Communists, the Moslems of the Northwest, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the various guerilla formations, and others.

Indeed, the characteristics and issues of both Free China and Invaded China can be tested better by this scale of marginal values than in any other way. Economically, for instance, there is the question of the degree of China's dependence on the outside world. Which is the more important, the Burma Road or the Turkestan-Siberia Road? If both were cut, could China survive? If all values in China were fixed and unchanging, these would be decisive questions. Actually, they are questions whose urgency is qualified by time and the rate of change. Because change is at work, the ways in which China is dependent on communications with the outer world are variable, and so is the degree of dependence in every case. The Industrial Coöperatives now being formed in Free China are, for instance, intermediate between state enterprise and private enterprise, and at the same time marginal both to the old handicraft manufactures of China and to the former functions of foreign trade. They are being organized

partly to provide employment for refugees, partly to set to work again machinery salvaged from cities abandoned to the Japanese, partly to decentralize industry because of the bombing danger, and partly to prevent Japan from "invading" China with goods the Chinese desperately need. As they spread, they alter not only the magnitude but the nature of many problems, by modifying the demand for the kinds of things that have to be imported over the Burma Road and the Turkestan Road.

Freedom from complete dependence on imported munitions and supplies tends to break down the stalemate between the Chinese and Japanese armies and increases the amount of offensive power which Free China can develop within her own territories. Strategically, again, the guerilla armies are marginal both to the regular armies of the National Government and to the Eighth Route Army of the Communists, which also has its nucleus of trained and disciplined veteran regulars. There is a close link here between military and political problems. At times the hostility toward the Communists of some at least of the Government armies is acute. This would be extremely dangerous for China as a whole if Free China were in fact sharply divided between a major area fully controlled by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and a minor area dominated by the Communists. Fortunately for China, the cleavage is not of this kind.

In the first place, the Kuomintang, though larger than any other party, is by no means a true majority party. It is a carefully recruited "élite" party. In the second place, it is a mistake to assume that the guerillas are all Communists. There are Communist organizers and even units at work among them, but in the main they are local peasants, fighting locally to defend their homes. Thus between the Kuomintang as the largest organized political party and the Communists as a much smaller organized party there spreads the vast majority of the Chinese people. Some of them have other organizations of different kinds — regional, political, religious or national, like the Kuangsi Faction of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Tsung-hsi, the Moslems, the Mongols, and so on. But the most important thing is that hundreds of millions of people are not members or even direct adherents of any party, though they are united by the idea of national independence and a democratic republic.

Both Kuomintang and Communists are for this reason obliged to compete not so much in asserting unquestioned control over

the majority that lies between them as in winning the confidence and support of as many people as they can. The necessity for winning assent and support and the inability to enforce obedience without assent are in themselves guarantees of essential democratic processes. It is in the light of this kind of competition that the recent attack of Chinese government forces on the Fourth Route Army should be judged. This army, unlike the Eighth Route Army, never had more than a minority of Communists. The attack on it, bringing back in a time of acute national danger the shocking idea that Chinese could still fight and kill Chinese, was probably the greatest mistake made on the Chinese side in the course of the war.

Nevertheless, the very nature of the incident shows that the situation may supply its own remedy. If the Communists continue to appeal for support by persuasion, while such reactionary generals as Ho Ying-chin simply demand unquestioning obedience and attempt to enforce it by shedding Chinese blood, there will undoubtedly be strong movements in favor of the Communists within the marginal groups between the Communists and the Kuomintang. It is therefore not impossible that Ho Ying-chin may yet turn out to be the military equivalent of Wang Ching-wei the politician; for like Wang Ching-wei he was closely linked with the Japanese even before 1937. It should also be remembered that the climactic point in the career of Chiang Kai-shek was his release after the "Christmas kidnapping" at Sian in 1936. Demonstrations throughout China then showed that Chiang Kai-shek had won a popularity greater than ever before; but they were partly, also, demonstrations of approval and relief at the settling of a great crisis by negotiation and without civil war. It should be remembered also that at that time both Ho Ying-chin and Wang Ching-wei urged that Sian be bombed, even if it meant risking the life of the Generalissimo. Many Chinese disapproved of this fervor, since it was quite clear that if the Generalissimo had been harmed Ho Ying-chin and Wang Ching-wei would probably have divided between them military and political control of the Kuomintang.

In short, the marginal and unorganized majority is probably becoming as much a political determinant to China's future democracy as the highly organized Kuomintang and Communists. There are comparable marginal values in the international relations of China. Because China is a rapidly changing country,

because the changes that are going on are potentially capable of breaking the military stalemate against Japan, and because the position of China in the world is of steadily growing importance, no country in the world can plan its policy toward China simply according to its own desires and needs. China's desires and needs, the trends of change within China, and those "marginal" values which modify the position and aims of the recognized political parties, must also be considered and accommodated. This is as true for the United States, lying across the Pacific, as it is for Russia, the only Great Power with a non-colonial land frontier on China within reach of major railway systems.

From this analysis conclusions emerge which are quite at variance with what one may call the "orthodox" view of China. Most Americans, like most Europeans, are still inclined to think of an "unchanging China." This idea involves the basic assumption that China is a static quantity, and that the dynamics of such change as takes place must be supplied by the policies of Powers interested in China. If this were true, even the "policies" of Chinese parties would be secondary and subordinate to the direction, pressure or suggestion of foreign sympathizers or backers. Indeed, it is probably not too much to say that most people outside of China really assume in their thinking — whether they are conscious of it or not — that the Kuomintang "represents" the democracies of America and Great Britain, while the Communists "represent" the Russian Communists, and Wang Ching-wei and the other puppets "represent" the Japanese. If this were true, it would again follow that the future of China depends on which — the democracies, the Communists, or the Fascist Axis — backs its "representatives" most effectively.

But are these assumptions necessarily true? Given the indisputable changes that are actually going on in China, and the still greater potential changes that can be foreseen, it would seem that the "orthodox" view and its implications are much too rigid. What of "marginal" China? Its geographical focus includes thousands of square miles and millions of people in the guerilla areas where none of the supposed "representatives" are definitely ascendant — neither the Kuomintang nor the Communists, and certainly not the Japanese invaders and their puppet régimes. Here changes are taking place which are unmistakably Chinese in character — mutations of the "unchanging China," influenced

but certainly not controlled by the various contestants. What is taking place in the focal guerilla areas radiates its own influences far into the foreland actually controlled by the Japanese as well as into the hinterlands of actual Kuomintang and Communist (Eighth Route Army) control. The fringes of "marginal" China are immeasurable.

Who is to win them? Not to conquer and *assert* control of them, at a time when all foreign intervention is increasingly limited, but to *win* them?

Probably not the Japanese, for in recent years they have shown that their political inflexibility is — from the point of view of their own interests — appalling. As between the great democracies and Russia, however, there is a possibility which most Europeans and Americans would have considered absurd a few years ago, though there is evidence that the Russians have been aware of it ever since the days of Sun Yat-sen. The foreign Power whose interests will in the end win out will be the one which is most ready to identify its interests primarily, not with those of its own supposed "representatives" in China, but with those of changing China as a whole. The only symbol of this changing China which has vitality and a survival value is the United Front. It represents the people as a whole more than it represents a compromise between organized forces. To give moral and material support to any one of its component parties would split China — which is the hope of both Germany and Japan. Only by supporting the United Front as such — whether the support comes from Russia or from the democracies or both — can Japan be defeated and China kept whole and independent.

THE I.L.O. IN WARTIME AND AFTER

By John G. Winant

THE International Labor Organization in wartime still serves its member countries, and it is prepared to help constructively in strengthening the democratic processes which, when the war is over, must determine the foreign and domestic policies of all nations if the peace is to last. Today its key personnel have been transferred temporarily from Geneva, Switzerland, to Montreal, Canada, in order to ensure it freedom of speech and action in the service of the free peoples of the world. After eighteen months of war we are in a position not only to reassess the prewar achievement of the Organization but to examine its wartime activity. In this way the experience which it has gained in the practical application of the ideals of world democracy can be taken into full account in planning for postwar reconstruction.

The I.L.O. was created in 1919 in response to the conviction of peoples everywhere that foreign policy could not continue to disregard the world's underlying social issues. Its machinery was designed to furnish a broader base for the conduct of foreign affairs, so that greater consideration could be given to the needs of the diverse economic and social groups within nations. The Organization itself was intended to promote social justice and to prevent differences in labor standards from becoming factors in international trade rivalries.

In its twenty-one year span of life the Organization has grown from a novel and untried instrument into an effective agency through which the free citizenry of over 40 nations have drawn together in search of social justice. It has adapted its program and its methods to the changing demands of prosperity and depression, peace and war. Its strength stems partly from the enduring validity of its objectives, partly from its unique composition.

Governments, employers and workers of the member nations are responsible in equal measure for the functioning of the Organization as a whole. Employer and worker representatives have a full part in every phase of the work, and have coöperated closely with representatives of governments in ensuring that the con-

Editor's Note. This article was written before Mr. Winant's resignation from the post of Director of the International Labor Office, which took effect on February 15, 1941.

clusions reached are put into effect. In the annual session of the International Labor Conference, delegates from the "most representative organizations" of employers and workers sit alongside the government representatives and vote independently of them. In the Governing Body of the Office eight employers chosen by the employers' delegates at the general Conference and eight workers chosen by the workers' group are elected to share executive and administrative responsibility with the representatives of sixteen governments. Thus, every measure which has been advocated by the Organization, whether adopted formally as a Convention or Recommendation of the Conference or accepted by the Governing Body as part of the continuous program of work of the technical services, must first have undergone the critical scrutiny of the representatives of employers and workers as well as of the member governments.

The annual Conference has provided many opportunities for three-sided discussion of such labor and social issues as are international in character; and labor and social treaties among nations have supplemented political treaties and made them more meaningful. Each Conference takes as the basis for discussion an annual report on social and industrial developments during the year, submitted by the Director of the International Labor Office. The result has been an interchange of views and experience which has frequently clarified both national and international social and economic policies. But while this discussion is frequently the most dramatic part of the sessions, the principal achievement has been the creation of a body of international standards and obligations covering most of the main topics of labor and social legislation.

The obligations take the form of the 67 Conventions adopted by the Conference in the course of its 25 sessions. A Convention is adopted by a two-thirds vote of the delegates present at any given session. Each member nation has four votes, two being cast by the government delegates, one by the employer delegate and one by the worker delegate. When a Convention has been adopted, each member nation is under obligation to submit it to the competent national authority for ratification within 18 months at most. If a Convention is ratified, the standards included in its provisions become a treaty obligation of the ratifying country. If a Convention is rejected, there is no further obligation on the part of the nation rejecting it. When the war began on September 1, 1939, a total of 853 ratifications had been

registered from over 50 countries and 46 Conventions had come into force for member nations. Ratifications have continued during the war, bringing the total to 879 as of January 1941. The United States during its brief membership has ratified five of these labor treaties, all of them determining labor standards for men at sea, including their hours of work, leave with pay, age of entrance, employers' liability and officers' competency.

The influence of the Conventions has not been limited to the ratifying countries. They have played a considerable rôle throughout the world as internationally-approved standards of social policy representing a broad measure of agreement among governments, employers and workers. The influence was especially great in countries which had been members of the Organization for the greater part of its existence and which had come to look upon it as a source of inspiration in the development of their social legislation.¹ Nor did the Organization's usefulness as an agency for defining standards stop with the adoption of Conventions. The 67 Conventions are supplemented by 66 formal Recommendations which have likewise influenced national standards.

Together, the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the annual Conferences embody provisions relating to placement services and public works; unemployment; minimum wage-fixing machinery; the regulation of hours of work; weekly rest periods; annual vacations with pay; age of admission of young people to employment in industry, commerce and agriculture; vocational training and apprenticeship; employment at night for young people; maternity protection; limitations on night work for women; health precautions in various industrial processes; safety standards; workmen's compensation for accidents and industrial diseases; sickness insurance; old-age and survivors insurance; labor inspection; a wide range of maritime labor legislation; basic standards for colonial labor policy; and protection for migrant workers.

The formal standards hereby set up are further supplemented by the conclusions formulated by numerous special meetings of experts convened to discuss specific questions of labor and social policy. Much of the most valuable work done by the Organization in the field of social insurance, for instance, has taken the form of

¹ In some of the smaller European countries, for example, and (especially during the latter half of the period) in a number of the Latin American countries.

standards of policy framed at meetings of experts. The questions dealt with in this way include the economical administration of medical and pharmaceutical benefits under health insurance; guiding principles for preventive and curative action by pension insurance schemes; the evaluation of permanent incapacity under workmen's compensation and invalidity insurance schemes; and the investment of the funds of social insurance institutions. The standards determined by expert committees range from the relatively formal Standard Code of Industrial Hygiene² to the resolutions adopted at successive sessions of the advisory committees of the Governing Body, such as the committees on salaried employees and professional workers. The United States has been particularly interested in the conclusions adopted by two expert gatherings which have discussed the problem of silicosis. International standards for the compilation of comparable labor statistics (the subjects covered include statistics of employment and unemployment, wages and hours of work, cost of living index numbers, real wages, and migration) have been developed through the work of the Office and of expert committees.

In addition to these general international standards, regional standards have been established covering certain particular problems. In the Americas, for example, regional labor conferences were held at Santiago, Chile, in 1936 and at Havana, Cuba, in 1939. These were especially concerned with problems of social security and the conditions of employment of women and young persons. At the 1939 meeting, particular attention was given to the question of migration to the American Continent, from the point of view both of the problems presented to the countries of immigration and of the measures needed to protect immigrant workers and their families.³ Similarly, factory inspection problems have been discussed on a regional basis.

In summarizing the normal peacetime accomplishments of the I.L.O. one may say with justifiable pride that an International Labor Code has been built up over the past twenty-one years which stands today as the first stage in planning for future international action in respect to labor and social problems. Though it is impossible to foresee in detail the extent to which, and the

² Another example is the Code of Safety Regulations for Underground Work for Coal Mines which would have been adopted by the Conference before now but for the outbreak of war. The compilation and recommendations of the experts have, however, been submitted to member governments.

³ Discussion on this question was initiated largely at the behest of the South American republics.

manner in which, these standards and obligations will require modification in the light of changed conditions, and though there are many respects in which the component parts of the Code have been inadequate and incomplete, yet the standards and the obligations already laid down do provide a point of departure for the future.⁴

The function of the I.L.O. as a center for the collection and distribution of information and as a technical service equipped to give advice and assistance to member countries in connection with the preparation and administration of labor and social legislation has been greatly extended in recent years. I.L.O. experts have been called in to advise on social insurance, labor inspection, industrial hygiene, migration and other specific problems and even to draft complete labor codes. Such work has been undertaken in a wide range of countries — Argentina, China, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, Venezuela, Great Britain, Canada and the United States. In Great Britain, the Office was asked to submit to a Royal Commission evidence on workmen's compensation systems in other countries; in the United States the Social Security Board sought I.L.O. advice when setting up an administrative organization; and the Canadian Government recently requested information on social security measures. In general, it may be said that the technical staff of the Organization now possesses the essential qualifications for sifting material and suggestions relating to social and labor policy, and that it is prepared to contribute toward the solution of the new social problems that may arise as a result of the present war.

II

Many of the ordinary activities of the I.L.O. were sharply interrupted by the outbreak of the war. The Organization was determined, however, to continue its work to the greatest extent possible and also to undertake a considerable amount of advance planning. Its policy and program in this most critical period have been inspired by the same faith and spirit in which the Organization was founded. They also have drawn on the experience

⁴ The preparation of a codified and annotated edition of the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conferences, with appendices embodying the other standards of social policy framed under the auspices of the I.L.O., from 1919 to 1939, has been completed and the volume will be issued as soon as possible. It is hoped to follow this Code with a Digest of the Constitutional Practice of the Organization over the same period. Code and Digest together will be useful tools for all concerned with the activities of the I.L.O.

and techniques which it has acquired in the interval between wars.

As early as October 1938, immediately after Munich, the Governing Body of the Office faced the question of what its functions would be in wartime. After a full discussion, in the course of which stress was laid on the difficulty of the labor problems arising in time of war, and on the necessity of preserving a tripartite mechanism for dealing, on an international scale, with the problems of reconstruction which would have to be solved at the close of a war, the Governing Body decided unanimously that in the event of war the activities of the Organization should be maintained on the highest possible level. Early in 1939, an Emergency Committee was set up to suggest practical measures to execute this policy. Its report to the June Conference in 1939 pointed out that war would create new labor and social problems demanding urgent solution, and that the Organization must remain in a position to offer its experience as a guide in working out social policies in both belligerent and neutral countries.

Calls on the Office have, in fact, been more frequent since the war began than even in the preceding years of activity. The adaptation of its program of technical work to war requirements was necessarily gradual and continuous. But no sooner had hostilities started than the Office began studying certain important problems — for example, those of the organization of employment; the adaptation of social security programs to changed social needs; living costs and wages; and nutritional standards in wartime. In general, the Office has continued to serve as a world center for the comparison and analysis of the experience of various nations with regard to social problems, whether of war or of peace.

Meanwhile, at first, countries at peace and distant from the conflict carried on their own economic life more or less as usual, even though they were considerably affected by the disturbance in Europe. Those countries were naturally entitled to expect the Office to continue to render normal peacetime services to them. Consequently, the second American regional conference met, as had been planned, at Havana at the end of November 1939. The delegates treated regional questions within the broader framework of international action. A declaration was adopted unanimously urging the I.L.O. to serve during the war as a social liaison between American countries and democratic European nations, and stating the conviction of the delegates that it would

have an essential part to play in the postwar reconstruction. The delegates pledged the unwavering support of the governments and peoples of the Americas to the fulfillment of this purpose.

In February 1940 a meeting of the Governing Body was held in Geneva. This was its first meeting since the beginning of the war, and the last which it has been possible to hold in Geneva up to the present time. The fact that government representatives, employers and workers of some 16 countries could actually meet was important, for during the last war there was far too little discussion of social policy on an international basis. The tripartite groups, made up of nationals of belligerent and neutral countries, both European and non-European, found themselves, somewhat to their own surprise, in a large measure of agreement on general social objectives and policy in wartime, and the debates led to a considerable degree of mutual understanding. It was decided to go ahead with plans for a June Conference and to make methods of collaboration between government authorities, employers and workers the principal subject of discussion — one whose significance was soon to be still further demonstrated at a time when the very survival of the democracies was dependent on the achievement of national unity by consent of the governed.

At the time this February meeting adjourned, only 12 of the 30 members of the Governing Body were nationals of countries directly involved in the European war; 18 were neutral. By the middle of May, the figures at a similar meeting, had one been held, would have been just reversed. At the end of June, 10 out of the 30 would have been representatives of countries which had been occupied or defeated by Germany. The new situation obviously called for new measures. Expenses had to be cut and staff had to be drastically reduced to meet the losses in support. The annual Conference had to be postponed. The question of the location of the I.L.O. had to be reëxamined. The principal body of staff had remained at work in Geneva so long as the risk of armed invasion was the principal disadvantage. Now the problem became the moral and physical isolation of the Office from the chief sources of its democratic support. We could not run the risk that an organization which was the international expression of the social purpose of the free peoples throughout the world should become a tool for the totalitarian policies of aggressor nations. The danger that this might happen was averted by transferring the principal body of staff to the New World.

Thanks to the coöperation of the Canadian Government and the generous hospitality of McGill University, a new working center has been established at Montreal. The process of reëstablishment has now been accomplished. Some 50 members of the staff, of 18 different nationalities, are at work there. The program of publications has been resumed, including the regular publication of the *International Labour Review* (in English, French and Spanish), the continuation of the *Legislative Series* (which carries on the work begun by the unofficial Basle Labor Office as early as 1906), and a number of special studies, reports and pamphlets. The work of technical assistance in the formulation and improvement of social and labor legislation has been intensified.⁵ In preparation for the forthcoming International Labor Conference, a supplementary report on methods of collaboration between governments, employers and workers is in process, as well as a report analyzing social change during the war period.

Here, as at many other points, the current work of the I.L.O. is directed with a view to responsibilities which it must assume at the close of the war. The coöperation between governments and workers and employers which has proved indispensable in wartime will be no less indispensable in dealing with problems of reconstruction. The Organization, which is the international embodiment of such coöperation, will have a great part to play in rebuilding a democratic world. "My war aims," declared the British Minister of Labor, "are summed up in the phrase 'the motive of our life should be social security.'" The late Marquess of Lothian stressed that the provision of markets and employment for all should be the main purpose of postwar economic policy. President Roosevelt has said that the future of the world must be founded on freedom from fear and want. Similar declarations have been made by the statesmen of many other countries.

To provide the working arrangements for bringing social ideals into practice must be, in large part, the function of those who know industry intimately as employers and workers. That is why the International Labor Organization, an international institution which is responsive to the desires of both employers and workers, and in which they have learned to work together constructively during 21 years, has such a great opportunity and so high a responsibility.

⁵ One result of this aspect of I.L.O. activity has been the creation of an Inter-American Committee to Forward Social Security, under the Organization's auspices.

THE INDUSTRIAL POWER OF THE NAZIS

By *Louis Domeratzky*

IF the economic relations between nations were normal and rational, the position of Germany would be primarily that of a converter of foreign raw materials into manufactured goods for the world market. But since the First World War these relations have not been normal, and they have become even less so since the National Socialist régime put Germany's economy on a permanent wartime basis. A necessary part of Hitler's *Wehrwirtschaft* has been the attempt to make Germany as self-sufficient as possible of foreign, more particularly non-European, sources of supply. Yet despite the gains achieved by autarchy, through such devices as the intensification of agriculture and the development of *Ersatz* industries, the fundamental composition of Germany's foreign trade had changed comparatively little before the outbreak of the war. There was, however, a definite trend toward Latin America as a source of supply in order to counteract the exchange difficulties involved in trade with certain European countries and the United States. At the same time, the Germans were making a strong effort to develop their trade with Southeastern Europe, even though this region could meet only a relatively small part of their needs.

Taking Germany's imports as a basis for calculating the degree of her dependence on outside sources of supply, we find that for the first six months of 1939 (after April 1 these figures included Austria and Sudetenland) they were valued at about 2,750,000,000 marks. Of this amount foodstuffs accounted for a little over 1,056,000,000 marks; the remainder consisted of industrial products, predominantly raw materials and semi-manufactures. Among the industrial raw materials — of particular interest to us here — we must distinguish between those used for satisfying the consumption needs of the population, of only secondary importance in the Nazi economy, and those intended primarily for industries essential to war. Thus, the fact that cotton came almost entirely from territories now practically inaccessible to Germany is not particularly important, since for some years a large part of her gradually curtailed demand for textile raw materials has been satisfied by synthetic fibers made from domestic or

European raw materials. On the other hand, Germany before the war had to obtain many important industrial raw materials wholly or largely from overseas. Among these might be included cotton, jute, wool, hides and skins, rubber, petroleum and petroleum products (including lubricating oil), copper and copper ore, nickel, lead, tin, gums, mica, antimony and tungsten ore. In the case of many of these items originating in the colonies of other European Powers, the degree of dependence on overseas sources was considerably greater than would appear from the German import statistics, since they reached Germany by way of the mother countries in Europe.

In evaluating the increased resources that Germany is deriving from her territorial expansion over the Continent, we must remember that as a whole the countries now under German control are not large-scale producers of raw materials and that in some cases, such as that of the iron ore of Lorraine, what is involved is merely a shift from one European source to another rather than the replacement of an overseas product. Some of these countries are among the most industrialized in the world, and the addition of their industrial facilities to those possessed by Germany must be of considerable assistance, both direct and indirect, in carrying on the war as well as in supplying some of the underdeveloped countries of Europe with manufactured products in exchange for the foodstuffs and raw materials they are sending to Germany.

We must also keep in mind that Germany has control of the raw materials and production facilities not only of those countries under her military occupation but of those others over which by political and economic pressure she is able to exercise effective domination. It is only fair to add that in some of these countries certain important industries have been maintaining close economic relations with corresponding industries or organizations in Germany for a number of years and are, therefore, inclined to assume a "realistic" attitude toward German overtures for economic coöperation.

II

In order to obtain an approximately correct idea of the productive capacities of the German-controlled countries we must resort, in the absence of current statistics, to a survey of their economic status prior to the outbreak of the war. In so doing we should, of course, make allowance for whatever modifying factors

the German occupation has effected. On the whole, however, we can assume that the German Government has not yet had time to take any radical steps towards adapting the economies of these countries to its own war needs aside from diverting their trade and commandeering their raw materials, foodstuffs and industrial machinery to German uses. Let us take up these countries in the order of their conquest or occupation.

AUSTRIA

Austria's contribution to the economy of the Reich consists largely of iron ore, timber and magnesite. The famous iron-ore deposits of the Erzberg in Styria produced, before the Anschluss, about 2,000,000 tons a year; since then the Germans claim to have increased this figure. The ore is taken from an open-cut mine and contains a higher iron content than the Brunswick deposits which the Germans have been developing to supply the Hermann Goering Werke. The comparatively limited output and their distance from coal supplies make the Austrian deposits of relatively slight importance to the German iron and steel industry, especially now that the Lorraine deposits have been annexed and the accessibility of the far richer Swedish ores has been assured. Austria's facilities for iron and steel production at the time of the annexation were rather small and not very efficient, and the construction of the plant of the Hermann Goering Werke at Linz might be regarded primarily as an attempt to increase employment in the newly acquired country rather than to add to Germany's iron and steel supplies.

The timber resources of Austria are important, especially in view of the increased demand for wood pulp as a raw material for the German textile industry. It is estimated that about 38 percent of the area of Austria is in forests; before annexation the country exported timber, much of it going to Germany. According to latest reports, the extensive Swedish wood-pulp industry, the output of which is now at the disposal of Germany, is not only working at low capacity, but is even compelled to store a considerable part of its product, which Germany evidently is not in a position to absorb either for her own use or for that of the occupied countries. This would seem to justify the conclusion that the wood-pulp resources of Austria are not at present of prime importance.

Austria's magnesite deposits, famous throughout the world,

yielded a considerable surplus for export before the Anschluss. Among the countries taking Austrian magnesite the United States was second only to Germany. The annexation has therefore affected the American rather than the German position.

As for industrial facilities, Austria cannot be regarded as making a substantial contribution to those of Germany. The most important Austrian industries were those engaged primarily in the production of articles of consumption, such as textiles, small metal articles, leather goods and articles of fashion. Many of them worked with imported raw materials which are now unavailable, and they depended to some extent on the tourist trade which has now virtually disappeared. Furthermore, the heavy industries, particularly the iron and steel plants, were not working very efficiently, and had a high cost of production. It should be remembered that in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bohemia and Moravia — and not Austria itself — constituted the industrial center, and that the economic conditions prevailing in Austria during the interval between the two world wars were not very conducive to large-scale industrial development.

THE SUDETENLAND AND THE CZECH AND SLOVAK AREAS

From the standpoint of industrial facilities, especially those available for the production of military supplies, the Sudetenland and the "Protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia probably constitute the most important addition to Germany's resources among all the conquered territories. Taken together, the two areas form a large industrial region which under normal conditions depended to a very large extent on imported raw materials, the principal exception being lignite — of which Germany, however, has very large deposits. Among the industries, the iron and steel plants are the most important, although the highly developed chemical industry centering in Aussig is also of considerable military value. Most famous of these plants is, of course, the Skoda works, one of the largest of its kind in Europe. As a matter of fact, a German-dominated consortium had acquired a majority control of the Skoda works before the declaration of the Protectorate. In addition to being a highly integrated concern, with its own deposits of coal, ore and limestone, Skoda produces a very wide range of manufactures including not only arms and munitions but heavy industrial machinery, automotive

products, aviation equipment, railroad material, special steels, tubes, etc. Skoda has its export organization and branches in a number of countries, some of them overseas. The Aussig chemical combine — now, of course, under German control — maintains close relations with the German I. G. and is reported to be producing chemicals for war purposes. There are a number of other large concerns engaged in the metal industries, as well as the extensive textile industry and large glass and china factories in the Sudetenland.

While some of these formerly Czech industries are of secondary importance, since they produce consumption goods and therefore represent a non-essential addition to Germany's extensive facilities, their output is nevertheless useful to Germany because she uses it directly or indirectly, to supply other European countries with manufactured products in exchange for the raw materials and foodstuffs which are essential to her. The German Government naturally publishes very little about the present volume of production in the industries of the Sudetenland and the Protectorate, or about the extent to which their facilities are used; but enough is known to indicate that very considerable progress has been made towards incorporating them into the German economy. In 1937, about 23 percent of Czechoslovakia's total exports went to Germany and Austria, while a very large proportion of their specialties -- like textiles, leather gloves, glassware and articles of fashion — went overseas, especially to the United States. Though it is safe to assume that some of the industries in former Czechoslovakia have had to curtail their production for lack of raw materials, it is quite obvious that the heavy industries, working primarily with raw materials which Germany or the occupied countries can supply, represent an extremely important addition to the productive facilities at German command.

POLAND

The chief industrial value of Western Poland to Germany lies in its mineral resources, particularly coal, and in the extensive metal-working industries of Silesia. The coal-mining industry is of special importance at present. During the postwar period Poland had developed a very considerable coal-export trade to Italy and the Scandinavian countries; at present this trade constitutes one of the chief factors in the political and economic relations between Germany and those countries. Poland is also one

of the large timber exporting countries in Europe. Furthermore, it has been a large exporter of pork products, particularly hams. Under normal conditions these went primarily to the United States; now however they are absorbed almost entirely by Germany. Poland's extensive textile industry will now be of chiefly local importance, unless Germany should succeed in utilizing it in her trade with the Soviet Union.

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

As in the case of Bohemia, Belgium's importance to the Reich lies primarily in her heavy industries, particularly iron and steel. This is the most important industry in Belgium and is practically the only one in Luxembourg. For many years the iron and steel industry of both countries has been closely connected with that of Germany, partly because it has participated in an international cartel in which the Germans have been very active, and partly because it has been to a certain extent dependent on German coal. The iron ore used in Belgium is obtained primarily from Lorraine, now under German control. Also, though Belgium is an important producer of coal, she must import additional quantities from Germany. In 1939, Belgium produced about 3,000,000 tons of pig iron and an equal amount of steel. The annual output of Luxembourg is somewhat over 2,500,000 tons. In both countries a very large part of the iron and steel output is used, directly or indirectly, for export purposes.

Since the German occupation, the iron and steel industries of the two countries have been concentrated into two organizations, primarily in order to assure closer coöperation with the German iron and steel industry. The new Belgian organization, Sybelac (Syndicat Belge de l'Acier), which came into existence on June 24, 1940, has replaced the Cosibel and exercises far greater control over the industry than the latter did. The new organization now controls the purchase of raw materials for its members, the distribution of the finished product and the fixing of prices; and it is expected to perform all those functions in closest understanding with the occupation authorities and the German iron and steel industry. The more important Belgian producers may express their wishes through an advisory committee.

The Luxembourg iron and steel industry was also coördinated after negotiations between the German iron and steel interests and the Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourge-

oises. Under the new agreement the Groupement, representing the Arbed, Hadir and Rodingen — which means practically the whole Luxembourg iron and steel industry — is to work in close agreement with the German Stahlwerksverband. It should be added that the most important Belgian iron and steel combination, the Ougrée Marihay, which owns the Rodingen in Luxembourg as well as plants in the Longwy Basin in France, has recently established a joint selling organization with the important German firm of Otto Wolff under the name of Eisenausfuhr Otto Wolff-Ougrée, with headquarters in Cologne and Brussels.

Belgium also has an important heavy chemical industry with international affiliations, and is an extensive producer of heavy industrial equipment and railway supplies. These industries are now working for Germany, not only directly but also indirectly as a supplier of iron and steel manufactures to those countries from which Germany is obtaining raw materials and foodstuffs. Among the other important industries in Belgium, the extensive textile and glass plants, of little importance to Germany at present, are understood not to be very active. Belgium has also been for many years one of the largest producers and exporters of cement. While Germany is a very large consumer of this material, she has a very extensive cement industry of her own, and it is quite possible that, with the slowing down in the construction of fortifications, she is in small need of the Belgian product.

THE NETHERLANDS

The chief importance of the Netherlands to Germany is as a source of foodstuffs, particularly vegetables and dairy products. Nevertheless, the country has a number of industries which under normal conditions of international trade are of considerable value. However, these industries depended primarily on imported raw materials, which, because of Holland's liberal tariff policy and importance as a colonial Power, they were able to obtain at low and, in some cases, dumping prices. An abundance of capital and cheap labor, and an active merchant marine, have built up a number of industries, such as tin smelting, textiles and cement, which naturally have been disastrously affected by the war. The highly developed textile industry, having been used primarily to supply the colonial market, is naturally not very active at present. AKU, the important rayon holding company in which German capital was considerably interested before the

war, is understood to be under even greater German influence since the occupation. The important Philips concern, with its very large production of radios, electric bulbs and its extensive distribution facilities all over the world, is probably regarded by the Germans as of greater value to them after the war than during it. Very little, of course, is known about the German utilization of the aeroplane production facilities of the Netherlands.

FRANCE

By occupying the most industrialized part of France, Germany not only regained the important iron-ore deposits of Lorraine, but also those of the Briey and Longwy Basins which together form one of the largest sources of iron ore in the world. In 1937, France produced nearly 38,000,000 tons of iron ore, of which half was exported. But, though France was more than self-sufficient in iron ore, she was dependent on German or Belgian coke for the production of a substantial part of her iron and steel: under normal conditions the exchange of iron ore for coal was a very important factor in Franco-German trade. According to German reports, comparatively little damage has been suffered by the iron mines during the war, and the only obstacle to a full resumption of operations is the shortage of transportation and labor. A large proportion of the labor employed in the iron-ore mines of France has been foreign, mostly Poles and Italians. With the abundant iron ore of France now available to Germany, the plans of the Hermann Goering Werke will undoubtedly have to be modified for they were based primarily on the necessity of utilizing the relatively low-grade ore of Brunswick. But the solution of this problem, like that of the German and the Continental iron and steel industry as a whole, will probably have to await the outcome of the war.

The French output of iron and steel increased considerably after the First World War, and in 1937 reached about 8,000,000 tons each of pig iron and steel. In the occupied part of France there are in addition to the large iron and steel plants, the famous Schneider-Creusot armament works, large automotive and railway equipment plants, a highly developed agricultural implement industry, including branch plants of a prominent American concern, very extensive factories for the production of cast iron pipe and a machinery industry turning out a wide variety of products. The German press has claimed that the

metal industry of France has not been greatly damaged; however, no precise information is available on this point under present circumstances.

The French aluminum industry, one of the pioneers in that field, is supported by large domestic bauxite deposits and abundant water power. While its output is not very great in comparison with that of Germany and the United States, it will furnish a welcome addition to the German aluminum supply in view of the increased war demand for that metal. The same is probably true of the highly developed French chemical industry. On the other hand, the acquisition of the Alsatian potash deposits is merely of academic interest at present, due to the inaccessibility of Germany's largest market — the United States — as well as to the development of the potash resources of Spain, Palestine and the United States itself.

Of relatively slight direct value to the Germans at present will be the well-known Michelin rubber-tire works with its world-wide distribution system. In view of the unavailability of natural rubber and the insufficient production of synthetic rubber, Germany's greatest benefit from the French industry so far has probably been the acquisition of whatever reserves of natural rubber were on hand at the time of the armistice. The same applies to the woolen industry, which probably had considerable stocks on hand since France is normally not only an important producer of finished woolen fabrics, but also has an extensive wool-processing industry.

The textile industry — in peacetimes one of the most important in France, especially because of its connection with the highly developed fashion trade — is located largely in the occupied part of the country. This industry has not only lost its important overseas markets but its raw materials, most of which like silk and cotton come from outside of Europe. The industry is now said to be turning its facilities to rayon and staple fiber. This means that for the present the Germans will control the industry's raw material by virtue of their control over the Scandinavian supply of wood pulp. Since Germany is already a large producer of textiles, and because of the shortage of natural raw materials, we may doubt whether the French textile industry is of immediate value to the Reich except perhaps as a source of supply for certain European countries in which Germany is particularly interested.

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Of the two Scandinavian countries occupied by Germany, Denmark is important primarily for its food resources: mostly meat, dairy products and eggs. Though Denmark also has a number of industries, particularly shipbuilding and machinery, they depend on imported raw materials, semi-manufactures and fuel, and are therefore unable to operate on the same scale as before the war.

The industrial resources of Norway are of a wider range and thus of greater value to Germany. Norway produces a number of important minerals and metals, like aluminum, saltpeter, pyrites and molybdenum. It also has a very extensive electro-chemical industry engaged primarily in producing ferro-alloys, based on abundant water power, metals and ores that for the most part are imported. Most of the Norwegian metal industries are geared primarily for the export market: before the German invasion a large proportion of the ferro-alloys went to England. In 1939 the aluminum industry, in which there is considerable American capital, yielded about 25,000 tons for export. The forest-products industries also worked primarily for export, largely to British markets, and turned out large quantities of lumber, newsprint paper and wood pulp. Norway also has a highly developed electro-chemical industry and produces large quantities of carbide. The large shipbuilding plants, likewise largely dependent on imported materials, normally provided not only for the very extensive Norwegian merchant marine but also for export.

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria cannot be regarded as "conquered" countries in the same sense as Poland or Belgium. Yet at the moment of writing they are under effective German military occupation. The fact that they submitted to German domination without fighting and have nominally become "allies" of Germany does not mean that their economic resources will be appreciably less under her control than are those of the countries which fought before losing their freedom. Even before the war, and particularly after the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, Germany had been taking an ever growing share of the trade of Southeastern Europe. At present she holds an almost monopolistic position in the countries mentioned, as well as in

Jugoslavia, whose political and military fate is still, as these lines are written, uncertain.

While the resources of the Southeast European countries are primarily agricultural, they also include a few minerals of considerable importance to Germany, notably the petroleum of Rumania, the bauxites of Hungary and Jugoslavia, and the copper and other non-ferrous metals, including chrome ore, of Jugoslavia. The latter's production of copper, lead and zinc, largely financed by French and British capital, is now being turned over to Germany. The same, of course, is true of Rumanian petroleum production, except that Germany has to share a small part of this with Italy and some of the Southeast European countries themselves. No information is available as to the actual mineral production of those countries, but the 1941 agreement between Germany and Rumania calls for the delivery of 3,000,000 tons of petroleum. In 1939 Jugoslavia exported about \$16,000,000 worth of mineral products, of which crude copper was valued at a little over \$10,000,000 and lead ore at over \$3,000,000; the remainder consisted of iron ore, bauxite, zinc, lead and chrome ores, as well as crude lead. In 1939 Rumania exported a little over 4,000,000 tons of petroleum products.

SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND

In addition to the countries occupied by Germany, either as defeated enemies or as compulsory allies, there are two others — Switzerland and Sweden — which are almost entirely cut off from trading with the non-European world and have therefore been obliged to confine their economic intercourse to the Axis Powers. Both are highly developed industrial countries, and each possesses a large metal industry. Sweden has supplied Germany for many years with much of her iron ore. Sweden's large forest resources provided the basis for her extensive wood-pulp production. In manufacturing, she is particularly renowned for fine steels, machinery of all kinds, ball bearings, armament and explosives. One of the specialties of the famous Bofors works is anti-aircraft guns. Switzerland also has a highly developed machinery industry and is well-known for her precision tools. She also has a relatively large aluminum production, with exports of over 30,000 tons in 1939. Her chemical industry has specialized along coal-tar lines and has for some time maintained more or less close relations with the German chemical industry.

ITALY

In view of Italy's high degree of dependence on Germany for some of the most essential commodities in carrying on military operations — especially coal and the heavier products of the iron and steel industry — we need not include her among the European countries of industrial value to Germany. But even Italy can contribute to Germany's war effort. She can send her fruits and vegetable products that are undoubtedly appreciated as adding variety to the present German diet. She also can furnish the mercury her ally needs, for Italy is one of the world's largest producers of that mineral. Italy probably does not have a surplus of aluminum. Her chemical industry, however, is probably of considerable use to Germany.

III

To summarize, then, what has been the net increase in German industrial capacity since the outbreak of the war? In striking such a balance we shall have to confine ourselves to the really important items and must naturally leave out of account whatever damage the R.A.F. has done to industry within Germany.

The most substantial increase is that which has taken place in the iron and steel industry as a result of its large acquisition of ore, and facilities for producing raw metals and finished products, particularly armaments and machinery, in the various occupied or dominated countries. According to a recent German calculation, the steel production capacity of what is now regarded as the German customs area (Austria, Upper Silesia, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Luxembourg and Lorraine) is from 35,000,000 to 37,000,000 tons. By including the capacity of the Belgian plants and those in France outside of Lorraine, another 9,000,000 tons is added. This means that the capacity under German control is now half of that possessed by the United States, and is thus second in the world. In facilities for producing armament the German bloc would probably occupy first place, and a very high rank in the production of machinery. Incidentally, industries of this type possess a large equipment of machine tools. The German press has reported that a considerable proportion of the metal industries in the occupied and dominated countries is now being utilized by the Reich.

Germany has also acquired control over large coal supplies in

Poland, Belgium and France. As some German writers have pointed out, coal is now Germany's best substitute for free exchange — in fact, it is even superior, since free exchange would not make it possible for a neutral country like Sweden or Switzerland to obtain British coal under present conditions. What the German economists do not mention, however, is that coal also enables Germany to bring pressure on her neutral neighbors and constitutes an extremely important factor in the economic subordination of her Axis partner, Italy. Before the war Poland exported one third of her annual production of 40,000,000 tons. As far as increasing her coal exports is concerned, Germany's greatest gain has therefore been the acquisition of the Upper Silesian coal fields. Under present conditions Germany has a virtual monopoly over the coal supply of every continental country that must rely in whole or in part on imports, and she is making good use of this position when negotiating clearing agreements and in carrying out other aspects of her policy.

The facilities of France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland for aluminum production are of considerable value to Germany in spite of the fact that she claims to be the largest aluminum producer in the world, with an output of over 200,000 metric tons in 1939. In the same year the combined production of Norway and Switzerland was 59,000 metric tons. The importance of aluminum for the aviation industry and as a substitute for copper and other non-ferrous metals is obvious. The rich bauxite deposits of France are undoubtedly also welcome to Germany, although she also has at her disposal the deposits of Southeastern Europe.

The zinc resources of Poland are next in importance to its contribution of coal. Yugoslavia's output of copper and other non-ferrous metals constitutes only a small proportion of Germany's demand, yet it cannot be left out of consideration. Official German statements attach much importance to the petroleum resources of Rumania; we nevertheless lack any exact information as to how much oil the Germans are obtaining in that country.

The shift in the textile industry of Germany and Italy toward a synthetic base, as a part of the totalitarian policy of self-sufficiency, has given wood pulp an important position as a raw material. Germany has now at her disposal the abundant wood-pulp production facilities of the Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Finland which is still able to make some overseas shipments. Before the war Scandinavian wood pulp went largely

to England and the United States. Through her control of the Continent's wood-pulp production Germany has become a large exporter of staple fiber to the various European countries now cut off from their former supplies of natural fibers and this gives her an added means for dominating their textile industries. Furthermore, the large timber supply and the saw-mill facilities of the Scandinavian countries are naturally of great value to Germany for construction purposes and in mining.

The consumption goods industries of the occupied and controlled countries, while of secondary importance, are not altogether without value. In the first place, they are very useful in supplying the demands of other countries from which Germany is obtaining materials essential to the conduct of the war. In the second place, by using these consumption goods to supply the German market, German labor and industrial equipment are released for more important production.

German industry and agriculture have acquired a considerable addition to their labor supply in the form of prisoners of war, of whom the number is estimated at over 3,000,000. While a large proportion of the war prisoners is used for agriculture, an effort is now being made to divert the skilled workers among them to industry — where they will, of course, be paid only nominal wages. In addition to this prison labor there are the skilled workers recruited in the occupied countries where the shortage of raw materials and the destruction caused by the war have produced widespread unemployment.

In conclusion, it should be said, in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the industrial resources gained by Germany through her territorial expansion, that valuable as they are, they do not — with the exception of petroleum from Rumania and some copper from Yugoslavia — include important quantities of any of the strategic raw materials that normally figure so prominently in Germany's imports from overseas, such as raw cotton, jute, rubber, nickel, tin, mica, antimony and tungsten. The Germans doubtless have seized a certain quantity of each of these in the countries they have occupied. But, however large or small these quantities may have been, sooner or later Germany will have used them up.

BRITAIN'S COLONIES IN THE WAR

By *W. E. Simmett*

BRITAIN'S Colonies, no less than the Dominions and India, are contributing their share to the war effort of the Commonwealth. The spectacular activities of the Canadian airmen over Britain, of the Australians and New Zealanders in Libya, of the Indian division in Eritrea and of the South African troops in Ethiopia should not lead us to overlook the important rôle being played by the Empire's "junior partners" — the crown colonies, the protectorates and the mandated territories.

I

Before describing the part played by the British Colonies in the war, however, I should like to explain briefly just what they are. I found during a recent tour of the United States that there was considerable vagueness about the Colonial Empire even in otherwise well-informed quarters — which is perhaps not surprising, seeing that it is none too well known at home.

The British Colonial Empire comprises some forty separate territories, large and small, at greatly varying stages of political, social and economic development, scattered across the globe, covering a land area of three million square miles (exclusive of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) and containing a population — white, black, brown and yellow — of some sixty-five million people. The whites are in a small minority, for most of the colonies are tropical or sub-tropical and are therefore, unlike the Dominions, largely unsuited for white settlement.

Let us for a moment make a bird's-eye survey of this variegated Empire. Turning first to the Western Hemisphere we find numerous colonies off the coast of North America or clustered in the Caribbean — Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica and the other British West Indies, British Honduras and British Guiana — much in the news of late as a result of Britain's having granted the United States sites for naval and air bases on some of them. Further down in the South Atlantic lie Ascension, St. Helena, the Falklands — all useful *points d'appui* in Britain's control of the sea — as well as Tristan da Cunha, "loneliest isle," and a section of Antarctica.

But it is the vast continent of Africa that contains the great

bulk of British colonial territory and population. In West Africa there are the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria (which alone has a population of over twenty millions), plus the two mandated areas in the former German colonies of Togoland and the Cameroons. To the east lie the million square miles composing the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a "condominium" in which the flags of Britain and Egypt fly side by side, though the practical job of administration is largely in British hands. Still farther east, near the "Horn of Africa," is British Somaliland, temporarily under Italian occupation. Below the Sudan comes a large British bloc comprising Kenya, Uganda, the mandated Territory of Tanganyika, Nyasaland, the Rhodesias, the island of Zanzibar under its native Sultan, and, embedded in the Union of South Africa, the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swasiland, still under Imperial control. Southern Rhodesia, incidentally, is a self-governing colony, though it does not rank as a Dominion.

Along Britain's "short-cut" to the East through the Mediterranean and Red Seas are strung the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Aden (in which latter is included Britain's protectorate over the south coast of Arabia), as well as the mandated territories of Palestine and Trans Jordan. In the Indian Ocean lie the islands of Mauritius, the Seychelles and, at the toe of India, Ceylon — the premier colony, today self-governing. Burma, though politically quite separate and distinct from India, has the same status as its larger neighbor, and is therefore not a colony.

Farther east is British Malaya, a peninsula consisting of the Straits Settlements, with the great Singapore base, and the Federated and non-Federated Malay States under their native rulers. Malaya is the most prosperous of all the colonial areas, its wealth being derived largely from its tin and rubber, for which the United States is the principal customer. The island of Borneo, though mostly Dutch, contains British North Borneo, administered by the British North Borneo Company, and the protectorates of Brunei and Sarawak, the latter under its "white rajahs" out of the Brooke family. At the gateway of China stands Hong Kong, one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Out in the South Pacific lie many scattered islands such as Fiji, the Gilbert and Ellis groups, the British Solomons, the miniature Kingdom of the Tonga (or Friendly) Islands, ruled by Queen Saloti Tabou, and Pitcairn, still inhabited by descendants of the

mutineers of the *Bounty*. In this part of the world are also the New Hebrides group, until lately an Anglo-French condominium, and the phosphate island of Nauru, an Empire mandate. Not to be omitted is the interesting experiment of Canton and Enderbury Islands, where a joint Anglo-American administration is now in force.

Though this list completes the roster of British Colonies, it does not include territories belonging or mandated to Dominions, such as South-West Africa, Papua, New Guinea and Western Samoa. Such a bare catalogue of names cannot, of course, give any hint of the rich diversity of the lands and peoples living under the British flag, or of their varied history. Any impartial study of this history will, however, reveal that for the most part the Home Government, far from pursuing a policy of "grab," was often reluctant to assume responsibilities that were thrust upon it by the force of circumstances, by the enterprise of individuals, by spontaneous and sometimes repeated requests for protection, or by the consequences and necessities of sea power. Had it been otherwise, the Colonial Empire would have become far more extensive than it is. Many opportunities for territorial expansion were refused or neglected, while in other cases the possessions of other Powers taken as the prize of war, such as the Dutch East Indies, were restored.

In any event, the "imperialism" of the nineteenth century is in Britain a thing of the past, and has been superseded by the policy of trusteeship. British Colonies are no longer regarded as "possessions" to be exploited primarily for the benefit of the mother country but as responsibilities or trusts held for the ultimate benefit of the colonial peoples themselves. The objective towards which the "junior partners" are striving is that already attained by the "senior partners" in the Commonwealth — self-government. The Secretary of State for the Colonies not long ago insisted in Parliament that there can be no separation of Imperial and Commonwealth policy, that it must be the same for the Colonies as for the Dominions and India. The more backward peoples are to be guided towards that stage of political, economic and social development where they can stand on their own feet and take charge of their own affairs. Some colonies have already nearly reached this goal; others are in varying stages of progress towards it.

That is why there can be no question of transferring or barter-

ing any British colony, protectorate or mandated territory to another Power except at the express wish of the inhabitants. For Britain to do otherwise would be to shirk her responsibilities. These territories are not disposable property; they belong, not to us, but to their peoples — British subjects or protected persons who for the most part are proud of that status and who certainly do not desire to exchange it for anything but independence, and even then would probably wish to remain associated with the British Commonwealth of free peoples.

II

Of this attitude, signal proof has been given ever since September 1939. Upon the declaration of war the Colonies at once ranged themselves at the side of the mother country and placed their resources in man-power, money and materials at Britain's disposal. As Mr. George Hall, Under Secretary of State for Colonies, declared in the House of Commons on November 20 of last year: "The outbreak of war was the signal for a unanimous and spontaneous outburst of loyalty and support from all parts of the Colonial Empire. The assurances which were given then have been more than fulfilled, and all calls for service have been enthusiastically answered. Indeed, during the past 14 months the loyalty of the Colonies has been demonstrated in an almost bewildering variety of ways. There have been gifts showing a degree of thoughtfulness and sympathy which I find very touching. . . . There have been gifts from such bodies as the trade unions in Fiji, chambers of commerce, municipal councils, and so on; gifts for the general conduct of the war, for fighters and bombers, gifts in cash and kind, gifts to war charities, to the Red Cross, to King George's Fund for Sailors, for every conceivable purpose. Up to date the amount subscribed has reached the wonderful total of no less than £17,000,000. . . . Every territory has made its contribution from Nigeria's 20,000,000 population to the 200 persons who occupy Ascension Island."

The field of voluntary money contributions is, of course, only one of those in which the Colonies are helping. Mr. Hall's figure of £17,000,000 — now grown to over £20,000,000 — represents only special gifts and does not take account of the considerable colonial expenditure on local defense, which has naturally increased greatly under war conditions, or the normal contributions to imperial defense made by the Colonies. For instance, Hong Kong

alone contributes \$3,000,000 a year to imperial defense in addition to an expenditure of \$6,000,000 a year for local defense purposes. The Colonies took the lead in starting "Spitfire Funds" and in collecting money for canteens for air-raid victims in Britain — the first of these was a gift from the children of Mauritius to the children of London.

This was not the enforced action of subservient colonial governments, but the voluntary gesture of the peoples themselves and of their national leaders and representatives, who fully recognize that their future depends upon British survival, and that we fight for their freedom as for our own. Such a result could scarcely have followed upon "imperialistic exploitation" or "brutal repression." Nor must it be forgotten that this eager coöperation of the Colonies represents only the early stages of an effort which, with that of the Dominions and India, may well prove a decisive factor in the outcome of the war.

III

Let us look at the military side of the picture. For obvious reasons details cannot be given here, but it should be kept in mind that the Colonial Empire contains an immense reservoir of manpower, available not only for direct military service but also for labor. At the outset of the war the British Government made a significant decision: that for the duration of the conflict British subjects from the Colonies and British-protected persons, whether of European descent or not, should be placed, for the purpose of voluntary entry into the Armed Forces of the Crown in the United Kingdom, on precisely the same footing as other British subjects. In no sphere of activity have the Colonies shown more clearly and more insistently their desire to offer their services without stint. In Kenya, almost half the European population between the ages of 18 and 35 have enlisted in the armed forces, and it has been necessary to introduce compulsory service among Europeans throughout the Colonies, not for any lack of volunteers, but in order to make more rational use of the manpower available and to avoid interference with necessary production. As for the native peoples, there has been no need to apply compulsion since many more have offered themselves than can possibly be accepted. The limiting factor has not been the availability, still less the quality, of colonial troops, but our ability at present to supply all the necessary equipment.

Even before the war, the defense forces in many of the Colonies had been strengthened and new forces established where none had previously existed. Within the half year following the outbreak of war the local forces in East Africa, Malaya and Hong Kong had been increased threefold, while the number serving in West Africa had been doubled. Only lack of equipment prevented greater expansion. Units of the Royal West Africa Frontier Force, of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, and of the Southern Rhodesia Air Force are now coöperating in Ethiopia with contingents from the South African Army and Air Force and with the local forces in East Africa. In the Mediterranean, Gibraltar remains on guard, while Malta has already put up a splendid defense against constant air bombardment from Italian, and lately, from German planes. Thousands of Maltese have joined the Navy and other branches of the imperial forces. A pioneer unit from Cyprus had the honor of being the first colonial contingent to arrive in France for active service, and several thousand Cypriots are now serving in the newly-formed Cyprus Regiment in England. The contribution of the Cypriots towards the smashing British victory in Libya recently received especial praise from General Wavell. Pioneer units have also been raised in Palestine, Malta, Aden, Mauritius and Seychelles.

In Palestine, political differences have been adjourned, internal order and peace have been restored, and Arabs and Jews are now serving side by side in volunteer forces. In addition, large numbers of Palestinian Arab and Jewish companies have been attached to British battalions for combatant service in the Middle East. In short, the defense forces have been strengthened in all Colonies from the Falklands to Ceylon and Fiji. So far, combatant units have not been raised in the West Indies; but since West Indians have a long and honorable tradition of military service in other parts of the world, their turn may come. There is already a steady and increasing flow of colonial recruits for service in the Air Force as well as in the Army. Much study is being given to the problem of how the man-power resources of the Colonial Empire can be mobilized and used to the best advantage. And it should be emphasized that what has been done in the first eighteen months of the war is but an instalment of what the Colonial Empire is capable of contributing in men and materials.

Before leaving the problem of defense, something should be said of the West Indian bases. Leases on a basis of 99 years or

less are being granted to the United States Government "freely and without consideration" for air and naval bases on the Avalon Peninsula and the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and great bay of Bermuda. In exchange for naval and military equipment similar bases are to be set up on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the west coast of St. Lucia in the Windwards, in Antigua in the Leewards, on the west coast of Trinidad, and in British Guiana within 50 miles of Georgetown. In announcing the decision to grant these leases, Mr. Churchill emphasized that "there is of course no question of any transference of sovereignty — that has never been suggested — or of any action being taken without the consent or against the wishes of the Colonies concerned." This statement makes the position of the British Government quite clear and allays fears expressed by some West Indians that their status as British subjects might be affected or their land alienated. The colonial governments are necessarily parties to any agreements in which their rights are affected. On the other hand, this notable example of Anglo-American coöperation will not only contribute materially to Western Hemisphere defense but will probably add to the prosperity of the Colonies concerned.

IV

It is in the economic field that the colonial war contribution is, and can increasingly be, of the highest value. Being largely situated in the tropical and subtropical zones, the Colonies have immense resources in foodstuffs, raw materials and minerals, many of them complementary to those produced in other parts of the Commonwealth. Before the war, all these had been as freely available to other nations as to Great Britain. After the declaration of war the first step was to bring colonial trade under complete control in accordance with plans already devised. The purposes of this control were to prevent goods from reaching the enemy, to provide essential colonial supplies for Britain and her friends, to secure foreign exchange in return for exports, to limit imports paid for in foreign exchange, and to prevent the transfer of capital into foreign currency. All of these objects were successfully achieved with the utmost goodwill and active coöperation of the Colonies, even where some inconvenience was involved. In many cases the enemy has already been dealt heavy blows by our withholding colonial products necessary to his economy.

Turning to the positive side, when war began the Colonies at once asked of Britain: How can we help you with our products; what do you want more of; what do you want us to send to you rather than elsewhere? These questions covered a great variety of products, as can readily be seen from the *Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire* issued annually by the Colonial Office. Broadly speaking, Britain's policy has been to buy up the total crop or the total exportable surplus of the principal foodstuffs and raw materials produced by the various Colonies, buying if necessary more than she needs. The purpose of this policy is to assure the maintenance of the Colonies' economic standards, to encourage self-sufficiency in home consumption, to facilitate the expansion of exports as a means of obtaining foreign exchange (such as rubber, cocoa and tin) and to help develop existing as well as new industries and resources.

In pursuit of this policy Britain has purchased, or contracted to purchase, at a fair and stable price, the Colonies' total crops or exportable surpluses of such products as cocoa, sugar, tea, coffee, flax, cotton, wool, sisal, oilseeds, copra and phosphates. The Colonies are also great suppliers of copper, tin, lead, zinc, bauxite, iron ore, gold, manganese, chromium, pyrites, potash, groundnuts, oil and other essential raw materials. The quota releases of rubber and tin have been greatly increased, so that these two commodities are now virtually unrestricted. Very large quantities of rubber have been purchased by the United States. The Colonies have thus been assured of a demand for all their products, and some indeed are opening up fresh markets. Economic councils or development committees have been set up in the principal Colonies, and several of these are exploiting fresh resources or expanding existing industries. For example, the bauxite industry in British Guiana is being extended; large bauxite deposits are also being opened up in Nyasaland. Flax factories are being erected in Kenya. Power alcohol and diesel fuel is being made in Uganda. Iron ore has been discovered in Ceylon; Trinidad is increasing her oil output; and an oil industry is being developed in British Guiana. Secondary industries are likewise being developed in many Colonies under the stimulus of war needs. Hong Kong, for instance, is busy building ships to carry empire goods.

Lack of space forbids our going into all the details concerning this wide range of production or our enumerating all the items

colony by colony. Merely to give a few examples: copper is available in large quantities from Northern Rhodesia; chromite, the source of chromium, is coming from Sierra Leone, in addition to increased quantities of iron ore and gold; manganese, as well as gold, comes from the Gold Coast; the whole of the West African cocoa crop is assured, as well as tea and coffee from Kenya, Nyasaland and Ceylon; sugar is available from Mauritius, the West Indies and British Guiana; Nigeria and Malaya export tin; Uganda alone in 1940 produced nearly 400,000 bales of cotton, and besides this, there is the Sudan product and Sea Island cotton from the West Indies. These examples are but a few of those that might be cited; but they are enough to show that the Colonies' resources constitute a very great reinforcement for the Empire's economic war effort.

Moreover, there now exist close economic links between the British Colonies and those of Belgium, Holland and Free France. Also, at Delhi a conference is now sitting more or less permanently at which the Dominions and all the Colonies east of Suez are represented and of which the purpose is to evolve a joint economic policy for all these territories in order to make them self-supporting, as far as possible, and to supply the British Forces in the Middle East. This is an important development which may have far-reaching consequences.

Despite its grave preoccupations, the British Government has been fully mindful of its colonial responsibilities. In the midst of war, it has added to the statute book the most important piece of colonial legislation in recent years: the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This law provides for a vast program of economic, social and educational development to extend over a period of at least ten years and covering the Colonial Empire as a whole. It will entail an expenditure from the British Treasury of £5,500,000 a year. In addition, it has wiped out virtually the whole of colonial indebtedness, totalling well over £11,000,000. At the same time, the Government has issued the drastic recommendations of the Royal Commission on the West Indies, and has announced that these will be implemented as far and as soon as possible, and that a special sum will be allocated under this head, in addition to a due proportion of the Development Fund. Work has, in fact, already begun in the West Indies. It is esti-

mated that this legislation will cost the British taxpayer in all, excluding the debt remission, a sum equivalent to some \$280,000,000. To supervise the work, two important committees have been set up: a Development Committee under Lord Moyne, who was chairman of the West India Royal Commission, and a Research Committee under Lord Hailey. Preparatory work is being undertaken both at home and in the Colonies, though the full prosecution of the task must necessarily depend upon the progress of the war.

This legislation is in no sense to be regarded as a reward for good conduct, for it was drafted long before the outbreak of the war and is merely a necessary corollary of the British policy of trusteeship for colonial peoples.

In the sphere of medical, educational and social development, and in economic enterprise, the British Colonies have benefited considerably from American help and coöperation. Such bodies as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Phelps Stokes Fund, numerous missionary societies, as well as many commercial enterprises and private individuals, have all given liberally in money, expert advice and devoted personal service in such fields as medicine, public health, education and scientific research throughout Africa, in the West Indies, Malta, Palestine, Malaya, and other territories. American capital and initiative have greatly aided the economic development of various colonies, especially Northern Rhodesia, Cyprus and Palestine. One instance of this help is the financing, largely by the Carnegie Corporation, of the monumental survey of Africa carried out by Lord Hailey, which will probably form the foundation of future development in that vast continent. The great extent and variety of this valuable coöperation is not sufficiently appreciated by the American people.

Many Americans still suspect the British of imperialism in the old and bad sense, and in general, the American public does not understand the implications of our present colonial policy. If, as Mr. Churchill has said, the destinies of our two nations are in the future to be increasingly bound together, as certainly seems probable, it is highly desirable that the American people should fully understand, not only that the structure of the British Commonwealth is democratic, but that in this democratic system there is a place provided for the colonial peoples.

BERLIN TO BAGHDAD UP-TO-DATE

By Philip Willard Ireland

LITTLE fanfare attended the completion of the Baghdad Railway last summer, overshadowed as the event was by the Blitzkrieg and its aftermath. Yet when, on the night of July 17, 1940, the first through passenger train for Istanbul steamed out of Baghdad, the conclusion was at last written to one of the most dramatic of the stories of diplomatic and financial rivalry that have marked the last half century of European power politics. The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway had now become a reality — though not, as originally intended, under the aegis of Germany. Constructed primarily for peaceful commerce, the line nevertheless is of high military importance, and its completion at this moment is significant.


I

Through passengers from Europe to points on the Baghdad Railway must transfer at Istanbul by ferry across the Bosphorus to Haydar Pasha, while at Baghdad they must change again — from the standard-gauge (4' 8½") line to the Baghdad-Basra metre-gauge (3' 3¾") line. The Taurus Express, the Asiatic extension of the Simplon-Orient Express, makes the 1,636-mile journey from Haydar Pasha to Baghdad in three days. Basra, 353 miles beyond Baghdad, is reached in 14 hours by night express. From the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf is thus 1,989 miles, or as far as from Boston to Denver.

The Turkish State Railways operate the through trains from Haydar Pasha to Eskishehir, Ankara, Boghazköprü (near Kayseri), Ulukishla, through the Taurus Mountains to Adana, through the Amanus range to Meydanekbez on the Syrian border, a distance of 907 miles. In Syria, a French company runs the 103-mile section from Meydanekbez to Aleppo and back to the Turkish frontier at Chorbantey (Çorbanbey), where one of the only two private railway companies in Turkey operates it as far as Nissibin on the Turco-Syrian frontier, a distance of 237 miles. At Nissibin, the French line again takes over for 48 miles to Tel-Kotchek on the Syrio-'Iraqi border. From that point the 'Iraqi Railways operate the 341 miles to Baghdad and the metre-gauge line down the Euphrates valley from Baghdad to Basra.

The actual construction of the railway began in 1904 under a concession, granted to the Germans by Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1902. The existing railway to Konya was now to be extended to Baghdad via Ulukishla, Adana, Aleppo, Nissibin and Mosul. However, completion was delayed by lack of funds, the outbreak of the Balkan and World Wars, and the difficult terrain in the Taurus and Amanus Mountains. Not until October 5, 1918, a few weeks before Turkey dropped out of the war, was through traffic sent from Haydar Pasha to Nissibin.

The Germans had also carried construction 74 miles northward from Baghdad by the time the British captured that city in March 1917. This line was pushed forward by the British in order to facilitate their advance against the Turks. By the end of October 1917 the railroad had reached Baiji, and was



soon extended to Sharqat. Thus at the end of the war the two railheads, Nissibin and Sharqat, were separated by less than 200 miles, on which partial construction had been undertaken along 124 miles.

No further steps to complete the gap were taken until 1933. Indeed, the section from Sharqat to Baiji was torn up and, as a result of a decision by the British Government in 1919 to extend the metre-gauge line from Baghdad to Mosul by way of Kirkuk, it was expected that the remainder of the standard-gauge line would be pulled up back to Samarra. This decision was made for strategic and economic reasons, notwithstanding the fact that standard-gauge sleepers had been used in building the line from Basra to Baghdad in anticipation of the day when the line would be converted into standard gauge. The British Government apparently desired a break in the gauge at a point in northern 'Iraq because it preferred the construction of a new railroad from Haifa (on the Mediterranean) across the desert to Baghdad rather than the completion of the standard-gauge line from Constantinople to Basra. Several surveys were made for the trans-desert route, but the British were unable to induce the 'Iraq Government to pay £7,000,000 as its share of the cost.

The French company in Syria was the first to undertake to bridge the gap when in 1933 it built seven miles of track from Nissibin to Tel Zouan. This became the terminus of the Taurus Express, inaugurated in 1930 with connecting motor-car service to Kirkuk via Mosul. On May 15, 1935, service was opened to Tel-Kotchek on the Syrio-'Iraqi frontier, 41 miles from Tel Zouan. Beginning on this date also, the Taurus Express ran via Ankara instead of Konya. Under the terms of the Railway Agreement of April 1, 1936, the 'Iraqi Railways passed from British ownership to that of the Government of 'Iraq. As a result, the latter took upon itself the task of completing the line. Construction began in late 1936 from Tel-Kotchek to Mosul, but not until March 31, 1939, did the Taurus Express steam into Mosul. Upon the outbreak of the present war construction was also pushed northward from Baiji, a comparatively easy undertaking except for a section 30 miles south of Mosul where tunneling was needed. On May 24, 1940, the first train passed over the line to Baghdad and on July 17, 1940, the first passenger train went northward. Construction and the new equipment, bought in England, cost about £3,500,000, which was financed from revenue and from 'Iraq's first foreign loan, floated in London.

It was recently announced that the 100-mile gap between Diyarbakir and Mardin is to be filled in; construction is said already to have been begun. When this segment has been finished, the Baghdad line will be able to follow the route originally planned, in this way saving about 150 miles and avoiding the Taurus and Amanus ranges. It also has the advantage, from the Turkish point of view, of being much more easily defended.

II

With the intensification of the war the completed Baghdad Railway has become important as a means of supplying, from the port of Basra, those Near and Middle East regions now cut off by the closing of the Mediterranean to commerce. Traffic through Basra and on the Baghdad Railway is therefore steadily increasing. At Basra there now call every month five to eight ships

from American ports, as well as numerous Japanese, Dutch, British, Greek and British Indian steamers. The facilities of the port, geared to handle about 5,000 tons daily, have been taxed to the utmost. Ships formerly had to lie in the Shatt al-Arab for several days before coming to the wharf; but this difficulty has been overcome by a reorganization of the port facilities.

Delays are also incurred in moving freight by rail to and from Basra because of the lack of adequate rolling stock. The metre-gauge line, built and equipped during the last war "with odds and ends from India," as a contemporary writer expressed it, in 1938 had 55 locomotives, 226 passenger cars and 2,543 freight cars of all types. Much of this equipment dates from the last war and is inadequate for main-line traffic. The broad-gauge line from Baghdad northward was even less well prepared to handle the new influx of traffic: in 1938 it had 11 locomotives, most of which had been captured from the Germans, 55 passenger cars and 525 freight cars, few of which were modern. Additional orders were placed in England, but not all this equipment has arrived.

The transit trade to and from Iran no longer accounts for its former large share of the foreign commerce of 'Iraq, although the closing of the Mediterranean ports has caused a renewal of commerce between Baghdad and western Iran. As yet the transshipment of goods to Syria and Palestine is far from having reached its full possibilities, largely because of the high cost of transport across the desert, added to the wartime maritime rates to Basra, the freight rates on the railway, port dues, transit dues (\$3 per metric ton) and handling charges at Baghdad. Taken together, these charges tend to make the cost of many articles almost prohibitive in these countries. Under present circumstances, however, the rates on the railway are not excessive.

The greatest obstacle to an increase in traffic has been the freight rate for trans-desert truck transport. In early 1939, the rate per ton from the Mediterranean to Baghdad was about £5. It now stands at about £10. The increase seems to be due less to scarcity of gasoline or the high cost of trucks and tires than to the fact that the 'Iraqi operators, who alone can obtain licenses from the Baghdad Government to carry goods in 'Iraq, charge all that the traffic will bear. Syrian and Palestinian operators, who own more trucks than their 'Iraqi competitors, are excluded from 'Iraq. The rate to Aleppo and to North Syrian points has been kept down by the completion of the Baghdad Railway where through rates by rail run from £8 to £11 per ton.

Transportation to Turkey also is handicapped by high railway freight charges (from Basra to Istanbul the average rate per ton is \$89 plus \$3 for transit dues), by the necessity of transshipment at Baghdad from metre-gauge to standard-gauge, and by the lack of freight cars. At present, one freight train a day runs to and from Turkey. The Turkish Government, however, has taken steps to develop traffic. In July 1940, it sent a commission to Basra to investigate trade possibilities in the Persian Gulf; it also appointed a Commercial Attaché in Baghdad to facilitate customs and shipping formalities.

The use of the Baghdad Railway to reestablish Turkey's exports would not only improve her foreign exchange position but would also provide nearly 1,000 tons of freight daily for Basra. The success of such a scheme would largely depend on the value of Turkish products in relation to shipping costs. Thus one of the most recent shipments over the railway was 4,000 tons of

Turkish tobacco for the United States. In the opposite direction, American moving picture films for distribution to all parts of the Balkans and Near East are being imported, as well as automobile parts, tires, optical instruments, cotton and woollen cloth, chemicals, dyes, coffee, tea and armaments. Only if the shipments now trickling through the Mediterranean from England become completely cut off, and if prices within Turkey and the demand for Turkish products abroad rise enough to cover the added cost of shipping via Basra, can there be a further expansion of traffic on this route.

III

The ever-tightening hold of Germany on Southeastern Europe has naturally stimulated speculation as to whether the Baghdad Railway may not serve either as a sort of Burma Road for sending British aid to Turkey, or as a highway for German expansion toward the oil fields of 'Iraq and Iran.

As a belligerent against Germany, Turkey would undoubtedly require large supplies of matériel — particularly machine guns, tanks, trucks and planes — since her present equipment is not adequate for her 750,000 fighting men. As long as Great Britain retains her dominant position in the Mediterranean, she may be able to provide convoys to Izmir (Smyrna). In case Izmir were cut off, Mersin and Alexandretta, both connected by short branch lines with the Baghdad Railway, might then serve as avenues of supply, though neither is well-equipped to handle heavy cargo. Ships must lie out at sea, particularly at Mersin where in rough weather loading and unloading are impossible. Thus it would seem that, if Istanbul and Izmir become impossible or too dangerous to use, supplies could best be shipped into Turkey via the Baghdad Railway.

The difficulties which would interfere with this use of the Baghdad Railway as Turkey's principal window on the world seem to be: the lack of rolling stock; the long distances involved, with a consequent long "turn around;" the change in gauge at Baghdad; the bottleneck at the port of Basra; and the fact that trains must pass through three different countries. In this last connection trouble might come from the French forces in Syria. However, in case such interference should take place, it seems probable that Turkey, with British support, would annex those parts of Syria, including Aleppo, through which the Baghdad Railway runs. In passing, it may be noted that there are no more than 20,000 French troops in Syria at the present time.

The scarcity of rolling stock would probably not become acute unless requirements, say at Ankara, exceeded 2,000 tons daily — a small amount for a fighting army. To keep 2,000 tons arriving daily in Turkey, about 4 trains of some 40 cars each carrying $12\frac{1}{2}$ to 15 tons (full loading is seldom achieved) would have to be dispatched every day in each direction. Regular deliveries, allowing seven days for covering the 1,266 miles from Ankara to Baghdad at the average speed of 180 miles daily, plus two or three days "turn around" at Baghdad and at the Turkish destination, would require the constant use of between 90 and 100 trains, or about 3,600 to 4,000 cars and 100 to 120 locomotives, together with pusher engines for the mountainous regions. The total carrying capacity of these trains alone would equal about one-half of the average daily freight movement on all lines in Turkey in 1938. These requirements could probably be met at the expense of traffic on other lines. In 1939, the Turkish

Railways owned 898 locomotives of all types, 16,331 passenger and freight cars, and a number of Wagon-Lits. Turkey has given large orders for rolling stock, including 129 heavy-duty locomotives and 200 freight cars from Germany, 58 similar locomotives and 300 ore cars from Great Britain, and 22 locomotives and 600 cars from France. Some of these have been delivered, but definite figures are not available.

Now for 'Iraq. In 1938, the most prosperous year yet experienced by the 'Iraqi Railways, a daily average of 1,680 tons of freight was moved over all lines. At present two trains run daily between Basra and Baghdad in each direction. They approximate the railway's estimated 2,000-2,500 tons capacity. The railroad could be supplemented by steamers on the Tigris; this service is now furnished by three companies which in normal times carry one-half of the total freight movement of 'Iraq.

The difficulties would become still more formidable if the British should decide to move additional troops into 'Iraq to protect the oil fields there and in Iran, for the task of supplying these troops would still further strain the combined resources of the railways and the rivers. Should Turkey enter the war against the Nazis, she would immediately be faced with the problem of how to protect the coal supply of her railways. The capture of her coal deposits, located principally on the Black Sea between Zonguldak and Ergeli, would almost irreparably cripple her railways. In 'Iraq the locomotives use oil as fuel. In Syria they operate with coal, and this would have to be supplied either by Turkey or from overseas through Basra.

IV

Will Hitler in the near future venture down the route of the Baghdad Railway? We of course do not know. But it is no secret that the Germans would be very happy to acquire the 16 to 20 million tons of oil annually produced in the oil fields of 'Iraq and Iran. They also have every reason for wishing to cut the British fleet off from this supply and to destroy British naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean as a prelude to the conquest of the Suez Canal. To attain these objectives the Germans would find control of the Baghdad Railway to be invaluable, since there are practically no roads suitable for military traffic through Anatolia, particularly in the Taurus and Amanus Mountains.

Even if the German Army should obtain control of the Baghdad Railway and force its way into 'Iraq and Iran, it would discover that possession of the oil wells in those countries would not in itself satisfy Germany's oil-hunger. There are no available means for moving the oil by rail to Istanbul or Samsun. Turkey probably owns fewer than 200 tank cars, while the 'Iraqi Railways have less than 40. The only way to get oil out of Mesopotamia is therefore through the pipelines to Tripoli and Haifa. Unless Germany expects to divert tank cars from Rumania, she cannot count on oil from the Near East until the British have been driven out of the Mediterranean.

MARSHAL PÉTAİN AND THE “NEW ORDER”

THE French censorship and physical difficulties of transatlantic communication have restricted the flow of French newspapers and periodicals to the United States. Thus it has come about that the full texts of many of the public pronouncements of Marshal Pétain, who on July 11 assumed full powers as Chief of State, are still lacking in the United States; while the reports of them transmitted by American correspondents have often been very meager. Among the most important “programmatic” statements by Marshal Pétain is one given by him to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and printed by that periodical in its issue of September 15, 1940, under the title “La Politique Sociale de l’Avenir.” It has been widely reprinted subsequently in the local newspapers of unoccupied France. We reproduce below several striking passages from this statement, taken from *La Nouvelliste de Lyon*, an old-established Royalist organ, of September 20.

Marshal Pétain, who addresses his statement to all Frenchmen, begins by saying that he wishes to discuss politics — not, however, the “barren and gloomy struggle of parties and factions” but politics as a science and art, “the art of governing men in conformity with their highest and most general interests.” A strong State is an indispensable factor in good government. He says it is his intention to build such a State “on the ruins of the monstrous and flabby State which collapsed under the weight of its weaknesses and mistakes far more than under the blows of the enemy.” He continues:

“Not being in vassalage to any individual interest or group of interests, the new French State has the freedom, the strength and, I may add, the will to play its rôle of arbiter, and by meting out stern and impartial justice to assure that triumph of the general welfare over individual rights which is so important for the maintenance of national unity.

“There was nothing more illogical, more incoherent, more contradictory than the economic system which, for fifty years or more, brought us chronic agitation, marked by violent clashes in which the strike and the lock-out competed in producing ruin.

“Liberty was perpetually invoked by the powerful, on whom she bestowed intolerable increases of power; and when the law intervened in favor of the weak, it did so with such clumsiness that in the end it tipped the scales against them.

“This is the pitiful story of the so-called ‘social’ laws of the Third Republic. They did not improve the conditions of the working class; they did not humble capitalist feudalism; they succeeded only in half-ruining our national economy. To what must we attribute so complete a failure? Not so much to the incompetence or wickedness of man as to the weakness of the State — the inadequacy of the governmental machinery.”

At this point Marshal Pétain explains that he is in a more favorable position than his predecessors to approach social problems in a free spirit and with effective means of action. He describes the family as the core of the social structure. “In the new order which we are setting up,” he says, “the family

will be honored, protected, aided." He also considers the needs of youth. He then continues:

"When our young men and our young women enter life we shall not mislead them with lofty statements and illusory hopes. We shall teach them to open their eyes wide to reality.

"We shall tell them that it is fine to be free; but that real 'Liberty' can be attained only in the shelter of a protecting authority which they must respect and obey. We shall not be content to give them the liberty to die of hunger, even if this liberty confers on them the right to drop a ballot in a box every four years. We shall recognize their right to work — not, however, at any occupation they may choose, for in this domain freedom of choice will be limited within the possibilities of the economic situation and the demands of the national interest.

"We shall then tell them that 'Equality' is a beautiful thing on certain planes and within certain limits; but that, if men are equal in the face of death, if they are equal before God, if it is the business of civilized society to make them equal before the law and to give them an equal chance in life, these different kinds of equality must be fitted into a rational hierarchy, based upon diversity of functions and merits and regulated for the common good.

"Finally, we shall tell them that 'Fraternity' is a magnificent ideal, but that in the state of nature to which we here have fallen there can be true fraternity only in natural groups such as the family, the city and the Fatherland.

"We shall tell them that if it is normal for men to form into groups according to their trade affinities, their social level, their manner of life, and that if it is legitimate for these various groups to assert their interests and their rights against each other, then we shall tell them that the class struggle — which was considered such a great stimulus to universal progress — is an absurd concept which leads peoples to disintegration and death, whether by civil or by foreign war.

"We shall tell them that, if competition is the law of life and if the interests of employer and employee sometimes conflict, yet the general interest of their common occupation must dominate the clash of their individual interests, for it is but part of the still more general interest of production. Whence arises a triple necessity:

"The necessity of organizing the trade or profession on a corporative basis, wherein all the elements of an enterprise can come together face to face and reach an understanding.

"The necessity of having in each organized trade or profession a representative of the State with supreme power to arbitrate differences which otherwise would be irreconcilable.

"The necessity of having, outside and above the corporations or communities of enterprises, a State organism with power to orient national production in accordance with the capacities of the domestic market and the possibilities of foreign markets.

"Conceived in accordance with these principles, the new social order will not be 'Liberalism,' because it will not hesitate to combat violence which conceals itself under certain ostensible liberties, and to seek in certain legal restraints an indispensable instrument for liberation.

"It will not be 'Socialism,' because in large measure it will respect individual liberty and will preserve the powerful motive of individual profit.

"It will not be 'Capitalism,' because it will put an end to the reign of economics and its immoral autonomy, and because it will subordinate the money factor, and even the labor factor, to the human factor.

"One of the great innovations of Christianity was to teach man to accept willingly the necessity of work, and to give the most humble work a spiritual value. We yearn with all our soul to restore that value, which in the last analysis rests on our respect for the human being.

"In conclusion I would like to emphasize that this conception of social life is purely and profoundly French.

"Liberalism, capitalism and collectivism are foreign products imported into France. France, restored to herself, rejects them quite naturally.

"She understands today that she was misled in trying to transplant to her own soil institutions and methods which were not at all meant for her sun and her climate. And when she examines the principles which made her enemies victorious, she is surprised to recognize in all of them a little of her own self, her purest and most authentic tradition.

"The idea of a concrete economy, defined by human will and submitted to the judgment of moral conscience, is the same idea which dominated her own traditional social system.

"We find little trouble in accepting the National Socialist idea of the primacy of labor, and of its essential reality in contrast with the fiction of monetary tokens, because it is part of our classical heritage — so much so that we find the idea expressed by the most French of our writers, the most national of our poets, the good La Fontaine." He then recalls the fable of "The Worker and his Children."

Marshal Pétain concludes:

"I could pursue this thought still further. It would lead us, by a variety of roads, to truths which were ours, which we have forgotten, and which we can recover without borrowing them from anyone, and, moreover, without disregarding the merit of those who have known better than we how to turn them to good account. And thus we shall see how — without in any way disavowing ourselves, but, on the contrary, by finding ourselves again — we can articulate our thought and our action with those which tomorrow will preside over the reorganization of the world."

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

SHALL NOT PERISH FROM THE EARTH. BY RALPH BARTON PERRY. New York: Vanguard, 1940, 159 p. \$1.50.

A brief and lucid explanation of what the democratic way means, especially to Americans, and a call to defend it, by a professor of philosophy at Harvard University.

STATE OF THE MASSES. BY EMIL LEDERER. New York: Norton, 1940, 245 p. \$2.50.

An interpretation of Fascism as a form of social disintegration induced by the party-state in order to make the masses more homogeneous and therefore more easily controllable. The author, a German Socialist and economist, was dean of the "University in Exile" at the time of his death.

THE CITY OF MAN. BY HERBERT AGAR AND OTHERS. New York: Viking, 1941, 113 p. \$1.00.

"A Declaration on World Democracy" drawn up and issued by seventeen scholars and writers, including several European exiles.

OUT OF THE NIGHT. BY JAN VALTIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 841 p. \$3.50.

This story of the career of a German Communist in the employ of the G.P.U. is one of the most amazing and depressing ever to be reduced to writing. It is one long tale of espionage, deceit, torture and betrayal by the secret police of the rival totalitarian Powers. If anything were needed to put an end to the "revolutionary" glamor of either Communism or Fascism, this book should do it.

NOT BY ARMS ALONE. BY HANS KOHN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 161 p. \$1.75.

Papers and articles forming a worthy sequel to the author's "Force or Reason" and "Revolutions and Dictatorships."

TO THE FINLAND STATION. BY EDMUND WILSON. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 509 p. \$4.00.

Essays on the revolutionary tradition of the last century.

WAR, PACIFISM AND PEACE. BY ROBERT CORKEY. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 171 p. \$1.25.

A discussion of the position of the Protestant Churches towards war — in particular this war. The author, a professor of ethics in Presbyterian College at Belfast, favors collective security as against absolute pacifism.

PROTESTANTISM'S HOUR OF DECISION. BY JUSTIN WROE NIXON. Philadelphia: Judson Press, 1940, 154 p. \$1.39.

National and world affairs viewed through Protestant eyes.

CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS. BY REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Scribner, 1940, 226 p. \$2.00.

Essays opposing absolute pacifism.

NON-VIOLENCE IN AN AGGRESSIVE WORLD. By A. J. MUSTE. New York: Harper, 1940, 211 p. \$2.00.

A vigorous and sincere presentation of the pacifist case.

THE CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE TO WORLD CHAOS. By LUMAN J. SHAFER. New York: Round Table, 1940, 208 p. \$2.00.

As seen by the chairman of the International Relations Commission of the Foreign Missions Conference of America.

THE GREAT HATRED. By MAURICE SAMUEL. New York: Knopf, 1940, 209 p. \$2.00.

A passionate yet closely reasoned interpretation of anti-Semitism as fundamentally a movement to put an end to Christianity.

NA PUTYAKH K MIROVOY VOINE 1914-1918. By A. A. MOGILEVICH AND M. E. AIRAPETYAN. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 293 p. \$1.50.

A study of the origins of the First World War, by two reputable scholars.

DIPLOMATIKE ISTORIA TES NEAS EUROPE. By GEORGE C. CHRISTOPOULOS. Athens: 1939, 316 p. Dr. 150.

The recent diplomatic history of Europe seen through Greek eyes.

CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN. By CHARLES HOWARD McILWAIN. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1940, 162 p. \$2.50.

Six annotated lectures delivered at Cornell University by the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard.

AN ATLAS OF WORLD REVIEW. By CLIFFORD H. MACFADDEN. New York: Crowell, 1940, 145 p. \$1.95.

Seventy-five maps, with explanatory notes, illustrating current world problems of politics, strategy and economics.

THE PENGUIN POLITICAL ATLAS. COMPILED BY S. C. JOHNSON. New York: Penguin, 1940, 207 p. 25 cents.

Sketchy but convenient maps.

GLASS HOUSES. By CARLETON BEALS. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1938, 413 p. \$3.50.

THE GREAT CIRCLE. By CARLETON BEALS. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1940, 358 p. \$3.00.

Carleton Beals has managed to be on hand at a surprisingly large number of exciting events -- the Fascist March on Rome, to cite only one example. These two books, which constitute the author's autobiography to date, give an entertaining word picture of numerous adventures in many parts of the world.

EYE WITNESS. EDITED BY ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 306 p. \$2.75.

Reportorial adventures by members of the Overseas Press Club of America.

MEN OF POWER. By ALBERT CARR. New York: Viking, 1940, 272 p. \$2.50.

Vivid sketches of key leaders in modern history.

ULTIMA THULE. By VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 383 p. \$3.50.

More unsolved mysteries of the Arctic, by the famous explorer.

SUR LES HAUTS PLATEAUX GROENLANDAIS. By E. WYSS-DUNANT. Paris: Payot, 1939, Fr. 36.

Illustrated report on a scientific expedition to a strategic island.

TWENTIETH CENTURY WARFARE. By LOWELL M. LIMPUS. New York: Dutton, 1940, 205 p. \$1.75.

A précis of military information by a former editor of the *Army and Navy Journal*.

BLITZKRIEG. By S. L. A. MARSHALL. New York: Morrow, 1940, 188 p. \$2.00.

Its "history, strategy, economics and the challenge to America," outlined by a Detroit newspaperman.

WAR ON WHEELS. By C. R. KUTZ. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 245 p. \$2.00.

The historical evolution of the use of cars, trains and tanks in modern warfare, traced by a captain in the United States Army.

THE ARMED HORDE. 1793-1939. By HOFFMAN NICKERSON. New York: Putnam, 1940, 427 p. \$3.50.

A review of military history since the French Revolution in which is traced the rise and fall of the "mass army." The author, who opposes the concept of the "people in arms" for social reasons, is happy to observe the return to vogue of a professional, specialized and smaller army.

SCIENCE IN WAR. New York: Penguin, 1941, 140 p. 25 cents.

Some two dozen scientists have collaborated on this original little handbook.

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By FREDERICK A. MIDDLEBUSH AND CHESNEY HILL. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940, 498 p. \$3.25.

A systematic, streamlined text, with useful bibliographies at the end of each chapter.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. VOL. II — DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY. By L. OPPENHEIM. Sixth Edition. Edited by H. LAUTERPACHT. New York: Longmans, 1940, 766 p. \$17.50.

A timely revision of a standard source.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by WALTER H. MALLORY. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1941, 200 p. \$2.50.

This standard reference volume, now in its fourteenth year, is more than usually valuable in view of the profound political changes which have taken place in the world during 1940 and the difficulty of obtaining accurate information regarding them. Revised as of January 1, 1941, it supplies detailed information on the governments, parliaments, programs and leaders of political parties, and the policies and character of the press of every country. An interesting sample is the section on France, which gives the decrees forming the legal basis for Marshal Pétain's régime.

General: Economic and Social

RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD TRADE. By J. B. CONDLIFFE. New York: Norton, 1940, 427 p. \$3.75.

How can the growing control of economic processes within national states be reconciled with attempts to reestablish international systems of trade and finance? This is the problem to which Professor Condliffe devotes his attention. He believes that if planning takes the form of detailed centralized management, its integration into systems of international coöperation will be practically impossible. If, however, the new types of national control take the form of regulation, international integration is not inconceivable, but will demand the invention of new international political and economic institutions. The author believes that in the event of a British victory world trade can be reestablished on liberal lines only through coöperation with the United States. "If an international system is to be restored, it must," he writes, "be an American-dominated system, based on a Pax Americana."

THE ECONOMICS OF FORCE. By FRANK MUNK. New York: Stewart, 1940, 254 p. \$2.00.

How the totalitarian state organizes its economy for conquest and why this carries dangers for the Americas, explained by a Czech refugee economist.

CAPITAL EXPANSION, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY. By HAROLD G. MOULTON AND OTHERS. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 413 p. \$3.50.

An investigation into the problems of idle money, factories and men.

DENEZHNYE KRIZISY (1821-1938). By I. TRAKHTENBERG. Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1940, 894 p. \$7.00.

This study of monetary crises between 1821 and 1938 forms part three of a treatise on "World Economic Crises" prepared under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

GELD UND GOLD. By HERMANN HÖPKER-ASCHOFF. Jena: Fischer, 1939, 246 p. M. 10.

Unorthodox ideas on money, by a former Minister of Finance in Prussia.

FROM MARX TO STALIN. By J. E. LEROSSIGNOL. New York: Crowell, 1940, 442 p. \$3.00.

A critique of Communism by the Dean of the College of Business Administration in the University of Nebraska.

MARXISM: IS IT SCIENCE? By MAX EASTMAN. New York: Norton, 1940, 394 p. \$3.00.

Max Eastman dissects Marxism and finds that it is not a science but a religion.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY. EDITED BY HARRY ELMER BARNES AND OTHERS. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 947 p. \$5.00.

A factual survey, with notes and bibliography.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE. By HARRY F. WARD. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 293 p. \$2.50.

A discussion of the problems involved in attaining and defending democratic forms, marred by the author's naïveté concerning the realities of Soviet Communism.

RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS. By RUTH BENEDICT. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 274 p. \$2.50.

A popular survey by a social anthropologist.

The Second World War

NIGHT OVER EUROPE. By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. New York: Knopf, 1941, 600 p. \$3.50.

In this continuation of his synthesis of recent diplomatic history, initiated in "Europe on the Eve," Professor Schuman carries the story of Europe's descent into the abyss from January 1939 to the end of the Third Republic in the summer of 1940. The story is not a pretty one at best, and Professor Schuman's own pessimism as to the perfectibility of man and the vitality of Western civilization does not make it any prettier. But whether or not his despair is justified, his book certainly contains the most complete chronicle yet prepared of the immediate background and the early phases of the war.

SEVEN MYSTERIES OF EUROPE. By JULES ROMAINS. New York: Knopf, 1940, 253 p. \$2.50.

M. Romain is principally known for his gigantic *tour-de-force*, "Men of Good Will." The world was therefore considerably startled to learn, on the publication of the present book, that for a number of years prior to the outbreak of the current war M. Romain engaged off and on in amateur diplomatic negotiations with some of the principal political personalities of Western Europe, in an effort to avert another catastrophe like that of 1914-1918 on which he has written so much historical fiction. Among his confidants were such men as Otto Abetz, Henri de Man and Georges Bonnet. It is scarcely any wonder, then, that on almost every page the credulity of M. Romain is amply documented.

THIS SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM. New York: Dutton, 1940, 260 p. \$2.00.

Mr. Schlamm, formerly a journalist in Vienna, explains Hitler's success and in particular warns America against the "decomposing functions of intellectuals."

LA TRAGÉDIE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE DE SEPTEMBRE 1938 À MARS 1939. By PIERRE BUK. Paris: Sagittaire, 1939, Fr. 18.

An account by a high Czech official, based in part on the unpublished "White Book" of the Czechoslovak Government.

THE REVOLUTION IS ON. By M. W. FODOR. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 239 p. \$2.75.

A vivid eye-witness narrative of the Blitzkrieg in the west and an attempt, not always convincing, to appraise its significance.

SUICIDE OF A DEMOCRACY. By HEINZ POL. New York: Reynal, 1940, 296 p. \$2.50.

This is one of the better books on the background of the French tragedy. The author, a refugee German journalist living at that time in France, recites chapter and verse concerning the activities of the Fifth Column before and during the war. He also supplies enlightening information on the French concentration camps for alien enemies.

JUGGERNAUT OVER HOLLAND. By EELCO NICOLAAS VAN KLEFFENS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 195 p. \$2.00.

A sober, documented account of how the war came to Holland, by the Foreign Minister of that country. Those who believe that the Nazis and civilized people can live peacefully together in the same world should read this book.

THE BELGIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE SURRENDER OF THE BELGIAN ARMY, MAY 10-28, 1940. Compiled by the Belgian American Educational Foundation. New York: Compiler, 1940, 85 p. 50 cents.

The object in publishing these documents and the accompanying comments by various Belgian and American statesmen is to explain more fully what happened in Belgium in May 1940, to put the tragic events of that time in their historical setting, and in this way to present the actions of the Belgian king and his army in a more favorable light.

TOUTE LA VÉRITÉ SUR UN MOIS DRAMATIQUE DE NOTRE HISTOIRE. By JEAN MONTIGNY. Clermont-Ferrand: Editions Mont-Louis, 1940, 157 p. Fr. 5.

A revealing little book by a French deputy long identified with German circles. The text contains an extended report on the private sitting of the National Assembly on July 10, including in particular M. Laval's speech.

POURQUOI ET COMMENT FUT DÉCIDÉE LA DEMANDE D'ARMISTICE. By CHARLES REIBEL. Vanves: Imprimerie Kapp, 1940, 30 p. Fr. 3.

Light on the events of June 10 to 17, 1940, by a member of the French Senate.

BEHIND THE NAZI FRONT. By JOHN McCUTCHEON RALEIGH. New York: Dodd, 1940, 307 p. \$2.50.

A correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune* in Germany recounts his adventures there and in occupied Poland during the first year of war.

WAR WITHOUT MUSIC. By PETER MUIR. New York: Scribner, 1940, 262 p. \$2.00.

An American ambulance driver's experiences during the Blitzkrieg in France.

EUROPE'S RETURN TO WAR, 1938-1940. By F. LEE BENNS. New York: Crofts, 1940, 120 p. 75 cents.

This supplement brings the author's two well-known texts up to November 1940.

YANKEE SKIPPER. By JOSEPH A. GAINARD. New York: Stokes, 1940, 265 p. \$3.00.

The experiences of the captain of the *City of Flint*, the ship which helped rescue the survivors of the *Athenia* and was later boarded by a German crew and taken to Norway.

NEW WAYS OF WAR. BY TOM WINTRINGHAM. New York: Penguin, 1940, 128 p. 25 cents.

This little brochure may turn out to have been one of the decisive factors in the war. It is the handbook being used today by the Local Defense Volunteers throughout Britain and it was written by their commander, a veteran of the First World War who later commanded the British Battalion in Loyalist Spain. The author not only gives a wide variety of practical advice on how to resist mechanized invasion — the chosen weapon is a home-made hand grenade — but tells *why* the British *people* must fight against Fascism whenever they encounter it.

WHY WE FIGHT: LABOUR'S CASE. BY ARTHUR GREENWOOD. London: Routledge, 1939, 222 p. 5/.

A statement by one of the Party's leaders.

BRITAIN SPEAKS. BY J. B. PRIESTLEY. New York: Harper, 1940, 263 p. \$2.50.

An English novelist reports to the American people on the state of Britain during the summer of 1940.

REPORT ON ENGLAND. BY RALPH INGERSOLL. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 202 p. \$1.50.

Graphic descriptions of life in London, and of England's war effort and defense needs, as seen by an American newspaper publisher who spent two weeks there in November 1940. There are some good sketches of Churchill, Bevin and others.

The United States

AMERICA'S LAST CHANCE. BY ALBERT CARR. New York: Crowell, 1940, 328 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Carr warns the American people that they must hurry if they are going to preserve their democratic way of life as well as their place in the world. To arouse the country and assure it victory he offers a detailed program of what it must do. A challenging, realistic book.

AMERICA NEXT. BY PETER MARKHAM. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 370 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Markham pursues a line of reasoning similar to that of Mr. Carr, but with more attention to European precedents.

AMERICA'S DILEMMA: ALONE OR ALLIED? BY NORMAN ANGELL. New York: Harper, 1940, 226 p. \$1.75.

The author of "The Great Illusion" finally decides that, in view of Europe's recent history, isolation is no longer feasible, even for America.

BEYOND GERMAN VICTORY. BY HELEN HILL AND HERBERT AGAR. New York: Reynal, 1940, 117 p. \$1.00.

A hard-hitting tract telling Americans in plain language why to appease Hitler is to court disaster.

ZERO HOUR. BY STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT AND OTHERS. New York: Farrar, 1940, 244 p. \$2.00.

Six authors contribute chapters germane to the general theme that the American people had better wake up to the crisis in their national life before it is too late.

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. BY JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ AND DAVID W. WAINHOUSE. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 1028 p. \$6.00.

A revised edition of a standard text. The Odyssey Press publishes a student's edition at \$4.50.

SPEAK UP FOR DEMOCRACY. BY EDWARD L. BERNAYS. New York: Viking, 1940, 127 p. \$1.00.

A useful source of facts and advice for those who believe the American way of life is worth saving.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: TRIAL AND FAILURE. BY CHARLES G. FENWICK. New York: New York University Press, 1940, 190 p. \$2.50.

Lectures in which an authority on international law explains why some of the popular American ideas about neutrality have failed because they were unrealistic.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY. BY JAMES A. GATHINGS. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940, 143 p. \$2.50.

A scholarly review of American practice and policy before and during the First World War, with a concluding chapter looking into the future.

AMERICA AND A NEW WORLD ORDER. BY GRAEME K. HOWARD. New York: Scribner, 1940, 121 p. \$2.00.

Neither isolationism nor blind interventionism is a practical policy for the United States, according to the author. His own pattern for the world of tomorrow is based on a policy of "coöperative regionalism," which in effect means letting the totalitarian Powers divide the Eastern Hemisphere while we take over the Western.

THE TROJAN HORSE IN AMERICA. BY MARTIN DIES. New York: Dodd, 1940, 366 p. \$2.00.

This book is a further indication that Mr. Dies is rather more interested in promoting himself and his anti-New Deal and anti-"Communist" activities than in going after the Nazi and Fascist Fifth Columns, whether homegrown or imported.

FIFTH COLUMN IN AMERICA. BY HAROLD LAVINE. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 240 p. \$2.50.

A very readable exposure of the activities of the various anti-democratic movements, foreign-born and native, operating in this country. The author is editorial director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis at Princeton.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE NEW WORLD. BY A. A. BERLE, JR. New York: Harper, 1940, 141 p. \$2.00.

Essays on various aspects of American foreign policy, by an Assistant Secretary of State.

WARTIME CONTROL OF PRICES. BY CHARLES O. HARDY. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 216 p. \$1.00.

How to control American prices during the defense boom.

M-DAY: BANKING AND FINANCE. BY A. PHILIP WOOLFSON. Cambridge: Brady, 1940, 116 p. \$2.50.

Prognostications as to what may happen to American financial institutions if this country gets into war. The author, a lawyer and financial writer, bases his predictions on the experience of certain European countries and on our own legislation.

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POPULATION POLICY. BY FRANK LORIMER AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1940, 178 p. \$2.50.

Essays on social and economic aspects of our demographic problems.

THE AMERICAN IMPACT ON GREAT BRITAIN 1898-1914. BY RICHARD HEATHCOTE HEINDEL. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940, 439 p. \$4.00.

This scholarly investigation is concerned with the whole complex of Anglo-American relations — economic, social, cultural as well as political.

THE PRESIDENT MAKERS. BY MATTHEW JOSEPHSON. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 584 p. \$3.75.

A readable review of the "reform" period in American history — 1896-1919.

MR. HOUSE OF TEXAS. BY ARTHUR D. HOWDEN SMITH. New York: Funk, 1940, 381 p. \$3.50.

A friendly portrait of Colonel House by a newspaperman and novelist associated with him for many years.

HOW MAINE VIEWED THE WAR, 1914-1917. BY EDWIN COSTRELL. Orono (Me.): University Press, 1940, 101 p. 50 cents.

A study based primarily on six Maine newspapers.

TOWARD A NEW ORDER OF SEA POWER. BY HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 332 p. \$3.75.

This sequel to the authors' "The Rise of American Naval Power" carries the story from 1918 through the Washington Conference in 1922. A fine piece of scholarship and a valuable addition to postwar history.

BATTLE SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC. BY MAJOR MALCOLM WHEELER-NICHOLSON. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 212 p. \$1.50.

Criticisms of the present organization of the United States Army and concrete suggestions for remedy, by a cavalry officer with long experience both at home and abroad.

THE FLEET TODAY. BY KENDALL BANNING. New York: Funk, 1940, 346 p. \$2.50.

A popular introduction to the organization, activities and equipment of the United States Navy.

SPY AND COUNTERSPY. BY EMANUEL VICTOR VOSKA AND WILL IRWIN. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 322 p. \$2.75.

The dramatic story of how the Czechs in the United States carried on counter-espionage activities against German agents during the First World War.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN AMERICAN POLITICS. BY ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 304 p. \$2.50.

Essays, in part previously printed elsewhere, on the decisive political rôle of the middle classes in American history. The author is professor of government at Harvard University.

THE OLD DEAL AND THE NEW. BY CHARLES A. BEARD AND GEORGE H. E. SMITH. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 294, p. \$2.00.

This sequel to the authors' "The Future Comes" places the acts of the Roosevelt régime in their historical setting.

WE PLANNED IT THAT WAY. BY HAROLD R. MALCOLM. New York: Daniel Ryerson, 1940, 219 p. \$2.00.

An opinionated blast against the New Deal.

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP. BY PENDLETON HERRING. New York: Farrar, 1940, 173 p. \$1.50.

A penetrating analysis of the relations between the Presidency and the other branches of government.

THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS. BY EDWARD S. CORWIN. New York: New York University Press, 1940, 476 p. \$5.00.

A scholarly study, by a professor in Princeton University, in which constitutional law and custom are emphasized rather than political considerations.

THE PATTERN OF POLITICS. BY J. T. SALTER. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 246 p. \$2.25

Colorful essays on American political folkways, by an associate professor of political science in the University of Wisconsin.

WITCH HUNT. BY GEORGE SELDES. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 300 p. \$2.75

One of America's most diligent muckrakers exposes the activities of the various individuals and organizations in the United States that make a business of "redbaiting."

THE NEWS AND HOW TO UNDERSTAND IT. BY QUINCY HOWE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 250 p. \$2.00.

Mr. Howe distributes praise and blame among the various organs and personalities — newspapers, magazines, columnists, radio commentators and the like — which are at work forming American opinion. His guidance is sometimes more pungent than unprejudiced.

UNCLE SAM'S PACIFIC ISLETS. BY DAVID N. LEFF. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 71 p. \$1.00.

A historical review of American policy in Oceania.

ALASKA: EIN PARADIES DES NORDENS. BY HERBERT TICHY. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 277 p. M. 7.50.

A vivid description calling attention to Alaska's strategic location.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, JULY 1939-JUNE 1940. Vol. II. EDITED BY S. SHEPARD JONES AND DENYS P. MYERS. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1940, 875 p. \$3.75.

The second annual volume of an invaluable compilation.

Western Europe

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO EUROPE. BY GEOFFREY T. GARRATT. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 351 p. \$2.75.

A British liberal examines recent European history and finds much to criticize among both the dictatorships and the "pluto-democracies."

LES MISSIONAIRES FRANÇAIS ET LE NATIONALISME. BY R. P. PERBAL. Paris: Librairie de L'Arc, 1939, 267 p. Fr. 48.

A scholarly historical work by a French monk.

NEDERLANDS AANDEEL IN DE ONTWIKKELING VAN HET ONZIJDIGHEIDS RECHT GEDURENDE DEN WERELDOORLOG. BY F. J. A. HUART. Leyden: Brill, 1939, 373 p. Fl. 16.

The Netherlands' struggle to maintain its rights as a neutral during the last war.

I CHOSE DENMARK. BY FRANCIS HACKETT. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 291 p. \$2.50.

Life in pre-invasion Denmark as seen by an Irish writer who married a Danish woman.

THE RISE OF MODERN INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN. BY G. A. MONTGOMERY. London: King, 1939, 287 p. 10/6.

A useful summary of the country's economic history.

EUROPE AND THE GERMAN QUESTION. BY F. W. FOERSTER. New York: Sheed, 1940, 474 p. \$3.50.

The basic thesis of this book by a great German liberal is that Germany's rôle in history should have been to unite Europe in a Christian federation but that the rise of Prussianism caused her to take the fatally wrong road to national aggrandizement. Dr. Foerster therefore believes that Germany must be defeated and humiliated before she can regain her true place in Europe.

THE GERMAN CATHOLICS. BY ROBERT D'HARCOURT. London: Burns, Oates, 1939, 274 p. 7/6.

An ardent Catholic indicts the Nazi Government for its treatment of his Church.

SOZIALPOLITIK IM DRITTEN REICH, 1933-1938. BY FRANZ SELDTE. Berlin: Beck, 1939, 274 p. M. 8.50.

The Reich Minister of Labor explains his aims and methods.

THE ART AND TECHNIQUE OF ADMINISTRATION IN GERMAN MINISTRIES. BY ARNOLD BRECHT AND COMSTOCK GLASER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 191 p. \$3.00.

A translation and annotation of Republican Germany's General Code of Administrative Procedure, of which Dr. Brecht was the principal author.

REFUGEE. TRANSLATED BY CLARA LEISER. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, 308 p. \$2.50.

The thrilling story of how two "Aryan" Germans escaped from the fatherland.

NEITHER LIBERTY NOR BREAD. EDITED BY FRANCES KEENE. New York: Harper, 1940, 388 p. \$3.50.

Some two score anti-Fascist Italian exiles contribute excerpts from previously published works to give a comprehensive picture of Mussolini's Italy. In the appendix there are biographical and bibliographical notes about each of the contributors.

LA MARINA MERCANTILE IN VENTI ANNI DI FASCISMO. BY GIORGIO RICCO. Rome: Edizioni "La Novissima," 1939, 359 p. L. 12.

A chronicle of expansion by a Fascist naval officer.

THE POPE SPEAKS. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 337 p. \$2.75.

Pronouncements made by His Holiness between March 3, 1939, and September 4, 1940, with a short biography by Charles Rankin.

SA SAINTETÉ LE PAPE PIE XII. BY GEORGES GOYAU. Paris: Plon, 1939.

A very sympathetic biography by a French historian.

THE MEMOIRS OF EX-PRESIDENT AZAÑA. London: Butterworth, 1939, 15/.

The author was President of the Loyalist Government during the recent Civil War.

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY. BY JEF LAST. London: Routledge, 1939, 228 p. 7/6.

Notes by a Dutch Communist made on the Madrid front in 1937.

SPAIN, THE CHURCH AND THE ORDERS. BY E. ALLISON PEERS. London: Eyre, 1939, 219 p. 10/6.

A somewhat impassioned defense of the Catholic Church in Spain.

IL NON INTERVENTO IN SPAGNA. BY GIUSEPPE VEDOVATO. Florence: Studio Fiorentino di Politica Estera, 1940, 3 v. L. 50.

A documentary history from the Fascist point of view.

Eastern Europe

WAR AND PEACE IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. BY T. A. TARCOUZIO. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 354 p. \$4.00.

A survey of Soviet foreign policy and an appraisal of it in the light of Communist doctrine. In particular the author throws much light on the background of the Soviet-Nazi rapprochement. This book, published under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College, is amply supplied with documentation, a bibliography and a subject index of Soviet treaties, agreements and conventions now in force.

VNESHNAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA. BY M. TIKHOMIROV. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 107 p. 25 cents.

A popular survey of Soviet foreign policy.

RUSSIA. BY Sir BERNARD PARES. New York: Penguin, 1940, 256 p. 25 cents.

A bird's-eye view of recent Russian history by a distinguished British historian.

POD IGOM POLSKIKH PANOV. BY G. MINSKY. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 96 p. 20 cents.

A justification of the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland.

THE SOVIET POWER. BY HEWLITT JOHNSON. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 352 p. \$2.50.

The Dean of Canterbury is favorably impressed by the great socialist experiment in Russia and he lets no inconvenient facts interfere with his belief in its soundness.

OSNOVNYE PROBLEMY GEOGRAFICHESKOGO RAZMESHCHENIYA TOP-LIVNOGO KHOZYAISTVA SSSR. BY A. E. PROBST. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1940, 404 p. \$3.80.

A scholarly study on the geographical distribution of the Soviet fuel supply and industry.

EKONOMIKA I PLANIROVANIE SOVETSKOI TORGOVLI. EDITED BY M. M. LIFITS AND G. L. RUBINSSTEIN. Moscow: Gostorgizdat, 1940, 603 p. \$3.00.

A detailed account of the planning and operation of Soviet trade.

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE WORLD WAR. BY OLGA HESS GANKIN AND H. H. FISHER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 856 p. \$6.00.

Documents on the origin of the Third International.

RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY. BY HARRY DOROSH. New York: Savoy, 1939, 103 p. \$1.25.

A history of the Constituent Assembly (1917-1918) based on Russian sources.

GESCHICHTE DER UKRAINE. BY B. KRUPNYCKJ. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1939, 324 p. M. 10.

Prepared for the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin.

SVANETIYA. BY S. S. ANISIMOV. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 116 p. 40 cents.

A popular account of the development of one of the autonomous areas in the Caucasus.

JAHRE DEUTSCHER ENTSCHEIDUNG IM BALTIKUM. 1918-1919. BY CLAUD GRIMM. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 514 p. M. 14.

An account, based partly on unpublished material, of the struggle of the Germans in Courland and Southern Livonia.

BEITRÄGE ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN POLITIK. BY JOSEF BECK. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 528 p. M. 8.

Speeches, statements and interviews by the former Foreign Minister of Poland.

DIE WEICHSEL. EDITED BY RICHARD WINKEL. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1939, 445 p. M. 30.

Chapters on the geography, economics and cultural problems of Germany's Vistula *Raum*, prepared for the Danzig School of Technology before the conquest of Poland.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. EDITED BY R. J. KERNER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940, 504 p. \$5.00.

Twenty-two American, British and Czechoslovak writers and scholars record the remarkable achievements of the republic during its brief span of life.

MUNICH: BEFORE AND AFTER. BY DR. HUBERT RIPKA. London: Gollancz, 1939, 523 p. 15/.

A careful, documented defense of the policies of Masaryk and Beneš.

BENEŠ OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. BY GODFREY LIAS. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 303 p. 8/6.

A rather conventional biography.

DIE SLOWAKEI: DER JUNGSTE STAAT EUROPAS. BY MICHAEL SCHWARTZ. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 155 p. M. 3.

A sympathetic history of Slovakia's "struggle for autonomy" and a survey of some of its current problems.

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940, 141 p. 5/.

An Information Department Paper concerning the political and economic situation of Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. The area is treated collectively rather than country by country, as did a previous pamphlet with the same title issued by the Royal Institute in May 1939.

DES REICHES NEUE NACHBARN. EDITED BY W. SCHNEEFUSS. Salzburg: Pustet, 1939, 523 p. M. 6.80.

A geo-political survey of Southeastern Europe.

FIFTY YEARS OF WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS. BY COUNT CARLO SFORZA. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 195 p. \$2.75.

For many years Count Sforza, as the Italian envoy to Serbia and later as Foreign Minister of Italy, followed at close range the career of Nicola Pašić and the movement for union among the Yugoslavs. In this interesting book he has woven his own recollections into the fabric of a half century of history along the Adriatic.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE. BY NICHOLAS KALTCHAS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 187 p. \$2.00.

A posthumous publication, covering the last 120 years.

GREEK MEMORIES. BY COMPTON MACKENZIE. London: Chatto and Windus, 1939, 455 p. 10/6.

This very indiscreet book was originally published in October 1932 and then withdrawn at once due to official intervention. Though it now appears in a presumably somewhat expurgated version, it still contains a lot of dynamite in the form of revelations concerning the activities of the British secret service in Greece during the First World War, activities in which Mr. Mackenzie participated in an important way.

ALBANIEN. NEUES LAND IM IMPERIUM. BY RICHARD BUSCH-ZANTNER. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 217 p. M. 6.80.

A political and sociological survey of Fascist Albania.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

WINSTON CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY. BY RENÉ KRAUS. Philadelphia: Lipincott, 1940, 366 p. \$3.00.

The adventurous life of one of the most colorful men of modern times told by a continental journalist.

SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. BY VISCOUNT HALIFAX. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 368 p. \$4.00.

Fifty addresses, edited by H. H. E. Craster.

THE LIFE OF SIR PERCY COX. BY PHILIP GRAVES. London: Butterworth, 1939, 15/.

A biography of one of Britain's outstanding pro-consuls — the man who assured her hegemony in Iraq and around the Persian Gulf.

ENGLAND WAS AN ISLAND ONCE. BY ELSWYTH THANE. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 324 p. \$3.00.

A novelist records her impressions of England between two World Wars.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? BY HAROLD J. LASKI. New York: Viking, 1940, 192 p. \$1.75.

The fundamental purpose behind this tract by a leading intellectual of the Labour Party is to convince the British ruling class that a "revolution by consent" making England truly democratic is the only way Hitler can be defeated.

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY. BY E. V. FRANCIS. London: Cape, 1939, 391 p. 12/6.

This book, though it contributes little that is new, at least summarizes the economic policies pursued by the British Government over the last two decades. The author unintentionally proves that it was precisely "strategy" and a planned organization which Britain lacked when she entered the war.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN WARTIME GREAT BRITAIN, 1914-1918. BY WALDO CHAMBERLIN. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 239 p. \$3.00.

"An annotated bibliography of materials in the Hoover Library."

SEVEN PERIODS OF IRISH HISTORY. EDITED BY SHAEAMAS O'SHEEL. Scotch Plains (N. J.): Flanders Hall, 1940, 120 p. 75 cents.

A typical example of the violently anti-British propaganda published by this firm.

GESCHICHTE IRLANDS. BY RUDOLF BRINGMANN. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1939, 195 p. M. 6.80.

Ireland's struggle for freedom.

CANADIAN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEMS. EDITED BY J. F. PARKINSON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940, 292 p. \$3.00.

Over a score of short studies by various experts.

CANADIANS IN AND OUT OF WORK. BY LEONARD C. MARSH. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940, 503 p. \$3.50.

A comprehensive social and economic study of the Canadian labor market.

THE MAORI PEOPLE TODAY. EDITED BY I. L. G. SUTHERLAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 449 p. \$4.00.

A description of the metamorphosis that has taken place in native life in New Zealand during the last century.

TOWARD FREEDOM. BY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. New York: Day, 1941, 445 p. \$4.00.

An abridged edition of one of the world's great autobiographies, that of the Indian Nationalist leader.

MOLODEZH INDII. BY G. KOCHARYANTS. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1940, 72 p. 10 cents.

A Soviet propaganda pamphlet about movements among the youth of India.

LAND OF THE EYE. BY HASSOLDT DAVIS. New York: Holt, 1940, 415 p. \$3.00.

An entertaining travel book about Himalayan countries.

The Near East

ISLAM, EGO PROISKHOZHDENIE I KLASOVAYA SUSHCHNOST. BY G. A. IBRAGIMOV. Moscow: Gaiz, 1940, 112 p. 5 cents.

A Soviet attack on Islam.

KAMÂL ATATURK'S LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN TURKEY. BY AUGUST RITTER VON KRAL. London: King, 1939, 283 p. 7/6.

A revised and expanded edition of one of the better books on modern Turkey.

JEWISH FATE AND FUTURE. BY ARTHUR RUPPIN. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 386 p. \$4.00.

A sociological study by a professor in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

SYRIENS FREIHEITSKAMPF. BY CHRISTOPH SCHULTZ-ESTEVAS. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 141 p. M. 2.85.

The postwar history of the French Mandate and of Syria's fight for independence.

ALS DEUTSCHER GESANDTER IN AFGHANISTAN. BY KURT ZIEMKA. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 393 p. M. 10.

A German diplomat throws light on a little-known land.

Africa

EUROPA BLICKT NACH AFRIKA. EDITED BY ERWIN BARTH VON WEHRENALP. Leipzig: Lühse, 1939, 356 p. M. 7.

Essays on the present state and future prospects of agriculture, stock-raising, forestry, mining and industry in Africa.

LA FORMATION DE L'EGYPTE MODERNE. BY BOURGEOIS. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1939, 415 p. Fr. 60.

A legal study of Egypt's international status and how it has been modified in recent years.

THE ITALIAN COLONIAL EMPIRE. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940, 72 p. 2/.

A handy source of up-to-date information.

L'AVIAZIONE FASCISTA E LA CONQUISTA DELL'IMPERO. BY GUIDO MATTIOLI. Rome: "L'Aviazione," 1939, 334 p. L. 25.

This volume, a sequel to the author's "L'Aviazione fascista e la Conquista dell'Impero," describes the rôle of the air arm in the "police" work that followed the conquest of Ethiopia.

LAVORO ITALIANO NELL'IMPERO. BY DAVIDE FOSSA. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 571 p. L. 30.

What the Italians did to "civilize" and exploit Ethiopia, illustrated with abundant data and photographs.

TEN YEARS IN THE CONGO. BY W. E. DAVIS. New York: Reynal, 1940, 301 p. \$2.50.

A doctor's enlightening experiences in Belgium's colony.

The Far East

OUR FUTURE IN ASIA. BY ROBERT AURA SMITH. New York: Viking, 1940, 306 p. \$3.00.

This is one of the best books on American policy in the Far East to appear in recent years. Mr. Smith, a newspaperman who knows the Orient well, gives a comprehensive picture of the problems we face, particularly in Southeastern Asia where America's economic and strategic interests are shown to be anything but negligible. Though isolationists will not like his suggestions as to what active steps this country should take to protect its position in the Far East, they will find it very hard to refute them.

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, 1939. EDITED BY KATE MITCHELL AND W. L. HOLLAND. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 299 p. \$3.50.

The proceedings of the meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Virginia Beach late in 1939. The discussions covered a wide range of subjects.

I. P. R. INQUIRY SERIES. BY VARIOUS AUTHORS. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 9 v.

Further titles in this useful series, of which the first seven volumes were mentioned in the April 1940 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS: "Japan Since 1931," by Hugh Borton (149 p. \$1.25); "The Chinese Army," by Major Evans Fordyce Carlson (139 p. \$1.00); "Far Eastern Trade of the United States," by Ethel B. Dietrich (116 p. \$1.00); "Government in Japan," by Charles B. Fahs (114 p. \$1.00); "British Relations with China;

1931-1939," by Irving S. Friedman (255 p. \$2.00); "Canada and the Far East," by A. R. M. Lower (150 p. \$1.25); "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State," by E. Herbert Norman (254 p. \$2.00); "Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East," by Nathaniel Peffer (121 p. \$1.00); "The Struggle for North China," by George E. Taylor (247 p. \$2.00). **AUTHOR IN TRANSIT.** By LANCELOT HOGBEN. New York: Norton, 1940, 278 p. \$2.50.

A scientist's keen comments on a trip he took through Russia and Japan.

CHUNG-KUO CHAN-SHIH CHING-CHI TEH-CHI. EDITED BY YEH HSIAO-SHAN AND TUNG WEN-CHUNG. Shanghai: 1939, 329 p.

A comprehensive economic survey of China at war.

THE PEOPLE'S WAR. By I. EPSTEIN. London: Gollancz, 1939, 384 p. 7/6.

An eye-witness account of the early part of the war in China, by a journalist of pronounced Leftist persuasions.

CHANG KAI-SHEK. By SVEN HEDIN. New York: Day, 1940, 290 p. \$3.00.

A eulogy by the well-known Swedish explorer.

MIN-KUO CHENG-CHIH SHIH. By CH'EN TUAN-SHENG and Others. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939, 2 v. \$4.50.

A history of the political and legal organization of Chinese governments since 1910. **CHINA AND SOME PHASES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.** By L. TUNG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 210 p. \$2.25.

High-grade legal and historical scholarship, by a former secretary of the Central Political Council of the Chinese National Government.

CHUNG-KUO T'U-TI CH'ENG-TS'Ū. EDITED BY THE CHINESE LAND ADMINISTRATION SOCIETY. Chungking: Independent Press, 1939, 239 p. 70 cents.

A symposium of seventeen papers on the land policy of China.

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF JAPAN AND MANCHUKUO, 1930-1940. EDITED BY E. B. SCHUMPETER. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 944 p. \$7.50.

A voluminous study concerning the increasingly extensive and helpful rôle played by Manchukuo in the expansion of Japanese industry. The authors' picture of Japan's prosperity and economic invulnerability is probably too rosy, due to their excessive respect for not always reliable Japanese statistics.

BORBA ZA SOVETY V BURIAT-MONGOLII (1918-1920). Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 283 p. \$1.00.

Memoirs and documents concerning the struggle for Buriat-Mongolia during the period of the civil war and foreign intervention.

Latin America

DOLLARS IN LATIN AMERICA. By WILLY FEUERLEIN AND ELIZABETH HANNAN. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1941, 102 p. \$1.50.

This first of a new series of "Studies in American Foreign Relations" deals with the economic aspects of Latin American nationalism, and reviews the financial policy of the United States in Latin America in the light of the necessities of the economic defense of the Western Hemisphere.

PAN AMERICA. By CARLETON BEALS. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 545 p. \$3.00.

A discursive book on American foreign policy and the resources of the Western Hemisphere. It suffers from the obtrusion of Mr. Beals' prejudices. His hatred of imperialism, for instance, leads him into finding Great Britain no better than Germany — an example of the intellectual abdication prevalent today among so many so-called "liberals." Even the sections of his book devoted to economic questions are superficial and display considerable *parti pris*.

WHO'S WHO IN LATIN AMERICA. By PERCY A. MARTIN. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 558 p. \$5.50.

A new edition of an indispensable reference book enlarged by the addition of some 400 new biographical sketches.

NEUTRALIDAD. By ISIDRO FABELA. Mexico: Biblioteca de Estudios Internacionales, 1940, 325 p.

"An historical, juridical and political study, dealing with the League of Nations and the American continent before the war of 1939-40."

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1939. EDITED BY LEWIS HANKE AND MIRON BURGIN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 476 p. \$4.00.

The latest annual instalment of an invaluable bibliography.

THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS. EDITED BY CHARLES H. WESLEY. Washington: Howard University, 1940, 86 p. \$1.00.

Seven lectures, delivered at Howard University by as many authorities, concerning the status of the Negro in various parts of the Western Hemisphere.

MEXICO: A NEW SPAIN WITH OLD FRIENDS. By J. B. TREND. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 185 p. \$2.50.

Mexican culture and politics as seen by a British professor.

MÉXICO ÍNTEGRO. By MOISÉS SÁENZ. Lima: Torres Aguirre, 1939.

Essays on cultural and racial problems by a Mexican diplomat.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PANAMA ROUTE. By DWIGHT CARROLL MINER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 469 p. \$4.00.

An exhaustive history of the American acquisition of the Canal Zone.

PUERTO RICO: A GUIDE TO THE ISLAND OF BORIQUEÑ. New York: University Society, 450 p. \$2.75.

A new addition to the excellent W.P.A. guide series.

THE EUROPEAN POSSESSIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA. By RAYE R. PLATT AND OTHERS. New York: American Geographical Society, 1941, 112 p. \$1.00.

A compilation of facts concerning their population, physical geography, resources, industries, trade, government and strategic importance.

ROUNDOABOUT SOUTH AMERICA. By ANNE MERRIMAN PECK. New York: Harper, 1940, 359 p. \$3.00.

A travelogue skimming over the whole continent.

VENEZUELA. By HENRY J. ALLEN. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 289 p. \$3.50.

This enthusiastic description of the country and its people, by a former governor of Kansas, makes no attempt to get below the surface.

VENEZUELA REPUBLICANA. By AVELINO SÁNCHEZ. Caracas: Impresores Unidos, 1940, 193 p.

Essays on the government of President López Contreras.

A NOVA POLITICA DO BRASIL. By GETULIO VARGAS. Rio de Janeiro: Olympio, 1940, 7 v. Milreís 20.

The texts of speeches, interviews and reports made by the President of Brazil between January 2, 1930, and June 29, 1940.

SEVEN KEYS TO BRAZIL. By VERA KELSEY. New York: Funk, 1940, 314 p. \$3.00.

Well-organized information for student and traveller.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations*, *Perm. Court of Int. Justice*, *Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ALIENS

AN ACT to amend an Act entitled "An Act to punish the willful injury or destruction of war material, or of war premises or utilities used in connection with war material, and for other purposes," approved April 20, 1918. Approved, November 30, 1940. Washington, 1940. 2 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 886, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10465.)

AN ACT to require the registration of certain organizations carrying on activities within the United States, and for other purposes. Approved, October 17, 1940. Washington, 1940. 4 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 870, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10094.)

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QUESTIONS and answers on alien registration. (Revised edition.) Washington, U. S. Department of Justice, Immigration and naturalization service, Alien registration division, [1940]. 22 p. 21½ cm.

BRITISH EMPIRE

AN ECONOMIC survey of the Colonial Empire (1937). London, 1940. 674 p. 33 cm. (Colonial No. 179.) £1 5s.

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REPORT of the Royal commission on Dominion-Provincial relations. [Ottawa, King's Printer, 1940.] 3 v. 29½ cm. \$1.00.

Book I, Canada, 1867-1939; Book II, Recommendations; Book III, Documentation.

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
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
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
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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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PACIFISM AND DEMOCRACY

By Julien Benda

IN all countries there are democrats who maintain that a democratic state must, because it is democratic, refuse any kind of war — a war of defense just as much as a war of conquest. Their thesis is that a democracy must abstain from any international action which is liable to cause war. In short, it must be for peace at any price.

Those who take this position do not always say so frankly. They are embarrassed to admit that they refuse even a defensive war. They therefore claim that what is being presented to them as a defensive war is really an offensive war, planned by politicians or industrialists who expect to derive power or profits from having men kill one another. I once asked one of them whether he thought that the Greeks were right to have stood out against Xerxes rather than become his Helots. He did not reply. If he had stuck to his thesis he would have had to answer that they acted wrongly. Not long ago a citizen of a certain great democracy exclaimed: "This policy of our President means that we shall have war, and one out of every four of our sons will be killed." He should have been told that his own policy meant that all four of them risked becoming slaves. Maybe subconsciously he really preferred this prospect; but he probably would not have admitted it, even to himself.

Others are more outspoken. They endorse a slogan which a group of French Socialists adopted a few years ago: "Servitude rather than war!" Or one that we used to hear from certain French intellectuals: "In our eyes *nothing* justifies war."¹ In most cases this position is based simply on a desire to avoid fighting, camouflaged as well as possible under doctrinal reasons.

¹ Manifesto sponsored by Alain and signed by a group of students of the Ecole Normale Supérieure at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian war.

The desire is normal enough, and especially today when war has become the thing we know it to be and when the whole nation is involved in it. Sometimes, however, the position is based on sincere ideological convictions. Those who adopt it often are veterans of the last war.² It is the position of these perfectly sincere people which we shall consider here, particularly the ones who maintain that the theory of peace at any price is an integral part of the definition of democracy.

DEMOCRACY'S "HIGHEST GOOD"

The mistake of thinking that peace at any price has anything to do with democracy comes from a confusion of essential values. It is imagined that democracy's paramount concern is human life, whereas it is human liberty. Human life deprived of liberty is worthless. Therefore the democrat, in order to preserve the advantages of democracy for his children, admits and sanctifies the sacrifice of life.³ Over and over again in the course of history democracy has proved this to be its supreme law. If our pacifists were consistent, they would have to condemn the French revolutionaries who were willing to shed human blood to win their liberties, and the Americans who preferred war to remaining the servants of George III. As a matter of fact, some of them do. The question is how they can then pretend to be democrats.

They should meditate the words of George Washington, who was not a bad democrat. In his Farewell Address he weighed the advantages, in various circumstances, of neutrality, and did not hesitate to say that "we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." We shall be told in reply that war has become something very different from what it was in 1796. But the question of principle has not become different.

The mistake also arises from a confusion between the *fact* of war and the *love* of war. Democracy may accept the one and condemn the other. War may be imposed upon men who have no love for it whatsoever.⁴ The ideal of democracy is, certainly, to suppress the fact of war. But the effective way to attain this goal

² For example Alain, who was a volunteer in the World War.

³ Jean Giono declares distinctly that the supreme value, the only one, is human life. "There is no glory," he says, "in being French. There is only one glory: it is to be alive." ("Jean le Bleu," p. 303.) But Giono makes no pretense of being a democrat.

⁴ "What does one condemn in war?" says St. Augustine. "Is it the fact that it kills men who all must some day die? Faint-hearted men may blame war for this, but not religious men. What one condemns in war is the desire to harm, implacable hate, the fury of reprisals, the passion for domination."

is to hold in check the people who worship war. This entails accepting the fact of war, under the democratic slogan "War on war."

SAVING PEACE AND ESTABLISHING PEACE

There is a distinction, though it is scarcely ever made, between *saving* peace and *establishing* peace. To save peace is to ward off war in some particular moment of great excitement. There is no leading motive, no general idea. To establish peace is to act deliberately to prevent war in accordance with a thought-out plan, in a time when no particular fear of war exists because those who might wish to disturb the peace have been temporarily deprived of the power to do so. At Munich in 1938 the British and French ministers saved peace. We all know that they did not establish it. At Versailles, the victors of 1918 were in a position to establish peace, maybe because four years earlier they had been willing not to save it.

Two profoundly distinct conceptions of peace are here involved. According to one, peace is based on respect for contracts between nations and on sanctions against violators. This is the *legal* conception. The other, the *sentimental* conception, expects love between men to bring about peace, all idea of contracts or sanctions aside. The first conception puts justice before peace, or at least states that it is respect for justice which must bring peace. This is displeasing to the sentimentalists who, naturally, place love above justice. At the time of the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Archbishop of Canterbury startled some persons by declaring that he, a churchman, favored the use of sanctions against the aggressor. When told that sanctions were liable to cause war, he answered: "My ideal is not peace, but justice." He was only repeating the words of his divine Master: "I came not to send peace, but a sword" — *i.e.*, to make war against evil.

A few examples of the purely sentimental conception of peace might help my readers to measure its intellectual worth.

A famous author, I read recently, was visiting in the Engadine. As he stood looking at the landscape he uttered some words which were much admired by the newspaperman who reported them. "Facing so much beauty," he said, "how is it possible not to think that men ought to love and not hate one another!" Laments of this sort seem to me quite childish. Men should be loved when they deserve to be loved, when they show justice

and loyalty and respect for the rights of others. I am under no compulsion to love them when they violate elementary rules of moral conduct. Instead, I have to protect myself from them — even if, later on, I try to change them. Landscapes have nothing to do with it.

Recalling pleasant memories of his youth, my compatriot Jean Guéhenno writes: "We were twenty years old. It was a serene July and the sun shone over Europe. . . . Our thoughts, like the earth, were ripening. . . . And then, all of a sudden, there was war, because an Austrian Archduke, whose name no one remembers any more, had been killed at Sarajevo." What does all this signify? It may also have been a beautiful morning at Marathon, at Valmy, at Saratoga. Would that have been a reason to give in to Xerxes, to Brunswick, to Burgoyne?

Again, many of my readers probably saw a film depicting the wife of a German peasant who had been killed in the war giving a kind welcome to an escaped French prisoner. She lets him stay in her house several weeks and watches him depart with regret. The film's name, "Grande Illusion," obviously was chosen to show the error of believing that war between nations implies hatred between peoples. But this question is not related to the question whether or not France in 1914 was right to resist the German invasion.

The really significant thing, however, is that many of my readers will be disgusted that, confronted with such touching pictures, I persist in continuing to use my powers of reason.

NOT DEMOCRATS, BUT ANARCHISTS

One of the ways the absolute pacifists have of arguing is to challenge their opponents: "You call yourself a democracy, that is, a government of the people by the people, and yet you send me to war without consulting me, in spite of myself." Thus we find a character in Roger Martin du Gard's book "The Thibaults" declaring that if the French people had been consulted in 1914 eighty percent of them would have rejected war. This statement rests upon the hope — apparently justified, I must admit — that most men, even in most democracies, still have so little political education that, if consulted individually, they will refuse to make the sacrifices necessary for the preservation of the whole. Now it is arguable that no true democracy as yet exists — in the sense of being completely a government of the people

and by the people. But is not the reason precisely because men find such difficulty in forgetting their individual conveniences in favor of the collective good? If they were consulted separately, how many citizens would offer spontaneously to pay taxes? Yet even "absolute democrats" probably admit that taxes are indispensable for the State.

"Absolute democrats" also contend not only that there should be a referendum on war, but that only those who voted "yes" should then have to go to war. This is a denial of national solidarity. Yet such people certainly accept some of the advantages of national solidarity. If they are civil servants, for example, they want to be paid salaries which some (perhaps many) of their fellow-citizens might, if they were consulted, refuse to grant. If they are interested in art, they might find that many tax-payers, consulted in the same way, would veto appropriations to maintain the museums. The fact is that these intellectuals would be more truthful — or, let us say, more enlightened about their own natures — if instead of pretending to be pure democrats they called themselves pure individualists or pure anarchists.⁵

Another sophistry often is uttered in the name of democracy. It consists in rejecting even a defensive war on the ground that it will require the surrender of full powers to the governing body, and that this surrender will spell "the end of democracy." They forget that among the basic democratic principles it is formally inscribed that in exceptional circumstances a nation may grant full powers to the governing body. During its famous meeting of September 9, 1793, the Convention declared that it accepted the idea of dictatorship for times of crisis. This doctrine meant, of course, that popular control would be suspended only temporarily and that it would be restored as soon as the emergency had passed. "Revolutionary France," says the historian Mathiez, "would never have accepted the dictatorship of the Convention if she had not been convinced that victory was impossible without the suspension of her liberty."

Two occurrences in French history show democracy accepting dictatorial powers because it is necessary, and discarding them as soon as the necessity is past — the rise and fall of Robespierre,

⁵ The American States, though always jealous of their autonomy, conferred upon the Federal Government, as early as 1787, the exclusive power to declare war and the right to promulgate the laws necessary for the "common defense."

and the rise and fall of Clemenceau. The fall of each occurred when victory was at hand and the danger which the dictatorship had been created to repel seemed safely over. I say "seemed" because France was far from being out of danger on November 11, 1918, and it would have been better for the country if the war government had continued for a while longer.

FORCE, BUT FOR JUSTICE

There is still another side to the argument of the "absolute democrats." They say that when democracy resorts to force it denies its essential character and becomes similar to the very systems which it affects to despise. This is a formalist argument. It forgets that one can inquire on whose behalf force is to be used. To use force on behalf of justice is not the same thing as to use it for aggression. This being so, the democratic system which uses force for justice cannot be assimilated to opposite systems which use force for aggression.

There also seems to be a widespread conception that democracy is a sort of celestial body, aloof and, by definition, scornful of mundane necessities of self-defense. This idea, like the total condemnation of force regardless of the purpose for which it is used, plays straight into the hands of those who wish to use force for aggression. It thus becomes itself an agent of immorality.

At the bottom of these erroneous conceptions of democracy we discern what some would call a Christian idea, namely that it is the fit and necessary lot of the righteous to be weak and to suffer. If the righteous ever becomes strong enough to demand justice, apparently he ceases, for this school of thought, to be righteous. If Socrates had resisted his executioners, for example, he would no longer symbolize righteousness. Carry the argument one step further, and it will be the executioners who, having become the victims, incarnate righteousness. This obviously was the sort of feeling which obsessed many persons in 1918, when a violent nation had at last been compelled to cease from violence and listen to reason.

In such matters, democratic doctrine, like the doctrine of one great school of Catholic thought,⁶ considers that the righteous are entitled to "the right of the sword" when they use it in a just cause and without regard for personal profit. Democracy

⁶ The so-called scholastic doctrine of war, enunciated by Thomas Aquinas. See my "Trahison des Clercs" (edition in English, entitled "The Treason of the Intellectuals," p 130).

merely remains true to its dogma when it reminds absolute pacifists that there are angels who go armed; and that because Lohengrin draws his sword and strikes the felon down, he is not thereby any the less Lohengrin and has not become Attila.

Pascal said: "Justice without force is powerless." I should like to add: "It is essential for democracy that justice shall have power so long as there are men determined to ignore it." Contrary to those who pretend that, by very reason of its democratic principle, the democratic State must be deprived of arms, I contend that by very reason of its democratic principle it must be better armed than any other State, in order that it may be respected by States which might otherwise be tempted to ignore justice and strike across its borders.

HOW ABSOLUTE PACIFISM EVADES THE ISSUE

To be consistent, non-resisters must accept the prospect that their country may be annihilated. André Gide wonders: "What would have happened in 1914 if France had offered no resistance to Germany?" Everyone knows what would have happened. When he says that France would have been invincible if she had used only spiritual force against Germany, instead of opposing force to force, he forgets to inform his fellow-citizens that there is nothing incompatible between the "invincibility" which he speaks of and the erasure of their country from the map.⁷

Others go even further and find that non-resistance to evil is a practical doctrine, the only one which will bring peace to the world. Tolstoi in his "Intimate Diary" says that when a wall stands up to blows it causes the aggression to continue, whereas if it gives in it "absorbs the movement" and causes it to stop. By analogy, war would be suppressed if people never resisted any group which was greedy to expand at their expense. Tolstoi omits, however, to tell us that in "absorbing the movement" the wall ceases to exist, that is to say, loses its life, which, oddly enough, it might wish to keep.

NON-INTERVENTION

It is absolutely contrary to the democratic ideal to watch from a distance, without interfering, while a strong nation crushes a

⁷ "Journal," p. 1320-1321. The author adds that though Germany "could swallow France, she could not have digested her." There are no grounds for this assertion. Moreover, it is a most cruel experience merely to be swallowed.

weaker one and deprives it of its liberty. Non-intervention may be forced upon democracies because they happen not to be strong enough to give material help to the nation which is being abused and oppressed. But if they are true to themselves, they must deplore their weakness and inertia. To some extent they must feel disgraced, as a European minister felt disgraced when, in answer to a call for help from a small country whose independence was being threatened, he replied: "*Flere possumus, juvare non.*" To set up non-intervention as a principle, to feel almost proud of it, is to undermine democratic morality. Selfishness may be a necessity. It cannot be a democratic dogma.

A democracy which rejects the idea of intervention usually declares that it has adopted this attitude in order to "save peace." The truth is that its passiveness encourages the aggressor. He not only attacks the state which has appealed in vain for help, but some day he will perpetrate an act which even the laggard democracy cannot condone and which therefore causes war a second time. Thus the war of 1914 was brought on by the inertia of the democratic governments which did not care to interfere with Austria in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. A statesman of one of the Central Empires told us in 1920: "It is you who were responsible for the war. You yielded to us for so many years that you led us to think that we could do anything with impunity." It is unnecessary to cite more recent examples.

It is not by accident that those who disturb the peace of the world are almost always the heads of autocratic states. A man who mocks ordinary standards of justice at home sees no reason to act differently abroad. For that reason democracy should be prepared to intervene within a foreign state when its head flagrantly violates the rights of his people. This is what Mr. Herbert Morrison, a member of the British Parliament, meant when he said on November 27, 1939: "We must cling to an ideal of government, whatever its actual form, as something which exists to serve peoples and not to dominate them; and we must remember that this is no mere internal question, since the governments which dominate at home are often the peace-breakers abroad." In the past few years the democracies have usually refrained from this kind of intervention. But their course has not been determined, as some would like to have us believe, out of regard for democratic principle, but simply because democracy has come to worship peace and quiet. So far as I know, there is no

principle inscribed in its statutes providing for, or excusing, that form of worship.

OF "DEMOCRATIC ANTI-MILITARISM"


Another aspect of the pacifist democracy which we are here discussing is that democrats often display a sort of systematic hostility to their country's military institutions. They haggle over the number of men there ought to be in the army, the number of years they should serve, how much money should be voted to cover their expenses. They claim that this "anti-militaristic" attitude suits the real spirit of democracy.

In a true democracy the military element should be subordinate to the civilian. Once this principle has been established, we need merely see to it that the military machine is powerful enough to perform its tasks and so to enable the democratic State to survive. One looks in vain through the great declarations of democratic principle, in any time or country, for a single text advocating a weak army. There are plenty of statements about the ideal future world in which this kind of institution will no longer be required. But there is no statement that makes weakness a virtue.⁸ Once again we find that an idea which never had any connection with democracy has been added to its concept and has falsified it.

We saw in France, a few years ago, what harm the doctrine of peace at any price can do to democracy. Its devotees maintained that the best defense against a neighbor's greed was disarmament. They even went so far as to advocate a general strike in case war came. Recently in several countries the enemies of democracy exploited the doctrine of peace at any price in order to prevent a war which, though necessary for the salvation of the State, menaced the interests of their particular class. In France men of this sort who for years had berated the working class for their pacifism, suddenly found that same pacifism beautiful and called on labor to oppose the war which lay ahead.

Pacifism, in the sense I have described it here, is a parasite on democracy. It has nothing to do with democratic doctrine. Democracy must repudiate it.

⁸ In his "Histoire de Belgique" the great historian, Henri Pirenne, shows how systematic anti-militarism made it impossible for Belgium to avoid war in 1914.



PLANNING FOR VICTORY

By George Fielding Eliot

THE past year has given ample evidence of the grim truth that in the making of total war the totalitarian state enjoys considerable initial advantages over a democratic adversary. These advantages in preparation and initiative have always lain with absolute rulers. The free nation has found compensation in its greater staying power, its ability to retrieve disaster, and its higher morale under defeat. So true has this been, that since the invention of firearms (which made the common foot-soldier superior to the armored knight) there has not been, until last year, any instance of a strong and well-established republic being conquered and enslaved by an absolutist power; while there have been many instances of peoples determined to be free wrenching their freedom by force from tyrants, even well-intrenched ones, or maintaining it against absolutist assault.

Until last year. The date is significant. For just as firearms helped make possible the emancipation of burgher and peasant from feudal slavery, so now it is a question whether the mechanization of warfare — and particularly the development of those weapons of which the internal combustion engine is the heart — has not produced another revolutionary change affecting not only the conduct of war but its political consequences. Has the speed, range and power of the offensive become so great that initial disaster may be made irretrievable? Has the disparity in armament between the victor who has his force intact and the vanquished who has lost his equipment (and may temporarily be deprived of the means of making more) become so great that no amount of higher morale can be relied on gradually to compensate for such disadvantages? It seems quite possible that these things are true. In other words, the tempo of war, like other human activities, may have been so accelerated by the Machine Age as to require a complete recasting of our theories of national defense, of security, of the maintenance of peace and, in general, of the conduct of international relations.

The character of total war carries it outside the purely military field. Totalitarian attack is not only a matter of coördinated assault, at the assailant's selected moment and after full preparation, with forces precisely adapted to the end to be accomplished.

It is also a matter of political attack from within the ranks of the enemy, of psychological attack on his morale, and of economic attack both from within and without. Indeed, it is by the co-ordination of all these methods, and the coördination, within each category, of every means available without stint and without scruple, that totalitarian war seeks to achieve success.

In principle, there is nothing new in all this. The three great immutable principles of war still stand, indeed are once more proven sound by this seemingly new experience. These principles are: Concentration, Offensive Action, Security. The first demands concentration of power, of means, of effort. The second demands striking at a selected objective with the concentrated force. The third demands that in the meantime no vital interest of the attacker is to be exposed to enemy counter-action. These principles the Germans know, and apply.

They cannot be defeated except by those who in their turn can apply these principles to their own efforts. Simple, static defense is not enough. It serves only to gain time — that is, either to stave off defeat temporarily, or to permit the gathering of force for a counter-offensive. The latter must come, or defeat is certain. If we have not learned that lesson from the centuries of warfare that have gone before, let us at least learn it from the fate of France.

When we seek to apply the above to the conditions immediately facing this nation we must realize that to await the moment selected by the Germans is to court defeat; but we must likewise realize that for us to take the offensive we must prepare offensive means and possess bases from which those means may be employed. This does not necessarily mean a vast A. E. F. for Europe, now or later. The Germans have shown us other ways. It means that we must be prepared to take the offensive not only with armed force, naval and aerial, but in the political, psychological and economic fields. It means that we must seek out the methods of attack suited to our national genius and our available resources. Of these methods, land fighting on a great scale obviously is not at present possible and may never be required. A Germany defeated on all the other fronts — on every one of which we and our associates can establish an unquestionable and decisive superiority — will hardly require to be defeated on land, where her power is greatest now. The foundations of her land power will crumble away; the energies which give her armies life can be

destroyed at their fountainhead. The Germans have given much thought to military security. They have rightly anticipated that they would not be attacked in other fields (save economically by blockade) very soon. But they are not as secure against these other forms of counter-attack as they may be against a direct invasion of the continent they have enslaved.

II

Above, very briefly set forth, are certain of the ingredients of victory. It is a victory which must be won if freedom is not to perish from the earth. In its winning, America must take the leading part. It is her duty — it is her right. But in order for her to make her full contribution on all the battlefields to which her energies may be called, America is badly in need of leadership, planning and direction. In all these qualities totalitarian Germany has so far been surpassingly efficient. In all of them, then, free men must meet and overmatch her. And they must do it without the sacrifice of the essential freedoms. It can be done.

Yet the record makes clear that no free people will rise to really efficient action unless the danger is overwhelmingly close — when it may be too late — or unless it is roused by a dynamic and realistic leadership. Evidently a free people is not in a position to make full use of its resources, however great, for the coördinated purposes of total war unless there has been careful planning. Evidently a free people cannot conduct total war in all its phases without competent direction, inspired by trustworthy leadership and proceeding according to well-conceived plans. Lacking these, it will be defeated, maybe irretrievably. The task facing the American people is therefore not only to take appropriate action to preserve their way of life, but to create the necessary organs of leadership, planning and direction to make certain that their action is sufficient, timely and in the end victorious.

At present we have no such organs, or possess them only in rudimentary and uncoördinated form. This is not for lack of warning. The subject of planning for defense is not, for example, new to these pages. In this review, and elsewhere, experts like Hanson Baldwin and Lindsay Rogers have again and again pointed out the defects in our peacetime organization and planning machinery.¹

¹ Cf. Lindsay Rogers, "Civilian Control of Military Policy," January 1940, and "National Defense: Plan or Patchwork?" October 1940; and Hanson W. Baldwin, "America Rearms," April 1938, "Our New Long Shadow," April 1939, and "The New American Army," October 1940.

The present writer has contributed to these warnings from time to time. The discussion may now be narrowed to the immediate requirements of the moment, however, rather than directed to the developement of permanent arrangements.

For the moment, time is the principal factor in all that we do and plan to do. We ought, therefore, to try to create an efficient organization as quickly as possible, and one which can give us the quickest possible results. This suggests that wherever possible we should seek to develop and improve upon the elementary facilities which we already possess rather than to create a whole new fabric from the ground up. Moreover, we are restricted by the absolute necessity of making our war machinery fit within the framework of our existing constitutional structure.

We begin, then, with the broad powers of the President both as chief executive of the Republic and as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Such additional powers as he may need may be the subject of legislation. Indeed, they have largely been embodied in the draft legislation appended to the Industrial Mobilization Plan and intended to implement it. It is to the President, initially, by virtue of his powers and his responsibilities, that we must look for leadership. But no single man, however wise and gifted, can exercise those powers and discharge those responsibilities without properly organized assistance, advice and information. The same problem on a smaller scale arises in the case of the commander of an army. Where formerly — as in the Civil War — it was considered sufficient to provide such a commander with a few aides (personal staff), plus an administrative staff (adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, and so forth, each member being responsible for a certain phase of administration), the modern requirements and complexities introduced by the increase in the number and type of weapons and the increased speed of movement has necessitated the creation of a general staff, as distinct from the old administrative staff. The function of the general staff is planning, coördination, control — or, more concretely, to provide the commander with the information and estimates necessary to a decision, and then to see to it that the decision is properly executed by all subordinates concerned.

The President now possesses a personal staff (his secretaries and executive assistants) and an administrative staff (his Cabinet). He does not have a general staff, and he needs one badly. But to create one out of whole cloth, composed entirely of people

who have not previously been dealing with matters of high policy, might be to impose fatal delays while the new men became acquainted with their duties and with all that had been planned, done and proposed before they took over. There is not time for that. Moreover, let us for a moment consider the nature of staffs, or committees (the civilian term for such advisory and executive groups).

It is necessary for members of such bodies, charged with high responsibility, to have relief from the pressure of the infinite details connected with administrative posts. One reason for creating a general staff for the President is to relieve him of such pressure. This will hardly be accomplished by giving him a staff composed of men likewise harried and shackled. The members of such a staff must have time to think, to plan, to foresee and forestall; to examine the record of experience; and, guided by the light of the past, to project their minds into the future. They ought to be as free as possible to devote themselves to broad aspects of policy, leaving detail to competent subordinates under the guidance of general directives laid down by the President. The main task of the staff is to assist him in formulating these directives.

In the last war, no really satisfactory organization for the British cabinet was discovered until Mr. Lloyd George set up his "War Cabinet," in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer alone was the head of an Executive Department, the other four members being "without portfolio."

But there is another side to this conception of a War Cabinet or Presidential General Staff, and that is the very grave dangers which lie in divorcing the planning of policy from responsibility for its execution. In war planning especially, the work of planning must go hand in hand with the actual conduct of operations, for every day unforeseen developments will alter in some degree the plans of yesterday. A staff charged with advising the nation's Commander-in-Chief on plans, on the procurement of resources to meet the needs of those plans, and on the translation of plans into operations, must include some of those responsible for carrying out the plans — just as the board of directors of a corporation customarily includes several of the principal executive officers. In the British War Cabinet, above referred to, the members "without portfolio," though not heads of departments, were each charged with general oversight of, or at least a particular and understood relation to, a definite phase of the activities of the

British Government — one with military operations, another with supply and procurement, and so on. Moreover, it was the invariable custom to have present at meetings of the War Cabinet the actual heads of departments whose work was under discussion, as well as the chiefs of the fighting services when appropriate.

What is needed, then, is a directing and planning body in the realm of the higher decisions, the members of which will be sufficiently relieved from details to enable them to give most if not all their time to the great tasks of planning and deciding, and at the same time will be sufficiently in touch with what is going on to bring to that work sufficient day-to-day knowledge of the course of events to enable them properly to weigh risks against advantages; moreover, who will have a responsibility, joint and several, for the execution of the decisions reached, sobering in its effect and essential to efficient progress. Probably only a certain amount of experimentation will enable final adjustment between the necessary time to think, on the one hand, and the necessary flow of authority on the other.

Time to think is essential, it cannot be dispensed with. And yet, as Sir Arthur Salter remarks in his "Allied Shipping Control": "Nothing is so ineffective as a committee which consists of persons each of whom has no specialized function and no personal executive authority, and yet tries to direct executive action. But if a number of persons, each of whom has a direct executive authority which he continues to exercise in his own special sphere, meet from time to time in order to dovetail their several measures and adjust them to a common plan, and then return to their departments to put into effect what they have agreed, the committee is an effective instrument of coöperative action." It should, however, be borne in mind that in a War Cabinet or staff such as we are considering, the planning and advisory function is paramount: that is, the joint activity of the whole is of greater importance than the several activities of the members.

In the light of these considerations, let us now see how we may approach the immediate problems at hand, especially how we can adapt to their solution our existing American institutions with as little lost time and waste motion as possible.

III

It is quite plain that the Presidential General Staff — perhaps we had better call it the War Cabinet, and have done — should

include some members of the existing Cabinet. Those who would almost always have to be present would be the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy and the Treasury. To these four we might add certain new members to be given Cabinet status "without portfolio," but charged each with a special relation to certain essential activities — one for production and procurement, let us say, one for morale, propaganda and civilian defense, and one for economic warfare. This would give a total of seven members, which is about as large a body as can work satisfactorily together. The three members "without portfolio" should of course be citizens of outstanding character, ability and public standing, chosen with a view not only to the efficient discharge of their functions but also with a view to commanding popular confidence. Care should be taken that their supervision of their several specialties should be of a general nature, avoiding the mass of administrative detail which should be the province of the proper executive officers, the heads of the agencies charged with carrying out the policies agreed upon.

As for the four Secretaries, much could be done in the way of reorganizing their departments so that all ordinary routine matters could be handled by the Under-Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, leaving only the major decisions to be made by the departmental heads. The work of the War Cabinet should be considered the major task of its members, and every endeavor should be made to free them from red tape and detail, while still maintaining the close touch with general departmental activities which is necessary both for effective departmental control and for the essential connection between the executive departments and the War Cabinet.

On the whole, this plan, while admittedly a compromise all round, is at least a promising beginning. Only in actual practice can the many hitches and complications that are certain to develop be eliminated. At least the President would be provided with an advisory and planning staff, directly associated with the execution of policy.

But in order for the War Cabinet to perform its functions its work must be carefully and thoroughly organized. It cannot simply function in the loose fashion of a weekly Cabinet meeting, sometimes held and sometimes not. It should meet daily, at an appointed and regular hour, to consider the vitally important subjects of its agenda. These meetings should normally be under

the chairmanship of the President; but the President's occasional inability (because of the terrible demands on his time) to meet with the War Cabinet should not prevent any of the daily meetings taking place. The Vice President should be the Vice-Chairman of the War Cabinet, and preside over it in the President's absence. This will also serve the purpose of keeping the Vice President thoroughly in touch with current policies and plans, a matter upon which the safety of the nation might rest in case of the death or disability of the President.

The War Cabinet's meetings ought not, of course, to be confined to its members. No doubt meetings so confined would be necessary; but the ordinary meeting should be attended by others whose work is involved in the particular decisions to be taken. Among those frequently to be present would be the remaining members of the Cabinet, as occasion might render necessary; the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), the Chief of Naval Operations; the Director of the Office of Production Management; the Director of Civil Defense; the heads of executive agencies having to do with shipping, economic warfare, morale, propaganda and counter-propaganda, raw materials, and perhaps some others. Care should however be taken to keep attendance to the minimum necessary to the discharge of the day's business, as nothing is more wasteful of time and effort than an excess of numbers participating in discussion.

To see to this, as well as to other problems of routine and work-organization, should be the care of a permanent Secretariat to the War Cabinet. Great care should be taken in the selection of the officer to head this Secretariat, and in its organization. It should be the servant of the War Cabinet and of the President; it should never be permitted to develop into an executive organism itself. Its duties should be to keep up to date, by daily additions, deletions and changes, a Central Estimate of the Situation; to maintain liaison between the War Cabinet, the various sub-committees thereof, the executive departments and agencies, and the Congress; to prepare the agenda of each day's work, under the direction of the War Cabinet; to prepare digested reports and memoranda for use in connection with the work of each day; to prepare and circulate orders and decisions of the President, giving effect to the work of the War Cabinet; and to prepare such reports and memoranda for the use of the President, the War Cabinet, and Congressional organisms as might be required. The Secretariat

should not of itself have authority to issue directions to executive departments; but it should have direct access to them, and the right to obtain information and assistance from them in the pursuance of its proper duties.

Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon these two matters — the daily meetings, and the permanent Secretariat. They will give the War Cabinet the definite and established character necessary for it to discharge its grave responsibilities successfully.

The War Cabinet in no sense detracts from the President's responsibility or authority. Indeed, it adds to his powers by relieving him of detail, by presenting him with considered and informed advice, and by giving the public the assurance that sound methods are being taken to reach momentous decisions. The guiding principle should be that the War Cabinet advises, the President decides, the executive departments carry out the decisions.

The matter of how the War Cabinet is to secure professional advice in the realm of strategy, as well as in that of production and procurement, and in other fields, demands attention. This was a source of difficulty to the British War Cabinet in the last war. The failure at the Dardanelles, for example, is ascribed in part to the view taken by the professional advisers, naval and military, that once they had expressed their dissent to their civilian superiors and had been overruled, they were bound in loyalty to remain silent when the matter came up for discussion in their presence by the War Cabinet. In the light of this experience, the British principle now lays down that the military advisers of the War Cabinet (or of the Committee of Imperial Defense in time of peace) have the *duty* to make their views known and the *right* to have them recorded. It is hard to see how this principle can be improved upon. The British practice is that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the First Sea Lord (Chief of the Naval Staff) form what is called the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee of the War Cabinet, and are responsible jointly and severally for giving military advice to the War Cabinet. They are, as one British writer puts it, a sort of "super-chief of staff in commission."

In this country the President has taken a step in the right direction by placing the Joint Board of the Army and Navy under his personal direction. It might be suggested, however, that the Joint Board at present is too large and that it should be reconstituted, to consist only of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy

Chief of Staff (Air) and the Chief of Naval Operations. These officers should be invested, while retaining their individual responsibilities, with an additional *joint* responsibility for the giving of military advice to the President and the War Cabinet. It should be a matter of course for them to attend all meetings of the War Cabinet at which military decisions are to be taken. To assist them in carrying out their joint responsibility, and especially for the purpose of producing, under the direction of the Joint Board, coördinated memoranda and reports, there should be a small group of specially selected officers of both services.

This special staff should be quite distinct from the Joint Planning Committee, which should serve directly under the Joint Board and should consist of the Chiefs of the War Plans Divisions of the two services, with such assistants as might be necessary, and probably including a representative of the agency concerned with economic warfare and one of the Office of Production Management. To furnish the information required by the Joint Planning Committee, there should be a Joint Intelligence Committee, consisting of the Intelligence Chiefs of the two services, plus representatives from the State and Justice Departments and the economic warfare agency, also with the necessary assistants. In the matter of procurement and production, the relationship of the Director of the Office of Production Management to the War Cabinet should be much the same as that of the Chiefs of the fighting services.

It seems likely that experience will show the advisability of having much of the "spade work" of the War Cabinet done by sub-committees of one sort and another — groups working together (according to the principle laid down by Sir Arthur Salter, quoted above), composed of people actually dealing with, or having special knowledge of, the particular subjects involved. Whether, as the British found advisable in some cases, members of the War Cabinet should sit as Chairmen of some of the more important of these sub-committees, is a matter for experience to determine. The members of the War Cabinet ought to be protected as far as possible from demands on their time which do not help them directly to carry out their fundamental duties.

The basic advantage of a War Cabinet so constituted is that it would afford the means of coördinating the work of the various executive departments and agencies and of the various joint committees which now seek to effect some degree of coördination. It

provides for a flow of information upward, and of decision and authority downward. It assures the continuity and consistency of policy. It avoids waste motion and makes real team-work possible. It gives point and direction to the efforts of the Government in such manner that the resulting "indoctrination" is felt by all concerned. This translates itself into public confidence in the efficiency of the Government and its agencies. It prevents conditions such as described recently to this writer by a high official, who said: "There is no national policy. There are departmental policies, conceived within each executive department according to its lights. The trouble is, they are all different."

IV

In the field of leadership, the War Cabinet system provides the President with information and advice, relieves him of detail, and keeps before him a running estimate of the situation, military, economic, political and psychological. He has more time to think, to consider the broad general lines of policy. He has more information on which to base sound decisions. The quality of his leadership cannot fail to be enhanced.

In the field of planning, the War Cabinet system provides machinery for coördinated planning. It brings together the labors of the executive departments and the many sub-committees studying special subjects, introducing into its discussions the clear expositions and analyses from which simple and direct plans can be prepared. It reduces to a minimum the useless dispersion of effort. It avoids waste of the nation's resources in unproductive labors where they are most ruinous, at the top. It insures that first things shall come first.

In the field of direction, the War Cabinet system provides means by which the plans agreed upon, and which have received the approval of the President, may be carried into execution under the supervision of those who have had a share in their making. In this connection, a suggestion made by Lieutenant Colonel Garsia in his admirable book, "A Key to Victory," seems worth-while — that under the War Cabinet there should be a sub-committee for each theater of operations, or each special enterprise. This sub-committee should include a representative of the officer in command, or the person charged with carrying on the enterprise. This sub-committee would have the task of keeping up a daily study of what is being accomplished in its particu-

lar sphere of attention; of what resources are needed, and will be needed later, for further accomplishment; and to act in some part as an advocate of its campaign or task before the President and War Cabinet, who must weigh these needs and apportion the available resources according to the requirements of the moment. When there are conflicting claims to be settled, *ex parte* decisions ought not to be taken, but the claims of those whose requirements are in conflict should be heard by the President and the War Cabinet, each in the presence of the others.

Such a system of planning and direction involves the "grading" of the various subsidiary plans that will be brought forward; the selection of those plans and methods which seem best suited to accomplishment of the chosen objectives; and the daily prosecution of the war or the accomplishment of the national ends with resources best adapted to the purpose. It serves also to keep the objectives themselves, and the methods chosen to attain them, within the limits imposed by the available means. It puts new ideas to the test of careful and impartial scrutiny, while tending to guard against the rejection of ideas for no other fault than novelty. It tends to eliminate, within the limits of human foresight, the waste and danger that attend hasty changes of plan and improvisations in the face of surprise moves by the enemy.

Two other points with which this article cannot deal directly should be given attention. One is the relation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government in the conduct of war. At present no less than eight Congressional committees and sub-committees are concerned with national defense: the Military and Naval Affairs Committees of each House, and the sub-committees on Military and Naval Affairs, respectively, of the Appropriations Committees of each House. In addition, the Foreign Relations Committees and probably the Commerce Committees of each House are closely involved in discussions of war policies. There is obvious need for a single Committee of each House on National Defense, to consider not details, but matters affecting the national defense as a whole. It should not take the place of the existing committees, but there should be an arrangement for interlocking memberships in order to save time and eliminate duplication of effort. Finally, there should be set up a system of liaison officers, through whom the War Cabinet and the Executive Departments would maintain close touch with the Congressional Committees.

The other point requiring consideration is the matter of how best to coöperate with Britain, the British Dominions, the Latin American Republics and other possible allies or associates — the Netherlands and China, for example. The conduct of war by a coalition is a subject which has received little attention and study. Yet in these days, when time is of such vital importance and when the enemy is in a position to take single-handed decisions, a means clearly must be found of offsetting this advantage by equally efficient methods. The War Cabinet plan offers possibilities for arranging a close collaboration with our associates which would be difficult if not impossible to achieve under our present loosely articulated system. This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of this subject, but its importance can hardly be overemphasized.

Fortunately, certain steps have already been taken in the direction of establishing more efficient machinery for our leadership, planning and direction in war. The President has taken the most important of these steps in setting up the authority for executing the provisions of the Lease-Lend Bill. This authority consists of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy and the Treasury, and Mr. Harry L. Hopkins. Mr. Hopkins thus represents the Cabinet members "without portfolio" suggested above. He has begun to assemble a group of advisers and liaison officers which could easily become the nucleus of a suitable Secretariat, just as the Lease-Lend Authority itself could easily pass from its present character into that of a true War Cabinet. The ground-work, at least, has been laid.

It is not beyond the genius of the American people to create instruments of government and command which are capable of dealing with anything that totalitarian efficiency can produce. Today the vital need is that all concerned — which means every citizen — should realize the imperative necessity of wasting no time. If we are to defend our way of life we must have not only weapons, but the right weapons; we must have not only armed forces, but armed forces of the size and character the situation demands; we must not only act, but our actions must be timely and effective. We must, in short, provide not only the material ingredients of victory, but the leadership, planning and direction without which victory cannot be achieved. We can do this if we will. There is still time. But the sands are running out.

LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE IN WARTIME

By Lindsay Rogers

THE more popular a government the greater the disadvantages it faces in preparing for and waging war. Government action must wait on the development of a substantial measure of supporting consent. And the support must come not only from public opinion but from the legislative representatives of that opinion. Effective preparations are hampered and military effort is checked if, instead of joining forces in the face of a common enemy, the executive and the legislature waste their strength in jurisdictional quarrels. An emergency, however, is no time to dispense with or even unduly to subordinate a legislature. It may have to change its activities, but it can play a high, albeit a different, rôle in making a militant representative government more vigorous and effective.

Representative governments have now well-nigh vanished from the continent of Europe. Herr Hitler's Gauleiters have taken their places. Only in Great Britain and the British Dominions, in the United States and in the continent to the south of us, are there governments which are still representative. Only these states, therefore, face problems which involve the relationship of executive and legislature, whether in peace or in war. When, in wartime, these problems are solved, representative governments which at the start have faced disadvantages of disunion and delay develop a resiliency and superiority of spirit which can carry them to victory. That was abundantly demonstrated from 1914 to 1918. And since September 1939 all observers of the House of Commons agree that it has played a not inconsiderable rôle in making Britain's effort as effective and as magnificent as it has become. On the other hand, the failure of the French executive and parliament to subordinate personal and factional quarrels and to give to the country the vigorous leadership it needed was one of the reasons for the French collapse.

In the United States, as I write, relations between the President and Congress are unsatisfactory but they are not yet ominous. So long as the war is a white war — that is, one of threats and propaganda, of economic reprisals and sabotage — the emergency does not seem pressing enough to make a chief executive display

his best qualities of leadership, to impose on the legislature adequate feelings of responsibility, and, the coördinate branches of the government having reached virtual agreement on essentials, to unify public opinion and energize administrative action.

In ordinary times, when "normalcy" reigns and government can approach — but not very near to — the simple thing that President Harding declared it to be, relations between the executive and the legislature almost always give rise to complaint. If a president tries to lead, he is charged with seeking to be a dictator and with expecting Congress to be a rubber stamp. If he does not wish to do much and Congress flounders, then we complain of the legislative inefficiency which derives from executive inaction. In England and France there have been comparable complaints. During the twenty years between two world wars, the balance in Great Britain (save when two minority labor governments were in office) was decidedly in favor of the cabinet, which in effect legislated subject to the consent of the House of Commons. On the other hand, the normal working of the French parliamentary system was such as to justify the statement that during the eight months of the year when they were in session the chambers administered as well as legislated. The critical publicist will have thought the balance out of line in each country.

But when crisis comes, when action must be speedy and drastic, when a wrong decision may be better than no decision at all, the scales always oscillate violently in the direction of the executive. When fear stalks abroad, as it did in the United States in 1933, Congress is willing, even eager, temporarily to abdicate. That spring Congress passed bills before its members had read them. Just a year ago, after the fall of France, when the President presented a huge defense program, Congress approved the largest appropriations in history without serious question — indeed, without careful scrutiny. When a legislature realizes the necessity of spending huge sums of money rather quickly — on something like defense or relief — it ceases to be a checking body and must let go of the purse-strings. On the other hand, when, as in the case of the Lease-Lend Bill, the decision is on policy and time does not seem to be of the absolute essence, Congress (and rightly so) seeks to be a good deal more than just a rubber stamp.

For the waging of war — even for war preparations — the legislature must grant enormous powers to the executive. Then it becomes the task of the elected representatives of the people to

watch the possessors of the power and to encourage or tame them. An unsympathetic executive can make this difficult. A legislature is always unhappy in wartime, no matter how much confidence it may have in the executive. For it wants to know more about what is going on than the executive is willing to disclose. It feels that it has experience and ability that are not being used. Only an unbroken succession of victories can prevent or remove fears which may, sooner or later, drive it to critical speech or interfering action which may weaken the national effort.

"I hold it to be our bounden duty, impressed upon us by our position here, to keep an anxious, watchful eye over all the executive agents who are carrying on the war at the direction of the people, whom we represent and whom we are bound to protect in relation to this matter." Thus argued William P. Fessenden in a speech in the Senate on December 9, 1861. Eighty years later, Congress considers itself to have the same "bounden duty." But how can the duty be performed without hampering the executive in his task of direction? How far, indeed, is it proper that the "anxious, watchful eye" of Congress be permitted to scrutinize the President in his use of powers which he possesses apart from statute, under the Constitution which makes him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy?

No one can make a blueprint for executive-legislative relationships. "The men of Massachusetts," Walter Bagehot declared, "could have worked *any* constitution." Much will always depend on the characters and abilities of the individuals who may be in key places in the two branches of the government. But from the past we can draw suggestions which are pertinent to our present situation. Those drawn from the experience of France and Great Britain do not lose value because there is a difference between parliamentary and presidential government.

II

So long as military matters were the preserve of monarchs and a popularly elected assembly had not gathered power to itself, the problem of legislature and executive in wartime could not arise. Curiously, the first legislative interference with the conduct of military operations was probably the most extreme of all. In August 1793, the French turned to the *levée en masse*. Since France's "mass armies and their warfare were at first in the service of the new bourgeois state, the 'lawful' representatives

of that state — whether the Legislative Assembly, the Convention or the Directory — sought to maintain civilian control over the Leviathan that they had called into being.” Hence Lazare Carnot, as head of the Committee of Public Safety, sent to the front so-called “deputies on mission.” As Dr. Alfred Vagts has explained in his “History of Militarism,” these deputies controlled the armies “by the summary promotion and demotion of officers and the execution of generals who failed to achieve victory.”

That experiment France did not repeat, although in 1915 and 1916 there was greater parliamentary interference with the military authorities than was the case in any of the other states then at war. There were parliamentary delegations to the armies; Deputies and Senators presumed to question and chide commanders and, on their return to Paris, seek for dismissals. Such parliamentary activity was probably annoying rather than harmful. Sometimes the parliamentary interference had beneficial consequences, especially in the case of inquiries which certain commissions made into the adequacy of hospital facilities and the provision of heavy artillery and munitions supplies. Some of the members of these commissions were on terms of intimacy with the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré. Successive Cabinets endeavored to keep him in ignorance, and he had grave doubts as to the adequacy of the French industrial effort. To the pages of his well-nigh interminable diary he confided his fears and chronicled the encouragement that he gave to Deputies and Senators in their efforts to speed things up and to bring the Ministry of War to a realization of the seriousness of the situation. Such a combination of pressure by the President of the Republic and parliamentarians in his confidence was on the whole more beneficial than harmful. Half a dozen changes of ministry before Clemenceau began to earn the title “Père de la victoire” showed that Parliament had not abdicated. It was still exerting control, albeit selectively and spasmodically. The fact that the Deputies were in session, debating and prodding, had a good effect on public opinion.

While France was engaged in the present war, however, from September 1939 onwards, the French Parliament did nothing in particular and that not very well. The negligible character of its rôle was the result of a number of different factors. Not the least important was that it had, over the years, permitted itself to be-

come more and more anaemic in comparison to the executive. The complexity and severity of financial and economic crises had compelled the French Parliament to grant *pleins pouvoirs* to successive Cabinets. It was necessary that the Ministers do much of the legislating; but Parliament should at least have concerned itself with the results. The decrees had to be submitted to the Chambers. Only rarely, however, did objections force withdrawal or modification. This abdication of Parliament as an organ of review and control, and as a critic of the executive, was fatal.

When the war came Parliament could not reassert itself. From September 3 until November 30, 1939, it did not meet. On the latter date it extended M. Daladier's decree powers and provided (in the usual form) that each decree must be submitted within one month for the approval of Parliament if it was in session. At meetings in December the Parliament considered budget matters. Throughout the winter there were no important debates. Unlike the House of Commons, the Chamber of Deputies contained only a few members who could catch the ear of the country by criticisms of the government. These seem not to have felt it a duty to criticize, and if they had the censorship to which Parliament consented would have kept their voices from being heard.¹ A number of parliamentary commissions pretended to be active. They met rather frequently and listened to perfunctory statements from Ministers. But the commissions were futile because they emanated from a Chamber in which the country had little confidence. This time, moreover, there was not in the Elysée a President who, like Poincaré, wanted to be something more than a machine to parade or sign. The Parliament and the commissions had a few secret sessions — an expedient which, as the English have learned, is never reassuring to a nation. The Chamber did drive out Daladier and install Reynaud as Prime Minister. But this was brought about as much through party and personal intrigues as from a parliamentary demand for more effective leadership. It is not strange, therefore, that in the tragic days that marked the end of the Third Republic the Ministers and a few powerful personages who were not Ministers were permitted, or forced, to make the crucial decisions without any Parliament which they could consult. Decisions participated in and approved by Parliament might not have been any better. They could hardly have been worse.

¹ Parliament made no serious effort to force the modification of any of the censorship regulations.

III

In Great Britain, from 1914 to 1918, Parliament was less effective than its counterpart across the Channel. When the present war began it was incomparably more effective. When in 1915 the munitions shortage became so great as to be a scandal and a serious threat to the British armies in France, exposure took place in the newspapers and not on the floor of the House. In December 1916, when the House turned from Mr. Asquith to Mr. Lloyd George, the parliamentary opposition became even more negligible. Save in a few cases when Mr. Lloyd George clashed with generals who had their friends in the House of Commons, the real criticism of his administration came only from the press. Parliament, through select committees, investigated a few matters, but by and large the Fourth Estate took the place of the elected representatives of the people as the forum where grievances were voiced and where the executive would hear criticism of its acts. Indeed, the Prime Minister was infrequently in the House. He entrusted its leadership to Mr. Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Lloyd George attended only when he had some pronouncement to make. His parliamentary utterances became more like Presidential Messages than participations in disputes on policy. He was frank in recognizing this shift of influence to the press; and not unconnected with the recognition was the large number of press lords whom he translated into real Lords with seats in the upper chamber.

In this war the House of Commons has not had to yield to the press as critic of the executive. It has influenced policy; it has forced the correction of abuses; it has spurred executive action; and it has not felt that it was deprived of the knowledge which is essential if action is to be intelligent. British critics are sorry that the House has not been able to do more, but even the most severe of them agree that the House has done much. The daily questioning of ministers has been important. Even Mr. Chamberlain recognized its utility and endeavored to give members greater opportunities. On the whole there has been expert steering between the Scylla of triviality and the Charybdis of demanding information that would be of use to the enemy.

The House forced Mr. Chamberlain's resignation and in effect made Mr. Churchill Prime Minister. It has driven some individual incompetents out of the government and has brought

about a number of shifts of square pegs to what it was hoped might be square holes. Full powers of legislation have been transferred to the Cabinet, but debates on some of the emergency defense regulations have caused their withdrawal and revision. Policy — strategic, financial, economic, industrial — has been discussed in the open, mostly on the motions for adjournment which permit full debate without requiring the debaters to take sides in a vote.

At secret sessions war ministers have been able to talk more frankly than in public session. But the whole principle underlying a virile legislature is frustrated if it does not meet in public. It must be a sounding board for the wishes and fears of constituents, and the sounds are ineffective if they reach the ears of ministers only in private. The nation is prevented, moreover, from knowing whether ministers have satisfactory explanations for what have seemed to be mistakes, and whether, in criticizing and questioning, the House of Commons is really representing it. But, as Mr. Churchill has said, "There is no reason why we should keep the enemy informed of the details of our arrangements." And he added grimly: "We do not receive similar information from him about his way of life, although, I am sure, our military staffs would be much inconvenienced thereby."

Under these circumstances, the Select Committee on National Expenditure has done highly important work. Set up in December 1939 "to examine the current expenditure defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament for the Defence Services, for Civil Defence, and for other services directly connected with the war," the Committee is instructed "to report what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the Government may be effected therein." The limitation "directly connected with the war" has not prevented the Committee from ranging over nearly the whole field of British administration. At once the Committee determined that they conceived it "to be more their duty to prevent or check waste before it occurs than to conduct inquiries into past events." They would be able to discharge this task better "by discussion and exchange of ideas with the spending departments undertaken concurrently" with the examination of representatives of the departments and scrutiny of their plans, rather "than by recommendations and criticisms in a formal report." Thus the Committee, which consisted of twenty-eight members (later increased), divided into six

sub-committees among which were allocated all phases of the war effort.

This was a wise decision. Five persons meeting privately with a Minister or Under Secretary are not an inquisitorial body. In April 1940 the Committee reported to the House that "in this field" — that is, "in discussion and exchange of ideas" — their efforts had "already met with definite success." It would be tedious to enumerate all of the matters that the Committee and its sub-committees have inquired into. Each sub-committee has held dozens of sessions and heard scores of witnesses. A coördinating committee composed of the chairmen of the sub-committees seeks to secure an over-all view. Normally a Select Committee of the House of Commons can speak only to the House, but this Select Committee received special permission to address memoranda directly to the Prime Minister. In these it makes suggestions on matters unsuited for public comment.

Nearly a score of reports have been published. The Eleventh Report, filed in August 1940, was comprehensive and enumerated some of the matters in respect of which the Committee had thought that changes of policy or reorganization of administration were essential, and checked them with the actions, if any, that the government had taken. Nearly one hundred Committee proposals were listed, some of them minor but many on matters of great importance. The Departments reported what they had done: "accepted"; "partly accepted"; "under constant study"; "not accepted, but coördinating committee set up"; "implemented with certain exceptions"; "substantially implemented"; "action under consideration by Treasury". The subjects ranged from the purchase of land and the selection of airdrome sites to priorities for sub-manufacturers of machine guns and the best utilization of the available supplies of sugar.

If members of the American Congress read the reports of the Select Committee, they will feel that, in comparison with members of the House of Commons, they are uninformed and uninfluential in respect of the progress of our defense preparations.

IV

Members of our Civil War Congresses, however, were neither uninformed nor uninfluential. In December 1861, Lincoln's radical opponents got Congress to set up a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War which at times seemed not unmindful of the

precedent of Carnot's deputies on mission to the armies. Originally proposed to inquire into why battles had been lost, it obtained broader terms of reference. As Senator William P. Fessenden declared, Congress is "not under command of the military of this country. They are under ours as a Congress." The Committee summoned commanders and their subordinates before it and inquired into the political opinions of the generals. Sub-committees visited the battle-fronts. Sessions were in secret, so a witness did not know what had been testified to about him before his appearance. Senators used the testimony in their speeches or gave out dribblets to the newspapers.

In 1917 when the Senate sought to amend the Food Control Act to set up a Joint Committee on Expenditures in the Conduct of the War, President Wilson declared that, if accepted, it would "render my task of conducting the war practically impossible." He thought that "the constant supervision of executive action which it contemplates would amount to nothing less than an assumption on the part of the legislative body of the executive work of the administration." And he added that there was "a very ominous precedent in our history which shows how such a supervision would operate." He referred, of course, to the Civil War Committee which, in his view, "was the cause of constant and distressing harassment and rendered Mr. Lincoln's task all but impossible." He went on to say that he was not questioning what might be the motives or the purposes of the members of such a committee. Even if they wished to coöperate in the most patriotic spirit, such coöperation would not be "practicable in the circumstances. The responsibility rests upon the administration. There are abundant existing means of investigation and of the effective enforcement of that responsibility." Mr. Wilson's judgment of the Civil War Committee was probably too severe. His estimate of the "abundant" means that Congress had of holding the executive responsible was certainly optimistic.

For, given the uneasiness in Congress and the unrest among the public, the Civil War Committee was probably inevitable. There is little evidence that President Lincoln was hostile to its creation or, within limits, to its activities. Indeed, Nicolay and Hay spoke of the Committee as "earnest, patriotic and honest." The Committee reported to Congress that "for a long time they were in constant communication with the President and his Cabinet and neglected no opportunity of at once laying before them

the information acquired by them in the course of their investigations." But after two years relations with the President became acrimonious. Members of the Committee used their positions to seek advantages for their military friends. The commanders regarded the Committee as a Court of Star Chamber or a species of Aulic Council.

On balance, did the Civil War Committee do more harm than good? It is interesting to note that two scholars who have devoted particular attention to the workings of the Committee do not view its efforts or even its excesses so harshly as President Wilson did. Writing shortly after the controversy in 1917, Professor W. W. Pierson thought that the Committee had "brought speed and energy into the conduct of the war; that they ferreted out abuses and put their fingers down heavily upon governmental inefficiency; and that they labored, for a time at least, to preserve a balance and effect a coöperation between the legislative and executive departments." Three years ago, Professor T. Harry Williams, reëxamining the evidence, concluded that if the Committee had been divorced from its unfortunate political bias it "might have performed a very real service. No other body in the country had its unique opportunity to gather information from all fields of the war." In short, the most valid objections to the Committee were to its members and to their behavior, rather than to the device as such.

During the World War, President Wilson's opposition to any Congressional committee was effective. There were one or two special inquiries. The House of Representatives agreed speedily and almost unanimously to the appointment of a special committee to investigate the shipment of defective ammunition. Under Senator Chamberlain, the Senate Military Affairs Committee held a series of hearings and probably did some good, although all too patent were the desires of certain Senators to embarrass the administration rather than to ferret out mistakes and to seek their correction. Again, in May 1918, Wilson successfully opposed a Senate Resolution which would have made the Military Affairs Committee in effect a committee on the conduct of the war. He asked that every supporter of the administration vote against the resolution and added (to the regret of some): "These are serious times and it is absolutely necessary that the lines should be clearly drawn between friends and opponents." He did yield to the general demand for an inquiry into

aircraft production and appointed a Board under the chairmanship of Charles Evans Hughes, who two years before had been the Republican candidate for the Presidency. With no fanfare of trumpets, that Board went about its task expeditiously, and a reorganization of the aircraft procurement speedily followed.

By and large, however, Congressional scrutiny of the conduct of the war — of what was being done with the billions that were being expended — waited until after the Armistice. Then the Republican House of Representatives elected in November 1918 appointed an investigating committee known as the Graham Committee. It spent half a million dollars in conducting wholesale inquiries into past demeanors. Such *ex post facto* investigations must stress malfeasance, not nonfeasance and misfeasance. They cannot accept the principle of Fouché: "It was worse than a crime; it was a blunder." The Committee turned up a very small amount of corruption. It did uncover imbecilities that had cost the country millions. But who then cared? The war had been won. Who, now, indeed, recalls what the mistakes were? Legislative control, to be effective, must be concurrent.

Unhappily, however, the Congressional system is not well geared for concurrent scrutiny and criticism of executive action. Constitutional arrangements separating legislature and executive give Washington a political climate that is inhospitable to harmonious relationships. When at the outset of his first administration he revived the custom of delivering Presidential Messages in person, Woodrow Wilson told the Congress that he thought it desirable to demonstrate that the President was a person and "not a mere department of the Government hailing Congress from some isolated island of jealous power" — that he was "a human being trying to coöperate with other human beings in a common service." During his first administration President Wilson had a high measure of success in achieving such coöperation. There was never any doubt as to what he desired in the way of legislation, but he worked with, instead of attempting to dictate to, Congressional leaders.

It is only by Presidential frankness with Congressional leaders and by the appearance of Cabinet members or other officials before Congressional Committees that Congress can get the information which the whole House of Commons receives from the

Prime Minister and his colleagues. Congress does not often debate large policy and the way it is being implemented. Senators and Representatives are hard-working men, but most of their energies are devoted to committee service and within the committees the matters under discussion frequently boil down to technicalities. The machinery of defense preparations is so ramified and uncoordinated that Congress cannot be sure of who does what. On occasion President Roosevelt is unwilling to give a clear lead on important matters — the conscription bill of last summer, for one example, and the pending tax measure for another. Anyone who set out to rewrite Emile Faguet's book, "*L'Horreur des Responsabilités*," would find pertinent materials in Washington today.

Even though the American executive and legislature are separated, even though the former occupies a special status under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, and even though the latter has difficulty in securing an over-all view, the two can and should seek to work harmoniously in a time of crisis. The President could allay a good deal of legislative uneasiness if he conferred on a group of Congressional leaders the rights which Walter Bagehot once declared were the only rights the British Crown possessed: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn. Bagehot added that "a King of great sense and sagacity would want no others; he would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect." Those are in essence the rights that Mr. Churchill encourages the House of Commons to exercise. He could ignore Parliament. Instead he cultivates it.

Much in the way of collaboration and understanding can be achieved through committees of inquiry. If Senators and Representatives undertook (like members of the Select Committee on National Expenditure in Great Britain) to spend dreary hours quietly examining representatives of the services and other spending officers — who at the outset, at least, might be hostile and uncommunicative — and if they made it clear that the Congressional intention was only to aid and coöperate and not to pillory or to gain personal publicity, they might discover that they were aiding Congress to perform "its bounden duty" more effectively. An executive weakens himself if he neglects "the care and feeding" of his legislature. And a legislature must make its wants known.

THE ATLANTIC AREA

Distances in statute miles
100,000 square miles

Zentral Equal Area Projection
Centered at 20° N. and 30° W.

Distances in statute miles
100,000 square miles

*Zenithal Equal Area Projection
Centered at 20°N. and 30°W.*

THE ATLANTIC AREA

By Francis Pickens Miller

FOR three centuries Americans have been accustomed to think of their world in continental terms. The land mass of the Western Hemisphere was the New World. Expansion meant moving west and settling land. Political and military control, in so far as it played a rôle in shaping national policy, was limited mainly to land control. The Monroe Doctrine was concerned with continents, not oceans. We wanted European nations to leave us alone, and to leave other parts of the Western Hemisphere alone. We favored freedom of the seas, but we were not interested in ruling the waves; and we did not often stop to notice how much we relied on the naval power of the country which did "rule" the waves to keep them open to our commerce.

This three-hundred-year period in American life has come to an end. It has been terminated by the juxtaposition of several historic events. The land has for the most part been settled. Communications by air and by sea have been revolutionized. And at the very moment when the economic, political and strategic consequences of these developments were becoming apparent, a militaristic Power, through its conquest of the entire European Continent, moved into position to put the Western World into a strait jacket, unless opposed by the full resources of the United States. The combination of these circumstances radically alters the position of the United States and requires a fundamental reëxamination of its world outlook and policy.

The purpose of the adjoining map is to indicate some of the factors to be taken into account when we plan our national policy, under these new circumstances, now and in the years ahead. The focus is no longer on land masses but on air and sea communications. The ocean has ceased to be a barrier and has become a highway for enemy attack. Our coastline is no longer the line of American defense. To paraphrase Nelson, our sea and air frontiers have become the shore-lines and air-lines of our enemies. Our freedom as a nation will depend, in the future, less upon our ability to execute land operations than upon our control of the sea and air approaches across the oceans.

This means that as long as Europe continues to be a source of actual or potential aggression against us, the air and water of the North Atlantic must be controlled by us or by our friends. A glance at the map will show the location of control points in this area. If control over the entire area is to be effective, the controlling forces must be in possession of Greenland, Iceland, the British Isles, Gibraltar, the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, and either Dakar or some nearby point on the West Coast of Africa. From the standpoint of the defense of the United States, these strong-points are our advance bases. Most important of them all, of course, are the British Isles.

The exercise of effective control over this area depends upon joint action by American-British sea and air power, since the armed forces of the United States are not at present strong enough to assume single-handed the responsibility which the British Navy assumed in the past. Joint action presupposes a powerful British Navy and Air Force in being and free to operate from their own

bases. This obviously would not be the case if England, Scotland and Ireland were occupied by a continental enemy. Hence it is a paramount national interest of the United States to insure the continued and successful defense of the British Isles.

Another glance at the map will indicate what would happen if American-British forces were not able to control the air and water spaces in the eastern half of the North Atlantic. Suppose, for example, that the Germans were to establish themselves in force at Dakar, as they will do eventually -- perhaps this summer -- if not prevented. Obviously if the United States thereupon attempted to defend the Monroe Doctrine, it would be outflanked before its armed forces could go into action. Squadrons of German bombers could fly overnight from Dakar to Natal. Once established on the South American mainland, the Germans could shortly thereafter make an air attack upon the Panama Canal, with fair chances of hitting their target, assuming of course that they had made the same kind of thorough advance preparation in the countries supplying intermediate bases that they have always made in comparable European circumstances. If the Canal were blocked temporarily as a result of such an attack, the Germans would have a breathing spell within which to organize a series of other operations. That is all they would require in order to be able to move on South America below the bulge.

American-British control of the North Atlantic is essential for strategic reasons. It is equally imperative on other grounds. The North Atlantic area is the cradle of our civilization, and the survival of the American way of life depends upon the survival of this civilization. For more than a thousand years our fathers have been building a common society around the shores of the North Atlantic. They built it by labor, by faith, and, when necessary, by arms. It is a civilization based upon a belief in the essential dignity of man, as expressed through representative government, limited by a Bill of Rights. The Atlantic Ocean has become the ocean of freedom.

As long as control of the North Atlantic remains in our hands, and in the hands of those who share our material and spiritual interests, freedom, both political and economic, will have a chance to reassert itself in the world. If that control is lost we shall lose our freedom. That is the reason why we are beginning to assert control.

Editor's Note: The accompanying insert map of the Atlantic area, prepared for FOREIGN AFFAIRS by William Briesemeister of the American Geographical Society, differs in several respects from more familiar maps on such projections as the Mercator. The projection on which this map is drawn is "oblique," "zenithal" and "equal-area." In the present case, the center of the projection is at latitude 20 degrees N., longitude 30 degrees W. By using this center the cartographer has been able to show the entire north polar area with comparatively little distortion, which would not have been the case if he had used the more usual position directly over the Equator. Because the map is equal-area, linear distances cannot be scaled from it with accuracy. The figures in red refer to distances in statute miles.

WARFARE IN THE ATLANTIC

By Admiral William V. Pratt

THE sea term blockade can claim as its progenitor an older military term, the word siege. Siege itself is a form of warfare limited both in conception and application. A general campaign which is being conducted along a broad front often passes beyond some strong and obstinately held position or place. An encircling force is left behind to capture the position in question, either by direct assault or, more probably, by preventing all succor in the shape of weapons or supplies from reaching the beleaguered occupants. Hence, unless the place has been evacuated of its civil population, the hardships of siege fall alike upon them and the fighting forces. Previous to the appearance of the concept of total war, the civil population were usually classed as non-combatants. However, siege was not considered an inhumane practice, even though it entailed general starvation. The besieged always had the choice whether to hold out or surrender.

In its first concept blockade was, like siege, a limited form of warfare. Only those ports were considered blockaded which had to seaward of them a sufficient naval force to prevent safe ingress and egress. A ship attempting to run the blockade was a legal capture irrespective of the character of the cargo carried. But even such a ship was not destroyed unless she first refused to stop. Beyond the limits of the immediate blockaded zone, international law prescribed certain definite rules of procedure covering search on the high seas, to determine the character of the cargo carried, its ultimate destination, and whether it consisted in whole or in part of contraband. The ship was never endangered and the lives of those on board were not jeopardized unless she resisted the legal right of search. A ship was not permitted to be destroyed on the high seas unless it was impossible to bring her into port for legal adjudication. In all cases where a ship was destroyed, every provision had to be taken to assure the safety of the personnel. Thus it can be seen that under the guidance of international law the practice of sea war was as humane in its attitude toward persons not actually engaged in combat as any form of war can be.

The first use of the system of total blockade did not originate with sea-minded Britain, nor was World War Number One the first time it was tried. After overrunning the Continent of Europe,

and finding the invasion of Britain impossible, Napoleon declared the Continental blockade of the British Isles. This meant that no nations under his military influence could trade with England. He hoped thus to bring England to terms, reduce her influence on the Continent, and lessen the sea and financial power which had made her a great thorn in his side ever since the beginning of his career of expansion. Not being able to meet Britain on the seas, Napoleon had to exert military pressure on her as best he could. How like his action then is Hitler's pressure on Britain today! But because Tsar Alexander, who had at first concurred in Napoleon's plan, finally broke away, Napoleon turned on Russia. War with that country resulted in the débâcle before Moscow, which, with the campaign in Spain, was the beginning of the end.

During the last war Britain further extended the principle and practice of blockade, which, as already indicated, was originally designed to prevent contraband, *i.e.* supplies of military value, from reaching the enemy. The "Kirkwall practice," which required neutral ships to put into certain ports for examination, clearance or detention, represented an evolution in this practice. "Visit and search" became different from what it had previously been, and contraband as such ceased to exist. The net result was that blockade, previously intended to hamper the military life of an enemy nation, rapidly developed into an instrument for stopping the arteries of its economic life. In effect, the practice of siege was extended to entire nations, involving combatants and non-combatants alike. While this was going on, the United States remained neutral. By arming its ships it succeeded in evading the old right of visit and search on the high seas. For since the submarine is vulnerable to a single shot in its hull it could not carry on the customary procedure without risk of being sunk.

These practices by the Allies and by the United States led the Germans to establish their own counter-blockade methods — unrestricted submarine warfare. The great distinction which has been drawn between the practices of the Allied and the Central Powers lay here. One gave the choice between life and death; the other did not. This is not the place to discuss the merits or demerits of this phase of the last war. The writer's only purpose is to show that one departure from established law leads to another.

In the last war submarines operated independently, and all were of the seagoing type. The small submarines of the present day were then unknown. The method of attack at first was to

come to the surface, fire a gun, board the ship, put its crew in boats, place bombs in the hull, and in that way sink it. The advantage of sinking a ship by gunfire and bombs was that this did not waste a torpedo. Later on when all ships were armed the procedure became impossible, and then sinkings were effected by mines and torpedoes.

Convoys were not used until the spring of 1917. Ships continued sailing from various ports all over the world directly to the British Isles and to the Mediterranean. Even when submarine sinkings reached their height, in the spring of 1917, Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, was loath to resort to the slow method of convoy, and finally yielded only after much persuasion from Admiral Sims. Before the introduction of convoys the chief protection given shipping was by the patrol system. Coming from ports all over the world, the ships bound for England entered what might be called a funnel-mouth on their way to London and Liverpool. The German submarines naturally operated around this congested spot. The British marked off the danger area into smaller areas, and a light craft, a destroyer if possible, was assigned to patrol each such area. Needless to say, this method of hunting submarines was not effective. The sinkings went on apace, until cut down by the shift to convoys. In distant seas, meanwhile, raiders took their toll of shipping also. But raiding never has been the menace to shipping that submarine warfare is, and never can be.

We adopted the convoy system as soon as we entered the war, though we never did arrive at the point where we could afford to give as efficient protection to cargoes as to troopships. However, our aid eased the strain and greatly helped the Allies protect cargo ships bound for their own ports. We did not try to convoy all our ships. Those capable of making 19 knots or more sailed alone. The convoys were never so large as they are in this war. One of thirty ships was considered very large. Our practice on this side of the ocean was to give Admiral Sims notice of the time and latitude when the convoy would pass longitude 30 degrees W. Command during the passage was vested in a commissioned officer, on board of an auxiliary cruiser or some naval craft. He led the way, gave all the orders, set its courses, and directed when and how the zigzag (the simultaneous change of course of ships in column) should be carried out. As ports on the Irish Coast as well as the French Channel ports were then open to the use of the

Allies, the problem of protecting ships at sea was infinitely easier than it is today, especially since air attack must now be guarded against in addition to the danger from submarines.

II

Immediately upon the start of the present war the British readopted the convoy system. But the neutrality of the United States left Halifax, Nova Scotia, as practically the only large port on this side of the Atlantic from which Allied convoys could sail. As our aid in the way of supplies increased, a congestion of shipping in Halifax naturally resulted, and this meant that individual convoys became larger than they should be for efficient handling. The British also were forced to include in these big convoys vessels of low speed, which naturally handicapped the faster vessels.

The patrol system was still followed on distant seas, however, as a measure of protection against raiders. But up to the time the *Graf Spee* became active (she was eventually destroyed in the engagement off Montevideo) the raider problem presented no serious difficulties to Britain, at any rate none at all comparable to those in the last war. The British did not have the numbers of small naval craft available for escort duty that they had in the last war. Nevertheless until France fell they could count on the assistance of such French naval craft as were not engaged in convoy work in the Mediterranean. Again, the British Grand Fleet in this war did not have to stand watch and guard over a formidable German High Seas Fleet lurking in the Baltic, and this released many destroyers for escort duty.

The present war of the seas should be divided into two phases — before the fall of France, and after. In the first phase, the Germans had to send their seacraft out from the Baltic or from North Sea ports. In fact, both the British and the Germans started the first phase of the sea war exactly where World War Number One left off. The Germans operated in the North Sea and close around the British Isles, using the individual submarine as the instrument of attack. Improvements had been made in the torpedo in the period between the two wars, but these were mostly in the direction of speed and accuracy of fire. No great change had been made in the weight of charge carried. Nor was this necessary, as it had been proved in the last war that one torpedo was usually enough to sink the ordinary cargo carrier. Both opponents had improved their listening devices, and in their newer and heavier

naval craft the British had improved their underwater protection.

In the last war the Germans started their submarine offensive against naval vessels. But this time they at once made the merchant ship their main objective. Though they had a great air armada available, they looked on it more as a military than a naval asset. In fact, until they acquired the French bases its naval rôle was only as an adjunct to the submarine.¹ In this first phase of the sea warfare the Germans obtained the use of Norwegian bases, but their submarine campaign was not materially aided thereby. Their air power was still located too far away for it to be able to act efficiently in conjunction with the submarine.

The British reply to the Germans in this phase of the sea warfare was to block off the Straits of Dover, just as they had done in the last war. They also laid a mine field along the entire east coast of Scotland and England, with entrances and exits for Allied merchant shipping passing around Scotland or through the English Channel. As an additional precaution, they erected a balloon barrage to catch night flyers laying magnetic mines in the free seaway along the eastern coast. The west coast ports of Scotland and England remained fairly free for the use of shipping, since the main German submarine concentration was still in the North Sea. The close-in defense instituted by the British, conducted by their own air forces, by small craft such as trawlers and patrol boats, and by such destroyers as could be spared from escort duties, took so high a toll of submarines that the first phase of the sea war went decidedly against the Germans. The British were satisfied that they had the submarine fairly well under control.

III

But the second phase of the sea campaign has caused the British much greater concern. They have had to do without the naval assistance of France, while the Germans have gained that of Italy. Still more serious, control of French bases has enabled the Germans to conduct their submarine campaign from the Atlantic coast instead of the North Sea. Worse still, the Nazi air arm can now coöperate efficiently with the submarine. This is particularly important because the Nazis some time ago put the construction

¹ In conjunction with the submarine campaign, the Germans sprang a surprise with the magnetic mine. A counter for it was soon found, though actual contact with any form of mine always remained a danger.

of small submarines on a mass basis, with an estimated production rate of around 25 a month. This figure may lead to miscalculations as to the number of submarines actually available. World War estimates of the actual number of submarines in operation proved later to have been too high. And in this war intensive RAF bombing of construction, repair and operating bases undoubtedly reduces the total of submarines which can be used efficiently. In general, only about one-third of the total number of submarines available can be at sea at one time. Crews are under a great strain and craft must be overhauled after any great length of time at sea. Nevertheless, it is a safe assumption that many more German submarines are at large in this war than in the last.

Furthermore, the plan of campaign has been changed. Instead of operating individually, the small submarines now work in groups, probably under the leadership of a larger submarine which is able to maintain radio contact with long-range scouting planes. This arrangement enables the submarines to spot each convoy and plan their attack with great accuracy. In fact, they no longer have to use their own periscopes to detect shipping, but can remain submerged until the time for attack arrives. No system of patrol can cope with submarine attack under such circumstances. The only answer is to increase the number of warships used on convoy duty.

Today the area of most intense danger for British shipping extends from 300 to 700 miles west of Ireland and from Iceland to the English Channel. When the convoys from America enter this zone they are subject to air bombing, which increases in intensity as they approach the British coasts. Possession of French Atlantic bases also enables Nazi submarines and air forces to prey efficiently upon convoys bound from Cape Town and the Mediterranean. In addition, long-range submarines operate well out in the Atlantic, as they did in the last war, to destroy such shipping as they may come upon there. The Nazis also decided, in this second phase of sea war, that the best use they could make of their heavier naval ships was to send them out as commerce raiders. The *Hipper*, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* have operated in the Atlantic, while other raiders, principally converted merchant ships, have worked in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The British have been hampered in dealing with these various onslaughts by the fact that they are constantly threatened with

invasion, which has made it impossible for them to spare the small craft necessary to perform escort duty at sea properly. The number of such small craft on hand was inadequate in any case. Of these, a large proportion must be kept near home to prevent Nazi troops from crossing the Channel or coming in from Norway. The shortage of small ships used for convoy duty has enabled the German submarines to make attacks by night as well as by day. Indeed, some of the most successful German attacks have been made at night, by submarines operating on the surface.

The British have been further handicapped in convoy operations in the Atlantic by their campaign in the Mediterranean. Troop convoys must always be more heavily escorted than cargo ships, and there have been many troop movements in the Mediterranean, besides movements of supply ships. At all times, too, the main fleet must have its quota of destroyers, cruisers and aircraft. This still further diminishes the number of smaller naval ships available for escort duty. In consequence, a great burden has fallen on the smaller fishing boats and trawlers around the British Isles. They have performed their work nobly. But still the British have found no effective answer to the question of how to provide a greater measure of defense for their Atlantic shipping.

The fact is that what is required is teamwork between air and sea forces, and an increased number of each. The British have been handicapped by not being allowed the use of Irish bases. But even if they were, this would not compensate wholly for the insufficiency of their forces. Only America can supply what is needed now.

IV

The first attitude of the United States towards the war was that we were neutral, but neutral in a limited sense. Thus we gave up freedom of the seas in favor of the cash-and-carry plan. We also joined the other American Republics in establishing a so-called neutrality zone, something hitherto entirely unknown in international law. This zone covered the waters about the coasts of the signatory American states, up to roughly a thousand miles, and included the whole Caribbean. A naval patrol was set up in this zone with the ostensible purpose of preventing any hostilities from taking place within it. The proclamation of the neutrality zone did not succeed in stopping hostilities, and its main purpose turned out to be to secure and make public information about any

belligerent craft found operating there. This information was probably of more use to the British than to the Nazis. Since the British control the seas, they could use the information to direct the movements of their shipping and to pursue Nazi craft, whereas the only advantage to the Nazis was that the information might help them escape from danger. Our patrols were not empowered either in law or by executive order to drive enemy warcraft out of the neutrality zone.

Let us get some definitions straight. The term convoy is applied to a group of ships unable to defend themselves against attack and therefore in need of a protecting escort. The escort is responsible for its charge, the convoy, and must do its utmost to defend it. Hence the provision of an escort, though not an act of war, is an indication that the escorting ships intend to defend their charges even if this leads to fighting. But the escorting ships never fire the first shot unless they belong to a belligerent nation or are clearly within their rights in defending their own property within a sea area which their nation can claim as its own — nominally, under the old rule of international law, the three-mile zone. The duties of patrols are various, depending on the instructions received. Their duties may merge into those of an escort; or they may lead them to range very widely over the seas. Patrols may be either non-belligerent or belligerent. When used by a non-belligerent the supposition is that they will not undertake any belligerent act. When used by a belligerent, however, it naturally is supposed that they will fight whenever they encounter an enemy.

Though the present total war has smashed many old precedents and rules it may have the effect of bringing new ones into force. The Americas took a first step in the declaration of a neutrality zone at sea. Our recent extension of the area under patrol to a thousand or more miles from our shores is a second step. Patrol within such a far-flung area can never have the same decisive results as escort. Yet it does have the effect of broadening the area in which the ships and planes of a non-belligerent, in the present case the United States, can receive and impart information of military importance. Even though such devices may not in the end prove to have affected decisively the course of the present war, they are interesting harbingers of a new order of international law more competent than the old to cope with the problems raised by modern total war.

NARKOMINDEL AND COMINTERN

INSTRUMENTS OF WORLD REVOLUTION

By Bruce C. Hopper

THE goal of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is a World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics, to be established through the strategy and tactics of world revolution. Historically, the strategy has been divided into three phases, depending on current and immediate objectives. From 1903 to the March revolution in 1917, the immediate objective was the overthrow of Tsarism. In the second phase, from March to November 1917, it was the overthrow of imperialism in Russia and withdrawal from the "imperialist" war. In the third phase, after the November revolution, it was to consolidate the dictatorship in one country, where it could be used as a fulcrum to overthrow imperialism in all countries and open the epoch of world revolution. In this strategy the chief reserves of the revolutionary army are considered to be the masses in highly industrialized countries and the native populations in colonial and dependent lands. Throughout any one phase the strategy remains fairly constant in its principles; it changes only as the revolution moves from one phase to the next. Tactics, on the other hand, change repeatedly within any given phase, according to whether the revolutionary tide is ebbing or flowing, advancing or receding.

The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is dominated by considerations of practical politics. It knows how to change its tactics of world revolution both to fit the internal problems of Russia as well as to meet the changing pressures exerted first from one side, then from another, in the shifting constellation of world Powers. Its instruments in conducting its external relations are two — the Narkomindel (Foreign Office), used to maintain formal relations with other states and to promote peace during the period of building Socialism in Russia; and the Comintern (Communist International), used to promote class war everywhere outside Russia, to convert imperialist war into civil war, and to further the cause of world revolution.

The conflicts of policy between the Narkomindel and the Comintern at any given moment can be explained by shifts in the incidence of their use in the general scheme of strategy and tactics.

The goal, however, remains unaltered. By using the Narkomindel to placate other governments, and the Comintern to promote the overthrow of the same governments, the Bolsheviks were able over the years to create for themselves a position of special privilege in world politics, in which the right hand could deny responsibility for the left. They captured the interest and support not only of the instinctive revolutionaries around the world, but of a great number of idealistic liberals who observed the actions of the Narkomindel but ignored those of the Comintern. Herein lies the prevailing confusion regarding Soviet foreign policies.

The zigzag course of Bolshevik strategy and tactics is illustrated in the four major reorientations which the Soviet Government has executed in its relations with other states.

THE TACTIC OF WORLD REVOLUTION, 1917-1921

When the Bolsheviks proclaimed their peace decree on November 8, 1917 — no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination — they fully expected the “imperialist” war to be converted into a series of civil wars which would be the prelude to world revolution. Thus in defending his decision to accept the Brest-Litovsk peace with Germany on March 3, 1918, Lenin wrote: “By concluding a separate peace, we free ourselves as far as is possible at the present moment from both the contending imperialist groups, turning their mutual hostilities to our own account, taking advantage of the state of warfare between them which prevents their joining forces against us, thus freeing ourselves for a time so we can further and consolidate the Socialist revolution.”

What was not expected was that the attempts of the Allies to reestablish the eastern front, and to prevent German exploitation of Russian resources, would develop into military intervention against the Bolsheviks, civil war, and the *cordon sanitaire*. Instead of being allowed to lead a world revolution, the Bolsheviks were barred from the Paris Peace Conference. Nevertheless, they claim the credit for inciting the revolution which accompanied Germany's military collapse in the West. The revolution hung fire in Central Europe for two years. Bela Kun's Soviet Republic in Hungary was smashed by White reaction. The revolutionary tide reached its climax with the defeat of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw in 1920. Projects for revolution in Turkey, Persia and elsewhere in the East, which had been launched at the Baku

Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920, were destined to be held in abeyance by a shift in tactics.

The first instrument for world revolution was the Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda, which was set up in Moscow under three Americans, Boris Reinstein, Albert Rhys Williams and John Reed. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Narkomindel became for a time the chief disseminator of propaganda, and Chicherin, as Commissar for Foreign Relations, asserted in July 1918 that assistance to outside proletarian movements was a recognized function of revolutionary diplomacy. Accordingly, tons of revolutionary literature were distributed, especially among the million German soldiers occupying the Ukraine.

However, these activities were eventually taken over from the Narkomindel by the Comintern, created by Lenin in March 1919 to build a backfire against the interventionist states and to wean the masses of the world away from their support of the Second (Socialist) International. The Comintern consists of professional revolutionists organized into national sections, and is controlled by an Executive Committee which dictates the resolutions and theses of each Comintern Congress. It is in turn controlled by the Communist Party of Russia. The directives for action originate in the Russian section, and are forwarded by the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the national sections, or local Communist parties, in all countries. Internationalization of the revolution was to be achieved by a combination of two elements: the militant violence of professional revolutionaries and the doctrinaire aspirations of the Socialists. Part of the program, therefore, was to capture leadership of the entire Socialist world. Hence the subsequent alternations in policy between efforts toward a United Front with the Second International, and equally strenuous periods of active hostility inspired by hatred of that organization.

Between 1917 and 1921, to use Stalin's words, the revolutionary tide was flowing. As the Bolsheviks were in quarantine behind the *cordon sanitaire* there was no pronounced conflict between the Narkomindel and the Comintern. The Narkomindel negotiated peace with the Baltic limitrophe states and Poland in 1920, but refused to recognize Rumania's acquisition of Bessarabia. A dummy, the Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita, was set up to serve as a buffer against Japan. But toward the end of the period the tide of revolution began to recede. Foreign intervention in Russia was ended, but Russia proper was

devastated by civil war and weakened by famine and epidemics. Wartime Communism had brought the economic life of the country almost to a standstill. A change of policy was in order.

FIRST MAJOR SHIFT: THE TACTIC OF TRUCE WITH
CAPITALISM, 1921-1927

Lenin launched the New Economic Policy of 1921 in order to restore economic life through private enterprise, and to invite foreign investments in the form of concessions. Money was restored, industry was decentralized, and labor was granted freedom of contract. The Narkomindel was instructed to work out a *modus vivendi* with capitalist states and to subscribe in part to the accepted rules of international law. In 1923 the Soviet Union was formed. Property rights in concessions having been assured, the major Powers — with the notable exception of the United States — recognized it the following year.

Of special importance were Soviet relations with Weimar Germany. The rapprochement of the two nations, both outcasts from the family of nations, was cemented by the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. This was the start of close economic and military collaboration. Their Treaty of Commerce, signed in 1925, was presumed to serve as a working model for subsequent arrangements between the capitalist and Socialist camps. By signing the Locarno treaty in 1925, and negotiating for entry into the League in 1926, Germany seemed to reorient her policy in favor of the Western Powers. But she immediately propitiated the Bolsheviks with the 1926 Treaty of Amity, by which Russia was assured that German soil would not serve for passage of a League army in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant. Meanwhile, the Russians had supported Turkey in replacing the Treaty of Sèvres by the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923. The murder of the chief delegate to that conference, by a White Russian, caused the Bolsheviks to refuse all subsequent invitations to Switzerland until the Swiss had made reparations. Adjustment of the dispute was made by the Germans, and Litvinov officially appeared at Geneva for the first time in 1927 as a delegate to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. Russia likewise made a series of non-aggression treaties with her immediate neighbors. Germany aided Russia to emerge from the quarantine, and at the same time used her as a club to shake in the direction of Britain and France.

While the rôle of Narkomindel thus changed radically in this

period, that of the Comintern continued as before. Until Lenin's serious illness in 1922 he continued to serve as coördinator between the two. The Comintern policy was presumed to be promotion of the United Front with the Social Democrats. And yet Stalin, in his first declaration on international affairs (Imprecorr, October 9, 1924), said: "The workers are moving to revolution. Pacifists and democrats alike deceive the masses. Social democracy is the moderate wing of Fascism." And again: "The Fascists are certainly not sleeping, but it is to our advantage for them to attack first; that will attract the whole working class to the Communists. Moreover, all our information indicates that Fascism is weak in Germany. In my opinion we should restrain and not incite the Germans."

The contradiction between a United Front with the Social Democrats and opposition to them as the "moderate wing of Fascism" may account for the fact that the Comintern first ordered a revolution in Germany in 1923 and then abandoned it. Certainly Stalin's assumption that Fascism was weak in Germany had much to do with the subsequent Comintern policy to destroy social democracy there and allow the Nazis to seize power, in the belief that the Communists would succeed them in a brief time. The chief enemy of the period was considered to be Great Britain. There was the incident of the Zinoviev letter, the continuous Curzon-Bolshevik quarrel over conflicting interests in the Middle East, and finally the British general strike in 1926 which the Communists tried to capture for their own ends.

In 1925 Stalin conceded that capitalism had entered a period of temporary stabilization, and that the revolutionary tide again was ebbing. It was then that the Comintern became active in China. The Canton-Moscow Entente (1924-27) ushered in the expedition north, and ended in the expulsion of the Bolshevik advisers and the mass execution of Chinese Communists. In this period Comintern interference with the Narkomindel resulted in the breaking off, in 1927, of diplomatic relations between Russia and Britain and between Russia and China.

Within the Party the feud between Stalin and Trotsky for control of the direction of the revolution reached a climax in November 1927. Trotsky was expelled. Besides conceding that capitalism had been stabilized, and that the revolutionary tide had receded, the Bolshevik leaders realized that economic life had been restored in Russia largely through private enterprise, and that

major efforts would be needed to divert the Soviet system back to the Socialist rails. Plans for a gigantic and rapid industrialization of the country had been maturing for some years. To make them effective required another major change in policy. It was undertaken in 1928.

SECOND MAJOR SHIFT: "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH
CAPITALIST STATES," 1928-1934

The new internal policy was called Socialist Offensive on All Fronts. Stalin's victory over Trotsky, the victory of "Socialism in one country alone" over "permanent revolution," was equivalent to the temporary renunciation of world revolution. To industrialize a huge country so backward in technique, and at the same time to force through the measures necessary for socialization, required above all a policy of peace. The Narkomindel was instructed to work out "peaceful coexistence and friendly collaboration with capitalist countries." The avowed purpose was to obtain credits abroad and foreign technicians to aid in the socialist reconstruction of Russia by means of a series of Five Year Plans. Under the momentum of the Socialist offensive, the Soviet system weathered the economic depression beginning in 1929 better than most capitalist states. As one writer phrases it, "The Bolsheviks stole three years from history." At the end of the first Five Year Plan Socialism was pronounced "victorious." Russia was said to have built up the industrial bases of military defense and to have become independent in matters of foreign trade.

As Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov negotiated another series of non-aggression pacts, and demanded total disarmament at Geneva. At the London Economic Conference in 1933 he seemed to be the one constructive statesman present. Recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States followed. Bolshevism seemed to have become respectable.

The Comintern, in this period, was relatively quiet. The fear of capitalist intervention and encirclement nevertheless evoked a call to workers everywhere to "defend the Socialist fatherland." And in Germany the Comintern worked on lines parallel to those followed by the Nazis, thus hastening the arrival of the Nazis in power. To this extent it was in direct conflict with the Narkomindel policy of close economic relations with the social democracy of Germany.

The Bolsheviks did not have any illusions regarding the war

purposes of the Nazis. At the 17th Party Congress, in January 1934, Stalin said that, "War will certainly unleash revolution, and will challenge the very existence of capitalism in a number of states." In the confused tactics that followed, Stalin's special concern was to see that the expected conflict between the Nazis and the Western Powers would not be converted into a general crusade against Soviet Russia. Hitler's rise to power, his persecution of Communists as well as Jews, and the reiterated Nazi intention of marching one day to the Ukraine and the Urals, necessitated another change in Bolshevik policy. Having built an industrial base for military defense, the Bolsheviks, for the first time, felt strong enough to participate in the balance of power politics of Western Europe.

THIRD MAJOR SHIFT: THE TACTIC OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGAINST FASCISM, 1934-1939

As the first gambit in the new tactic the Narkomindel was instructed to negotiate Russia's entry into the League of Nations. The treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia were made the year following, 1935. These were part of Barthou's scheme for an Eastern Locarno. It was Germany and Poland that held back. Russia had in effect shifted from the revisionist to the *status quo* group of Powers, and had become a stalwart pillar of collective security. Litvinov was an ardent supporter of the sanctions against Italy, and he also championed Turkey in legalizing remilitarization of the Straits at the Montreux Convention in 1936. His speeches at Geneva were perhaps the most eloquent and convincing of any ever delivered in the cause of collective security. The failure of his policies, however, became apparent at the time of Munich. The Russians were excluded from the negotiations and from the conference.

The Comintern swung into action on the new tactic at its 7th Congress, held in 1935. On that occasion it passed a resolution ordering national sections everywhere to coöperate with all groups opposed to Fascism and war. This resolution was the basis for the *Front Populaire*, which brought the Blum Government to power in France and proved to be the spark for the civil war in Spain. In France the conflicts between capital and labor led ultimately to the ruin and downfall of the French Republic. Everywhere Communist parties were instructed to campaign for support for the "Socialist fatherland," using the thesis of the so-

called Peoples' Anti-Fascist Front. In speaking to the 18th Party Congress, in March 1939, Manuilsky, a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, reported that membership in Communist parties in capitalist countries had increased in the previous five years from 860,000 to 1,200,000 (the figure in the United States grew from 20,000 to 90,000), and in the Young Communist International and affiliates from 110,000 to 746,000. This made a revolutionary army abroad of nearly two millions.

Mystery still surrounds the duel between Hitler and Stalin in this period. Whatever the validity of the treason charges against older Bolsheviks like Bukharin and Rykov and against Marshal Tukhachevsky, and whatever the factor of Stalin's thrust for personal power, the immediate result was that the Old Bolsheviks were destroyed, the Red Army was decapitated, and a ruthless purge spread out through the Soviet rank and file in what seemed to be a colossal process of self-devourment. At the end Stalin became supreme dictator. But Russia, equipped with a new constitution called economic democracy, was for the time being incapacitated for war. This weakened condition at the moment of the final failure of collective security, combined with the encirclement of Soviet Russia by openly hostile Germany and Japan, made a new tactic inevitable.

FOURTH MAJOR SHIFT: THE TACTIC OF NEUTRALITY TO BREAK ENCIRCLEMENT, 1939-1941

Moscow was ominously silent during and after Munich. It is not yet known definitely whether the Bolsheviks would have joined in aid to Czechoslovakia in fulfillment of the 1935 pledge to follow the lead of France. But of this much students of Soviet foreign policy were sure — that the Bolsheviks were likely to take Homeric retaliation for their exclusion from the Munich negotiations. And not merely did the British and French abandon collective security themselves; their spokesmen did not deny the general expectation that as a result of the Munich Agreement the Nazis would be diverted eastward into Russia. At this moment the Bolsheviks were confronted on one side with the threat of a German *Drang nach Osten* and on the other with the threat of a Japanese invasion.¹

Stalin's first public utterance after Munich, in January 1939,

¹ The Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed by Germany and Japan in November 1936, and joined by Italy a year later.

showed by its acceptance of the Nazi seizure of the Sudetenland how the wind was blowing. Then came the seizure of Prague on March 15, 1939, which transferred equipment for forty divisions to the German side, a net gain for the Germans equivalent to eighty divisions. This changed the whole military balance of Europe. Stalin now spoke again, and even more leniently of the Nazis. Despite these warnings the Allied Governments in April gave guarantees to Poland and Rumania without consulting Moscow. Litvinov's resignation in early May should have given conclusive warning of a pending change in Soviet policy. Nevertheless, the Allies sent diplomatic and military missions to Moscow to enlist Bolshevik support. These missions utterly failed because they had no blue chips. Poland refused to entertain the idea of allowing the Red Army to cross Polish soil for the purpose of defending Poland against Germany. And the Allies refused to sanction a Russian guarantee of the Baltic states against the will of those states.

It was then that Stalin cast the die. In plans that had been maturing for months, he accepted the Nazi offer to share in the spoils in return for remaining neutral during the invasion of Poland. The pact was signed August 23, 1939. Molotov, who had succeeded Litvinov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was likewise a member of the Politbureau of the party. The policy of the Narkomindel and the Comintern had again become coördinated.

This action, which shifted Russia from the *status quo* camp back to the revisionist camp and ushered in the Second World War, had been heralded in the discussions of the Comintern. Manuilsky, in the speech quoted above, declared that Britain was the real enemy of the revolution. He said that she intended to sacrifice the small states, divert the Nazi push southeastward to Russia, partition China, and make a Munich peace in the Far East. The action likewise put the Soviet system back on the track to world revolution. The Comintern changed tactics in accordance with the new policy — expansion for defense of the "Socialist fatherland" through coöperation with the various national sections of the Comintern. Eastern Poland was occupied by the Red Army, under the partition agreement with the Nazis. The process failed in Finland because the Finnish army prevented contact with the local Communists. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the process worked smoothly, beginning with treaties of mutual assistance and the acquisition of rights to naval and air bases in September

and October 1939, and ending with annexation in June 1940, after the fall of France. Bessarabia and North Bukovina were acquired in July 1940 through old-fashioned power politics. Thus as a result of the Bolshevik-Nazi deal, the Comintern became an instrument for territorial expansion of the "Socialist fatherland."

Meanwhile the fellow travellers abroad, whose ideals had been outraged, began to drop off the revolutionary train. But not the professional revolutionists who compose the vast majority of the national sections of the Comintern. Their difficulty was simply to keep abreast of the "party line." In Britain, the Communist Party continued a pro-war policy until after the conquest of Poland. Then it turned defeatist, with a policy emulating that of Lenin in 1914: "Let the people of each country concentrate their attack on 'their own' government. The result will be, not the victory of one side or the other, but general international revolution and a Socialist peace." In New York, the *Daily Worker* continued its anti-Nazi attacks until the Red Army invaded Poland. Then it shifted to neutrality. After the partition accord it brought out a front page editorial entitled "Stop This Imperialist War!" Since that time no forthright anti-Fascist articles have appeared in any of the Communist papers abroad. And just as the German Communist Party worked in conjunction with the Nazis to bring about the downfall of the Weimar Republic, so the French Communist Party in 1939-1940 undermined the Daladier and Reynaud Governments in the hour of France's greatest peril, helping pave the way for the Nazi destruction of the French Republic itself. Just before May Day this year, to cap the climax, the Comintern issued from Moscow an appeal to "workers and people of capitalist countries to unite their efforts for a struggle against capitalism-breeding wars."

This revolutionary defeatism would seem to deny any assumption that the Bolsheviks would like to see the war continue to the point of exhaustion of both sides. But for the purpose of uniting workers of the world on behalf of a "Socialist peace" it is the same tactic employed by Lenin during the World War — the tactic of world revolution.

Having temporarily broken the threat of encirclement in the West, and having redivided Eastern Europe with the Nazis, Stalin next sought to accomplish a similar result in the Far East. For two decades Russia and Japan have been moving towards a collision in Asia. From the moment of Japan's conquest of Man-

churia in 1931, until the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, Russia consistently sought a non-aggression pact. But the Bolshevik price had gone up. Finally the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality, signed April 13, 1941, indicated that both parties agreed on the need to come to an arrangement. Whether or not the Nazis exerted pressure on both sides to make the agreement, it obviously was to their advantage that Japan should be free to engage the attention of the United States in the Western Pacific and thus divert American attention from the job of aiding Britain.

Under the strain of war in China, Japan had taken a definite plunge toward totalitarianism by dissolving political parties and trade unions in the summer of 1940. The Bolsheviks, thus encircled not by capitalism but by totalitarianism, have ample reason to fear that in a long war of attrition the Nazis will be compelled to seek oil and fats in Russia. They see that the real objective of the Nazi Balkan campaign might be the Ukraine, in order to gain control of the lower Volga, capture the oil wells of Baku and Grozny, and exploit the Ukrainian share of the Soviet Union's 30 million pigs. The longer the war lasts the greater the certainty that all the belligerents will be exhausted, thus insuring the progress of world revolution. But the likelihood also increases that the Nazis will demand the right to exploit Russian oil and fats, with or without Bolshevik consent. In these circumstances the decision of the Bolsheviks to abandon the risk of collision with Japan is as understandable as is Japan's decision to eliminate the risk of war with Russia in view of America's increasing preparations for war.

The Bolshevik gains from the pact with Japan are, on paper: neutralization of Japan in the event of a Nazi invasion of the Ukraine; recognition of Soviet control over Outer Mongolia; and freedom to move part of the Far Eastern military establishment back to the Western frontier. The latter might also imply freedom to take over Northern Iran, and otherwise to protect Soviet interests in the Middle East should the field of major hostilities extend to that area via Turkey or Syria.

The Japanese gains, on paper, are: escape from the obligation, implied in the alliance with Axis, to attack Russia in the event of a Nazi invasion of the Ukraine; neutralization of Russia if Japan engages in hostilities with Britain and the United States; recognition of Manchukuo; and freedom to move troops from the Russian frontier to Indo-China or other points south.

If there are secret clauses in the treaty we may presume that

they take care of Russia's need for effective use of the former Chinese Eastern Railway as the short-cut to Vladivostok, and include an arrangement regarding Northern Manchuria, Southern Sakhalin, and even the Kurile Islands. It likewise may be presumed that Japan demanded that Russia cease giving supplies to Free China; but Moscow has denied making any such concession.

While as many ways can be found to interpret this treaty as being as much against the Axis as in favor of the Axis, it marks a new Bolshevik reorientation which contains certain long-range possibilities definitely unfavorable to Britain and the United States. Japan, Italy, Germany and Russia have joined in breaking down the international order, and have shared in the division of the spoils. While offering different versions of a "New Order," they have made common cause against the remaining democracies. They want to keep their spoils. They do not intend to disgorge them at some peace conference called by victorious democracies. If, rather than go to war, the Bolsheviks consent to let Nazi Germany exploit their oil and fats, then there might emerge the equivalent of a Eurasian bloc running from the North Sea to the Pacific, and down the Pacific coast to Saïgon, for the purpose of smashing the British Empire. Such a Eurasian bloc could probably withstand attrition from without for an indefinite period. The situation is further complicated by the revival of the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China. Should that chasm widen, not only would the united front of Chinese resistance to Japan be broken, but there might develop a Chinese tendency to break into three parts: (1) North China to south of the Yangtze, including the seaports, under the domination of Japan; (2) Northwest China, under the domination of Soviet Russia; (3) West and Southwest China, under the Kuomintang, and supported by Britain and America. Such a partitionment of China would be a prelude to civil war and social revolution.

As the war crisis deepens, social revolution becomes an increasing threat in Japan also. Her position today is not unlike that of Tsarist Russia in 1916, with war expenditures overtaking the capacities of the treasury and social forces boiling up from below. Temporary relief from a desperate situation might be found in the full exploitation of Indo-China and of the oil and mineral resources of Southeast Asia. The ultimate victor in a long war of attrition might then well prove to be the Comintern. This is a vital point. Though revolution holds the field today both in Con-

tinental Europe and Asia, it as yet is only a *cauchemar* in a world sense. But the specter can be dispelled only by British victory or by a breakdown of the Bolshevik as well as the Nazi régime.

DEDUCTIONS

Let us try to make a few deductions. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has never abandoned, and is not likely to abandon, its goal of world revolution and a World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics. The various reversals in direction of Soviet foreign policy are merely moves in the basic strategy to that end. The shifts are determined by the internal problems of Russia (industrialization, socialization, periodic purges, etc.); by shifting values and pressures in the constellation of Powers; and by the flow and ebb of the revolutionary tide throughout the world. On occasions the Bolsheviks have been unable to distinguish a flow from an ebb (*e.g.*, in Germany in 1923). At other times they have allowed their two instruments for the conduct of external relations to work at cross purposes.

Before 1921 the Narkomindel and the Comintern were coördinated in the tactic of world revolution to defeat the Allied intervention and to break the *cordon sanitaire*. Between 1921 and 1939 they were often in conflict. The Narkomindel promoted the official peace policies of truce with capitalism, peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, and collective security against Fascism. The Comintern meanwhile played a secondary rôle, although it was active at times in the internal politics of Great Britain, China, Germany, Spain and France. Since 1939 the Narkomindel and the Comintern have again been coördinated in pursuing the tactic of neutrality, the while Fascism carries out its world-wide assault on democracy.

Faced with such a record we recoil from any attempt to predict exactly what the next Bolshevik tactic will be. But we may note that the world revolutionary tide has been flowing again for ten years, and that it can hardly be expected to reach flood peak until the end of the present war. The general policy of the Bolsheviks is to gain time, and to rely on the revolutionary defeatism being busily propagated by the Comintern's two million members and affiliates abroad under cover of the alleged desire to bring about a "Socialist peace." The success of this policy is predicated on Russia's ability to keep out of the war. She faces the danger that in a long war of attrition the Nazis, pressed on by desperate need,

will put up to Moscow the alternative of waging war or permitting the exploitation of Russian oil and fats. In that event the Nazis may again give Russia compensation, and we may see the process of redividing Eastern Europe extended to the Middle East, with the Red Army occupying Iran in a race toward India. Or, if forced to a final decision whether to fight the Nazis or coöperate with them fully, the Bolsheviks, putting all their faith in the inevitability of world revolution, may simply retire beyond the Urals and wait for the Germans to smother themselves in the Ukraine as they did in 1918. No one knows but Stalin, and Stalin does not cross bridges too soon.

On May 6, 1941, Stalin assumed the functions of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. It is the post from which Lenin directed Soviet affairs during what is called the Homeric period of the revolution, when the Narkomindel and the Comintern were coöordinated and the revolutionary tide was flowing. Today the Narkomindel and the Comintern again are coöordinated; the revolutionary tide again flowing; and Soviet foreign policy and Communist world revolution again are one pattern.

THE WARTIME USE OF SHIPPING

By William Diebold, Jr.

THE shipping problem is not just another name for the Battle of the Atlantic. Overloaded warehouses in Batavia and political crisis in Rio may result from torpedoings in the Atlantic; but the solution of the problems they create cannot wait on the defeat of the submarine. World shipping problems must be met within their own terms of reference and solved by the means at hand. British control of the Atlantic and a successful defense of the British Isles may depend on there being enough ships in the Pacific, Caribbean and Indian Oceans. The shipping problem is not one, it is many; it concerns not only embattled Britain and her American armor-bearer, but all countries that live by the purchase or sale of goods beyond the seas.

"It must be remembered," says Sir Arthur Salter, "that sea transport is almost as transferable as money itself."¹ From this premise it is clear that the British problem, and the problem of American aid to Britain, must be seen as a part of the world shipping situation. Every ship afloat and beyond Axis control is, in a sense, available for solving every wartime shipping problem, and almost every shipping problem is related to the British war effort. To secure war supplies from the United States, Britain must have transatlantic shipping; to guarantee the manufacture of those supplies in this country, there must be transpacific shipping. The war contribution of the Empire is communicated through ships. Ship transport for supplies may decide the attitude of borderline countries toward the war. The demands on world shipping as a whole and British and American shipping in particular arise from all of these needs.

No neat statistical etching of the British or world shipping position is possible. Some of the data are uncertain and behind the times; some are lacking. Yet a rough draft, showing at least the problem's dimensions, must be prepared as a preliminary to framing a solution.

The Germans claim to have sunk 11 million tons of British, Allied and neutral shipping from the outbreak of the war through April 1941; the British put the figure at 6.1 million tons.² It is

¹ "Allied Shipping Control," p. 31.

² Unless otherwise noted, figures in this article refer to gross tons, a measure of capacity in which a ton is taken as equal to 100 cubic feet. The gross tonnage of a ship is the capacity of the space

generally taken for granted that the German total is exaggerated, as, quite apart from propaganda motives, the Germans are in no position to determine sinkings accurately. The British might be expected to minimize their losses for the sake of morale. Admiral Sims wrote that at their first interview, on the entry of the United States into the World War, "Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out of his drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage losses for the last few months. . . . These figures indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those which were then being published in the Press."³ On the other hand, a desire to speed American aid, particularly in the matter of convoys, might prompt the British to write their losses large, especially of ships carrying American supplies.⁴ Perhaps these motives result in something like a balance. In any case, neutral observers are inclined to believe that the British figures are fairly accurate. With these caveats, and in lieu of alternative data, British figures will be used to discuss sinkings. They are subject to revision by the Admiralty for several months after they have been issued; and they do not include merchant ships lost on naval duty.

The monthly pattern of sinkings is significant. For the first half year of the war, sinkings averaged about 190,000 tons per month. The figure fell during the Scandinavian campaign, rose sharply in May, and spurted to over half a million tons in June, the month of Dunkerque. From July through the end of 1940, German submarines, operating now from bases along the whole western coast of Europe, raised their monthly average to 390,000 tons. A drop during the winter weather was followed by sinkings of 489,000 tons in March and 488,000 in April (including the Balkan campaign), bringing the total for the first third of 1941 to 1.6 million tons. It seems likely that sinkings for 1941 will total some 5 million tons. An intensive German effort might well raise the total above this mark; better protection for British convoys, whether through American help or not, might keep it lower. The rate of loss sets the pace for the shipping problem.

between the sides and ceiling of the hull plus the storage or living space above decks, with deductions for water tanks, wheelhouse and certain other installations.

³ Quoted in "War Memoirs" of David Lloyd George (London, 1938), vol. I, 689-90.

⁴ In a letter to Senator Vandenberg, Admiral Land gave world sinkings for the first four months of 1941 as 781,914 gross tons, less than half the British Admiralty's total (*New York Times*, May 8, 1941). It has been suggested that Admiral Land's figure was based on newspaper reports only. The Maritime Commission's Division of Economics and Statistics declines to explain the discrepancy, on the ground that it publishes no information regarding merchant shipping losses.

In the summer of 1939 the world's merchant marine (all ships of 100 gross tons or over, excluding Great Lakes shipping) totalled 66.5 million tons, somewhat more than was required to carry world trade at that time. After twenty months of war, the supply of merchant vessels available to countries not under German or Italian control had apparently fallen to between 52 and 54 million tons, a drop of some 20 percent.⁵ At the same time, the demand for shipping rose. Though import restrictions and the blockade have curtailed or eliminated many kinds of trade, their effect seems to have been more than offset by the British war effort, increased production in the United States, longer trade routes, congested ports, slow convoys, and the use of merchant shipping by armies and navies.

Merchant tonnage directly under British control has increased since the war began. In June 1939 some 20.6 million tons of shipping were registered in the British Empire, 87 percent of it in the United Kingdom. The British have captured at least 400,000 tons of Italian and German ships. From the merchant marines of the occupied countries (including France) they acquired about 7 million tons. Some of these ships are operated by the governments in exile along lines approved by the British. Ships totalling more than 800,000 tons were bought from the United States. New building in the British Empire during the first twenty months of the war was probably between 1.4 and 1.7 million tons. To all this should be added whatever neutral shipping the British may have on time charter above what they had in the prewar period, as well as those parts of the Greek and Yugoslav merchant marines coming to Britain. The subtraction of 6.1 million tons sunk leaves Britain, at the end of April, in direct control of 24-26 million tons

⁵ Total sinkings, including Axis ships, probably equalled 7.5 million tons. New building outside the Axis area, but including Japan, probably did not reach 3 million tons. Of the 6.5 million tons of unsunk German and Italian ships, the British captured at least 400,000, leaving the rest in Europe or laid-up in foreign harbors. A number of those used in the Mediterranean or in European coastwise trade have probably also been sunk by the British. The merchant marine of the occupied countries, including France, exceeded 12 million tons in 1939. Perhaps 1.3 or 1.5 million tons were sunk, and the British secured about 7 million. The remaining 3.5 or more million tons were under Axis control or in foreign harbors, save for parts of the French fleet still operating, claimed by Vichy to exceed 1.5 million tons. In all, something over a million tons of Axis and occupied country shipping is in foreign harbors, including that seized by the United States and Latin American countries. There are 600,000 tons of Axis shipping in Latin America, 150,000 in the United States, almost 300,000 tons of French, Danish and other laid-up ships in the United States and an undetermined amount in Latin America. Further deductions should be made for the Greek and Yugoslav ships which fell into Axis hands. Those sunk before the end of April are included in the 7.5 million above. It must be emphasized that the wartime figures are all estimates, but they have been compiled and checked by the best sources available.

of shipping, considerably more than before the war.⁶ It would be fallacious to regard this as a net gain of 30 percent in ships available to the British, as much of their commerce has always been carried in foreign bottoms. Foreign flagships carried 46 percent (by net tonnage) of United Kingdom imports during 1938. Nevertheless, it is an advantage to the British to have this larger number of ships directly subject to their wartime controls, and not to have to compete for them in a world market.

Not all the ships are effective merchant tonnage, however. The figures include many ships too small for overseas trade, and also passenger ships. Damages as well as sinkings reduce the supply. No official figures are available as to the number of British merchantmen laid up for repairs at any one time, but they are probably about 1.5 million tons, perhaps more. The Royal Navy has taken over numerous merchant ships to serve as auxiliary cruisers and patrol boats; the Army has taken transports and supply ships. By the autumn of 1940, the services were believed to have taken about 4.5 million tons of merchant shipping. With the development of the war in Africa and the Near East this figure rose, probably to 7 million.

Perhaps 16 to 18 million tons of shipping are available to the British for merchant traffic at any one time. Ordinarily Empire routes far removed from the United Kingdom absorb some 2 million tons. Recent reports suggest that less than a million tons are now so engaged; but there may be difficulty in keeping the total as low as this for a long period of time. Most British ships have been withdrawn from world trade routes outside the war zone, and the remainder are being taken out. British ships — many of them coastwise vessels — entering and clearing Chinese ports fell from 8.3 million tons in 1939 to 4.4 million in 1940. However, there are still Norwegian freighters in the Latin American trade, and Norwegian and Dutch ships, largely tankers, in the Far East. This has usually been taken to mean that Britain's position is not absolutely desperate. The ships are kept there, it is believed, as part of a compromise with the owners and in hopes of holding open trade routes for British shipping in the postwar period. Negotiations for the replacement of these ships by American vessels have probably been going on. Without such replacement their withdrawal would create serious difficulties. They

⁶ It is not quite accurate to subtract the whole 6.1 million from the British total as it includes neutral tonnage not under British charter but, presumably, sailing to the British Isles.

comprise, for example, about one-fifth of all the ships plying between Latin America and the United States.

Probably about 15 million tons of shipping are used to supply the United Kingdom. The task is much greater than in peacetime. It is no longer possible to obtain 32 percent of the United Kingdom's imports from nearby Europe, as in 1938, and ships from the Far East must sail around Africa. As is well known, the convoy system reduces the carrying power of the merchant marine. The collection of convoys causes delay; their speed is that of the slowest ship; some of them being reported to go as slowly as six knots an hour. At least 25 percent reduction in carrying power for ships in the war zone is usually attributed to the use of convoys, though this may be somewhat mitigated by allowing fast ships to travel alone. There is congestion at the English ports, arising from the arrival of large convoys, bombings, and the difficulties of unloading at night in the blackout. Over-all figures conceal the strain on British shipping resulting from heavy losses in specialized carriers such as tankers and refrigerated ships. While figures are not available, it is generally understood that a higher percentage of these ships has been lost than of ordinary cargo vessels.

Reduced capacity and efficiency make annual losses of 5 million tons very grave. The British are traditionally a nation of shipbuilders, but there is little prospect that their prowess in this field will be adequate to meet present needs. In his address of May 27, President Roosevelt said that "the present rate of Nazi sinkings of merchant ships is more than three times as high as the capacity of British shipyards to replace them: it is more than twice the combined British and American output of merchant ships today." Even this statement may be too optimistic. In 1938 over a million tons of merchant shipping were launched in the United Kingdom. Accurate figures are not available for 1939 and 1940, but most estimates put each year's launchings at about a million tons. However, a Department of Commerce estimate placing British shipbuilding in the first nine months of 1940 at 400,000 tons suggests that the output for that year might have been considerably lower. Naval construction and the repair of damaged ships occupy many of Britain's yards and much of her labor. The shipbuilding rationalization scheme closed and razed numerous yards in the years before the war; in 1938 Britain had 40 percent less shipbuilding capacity than in 1918. Bombings and

the blackout hinder the building of new yards and the full utilization of existing capacity. Estimates putting British launchings this year at 1.5 million tons are probably over-optimistic; two-thirds of that figure is more likely. The rest of the Empire's ship-building capacity is small; launchings in 1938 equalled 28,000 tons. Orders for ships have been placed in Canada, Hong Kong and elsewhere, and new shipyards are being built in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Much of the Dominions' effort, however, is going into the construction of corvettes and other small naval craft. Certainly they will make no significant addition to the merchant tonnage supply until 1942. It is doubtful if their output for this year will exceed 100,000 tons.

New British building may replace as little as one-quarter of this year's sinkings. A small amount of slack might be taken up in the use of the merchant marine — some further tonnage might be withdrawn from foreign routes, convoys might be more efficiently handled, commodities might be purchased from Canada and the United States rather than from Australia, Argentina and New Zealand. A total collapse of the Near Eastern front, whatever its strategical effects, might free some merchant shipping and additional naval vessels for convoy; but it might also bring new problems of protecting ships off Africa and in the Indian Ocean. Britain alone cannot supply the new tonnage needed to maintain her present rate of imports. She must have ships from abroad. The possible sources are few. Use of all the ships of Axis and occupied countries now laid-up in ports in the Western Hemisphere would yield over a million tons, a very considerable help. It is doubtful if much tonnage can be chartered or bought from the remaining neutral countries of Europe and Latin America. Seventy-five percent of Japan's fleet, once a great earner of foreign exchange, is now engaged in Asiatic waters, and the rest carries little but Japanese imports. Withdrawal of Dutch and Norwegian tonnage from the Japan trade would intensify Japan's problems, raising political issues the British and American Governments apparently wish to avoid. It is to the United States that Britain must turn for large-scale shipping aid.

The first measure of American wartime merchant marine policy — in the Neutrality Act of 1939 — curtailed the tonnage potentially available to Britain. Though of minor importance to the British in the past, the 500,000 tons of American shipping laid-up under the Act and now employed on other routes, would

have been precious in wartime and, in the absence of the law, would have been augmented by other American ships drawn into the Atlantic by higher freight rates. At the same time, the Maritime Commission gave permission for sales of about 800,000 tons of ships, many of them over-age, to British and Canadian purchasers. Britain also secured more or less direct benefits from the 450,000 tons of United States shipping, largely tankers, transferred to Latin American or European registry during the first year and one half of war. Late in February 1941, Maritime Commission officials were reported as saying that American needs made it impossible to transfer or sell any more ships abroad.⁷ Since the Commission's laid-up fleet of 700,000 tons has been depleted, further transfers would be at the expense of the active merchant marine, except to the extent that they were replaced by new building.

Since 1936 the Maritime Commission has had a merchant shipbuilding program designed to replace the high percentage of over-age tonnage in our fleet, much of which dates from the World War. The program was speeded up after war broke out and was supplemented by an emergency program calling for the construction in 1941 and 1942 of 200 "ugly ducklings," partially pre-fabricated ships of a standard design, inferior in excellence to the Maritime Commission's ships, but quicker to build. A British order for 60 cargo ships of about 10,000 tons each was also placed here. The production schedules on this program call for the launching of slightly over a million tons of new shipping in 1941 and about 2.3 million in 1942.

Whether the schedule can be speeded up, or whether it is itself optimistic, remains a matter of dispute among the experts. Early in April the President announced that he would use \$500 million of the lease-lend appropriation to build 56 new ways and 212 ships for Britain. The tonnage of these ships has not been announced, nor has the date when they should be completed. It seems unlikely that any will be launched before 1942, and the majority of them will probably not appear until late that year or in 1943. A figure of 5 million tons is sometimes mentioned as our output of ships in the latter year. To reach this figure it will be necessary to push the shipbuilding effort much harder than is

⁷ As a matter of fact, some sales and transfers have taken place, though at a much slower rate than in 1940. Outstanding among these was the transfer in April to Britain under the Lease-Lend Act of four large speedy cargo carriers of the newest design.

now being done and to begin work now on new ways and yards. More general use of pre-fabrication and possibly resort to wooden ships would also hasten construction. On present schedules, the combined rate of British and American shipbuilding will not equal half the rate of loss from sinking until sometime in 1942. This may be bettered by increasing the shipbuilding program or reducing the sinkings. The nub of the building problem is the relatively long lapse of time from the building of ways to the launching of ships.

The building of ships is the only fundamental way out of a world shortage. But the new supplies of tonnage to be expected this year are inadequate to the need, and little can be done to increase them. The problem is immediate; things will get worse, not better. To cope with this crisis, American policy must concentrate on making the best possible use of available tonnage in whatever routes it is sailing. The need for ships is not limited to the North Atlantic. The general shipping shortage has made it difficult to secure space for United States imports of jute, hides, vegetable oils, and other raw materials from Latin America and Asia. The accumulation of stockpiles of strategic materials has been hampered. The spectre of future shortages begins to be seen, though still not so clearly as it should. The rise in freight rates, though somewhat restrained by government pressure and British controls, is an element in increasing domestic costs which lies outside the scope of present price controls, and threatens the financial structure of the defense economy.

Cognizant of this situation, the President on February 10, 1941, addressed a letter to Admiral Land, Chairman of the Maritime Commission, stressing the importance of shipping to the defense effort and asking his advice and assistance regarding the "maximum utilization" of the merchant marine. The Maritime Commission then set up a Division of Emergency Shipping which sought to smooth out difficulties by conferring with shippers. Coördination in the use of shipping space and informal priorities for strategic materials were instituted. Some of the difficulties arose from the acquisition of merchant shipping by the Army and Navy. A partial solution was reached by arranging that some of the supplies for West Indian bases should be carried by south-bound freighters in the Latin American trade, instead of by special ships which would then return empty to the United States. Army ships returning from the Philippines were also used to carry

strategic materials. By the end of May the services had taken over 400,000 tons of passenger shipping and an undisclosed number of cargo vessels, particularly fast ships of the latest types, originally designed as potential naval auxiliaries. The increased rate at which merchant ships are being acquired by the Army and Navy threatens to become a serious factor in limiting the tonnage available for other uses.

On April 30, President Roosevelt asked the Maritime Commission "to secure the service of at least 2,000,000 tons of merchant shipping which now exists and plan the operation thereof in such a manner as will make their cargo space immediately effective in accomplishing our objective of all out aid to the democracies." This was the first action approaching a mobilization of American shipping resources to meet the emergency. Arrangements were made almost immediately for 25 tankers to be used to carry oil from Latin America to east coast ports in the United States, where it would be transferred to British ships for the run to the United Kingdom. Later 25 more tankers were supplied. On June 4 the Commission ordered Gulf and Atlantic coastwise shippers to divert half their ships to the pool. By making use of all the laid-up shipping of Axis, French and occupied country registry in United States ports, about one-quarter of the 2 million ton pool would be supplied. However, the damaged German and Italian ships will not be ready for use for some time. It may be possible to purchase some of the laid-up ships in Latin American harbors, but at least a million tons and probably more will have to come from the active United States merchant marine.

At the end of December 1940, some 4 million tons of our shipping plied in coastwise or intercoastal routes — nearly 60 percent of our whole merchant marine of 7.2 million tons.⁸ In the period from October 30, 1939, to the end of 1940, some 400,000 tons were withdrawn from the coastwise trade for sale to Britain or to take advantage of the higher freight rates on deep-water routes. The fifty tankers taken for the pool in May came largely from this source, leading to predictions that the consumption of petroleum products in the eastern United States would have to be sharply curtailed in the coming year. In urging Congress to pass a bill providing for condemnation of rights of way for a pipeline from Texas oilfields to Middle Atlantic refineries, the President

⁸ Figures for the United States merchant marine refer to ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.

stressed the need for additional transportation facilities to offset the reduced tanker supply. The withdrawal of numerous ships from the coastwise trade which has begun will require some adjustments in our economy. Reduction in water transport would increase the burden of American road and rail carriers. This pressure, coupled with the rise in industrial production, will probably necessitate an expansion of railroad facilities, including an enlarged production of rolling stock and other equipment. This in turn will intensify the strain on steel production. The higher freight charges for overland transportation will also tend to increase production costs of many items. Drawing on Great Lakes shipping would have similar effects. Some of the 2.6 million tons of shipping on the Lakes could be brought out through the canals to the open sea, but the need of bottoms on the Lakes is so great that a new law has been enacted allowing Canadian ships to carry iron ore between American Lake ports to relieve the burden on our own vessels.

There are no other domestic reservoirs of shipping. Any additional ships must be withdrawn from overseas routes, thereby aggravating one problem to ease another. The choice as to the relative importance of different uses, cargoes and routes can be made wisely only in terms of our defense economy as a whole. Some form of priorities for raw materials imports, drastically applied, would lay the foundation for a more efficient use of shipping. Shorter hauls, made possible by shifting purchases to nearer sources, would also save tonnage. Philippine sugar is already virtually barred from this country by high freight rates and the lack of ships. It has been suggested that Asiatic raw materials might all be delivered at west coast ports and carried the rest of the way by railroads and trucks. The purchase of increased quantities of semi-finished goods instead of the bulkier raw materials may be possible in a few cases.

Once priorities have been established, and imports regulated, so that it is known to what extent the rubber, jute and manganese are to share space with bananas, coffee and spices, it will be possible to calculate more exactly how much shipping can be spared, and from what routes. It will be necessary, of course, to control the ships themselves in order to be able to move them where they are most needed. If Britain needs ships in the North Atlantic, and if the United States remains on a short-of-war basis and retains the Neutrality Act, they can be transferred to British

or other registry. If they are to be used outside the war zone, they can remain under United States control. Or some compromise plan can be worked out, such as chartering the ships to the British for use outside the war zone, as was done in the case of the first 25 tankers collected in May. The aims of American shipping policy would not be dictated by defense needs alone, though these would be the weightiest factors, but also by political motives — the Good Neighbor policy, aid to China, the strategy of food — and by the usefulness of shipping control as an instrument of economic warfare. To the extent that the merchant marine was more efficient under a unified policy, larger amounts of consumption goods might be imported than would otherwise be possible.

Sir Arthur Salter has said: "I am confident that there is presently available in America enough merchant tonnage to form the so-called bridge of ships, until such time as the combined ship construction efforts of the United States and Great Britain begin sending new vessels off the ways."⁹ There is every reason to believe that this is true, provided the United States makes the most efficient use of its merchant marine. Perhaps this can be done by the present program based on the coöperation of the owners and operators. It is doubtful. Coöperation is secured for specific problems involving a clear and immediate need, but a shipping policy articulated to our defense economy as a whole must be conceived in larger terms and be planned in relation to future needs in a situation which will deteriorate so long as sinkings exceed launchings. Coöperation is likely to be a cumbersome, halting process. As shippers are called on to make greater sacrifices — in terms of what they might get in a free market — coöperation will be harder to secure. Compromise is basic to coöperation, for the shippers' needs as well as the government's must be considered. It is not conducive to immediate and drastic action.

The *requisitioning* of our entire merchant marine is the prerequisite to using it at its maximum. Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 empowers the Maritime Commission to requisition ships: in a national emergency or "whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable. . . ." Once requisitioned, the routes, sailings and cargoes of all ships could be determined by government order, though the actual operation of the vessels might be left in the hands of their managers, as is now done in England. Owners

⁹ *Journal of Commerce*, May 8, 1941.

would receive compensation for their ships on agreed terms and freight rates could be fixed at whatever level the Government chose. For many years we have subsidized the operators of deep-sea ships in one form or another, and protected coastwise ships from foreign competition. This policy was justified by the claim that it is in the national interest to maintain a merchant marine. Now it is in the national interest to use it.

Requisitioning raises many problems. At what rate shall the owners be paid? How shall the demands of different government agencies be coördinated? What weight shall diplomatic policy have in comparison with defense needs? Shall shipowners, who retain an interest in the ships they expect to have returned after the war, be employed by the Government to help operate the control? What representation shall be given to maritime labor? The problems are difficult, as would be those of any kind of control or of no control at all. Of the many possible types of government regulation of shipping, requisitioning is the best because it makes possible a unified control of the entire merchant marine in terms of the whole pattern of national needs. As Sir Arthur Salter explained it to the British Parliament: "Under requisitioning you can, as you cannot under a licensing system, plan ahead, take a look at your whole programme of imports, look at the whole of the ships operating. You can make a plan of the whole and no one who has not access to the whole of the facts can do that."¹⁰

Requisitioning will not take care of one important matter: the foreign ships carrying our goods. Only about 30 percent of our prewar imports (on the basis of cargo tonnage) arrived in American ships. Undoubtedly this share has risen since the war began. But of the 119 ships in the Latin American trade in March 1941, only 54 were of United States registry. Clearly some means must be found to bring foreign ships within range of an American ship control. Many such ships are in fact American-owned, though of foreign registry, and may be subject to requisitioning. Bunker control proved a useful instrument for bringing neutral ships into British service in the World War. Under this plan ships may fuel only if they are on voyages approved by the shipping authorities. Harbor regulations or the issuance of warrants may be similarly used. Some owners might prefer not to touch at American ports rather than meet these terms. But if our program were geared to that of the British, the field left for such ships

¹⁰ Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, March 18, 1940, col. 1769.

would be small; Japan would be the biggest customer. Should the situation become serious through the defection of too many ships, we might have to choose between offering inducements to enter our trade, in the form of very high rates, or of applying economic and political pressure on the individuals or countries involved.

The relationship between the American and British merchant marines is of the greatest importance. Under present conditions, the United States seeks to free ships from its services, and freed ships are then turned over, in one way or another, to the British. This procedure is unsatisfactory in that it contributes nothing towards the solution of our own problems. If our merchant fleet were requisitioned, a more coherent program could be worked out. Unless there is coördination there will be friction and working at cross purposes, with a consequent loss of efficiency. Even operating in close harmony there would be conflicts of interest and differences of opinion as to the best way to achieve agreed ends. The organization of such coöperation is beyond the scope of this article. Two chief instrumentalities suggest themselves: a specialized advisory body, modelled on the Allied Maritime Transport Council of World War days; or a joint board with virtually complete power over the two merchant marines. Whatever the form, the need for the articulation of the two programs is patent. Shipping is the crucial central link between the two war economies as well as between each economy and the areas of the world on which it depends for sustenance. Conceivably, Anglo-American coöperation in this sphere might strike roots and become the nucleus for a wider international organization, or at any rate for closer coöperation between the two countries in other spheres. In the postwar period, no less than in wartime, there will be problems to solve. Though the outside pressure will be absent, the merit of joint solutions will remain.

Whatever may come of this, and whether Britain wins or loses, the immediate wartime needs of the United States in the field of shipping are dual: increased shipbuilding, and maximum utilization of the ships available. These will not come about of themselves, but must be brought about by planned policy and strong action.

HISPANIOLA

By John Gunther

ON his first voyage to the American Indies, shimmering on the western horizon, Christopher Columbus discovered a Caribbean island which he called Hispaniola, meaning "Little Spain." He set foot on what is now Haiti on December 6, 1492, shortly after his first landfall at Watling Island in the Bahamas. Hispaniola was — and is — an exceptionally curious place, and it has had as curious a history as any area in the Western Hemisphere. Today it is divided into two independent states strikingly different from each other, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Haiti occupies the western third, and the Dominican Republic (often called Santo Domingo) the rest.

On the poinsettia-fringed shores of Hispaniola, Columbus — the most imaginative, the vainest, the luckiest, and the most persistent sailor the world has ever known — pitched his first camp and built his first fortress, La Navidad. It was in Hispaniola that he lost his caravel, the *Santa Maria*; here that he picked up his first naked Indians and screaming parrots for delivery to Seville; here that his men grumbled and almost mutinied as he lay sick for five months. In Hispaniola Spain created its first colony in the new world — which Columbus still thought to be the kingdom of Cathay — founded its first university, and erected its first cathedral, which still stands. In this cathedral Columbus still lies buried, after exhumation from his first burial in Spain. Columbus crossed the Atlantic after, as well as before, his death.

When Columbus first arrived in Hispaniola it was inhabited by mild-mannered, friendly Indians whom his men promptly butchered. Hardly an Indian survived fifty years after his coming. As early as 1506 sugar cane was introduced, and by 1512 the Spaniards were bringing in Negro slaves to work the new plantations. These slaves proliferated as did the crops they grew — spices, indigo, tobacco, as well as sugar. The island became rich, and the slaves survived the violently hard labor to which they were subjected. As a result Haiti today is 90 percent pure Negro and 10 percent mulatto (there are no whites except foreigners). It is the only Negro republic in the world, Liberia excepted. The Dominican Republic next door has, in contrast, a considerable

white population — perhaps 20 percent. The rest is mulatto, with some Indian admixture. Haiti speaks French and a bastard patois called Creole. Santo Domingo is Spanish-speaking.

The history of Hispaniola until modern times is a complex record of murder, romantic madness, nationalism, greed, ignorance, foreign intervention and black magic. The basic trend is perhaps rivalry between French-speaking Haiti and Spanish-speaking Santo Domingo. At first the Spaniards concentrated on Santo Domingo because it had some gold, though not much. Meantime French and British buccaneers and traders got into Haiti and found a better bargain. It turned out to be the richest colony in the new world, and they began to loot it. The French grip on the island grew, and presently Spain was forced to give up the Dominican end. All of Hispaniola — then called Saint Domingue — formally became French in 1795.

Observe the date. The distant winds of the great French Revolution began to reach Haiti. Fanning the dark fires already smouldering there they soon produced one of the most exceptional events in history, the revolt of the Haitian negroes against their French masters. A black chieftain whose name is legend, Toussaint L'Ouverture, beat the French and established a free republic in 1801. Napoleon sent troops under his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, to conquer Toussaint and his fighting blacks. It was the only instance of attempted Napoleonic penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Toussaint was captured. But the revolt went on, blindly, blackly, savagely. Two formidable Negro chieftains, Dessalines (who had all the whites on the island exterminated) and Christophe (who built the citadel near Cap Haitien which stuns tourists to this day), continued the struggle until independence was confirmed. Dessalines was "Emperor" from 1804 to 1806, and Christophe became "King," as Henri I, in 1811. But Christophe, a man of fantastic quality, killed himself in 1820. Haiti has been a republic ever since.

The affairs of Santo Domingo next door were inextricably entangled with this bloody record. Part of the time it was united to Haiti, despite the difference in language; part of the time it reverted to Spain or had a semi-independence of its own. The Spanish upper classes furiously resented subjection by Negro kings, and they joined the French to fight Toussaint and Dessalines. Then the Spanish revolted against the French, and Santo Domingo went back to Spain in 1809. Later, two more remarkable

mulatto adventurers — Pétion and Boyer — entered the scene. The Haitians reconquered the Dominican regions and reunited the island under Haitian rule till 1844. After a revolution, Santo Domingo reannexed itself to Spain in 1861, the only country in Latin America that has ever done so. It is curious that the United States did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine. In 1865 the Dominicans pulled loose from Spain again, and in 1869 the forlorn little country asked to be incorporated into the United States. A treaty annexing it was negotiated and drawn up; it failed ratification in the United States Senate by one vote. Had this vote gone otherwise, the Dominican Republic might be part of the United States today.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, now independent states, were tormented by the most vicious kind of civil disorder and revolution. By 1915 Haiti in particular had succumbed to complete political chaos. There had been six presidents in four years, and three of them were murdered. One president, named Guillaume Sam, was torn to pieces by a mob that dragged him from the French Legation after he had slaughtered a batch of political opponents. The United States intervened, and our marines took over protection of public order. We had been contemplating intervention for a considerable time.

This was one of the earliest and is probably the most celebrated case of what came to be known later as "Yankee Imperialism." Beyond doubt Americans entered Haiti for mixed motives, some of them dubious. We wanted to save lives and protect foreign property. But also we wanted to protect private American investors who had an important stake in the country — and what counted more — important friends in Washington. Bloodshed in Haiti was to some extent a pretext for intervention, not the real reason. American interests were largely concentrated in the National Bank of Haiti and a railroad concession controlled by the National City Bank of New York. The whole is an unsavory story. The best summary is that of Ernest Gruening in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* for January 1933. Once established in Haiti the American Administration took control of the government, wrote a new constitution,¹ ruled through puppet politi-

¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt has been quoted in the *New York Times* (August 19, 1920) as saying, "The facts are that I wrote Haiti's constitution myself, and if I do say it, I think it is a pretty good constitution." See Gruening, cited above. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the time.

cians, and forced the country to float a large loan on exorbitant terms.

But (it is important to state) the American occupation was probably a very good thing for Haiti on the whole. We never intended permanent settlement or conquest; we had no idea of making Haiti a colony in the orthodox imperial way. The American occupation lasted for 19 years — until 1934 when the Good Neighbor policy was getting fairly under way — and it ended a year ahead of schedule. Too long, certainly. But American guidance and control grew wiser and more lenient as the years went by. We ended a period of appalling violence and we restored political stability and public order. We contributed to education and public works. The cost to Haitian civil liberties was negligible. After all, there had been no “civil liberties” there before!

American intervention also took place in the Dominican Republic. Our marines went there in 1916, a year after our entrance into Haiti, but they stayed only until 1924. Intervention in the Dominican Republic never aroused as bitter resentment, either locally or among liberals in the United States, as did our prolonged Haitian adventure. Anyway the chapter is closed, or closing. No armed forces are maintained in either country by the United States today. Nor do we maintain any direct political control. In the Dominican Republic we have gradually unloosed financial strings, though we maintain a lien on Dominican revenues until the debt is liquidated. In Haiti we still maintain a Fiscal Representative who superintends local finance and controls the customs in collaboration with Haitian authorities.

II

We now turn to contemporary personal and political issues in the Dominican Republic. It has an area less than that of West Virginia and a population less than that of Los Angeles. In many ways it strikingly resembles Guatemala, although there are few Indians. A ruthless and highly efficient dictator, Generalissimo Trujillo, rules it with a steam roller, as General Ubico rules Guatemala. He exploits it, too.

Like Guatemala, the Dominican Republic pays somewhat appealing attention to the surface amenities. No beggars are allowed; it is forbidden to walk barefoot; children are permitted in the public parks only if they are decently dressed. The Dominican Republic carefully asks if you are a journalist before giving

you a visa (again like Guatemala), and pays close attention to any visitors. And Dominicans are formidably sensitive.

The Dominican Republic is run, bossed, awed, bullied, frightened, stimulated, made to work, and in general dominated by one of the toughest men in Latin America, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. I did not meet General Trujillo. He was in New York when I visited his country. I regret this very much. He is the archetype of old-fashioned Latin American despot — though he has some modern ideas — and I wanted to see and study his face. General Trujillo, who was born in 1891, calls himself Generalissimo of the Armed Forces, Founder and Supreme Chief of the Partido Dominicana, Benefactor of the Fatherland, Restorer of Financial Independence, and First Journalist of the Republic. (This last because he owns the newspaper *La Nacion*.) Some of these titles were given him by the Dominican Congress, unanimously. Foreigners refer to him (when he is not present) as “Mr. Jones” or “Mr. Jackson.”

This puissant general, who is of mixed racial ancestry, came of humble stock, like his friend Batista in Cuba. He started life as an errand boy and cattle hand, and then entered the Guardia Nacional, after graduating from the National Military School. After eight years of service he rose to Colonel. This was in the period of American occupation. The United States marines liked Trujillo, who was a doughty officer, and he built his career largely on their favor. They said, “He thinks just like a marine!” One American officer, a Major Watson, gave him his first chance. Watson “created” Trujillo much as the British General Ironside “created” the present Shah of Persia.

Trujillo rose rapidly and in 1930 performed the *coup d'état* that gave him power. The marines were gone, though the United States continued to control local finance and customs. The President in 1930 was Horacio Vasquez; Trujillo was chief of staff of the army. He made his “revolution” by telling Vasquez that army “reservists” were marching on the capital. The frightened Vasquez promptly resigned, though actually the Trujillo troops were still far away. But Trujillo did not at once make himself president. He appointed someone else to the job (a man who is now in jail), and then, a stickler for proper form, superintended “elections” whereby he became “legal” president. He remained president till 1938, serving two terms; then he decided to resign and rule from behind the scenes. In 1939 he visited Europe briefly

and saw the United States (for the first time) en route. He went to the United States again in 1940.

General Trujillo's domination of the Dominican Republic is complete and rigorous, but occasionally he must take drastic steps to retain his comprehensive position. Early in 1940 a group of dissident army officers disappeared; one is said to have been poisoned while in jail, the others shot. Later in the same year, when reports were current that Trujillo was ill, a group of former comrades determined to seize control in the event of his death. One of these was General José Estrella, formerly Trujillo's closest friend. The center of the plot was the Santiago region. But an officer in the capital betrayed the conspirators, and Estrella and the others were arrested. Estrella was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for complicity in a murder case ten years old. Estrella admitted the murder, but said he performed it on Trujillo's orders.

Late in 1940 the Partido Dominicana, the only political organization in the country, was purged and a new group — inside the Partido Dominicana — was formed called the Partido Trujillista, composed exclusively of intimate adherents of the dictator. Its leader is Dr. José Enrique Aybar, a professor of medicine, one of Trujillo's best friends and his private dentist.

The worst blot on the Trujillo record is the massacre of Haitians in the autumn of 1937. By the most conservative estimate, at least 7,000 Haitians were slaughtered in cold blood, cut to pieces by machetes, and left out in the fields to rot. These Haitians were absolutely innocent of any political ideas. They were itinerant farmers and laborers who drifted into Dominican territory each year to get work cutting sugar cane. What apparently happened was that Trujillo, with ambitions to control the whole island if not the whole Caribbean area, had sent agents to Haiti to foment revolution there. These were caught by the Haitian authorities and shot. Trujillo ordered reprisals. Then Dominican troops got out of hand and went berserk at the opportunity for wholesale slaughter.

This affair made the Generalissimo extremely unpopular in Washington; it was, indeed, one of the most unpleasant episodes in many years of Latin American history. Trujillo, alarmed, has behaved well ever since. He needs American good will, and he has enough political sense to know how important the United States is in Caribbean affairs. Besides he is very pro-American. This is

partly because of his training with the marines, partly because of natural instinct. Trujillo would be delighted if we actually established bases in the Dominican Republic. He is one of the rare Latin American leaders who take this point of view. He knows, of course, that United States army and navy garrisons and aircraft on his territory would serve to stabilize his régime.

The basic fact about the Dominican Republic may be expressed in one sentence: Trujillo in effect owns and runs it, except for the American sugar properties, virtually as his private estate. He controls the salt and shipping monopolies; he dominates the match monopoly; his dummies have their hands on practically all business enterprises. Trujillo manages this "estate" with considerable efficiency. The budget is balanced, and administration is well handled. But he makes vast sums out of it, while the peasants come near to starving. They do forced labor on the roads; they are lucky if they earn 20 cents a day.

About 60 percent of Dominican economy depends on sugar. Trujillo, with an eye to approval in the United States, leaves sugar severely alone. Even during the Haitian massacre, the miserable fleeing Haitians who took refuge on American-owned sugar estates were not molested. Trujillo, it seems, is content to let Americans control 60 percent of the country's business, provided he is free to do what he likes with the remainder.

But hard times are coming to Santo Domingo now. About 60 percent of the sugar crop was customarily exported to Great Britain and Canada. In 1940 British purchases sank to zero. The British simply stopped buying because of wartime exigencies, and this threatened to bring complete economic collapse. The United States has stepped into the breach in several ways. First, the Export-Import Bank lent the Dominican Republic \$3,000,000 late in 1940. In theory this was to build a hotel in the capital city (which, uniquely among world capitals, does not possess one) and for road development. Second, American experts are working on a scheme whereby Dominican sugar is transformed into "invert molasses," which in turn becomes alcohol. By importing this molasses the United States hopes to take about 12 percent of the Dominican sugar crop.

Meantime, as a natural development of the Good Neighbor policy, the United States early in 1941 gave up its control of the Dominican customs which had been American-run since 1905. This agreement followed years of complex negotiations. Our cus-

toms control was originally established to provide security for Dominican bonds sold in the United States. Private American bondholders protested against the 1941 agreement, which was effected without consultation with them, but met with no success. The State Department took the view that the United States no longer collects debts by such mechanisms as direct control of customs. On the other hand, American rights continue to be safeguarded. For instance, we retain a lien on all Dominican revenues, not just customs, for gradual debt repayment, ending in 1969. But no one knows what is going to be happening in 1969.

At the age of 50 Generalissimo Trujillo is a perfect picture of the successful Latin American dictator. He has millions in the bank; all the gaudy comforts of life; complete political authority; an army to back him up; a peasantry to exploit. He has cleaned up Santo Domingo physically; he has established political stability and ensured friendly relations with the United States; all his opponents are under the sod, in prison, or in exile.

A word about Trujillo personally. Like politicians in other lands he likes comfort and display. He maintains five houses, one of them converted out of a nightclub called the San Souci. He is ambitious, cool and forceful. An excellent horseman, he likes to ride. He likes to eat, to drink (especially a kind of brandy called Carlos Primera), to smoke, to dance. His yacht, the *Ranfis*, purchased from the Fleischmann family (it was formerly known as the *Camargo*) is the most splendid in the Caribbean; it has an American skipper, an American engineer, an American chief steward. One of Trujillo's characteristics is a fondness for clothes. He keeps absolutely complete wardrobes, even a full set of uniforms, in all of his five houses. The present Madame Trujillo, whose name was Doña Maria de los Angeles Martínez Alba, is of pure Spanish descent. He has several children. His family sense is very strong; like so many public men in Latin America, he clings close to his own kind. He has four sisters and a number of brothers, and all of them play a rôle. One brother, Hector, is chief of staff. One, Virgilio, is minister to Belgium and Switzerland. One of his sons, aged ten, has recently been promoted to brigadier general in the national army. At five he had become a colonel.

The other Dominican political personalities are, to put it mildly, somewhat overshadowed by the Generalissimo. The President of the Republic, however, is a personage of considerable

dignity and charm. He is Dr. Manuel Troncoso de la Concha, aged about 60, a lawyer by profession, a scholar of distinction, and a former rector of the university.² The foreign minister, Dr. Arturo Despradel, is a fluent professional diplomat who knows procedure well. An attractive character is Vaino Pichardo, the head of the Partido Dominicana, who is very close to the Generalissimo.

As to matters of defense in the Dominican Republic, there is virtually no Fifth Column problem, because no local Fascist party could exist and Germans are almost unknown. American military and naval planes use Dominican airfields practically at will. We could probably make formal arrangements for bases any time we wanted them, but at the moment they are unnecessary. The minuscule country is, from a military point of view, dependent on the United States.

I have mentioned points in General Trujillo's career that may pain the tender-minded. But one accomplishment to his credit should recommend him to their thanks — the colony for European refugees at Sosua, in the northern part of the island, near Puerto Plata.

Here is a tract of some 50,000 acres, the personal property of the Generalissimo, which he recently donated to the Dominican Republic Settlement Association. Originally, becoming interested in the refugee problem, Trujillo contributed a 26,000-acre estate worth \$100,000 which had formerly belonged to the United Fruit Company. Later he donated additional lands, including a mountain area.

The Sosua colony derives originally from the conference to deal with the plight of Jewish refugees called by President Roosevelt at Evian, Switzerland, in 1938. The conference talked piously and accomplished little. But out of it did come a permanent Intergovernmental Committee to deal with refugee problems. Since 1938 this committee has had an actual offer of land from only one nation — and of all nations in the world it happened to be the Dominican Republic. General Trujillo said that he would be glad to donate 25,000 acres, and that his country would give haven to 100,000 refugees.

Trujillo's motive was, one can imagine, double. First, he was

² A unique cabinet post exists in the Dominican Republic, that of Secretary of State for the Presidency. Presumably this is to give Trujillo direct access to the head of state if he needs it. The post is held by one of Trujillo's uncles.

eager to get favorable mention in the United States — particularly after the Haitian massacre mentioned above. Second, he had the long-range idea of improving the quality of Dominican stock by a deliberate importation of healthy white blood. Third, he wanted to stimulate and diversify the local economy.

A group of American philanthropists led by James N. Rosenberg of New York followed Trujillo's lead by creating the Dominican Republic Settlement Association. This, working in close conjunction with the American Department of State and the Dominican Republic, organizes the emigration of refugees from Europe and their settlement on Dominican soil. The Administration is financed largely by private contributions. Officially the movement is nonsectarian. Most of the refugees who have arrived are Jewish. The work has been in progress only a year, and only about 300 refugees are so far at work on the 750 acres that have been brought under cultivation. One thousand more settlers are expected during 1941. Buildings are going up; activity is lively; Mr. Rosenberg and his associates are highly confident. Various agencies in the United States, including the Brookings Foundation, are sending experts in such fields as rural electrification, tropical forestry, and sanitation, to lend technical assistance.

The Sosua experiment may give answers to several questions of great potential interest. First, can white Europeans settle satisfactorily in a tropical Latin American republic? Second, can they grow crops to provide more than mere subsistence? A third point will be the future social and political relations between the refugees and the Dominican natives. Something at least remotely akin to the Zionist experiment has moved into the Western Hemisphere. Luckily Dominicans are not Arabs — at least not yet.

III

Turn now to Haiti. Here the picturesque almost obliterates the practical. This is the country of *papalois* and *mamanlois* (witches), of muffled drum beats from hillside thickets, and of *zombis*, whom the superstitious natives believe to be folk who have been dragged, raised from the "dead," and made to work as slaves.

Voodoo — about which much nonsense is customarily talked — is a kind of animistic cult based on secret ritual and magic. As one friend in Port-au-Prince said to me, it is a religion of propitiation, fear and hate. The voodoo worshipper seeks to

exorcise the forces of nature — mountain torrents, snakes, the parching sun, hurricanes, poisonous weeds in the jungle — so that they may not destroy him. Similarly he seeks protection from his enemies. The technique is aggressive. You put a curse on your enemy before he can put a curse on you. The witch-doctor or priest prescribes the particular charm that will do the job, and makes a certain profit thereon. The prospective victim then buys off trouble by procuring a counter-charm. So at least the procedure was described to me by Haitians. Anyone, not merely the voodoo priest, may utilize *wangas* or charms. Anyone can "put the eye," as I heard it colloquially expressed, on anybody else. The priests sometimes are very powerful. If they say to their followers that a certain person is to be removed, that person will have an uncomfortable time. He may not be murdered, but he will be shunned by other Haitians, thoroughly terrorized, and probably forced to leave the community.

Voodoo is thus of considerable political importance. No Haitian government would dare to stamp it out, though one recent president, Louis Borno, a devout Roman Catholic, attempted to discourage it. His successor, Sténio Vincent, gained great popularity and thus helped to entrench himself in power, by leaning the other way. Legally, voodoo has approximately the status that alcohol had during prohibition in the United States. It is imbibed, so to speak, behind closed doors, and the police often slip in to take a drink.

Haitians are much milder folk than the Dominicans next door. Gentle, rather timid, 90 percent illiterate, ruminative, with small national sense despite their heroic past, speaking their strange mixture of French and Creole, they are an attractive and picturesque community. There are about 3,000,000 Haitians, living on 10,204 square miles, the area of Maryland. They occupy only one-third of the island, but their population is about that of the Dominican Republic. Most of them are peasants, and most are very poor. The annual budget is only about \$5,000,000. The amount of currency in circulation is about 50 cents per head.

Haitian economy depends largely on coffee, and the fall of coffee prices has impoverished the country. The average coffee crop — say 27,000,000 kilograms — was worth around \$16,000,000 in 1929; today the same amount brings perhaps \$6,000,000. The United States took 56 percent of Haiti's coffee crop in 1939-40; Haiti was the first country in 1941 to sell its cof-

fee quota. This shows remarkable foresight among the Haitians and their advisers, like the American fiscal representative, Sidney de la Rue. Until 1934 the United States bought no Haitian coffee at all. But obviously the American market would be of tremendous importance if Europe should be lost. So the Haitians adjusted their coffee blends to American standards of quality and taste. Similarly there has been great development in the sale of bananas to the United States. In the early 30's Haiti had no banana industry. But by 1940 it was producing 3,000,000 stems, all raised by small peasant landowners, and marketed by the Standard Fruit Company, an American concern.

The chief political issue in Haiti since the restoration of political order and the evacuation of the United States marines has been the struggle for power between the mulattoes, who comprise about 10 percent of the population, and the pure blacks. Though greatly outnumbered, the educated mulattoes hold practically all political power. The blacks resent this, and dislike the mulattoes much more than they dislike whites. But there is very little they can do about it. The situation derives from a law passed early in the nineteenth century which established that pure Negroes must go into farming and trade, while mulattoes were permitted to enter the professions. Thus the mulatto class — doctors, lawyers, engineers — became intellectually and socially dominant, and economic and political dominance naturally followed.

The grand old man of Haiti is Sténio Joseph Vincent, who became president of the republic in 1930, and who served as such until 1941. Robust, vigorous, jovial, he does not look or act his 67 years. He was a poor boy, but he managed to scrape his way through school; a brilliant and ambitious student, he got his degree in law at 18. Vincent is a man of deep culture, an intellectual. He is the author of numerous books; he can converse with vivid clarity on almost any subject; his indispensable hobby is reading; he talks French with the purity and grace of a member of the French Academy.

I saw him in his modest private villa in the oddly named village of Kenscoff, 4,500 feet above Port-au-Prince, the harbor capital. Walking along the roads were marvelous straight-limbed, firm-breasted peasant women, with trays and bowls balanced on their heads; they march gracefully mile after hilly mile, with their hands swinging, never touching the burdens their heads carry.

The road is winding, jagged and lined with jungle; the valleys dip steeply to the sea, flowering with blazing red poinsettia, bougainvillaea and wild nasturtium.

Dr. Vincent has spent his whole life in political service. While he was still a law student he worked as a school inspector. Then he went abroad, to both Paris and Berlin, as a diplomatic attaché. Returning to Haiti he became in turn a government commissioner, a judge, a senator, and eventually president of the Senate. He spent ten years, 1920-30, in the poverty-stricken political wilderness. In 1930, though he started as a bad third, he managed to win the presidential election by some very complex political strategy. Early in his career — when the marines were in Haiti — he was hotly anti-American; he was Haiti's severest critic of United States intervention. Later he came to acknowledge Haiti's absolute dependence on the United States politically, economically and geographically, and he changed his mood and policy. As things stand today he is one of the staunchest pro-Americans in the hemisphere.

There are no political parties in Haiti, and Vincent ruled for ten years by keeping close control of the armed forces (the first duty of every Latin American statesman), and by astute political chess play. A lone wolf himself, he balanced various groups against one another. His passion and joy was, and is, political manoeuvre. He sought to build schools, and to organize relief work for the poor. His idea was to make use of individual largess if necessary, and out of his healthy salary of \$25,000 a year he maintained a semi-private charity called the Caisse l'Assistance. He likes to go out into the country and distribute coins himself. He is a bachelor, and his sister is his all-watching hostess. He likes to sip Haitian rum in which peaches have been soaked, and a very delicious drink it is. He is a chain smoker of Philip Morris cigarettes. His English — as he put it to me — is good enough so that he can read the *Times*, but not the magazine *Time*. He doesn't like to be called a dictator, and he is very proud that in Haiti — in considerable contrast to the Dominican Republic hard-by — there has been no political execution in 17 years.

Early in 1941, his friends said, Vincent was flirting with the idea of following Roosevelt and getting himself elected for a third term. Unfortunately, it had already been necessary in 1935 to amend the constitution in order to let him run a second time, and a third term was forbidden unless approved by special plebiscite.

Vincent could have "arranged" to win this plebiscite, no doubt. For a long interval he refused to disclose his ultimate intentions. On March 10 the Chamber of Deputies went on record voting to extend his term. Then Vincent suddenly changed his mind, or was prevailed upon to change it. On April 4 he announced that he would not run again, and on April 15 the Haitian Minister to Washington, Dr. Elie Lescot, was chosen President as his successor.

Lescot, born in 1883, is a lawyer, administrator and diplomat of much experience. For some years he was a judge, like Vincent, and he served in various cabinets as Minister of Agriculture, Education, Justice and Interior. It was Lescot, astute and dignified, who arranged the settlement with the Dominican Republic after the 1937 massacres. Many Haitians thought he behaved too softly on this occasion. But he had little choice. School children in Haiti have sung for years a ditty called *Merci Papa Vincent*. The song became a kind of national anthem in diminutive. Now, perhaps, it will be *Merci Papa Lescot*.

As regards Fifth Columnism and national defense, the position of Haiti is much like that of the Dominican Republic. German commercial influence is stronger in Haiti, but political expression is mute. Like its neighbor, Haiti will almost certainly give the United States any facilities we wish. But since our acquisition of British bases neither Haiti nor the Dominican Republic is so important as she used to be as a site for full-fledged bases. Haitian landing fields may be useful, however, as fueling stops for fast fighter planes whose range is too short for direct flights from regular base to base.

CANADA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

By P. E. Corbett

A MINISTER from Brazil has just reached Canada. Opening the new legation, he will also formally open a new chapter in the Dominion's short diplomatic history. In the fourteen years since Mr. Vincent Massey went as first Canadian Minister to Washington, the Dominion has exchanged representatives with France, Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands. But in the Latin American field it has done nothing more than maintain a few scattered trade commissioners. Until late in 1940, the Government was politely but firmly negative to representations from inside and from outside the country suggesting closer ties with the Latin nations of the hemisphere. Then, suddenly, things began to happen. The Prime Minister announced that invitations to establish legations in Brazil and Argentina had been accepted. Almost immediately those two countries appointed their ministers to Canada; and similar overtures were received from Peru, Chile and Mexico.

These developments have been hastened, if not caused, by the war. Normally the actual or potential volume of trade with a country has been a major consideration in determining the establishment of a legation, and this factor has played some part in the present instance. For though there still is relatively little trade to lead Canadian diplomacy southward beyond Washington, war conditions have cut off or restricted overseas sources of supply and overseas markets both for Canada and for Latin America; and the hope of increased exchanges within the hemisphere is at least a gleam of light in a fairly grim prospect. It was to follow this gleam that a mission set out from Ottawa in November 1940, under the Minister of Trade and Commerce. The intention was a grand tour of the Americas; but unhappily the Minister fell ill at Cristobal and the whole expedition returned to its base, leaving only the correspondent of a financial journal to blaze the new commercial trail. At a favorable moment, we are told, the exploration is to be resumed. Meanwhile the Government has been exhorting exporters to apply to the Department of Commerce for information regarding possible markets in the Latin countries.

Yet the briefest glance at statistics will convince us that something more than the prospect of trade must lie beneath this budding of diplomatic relations with South America. In 1939 it required only \$4,407,000 of imports to make Brazil the largest Latin American customer of Canada. Argentina was next, with \$4,117,000. In 1940 Argentina took first place, with purchases in the amount of \$6,107,000 (almost the whole of the forty percent increase being in newsprint). Brazil also bought more in 1940; but the total still was only \$5,063,000. As for imports into Canada from Brazil and Argentina, these amounted in 1939 to \$1,111,000 and \$4,406,000; in 1940 to \$6,243,000 and \$6,542,000 respectively. Evidently a year of war did more than fifteen years of industrious trade commissioners. But the result is still far from impressive.

The figures showing the percentage held by various countries in the total trade of Canada are not yet available for 1940. In 1939, however, exports to South America were only 1.8 percent of Canada's total exports, while imports from South America were 2.8 percent of total imports. To the whole of North America, other than the United States, exports amounted to 2.9 of total Canadian exports; and imports from the same area were 2.3 percent of total imports. These figures state what is perhaps the chief reason why these countries have not bulked large in Canadian thought.

Nor is it by any means clear how a great and lasting expansion in this trade can take place. Canada will probably buy increasing quantities of cotton, coffee, linseed, fruits, hides and even wool; she may sell more lumber, more newsprint, a little wheat to Peru, more fish, conceivably some machinery and some textiles. But the fact remains that, as a manufacturing country, she can hardly compete in unprotected markets with the larger centers of mass production; while in respect of food and raw materials, her economy is largely competitive with, rather than complementary to, the principal countries of the hemisphere. In the matter of tropical products, a large part of her supply comes, under mutually preferential agreements, from the British West Indies and British Guiana. Such special privileges may give way after the war to a general lowering of trade barriers, but even so these established channels of exchange are not likely to be abandoned.

True, any potential new market is worth cultivation by a country that depends on exports, as Canada does, for thirty percent of its income. True also, the future may hold a rich devel-

opment in the Caribbean and in South America. New capital and new initiative are flowing into these channels from the United States. The accompanying rise in general standards of living, with the obviously needed improvements in nutrition, may in the long term completely change market potentialities throughout that part of the world. But in Canada, at any rate, there is little tendency, either among economists or in government circles, to bank on optimistic predictions of hemispheric self-sufficiency.

The timing and direction of Canada's latest diplomatic expansion are not so much, then, a move in economic strategy as one manifestation of a new sense of general solidarity with the other nations of the West. As a sign of a continuing adaptation to environment the development is even more significant than the joint defense agreement with the United States.

In the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada set up a Permanent Board for the joint study of defense problems affecting the whole continent. This was a larger recognition of North American community and responsibility than Canada had ever previously made. But collaboration with the United States in fisheries, transportation, aviation, radio and other matters of common concern has been a familiar feature of our good neighborhood, and the Ogdensburg excursion into the vital field of defense was a natural enough response to common peril. Moreover, it has always been connected in the public mind with the destroyer-naval-base deal, and it was justified to Canadians of the imperial school as merely one side of a triangular British-American-Canadian arrangement for carrying on the war. To these people it looked as if the United States had said to Great Britain and Canada together: "Give us naval bases in the western Atlantic and coördinate your defense in this continent with ours, so that if the war does come this way we shall be strong to meet it. In return, we'll give you the things to fight with." Few thought of the fifty destroyers as more than a forerunner of much to come. Thus the defense agreement, interpreted as part of the price for desperately needed continuing help, was acclaimed even by those who in normal times would most stubbornly resist any Canadian move towards the American orbit.

The exchange of diplomats with Brazil and Argentina, on the other hand, is a *volte-face*. Hitherto Canada has held systematically aloof from all the broader aspects of inter-American activity.

Officially she has scarcely acknowledged the existence of a world south of the Rio Grande. It was a vast unknown, worth scouting for trade, perhaps, and offering scope for some of the bolder power and traction enterprises. At Geneva delegates from Ottawa rubbed shoulders with polished diplomats who brought from both east and west of the Andes names that were often strangely Scottish or English. But as for direct association with these peoples, that was not really considered. Certainly it cannot be said that the "myth of the continents," so effectively demolished by Eugene Staley in the last issue of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, has ever figured prominently among Canadian illusions.

Opinion in the country corresponded, in the main, to the official attitude. A few Canadians spent winters in the West Indies or went on Caribbean cruises, but almost none extended these travels to South America. Three Canadian banks had numerous branches in these countries and maintained a certain exchange of personnel. One of them even published every two months a review of business conditions in the Latin American states and the British West Indies. Mining, power and traction enterprises financed by Canadian capital in Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Colombia distributed annual reports and quarterly dividends to shareholders in Montreal and Toronto. Some of the most biting criticism of Latin Americans and their ways came from men who operated or derived profit from these companies. Amid general ignorance, their supposedly experienced judgment had great weight. The impression spread that the peoples south of the Rio Grande were of such a different sort that the less we had to do with them the better.

These reasons for resisting Pan-American associations were reinforced by another objection. A hypersensitive loyalty to Great Britain and the Commonwealth made some Canadians shun a connection that might wean them away from the motherland and the other members of the family. They feared, too, that if they weakened the connection with England they would weaken their claim to England's protection and so be thrown into dependence upon the United States. If they had to depend on someone outside themselves, they preferred the old subordination.

All of these obstacles have shrunk in the last three years. Even before the war, the drying up of European markets owing to tariffs, quotas and exchange controls had worked curious changes in attitude. Several of the most British of the Canadian news-

papers began urging the Government to take a hand in the Pan-American conferences and share in any compensatory trade arrangements that might be devised there. When France fell, some Canadians became suddenly much more aware than before of the advantages of the Dominion's autonomy and hastened to assure American friends and clients that the country would not become a German colony even if resistance broke down in the British Isles. Other adjustments to a swiftly changing world followed. There are few echoes in Canada now of the complacent superiority expressed about Latin Americans in the thirties.

We must not leap to conclusions. The fact that Canada is opening up diplomatic relations with Latin American states does not mean that she is joining the Pan-American Union. But the age of aloofness certainly is over. Through its representatives in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires (others are to go later to Santiago, Lima and Mexico City), the Government at Ottawa will inevitably feel an increasing pressure for collaboration. Washington, too, will join in the persuasion, particularly if its present policy of strengthening the spirit and organization of Western Hemisphere solidarity is maintained.

How far the Dominion will respond to these urgings must depend to a considerable extent on how the war ends and what kind of world organization, if any, is set up afterwards. Hitler can consolidate his rule over Europe only by defeating Great Britain or forcing her to terms. If he can make her accept terms, Canadians might have two conflicting reactions. There would be a desire to make terms along with Great Britain; and there would be a determination to work in the closest collaboration with the United States in order to keep North America, at least, free. The latter desire would be supported by pressure from Washington, pressure amounting almost to insistence. Whether by her own desire, or as a result of such persuasion, Canada then would join in a program, defined for the most part by the United States, aimed at creating the strongest possible economic and political community on this side of the Atlantic.

We are even more concerned here, however, with Canada's voluntary adaption to the changing forces of her world, such as would follow the defeat of the Axis. Given the survival of Britain, the extent of Canada's collaboration with the Americas will depend in part upon the decision of the United States in the whole matter of world organization. If the United States again

retires into isolationism, Canada will continue to maintain her familiar ambiguous position with one foot in Europe and one in North America. She might even throw a little more weight on the American foot, participating gradually in any inter-American activities which did not seem likely to imperil her special political or economic relations with the other British nations.

This time, however, the United States may decide that she must, in her own interest, participate in whatever plans are worked out to prevent the recurrence of war. She then will have to remain associated with the British countries for an indefinite period after the end of hostilities, so as to maintain order and set the stage for general organization. Will she favor a single society, in which all peoples will join? Or will she favor a number of groupings, determined by geographical or other ties, perhaps under some looser universal association? Recent developments seem to point towards the latter choice. If the United States Government goes on strengthening the inter-American system, in the effort to check Axis influence, it will probably want to preserve whatever solidarity it has achieved there as an element in the new world order. Nor, if present indications are any guide, will Washington any more than Ottawa be content to regard their coöperative defense of the continent as a mere emergency measure to be dropped as soon as peace is declared. The word "Permanent" stands out in the title of the Joint Defense Board. A prolonged war will add to the partnership of defense an economic and financial partnership which peace will not totally dissolve. Is it not likely, then, that the United States, binding to herself the Latin Americas on the one side and Canada on the other, will try to knit these elements together in one regional community? The final result must be full Canadian participation in the inter-American system.

In the past, one argument heard in Canada against membership in the Pan-American Union has been the alleged danger of troubling the infinitely more important direct relations with the United States. Ottawa might find itself opposed to Washington in some Pan-American matter, and that opposition would sour a vital coöperation. The objection was always rather childish. But in the circumstances now developing, the very opposite reasoning would appear valid. Canada's absence from the wider association would be apt to hamper relations with the United States, not so much because there might be resentment in Washington

over the Dominion's aloofness, but for the simple reason that, as the community becomes more closely knit, an unintegrated unit that refuses to use the general machinery of coöperation will find itself in a position of increasing disadvantage.

It might have been expected that French Canada would take a well-defined stand either for or against a more intimate association with the other Latin peoples of the West. In fact it has not done so. For some years one important French newspaper of Montreal has advocated Canadian representation at Pan-American meetings, but the response has been indifferent. There is, however, an effective appeal which can be used at the proper moment. That is the invocation of the common religion and of the common Latin heritage of law and culture. Already there are signs that this avenue to the French-Canadian heart will not be ignored. An article by Professor Anatole Vanier, of the Université de Montréal, refers to recent discussions of the matter in which Latin Americans and French Canadians have joined, and shows that at least in university circles the opening up of diplomatic relations has aroused some enthusiasm. Professor Vanier lists the reasons for French-Canadian support of this development as follows: the common Greco-Latin culture; the widespread knowledge of French in Latin America; the historic position of New France as sharing with New Spain and New Portugal the glory of bringing the civilization of Europe to this hemisphere; and, finally, the advantage of increased economic interchange at a time when war has broken up the traditional channels of trade. It is characteristic of French-Canadian thought that the material profit should have been mentioned last.

Let us now attempt to strike a balance of the pros and cons. Chief among the factors working against Canada's participation in the inter-American system we must put down a reluctance on the part of those Canadians who have the strongest emotional attachments to the British Isles as their mother-country, or who believe in the permanent benefits of a closed British system of preferential tariffs. Add to this an unfavorable opinion, backed by the most inadequate knowledge, of the political and social qualities of Latin American peoples; an estimate that only insignificant economic profits would be gained; and a lingering fear that quarrels over Pan-American interests might in some way damage Canadian relations with the United States. On the positive side is the increasing recognition of Canada's identity

of interest with the United States; a growing confidence in the good sense and good faith of that country in its Pan-American policy; and a fuller realization of Canada's responsibility to help make this hemisphere into the strongest possible base of resistance against the spread of totalitarianism. Few economists or businessmen see any hope that Latin America can provide an adequate substitute for European markets; but there is almost unanimous support for plans to increase the volume of hemisphere trade and reduce our economic dependence on continental Europe. The obstacles to collaboration seem, on the whole, to lack actuality. The living forces of the present seem to be moving towards the full integration of Canada in the hemisphere community.

What will be the effect of this new orientation on Canada's membership in the British Commonwealth? To answer this question, we must first inquire what that membership means. For most of its members, it means one reigning sovereign; a common nationality (in addition, usually, to a Dominion nationality); a strong tendency to rally around Great Britain in time of war; and, economically, preferential treatment in British markets. Yet to show how these connections may be attenuated we have only to mention the case of Eire. Without ceasing to be a member of the British Commonwealth, Eire is resolutely neutral in this war; holds that its citizens have only one nationality, namely its own; uses the mechanism of monarchy not for internal government, but only in external relations; and has conducted a bitter trade feud with Great Britain.

There seems no reason why a regional association should exclude cultural, economic or even certain political bonds with other groups. This is particularly true when the other bonds are as elastic as those of the British Commonwealth. Yet it may be not merely interesting, but practically important, to know which of several associations a state would put first if in critical circumstances a choice had to be made. Concretely, that question asks whether Great Britain and the Commonwealth would continue to play the chief rôle in Canada's external policy or would be ousted by the inter-American system.

We may hope that Anglo-American coöperation will continue to be so close that Canada will never be placed in the position of having to choose between joining Great Britain immediately, on the outbreak of a war involving that country, or waiting to

take counsel with the United States and possibly other American nations. But if such a choice has to be made, the decision of Canada will depend, among other things, on the substantial value of the inter-American association and the extent to which its efforts and achievements have won the loyalty of the Canadian people. So far there is little ground upon which to base anything but an emotional prediction.

The monarchical government of Canada is sometimes mentioned as an obstacle to her membership in the Pan-American Union. Formally this is of no consequence. The documents of the Pan-American conferences use the terms "republics" and "states" interchangeably. In any event, the constitution of the Union is such that a mere resolution could remove any superficial difficulty of this nature. But the use of the English royal house as part of the Canadian system of government does have a bearing on the choice between an American as opposed to a British foreign policy. Even if constitutional lawyers end their debate by agreeing that identity of sovereigns does not involve identity of the British nations in war and peace, many Canadians will go on regarding themselves as belligerent when the King of England declares war. So long as the King of England is also King of Canada, this very natural confusion, though scarcely a determining factor, will have to be reckoned with in the ultimate issues of foreign policy.

We have probably heard the last of another confusion of thought which until recently made a good many Canadians tend to think of any closer association in a general American community as presaging absorption by the United States. The word that comes from south of the border these days is not one of manifest destiny stretching out towards the North Pole. Instead there comes an unmistakable hint that certain powerful interests, notably the wheat-growers of the Middle West, would strenuously oppose adding a parcel of Canadian states to the Union. The wholesome impression is growing that, far from having to fear absorption, Canada would experience some difficulty in persuading her neighbor to take her in. The bogey of annexation that stalked so fiercely thirty years ago is dead. Its burial has enabled Canadians to approach more dispassionately the problems of practical adjustment to their American environment.

When Colonel Lindbergh questioned the right of Canada to go to war without reference to the United States, the indignation

which he aroused in his own country was hardly less than in the Dominion. In the American strictures on his speech, Canadians saw evidence of respect not only for their national independence, but of recognition that their part in the British Commonwealth was not without its advantages to the United States. As Americans realize more and more that British security is a prime factor in their own security they give increased approbation to Canada's contribution toward that end. There no longer seems any danger of the United States exerting pressure to separate Canada from the Commonwealth.

It has indeed been suggested in some American quarters that Canada might assume a more active and responsible rôle in Commonwealth affairs. Certain Americans seem to find Great Britain's ownership and administration of colonies in the Caribbean an irritating next-door exercise of imperialism, and Britain's lease of naval bases there has not put a stop to proposals that she hand over the colonies in payment of existing or future debts. A counter-proposal is that Canada should assume the part hitherto played by Great Britain in this area. An irritant in Anglo-American relations might thus be removed. And the device would not increase the difficulties of American sugar-beet growers or leave on the American doorstep the complicated social problems emphasized in Lord Moyne's report in 1939.

Canada has had preferential trade agreements with the Caribbean colonies since 1912. She maintains a subsidized steamship service between their ports and Canada. Canadian banks have twentieth-five or more branches there. Trade commissioners from Ottawa are stationed in Trinidad and Jamaica. In 1938 Canada bought in the British West Indies, Bermuda, British Guiana and British Honduras products to the value of \$20,343,569 and sold products worth \$14,102,918. The war has improved the market there for Canadian goods, so that imports and exports in 1940 almost balanced at approximately \$21,500,000. The amount still is less than two and a half percent of Canada's foreign trade.

These details hardly add up to enough to provide any substantial basis for urging the transfer of administration over the Caribbean colonies to Canada. It would not be difficult for Canada to supply the small number of troops now garrisoned there by Great Britain; and the naval problem is disposed of by the establishment of the United States bases. But Canada has no experience of colonial administration, and her people evince no

ambition in that direction. Nor would the additional financial burdens involved in government and in carrying out social reforms be welcome.

There used to be talk of a union of all the Caribbean colonies, which could then join the Canadian federation as another province. This idea holds little attraction for Canadians, many of whom would shrink from taking on the native problem as a factor in their domestic life, and who would see disadvantages in throwing their industries open to labor from the islands. Moreover, it makes little headway in the colonies themselves. Progressive elements there are still working towards federation, possibly in the form of two unions centered respectively upon Jamaica and Trinidad. But the minimum they contemplate for these unions is distinct Dominion status.

One step of Canadian "expansion" does seem likely. Newfoundland's absence from the federation has always been something of an anachronism, and several very tentative approaches have been made from one side or the other towards union. On the only occasion, however, when Newfoundland displayed any real warmth towards the project her finances were in grave difficulties, and Ottawa was unwilling to take on an additional debt and new burdens. That was in 1895. In 1934 financial troubles brought about the suspension of the island's status as a Dominion and the substitution of an administrative commission appointed in England. Again the idea of federation with Canada came under discussion, this time quite unofficially, but no enthusiasm was exhibited on either side. Now Newfoundland has a United States naval base and a mixed Canadian-American garrison, and thus bulks large in the activities of the Permanent Joint Defense Board. These strategic considerations may in future outweigh bookkeeping caution at Ottawa. In Newfoundland, protracted economic stringency, coupled with the experience in commission government, must have awakened doubts as to the very possibility of separate autonomy. This is important, because the people of Newfoundland must desire inclusion in the Canadian federation if any such move is ever to materialize.

Clearly Canada's part in the community of the Americas will not be as a center of any new imperialism. She has room and to spare within her present boundaries, and problems and to spare. Nor is she pleased with the dreams some people have of hemispheric autarchy. Her heavy accumulation of wheat gives her a

keen interest in the Havana plan for the financing and orderly marketing of Pan-American export surpluses. She will keep an eye on the activities of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee and its subsidiary, the Inter-American Development Commission. The effort of the United States to develop Latin American industries, to stimulate production of commodities hitherto purchased overseas, and to increase the inter-American exchange of surplus products, will engage her earnest attention. But she will continue to regard the reopening of European markets as a necessity for her economy.

Coupled with this economic interest in the world outside the Americas, the Canadian people have a warm sense of fellowship with the other British nations. It is fully as important as any abstract devotion to democracy in explaining why Canada will be less than satisfied with a limited association designed merely to serve the security and welfare of the Western Hemisphere. The urge to assist all communities struggling to defend or to reach a liberal way of life will continue to be a feature of the Canadian national character. And a liberal way of life is not, in the Canadian view, simply a question of formal political democracy. It implies progress towards equality of economic opportunity for all with the will to work.

Confronted now with tasks and with perils that exceed anything in its previous history, adventurous though it has been, the Canadian nation is buoyed up by an undercurrent of strong optimism. It is perhaps a surviving characteristic of the frontier that beyond the dangers of these present years the future is still looked upon as inevitably holding great things for the country. Even sceptical observers foresee that new forces will thrust upon our northern people a larger rôle in world politics. There already is evidence that in the war's train will come an influx of immigrants of the most desirable type. We shall emerge from this struggle with a vastly augmented industrial production. The strengthening of our partnership with the other nations of the Americas brings new courage to face the formidable problems of post-war adjustment. Given a world in which international trade is possible, Canada will grow in population and power. She may be counted on to display two fairly constant qualities — a sturdy good sense which will continue to make her a reliable neighbor; and a generosity of outlook which will incline her to share actively in any practical and vigorous plan of world order.

THE DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE

By Pierre Cot

'T is commonly thought that France's defeat was due exclusively to the weakness of her air force. This is an exaggeration. France was conquered more by Germany's armored divisions than by her aerial divisions. What is true is that the success of the motorized troops would have been impossible without the work of the German air force. The same thing happened in Poland. Thus the first lesson to be drawn from the war on the Continent is the importance of a close collaboration between the armies on land and the armies in the sky.

Nobody, until now, has seriously studied the reasons of the defeat of the French air force. They were many. But most of them flowed from the mistake of French military leaders in underrating the importance of aviation in modern warfare. Let us begin by examining the factors which made German aviation superior to French aviation.

I. THE PROBLEM OF QUALITY

Germany's superiority in the air derived less from quality than from quantity. All the evidence so far collected seems to establish the fact that every time French aviators met German aviators, one against one, or even one against two, the French were the victors.

This proves, first, that in morale and training the French crews were equal or superior to the German crews. Secondly, it establishes that French matériel was, on the whole, good. At the outbreak of the war we had two excellent types of pursuit and combat planes, the Morane 405 and the Potez 63. These machines became somewhat outclassed in the course of the winter by new German planes. But in the spring we began to receive the Dewoitine 520, the Bloch 17 and the V.G. 33, which, in turn, were somewhat superior to the German machines. Meanwhile, the American planes sold to France did a wonderful job. Our pilots appreciated them particularly because of their motors, which were superior to the French motors and gave a sense of great confidence.

Furthermore, Germany did not enjoy any advantage in the

armament of the machines. The French planes were armed with cannon or machine guns. Experience seems to show that in aerial combat the cannon is more effective against bombers, while the machine gun is more effective against pursuit planes. Our cannon were somewhat superior, and our machine guns were somewhat inferior, to the cannon and machine guns of the Germans. As for the explosive capacity of bombs, our French bombs seemed to be more effective than the German bombs of equal weight.

II. QUANTITATIVE INFERIORITY

But in quantity of air forces France was far outstripped by Germany. The two following tables measure the extent of this difference. The first follows the figures given by the French Air Ministry to the Parliamentary Committees; the second is based on figures provided by the French Intelligence Service:

FRENCH COMBAT PLANES ¹

	<i>Continental France</i>	<i>North Africa</i>	<i>Naval</i>	<i>Total</i>
August 30, 1939.....	1,250	400	350	2,000
February 1940....	1,550	500	350	2,400
May 1940.....	1,550	600	350	2,500

GERMAN COMBAT PLANES

	<i>1st Line</i>	<i>1st Reserve</i>	<i>Naval</i>	<i>Total</i>
August 30, 1939.....	6,000	3,000	500	9,500
May 1940.....	7,000	4,500	1,500	13,000

¹ 1st line and 1st reserve.

In other words, the French air force was outnumbered almost five to one (six to one if we leave aside formations in North Africa).

But France was not alone. She was able to count on the assistance of Great Britain. It would be more just, then, to compare the air force of the Allies with that of Germany. The French Air Ministry, taking British figures into account, arrived at a figure of approximately three for the Allies against five for the Germans. The ratio appears to have remained constant between September 1939 and June 1940. This was due to a balance between production and losses. During the first ten months of the war both the production and losses of Germany were higher than those of France and Britain. Furthermore, after the outbreak of the war the Polish air force joined the French and English. It was perhaps not very large and was rather mediocre in equipment, but nevertheless this equipment was manned by an extremely courageous and well-trained personnel.

III. PRODUCTION

Among the many reasons why it is difficult to compare French and German figures are the following:

1. We lack accurate information as to the volume of German production. In order to impress her adversaries Germany frequently put out figures which were manifestly exaggerated.

2. When we speak of "airplane production," we must differentiate warplanes from all the other various types of airplanes necessary for an army (including training and transport ships), as well as from a country's production of civil aircraft.

3. Furthermore, people usually talk of a monthly production. But unless an average monthly production is based upon a very long period, the figure means nothing. The requirements of mass production on the one hand, and constant advances in aeronautical technique on the other, can result in a powerful aircraft industry producing relatively few planes over a period of several months, its activity being confined to the manufacture of special tools and dies and to the production of detached parts.

4. The same industrial effort will produce three times as many pursuit planes weighing two tons as it will bombing planes weighing ten tons. In order to compare the results of two industries, or of two periods of production, one must watch tonnage as much as units. Thus in 1937 France produced as many planes as she did in 1936. But the 1937 production amounted to 5,500 tons while that of 1936 amounted to 2,401 tons. As a result, the planes produced in 1936 were able to carry only 296 tons of bombs over Germany, but those constructed in 1937 could carry 880 tons.

If all these factors are taken into consideration, we may say that during the five years preceding the war Germany's production of warplanes was, on an average, approximately 7 times higher than that of France. The proportions seem to have been 7 to 1 in 1935, 1936 and 1937; 9 to 1 in 1938; 7 to 1 in 1939; and 5 to 1 in the spring of 1940. The high point of German production, compared to French production, occurred during the months just preceding and following Munich, because German industry was then in a state of mobilization. By the outbreak of the war France had achieved an average production of 120 warplanes per month, while Germany was producing 800 warplanes a month. In May 1940, the figures were 350 warplanes a month for France and 1,700 warplanes for Germany. To these figures must be added,

for each year, equivalent quantities of transport planes, training planes, etc.

We have here a contradiction between the proportion of 7 to 1 for production and 5 to 1 for the front-line craft. In reality, however, there is no inconsistency. Germany had to create her air force after the advent of Hitler; as a result, she used more planes than France for the training of her personnel and in the evolution of her tactics of air warfare. Furthermore, in 1936 and 1937 Germany sent ten times as many planes to Spain as France did.

Having established and analyzed the facts we must now try to find the causes. How was it that France was five times weaker in the air than Germany?

IV. INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

First, let it be said that France could not dream of producing as many planes as Germany when both countries were putting forth a maximum effort.

France is a country of 40,000,000 inhabitants whose economy is more agricultural than industrial. Germany is a country of 80,000,000 inhabitants whose economy is more industrial than agricultural. This simple fact is sufficient to explain why, even with an equal effort, France could not produce as many planes as Germany. With a good economic policy she would have been able to compensate for this inferiority in part. But the general trend of French policy was the opposite of the German. From 1934 to 1938 the index number of industrial production in Germany moved from 79.8 to 126.2, showing an increase of 80 percent. During the same period the index number in France moved only from 75.2 to 76.1, showing a practically static production. As a result, French industrial capacity, which at the outbreak of the First World War had been about 50 percent inferior to the German, and which still held that relationship in 1934, became at the outbreak of the new World War about four times inferior.

Let us consider, for instance, the output of steel and aluminum, both of them important raw materials for aircraft production. From 1935 to 1938 inclusive, Germany produced 78,808,000 tons of steel and 455,000 tons of aluminum. During the same period, France produced 26,817,000 tons of steel and 128,300 tons of aluminum. The 1939 statistics are not known, but the figures available for the first few months of that year reveal a situation

even more favorable for Germany than in 1938, when the ratio of production was 1 to 3.8 for steel and 1 to 4.5 for aluminum. From 1937 to the outbreak of the war, Germany produced three and a half times more steel and four and a half times more aluminum than France.

It would lead us too far afield to look for all the causes of this disproportion. German propaganda, as well as propaganda coming from the Vichy Government, has circulated the rumor that it was the "Popular Front" that disorganized French production and led to the decline of French industrial capacity. Statistical figures disagree with this explanation. French industrial production was 12 percent higher in 1937, when the Popular Front was in power, than in 1935, when Conservative cabinets led by Pierre Etienne Flandin and Pierre Laval were in the saddle. The insufficiency of French industrial production was due to the wrong economic policy of France dating from as far back as 1920, and not to the policy of any one cabinet. When M. Flandin, in 1935, refused to devalue the franc, his decision had worse consequences than the bad application of the forty-hour week. As a matter of fact, each cabinet added its own mistakes to the mistakes of its predecessors.

We therefore have to look for deeper reasons than the political agitation of February 1934 or the sit-down strikes of May 1936. They are to be found in the differences in social structure and economic system between prewar France and Germany. First, long before Hitler, Germany was more industrialized than France. In 1931, 41 percent of the French gainfully occupied population were independent workers (farmers, artisans, employers, etc.), whereas in Germany the figure was only 17 percent. In 1938, Germany had three and a half times more skilled workers than France. French farmers produced "butter" and German skilled workers produced "guns." Second, France kept her liberal economy, while Germany adopted a centralized economy. Experience has proved that when it comes to mobilizing a country's economic resources, free competition and capitalist monopolies are less efficient than centralized economic control and government leadership. Lacking leadership, the French industrial capacity which could be turned to producing armaments dropped to one-fourth of the German. All France must take the blame for not having paid sufficient attention to the menace of Hitler.

In view of this difference of one to four, France ought to have

been able to produce one-fourth the number of planes that Germany produced. Actually she produced one-seventh as many. How is this extra degree of inferiority to be explained?

V. DIFFERENCE IN MILITARY CONCEPTIONS

The explanation for the supplementary difference just mentioned is that in her war preparations Germany attached much more importance to aviation than France did. The two military doctrines may be summarized by the statement that Germany prepared for a war of movement, the Blitzkrieg, and France prepared for a war of position. The modern war of movement is based upon the use of solid masses of aviation and tanks. In contrast, the war of position is based upon the use of "lines," such as the Maginot Line, as well as upon defensive arms such as machine guns and cannon.

Having different military conceptions, France and Germany created two different war machines. Actual preparation for war forces important choices, because the resources of a country, in terms of credits and basic materials as well as manpower, are limited. The Maginot Line and the French Navy were approximately as expensive as the Siegfried Line and the German Navy. By choosing to develop her fortifications and her navy to equal Germany's, France was under a necessity of sacrificing her planes or her tanks. In fact, she sacrificed both. In May 1930, when her air force was one-fifth the size of Germany's, France had two motorized divisions to oppose to ten German "Panzerdivisionen."

Before the war it was possible to argue as to which was the better conception of modern war, the German or the French. Now the facts have spoken. The French General Staff failed to realize that a real revolution had occurred in military science as a result of new industrial techniques, especially through the progress of the internal combustion motor, the soul of the tank and the airplane.

VI. AIR APPROPRIATIONS

The difference in military conceptions was reflected in the appropriations placed at the disposal of the two air forces. Of all the great nations France applied the least part of her effort towards the development of military aviation. This is shown in the following table giving the amount of air force expenditures for France, Britain and Germany from 1935 to 1939, and the per-

cent which those figures represent of the total military expenditures of each country for air, army and navy.

EXPENDITURES FOR THE AIR FORCES

(in millions of dollars)

	<i>France</i>		<i>Britain</i>		<i>Germany</i> ¹	
	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Percent of total military appropriations</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Percent of total military appropriations</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Percent of total military appropriations</i>
1935.....	160	22	140	23	900	30
1936.....	162	23	280	34	1,000	33
1937.....	170	22	420	34	1,200	34
1938.....	230	27	600	34	1,550	33
1939.....	380	27	700	34	2,550	33
<i>Total</i>	1,102	24	2,140	32	7,200	33

¹ Estimated

This table shows that: (1) from 1935 to 1939 the British spent almost twice as much money for their air force as the French, and that the Germans spent almost seven times as much as the French; which explains why both the British and the German air forces were stronger than the French. (2) In this period Britain and France together spent less money than Germany for their air forces; which explains why, according to the French Intelligence Service, their aviation held a ratio of *three to five* to the German aviation. (3) In this period England and Germany put approximately one-third of their total defense expenditures into their air forces, while France put only one-quarter, this difference being the result of their different military doctrines and policies.

VII. MILITARY PROGRAMS: SOME UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Additional evidence may be found in the official plans proposed to the Ministry of National Defense by the Air Ministry.

At the end of 1933 the Air Ministry drafted a first program, called Plan I. In 1934 it was adopted by Parliament and put into execution. It envisaged the construction of an air force consisting of 1,000 first-line warplanes, with 200 first reserves. By June 1936 the numbers of planes under Plan I which had been delivered to the air force was 637, representing 50 percent fulfilment. In August 1936 the magnitude of the German effort led to the adoption of a new program. It was called Plan II, and it envisaged the construction of 1,500 first-line warplanes, plus 60 percent first reserves, or a total of 2,500 aircraft. Plan II was to be fulfilled by the end of 1939.

On December 30, 1936, the Air Ministry realized that Plan II was insufficient. It addressed to the Permanent Committee of National Defense a report which was filed in the archives under the number "10-913 R/EMAA." This report contained a complete study of the air problem and underlined the danger for France of the German air effort. To this report were attached two new plans: Plan III, which dealt with the organization of anti-aircraft defense and asked in particular for an increase in anti-aircraft guns; and Plan IV, which asked for the doubling of our air force, by creating a fleet of 2,600 first-line planes in addition to 1,500 reserve planes.

These plans were studied by the French military authorities. On February 15, 1937, a report was made on them by the High Military Committee, which included the Minister of National Defense, Marshal Pétain, the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Gamelin, and the Chief of the Navy Staff, Admiral Darlan. The Committee unanimously rejected the proposals of the Air Ministry and decided that "there was no need to extend or modify the plans for the expansion of the air force." Throughout 1937 the Air Ministry did all it could to get this decision changed. It could not break the resistance of the Ministry of National Defense and of the General Staff. And not only did it fail to succeed, but M. Georges Bonnet, Minister of Finance, reduced the appropriations requested for the 1938 budget by more than one billion francs.

In view of these facts, the Air Ministry on December 6, 1937, addressed a report to the Prime Minister and to the Ministry of National Defense. The report, filed in the archives of the Air Ministry under the number 712-C.M/R, protested against the attitude of the Ministry of National Defense as well as against the budget reductions. It may be interesting to cite some extracts from this document:

"During the past eighteen months I have not ceased to warn that the rôle assigned to aviation in our national defense system is too small. . . . In relation to the effort that we are making for national defense, the French Air Force today is the least provided for; its budget represents 22 percent of the national defense budget (1937 budget and projected 1938 budget). The British air budget represents 34 percent (last fiscal year, March 1937 to March 1938). . . . If the Air Force continues to be treated in this manner, it will not be able to accomplish the effort which

you deem desirable and the awakening may be terrible. . . . By refusing to develop our aviation in the same proportions as the other European armies, we risk repeating on a much larger scale the errors we committed before 1914 in neglecting machine guns and heavy artillery."

Not till the spring of 1938 did the General Staff realize its mistake. Then the Air Ministry had a new program adopted which was called Plan V. It was a new draft of Plan IV, and it envisaged the creation of an air force of 2,600 first-line warplanes.

The above-mentioned documents (principally Plan III, Report to the Permanent Committee of National Defense of December 30, 1936, and Plan IV, Report of December 1937) have remained unpublished until today. Before the war, and before June 1940, it was impossible, without weakening France, to disclose the conflicts which had existed all through 1937 between the Air Ministry and the Ministry of National Defense. But now they must be known. They exist in several copies in the archives of the Air Ministry, in the office of the Prime Minister, in the Superior Council of National Defense, and in the Ministries of War and the Navy. The Committee on Aviation in the Chamber of Deputies knows about them. The officers of the General Staff who drafted them are still alive. It is impossible to explain how one could have passed from Plan II of August 1936 to Plan V of 1938 without referring to Plan III and Plan IV. The text of the decision of the High Military Committee, and of the opinions given by the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, the Army and the Navy which preceded this decision, should be published. Military historians will not fail to do this later, when a free government will give them access to the archives. Only then can the responsibility of everyone be established.

In laying these facts before the American public today I am not motivated by any wish to blame the French military authorities who failed to realize the importance of aviation in modern warfare. I desire only to show that these problems are difficult and complicated.

VIII. THE FRENCH AVIATION INDUSTRY

The question now arises whether the aviation industry of France was capable of undertaking greater production programs. An answer is contained in the report delivered in September 1937

in response to the request of the Committee of Inquiry charged with making a general study of French production. The report on the aviation industry was made by M. Roos, an engineer, and submitted to the Committee of Inquiry. Copies of the "Roos Report" are to be found in the files of the Air Ministry, the Ministry of National Economy and the Ministry of Finance.

The "Roos Report" shows two things. It shows first that the productive capacity of the French aviation industry had not declined in 1937 but had grown. It states: "The increase in productive capacity as represented by previous machine-tool purchases since the beginning of the year 1937 varies from 40 to over 100 percent according to the companies." Second, it shows that the aeronautical industry in 1937 was capable of producing more had it been asked to do so. It states: "The productive capacity of the French aeronautical industry can, without further plant expansion, satisfy a much greater demand than that which will exist in the near future." (This means, of course, a demand based upon the execution of the production program of national defense.)

It is not my intention to deduce from the "Roos Report" that the French aeronautical industry was perfect. It was far from being perfect. The fact remains that this serious study emphasizes the development of productive capacity in the course of the year 1937. If the Cabinet had asked for it, and had provided the necessary funds, the French aeronautical industry could have built the planes and engines that the French Army needed.

IX. BOTTLENECKS IN FRENCH PRODUCTION

In every country in the world, including the United States, the aviation industry is the most difficult of all industries to organize. Production programs are usually from 30 to 50 percent behind schedule. This is a general phenomenon, due to the youthfulness of the industry and the incessant progress and changes in technique. From 1935 to 1939 the delay in production in France amounted to about 40 percent. It is interesting to examine the main causes of this delay. What were the chief French "bottle-necks"?

The most important bottlenecks were caused by the frequent changes in the type of machines constructed. Forgetting the French proverb "*le mieux est l'ennemi du bien*" (the better is the enemy of the good), the French General Staff too often in-

sisted upon the modification of prototypes. Sometimes modifications were even asked for when production was already under way, without consideration for the fact that very often a modification forces the manufacturer to vary his tools. Technological ignorance is a common phenomenon in the General Staffs of most countries. In France the well-known French characteristic of individualism aggravated this ignorance.

Another important source of bottlenecks was the insufficient way in which aircraft construction was organized. An airplane is composed of a body, motor, armaments and numerous accessories (navigation instruments, landing-gear, etc.). Each part was assigned to a different manufacturer. Thus any delay on the part of one manufacturer led to a delay in the entire production. For instance, from 1934 onwards the production of engines was slower than that of bodies. To overcome this the Air Ministry in 1937 acquired the patent rights on an excellent American motor. But as a result of opposition on the part of French motor manufacturers the Air Ministry in 1938 abandoned the construction of this motor. Similarly in 1937 the air force suffered from delays in the manufacture of its ammunition and machine guns. Even after the war had begun, the production of new planes suffered from delays in the manufacture of landing-gear.

The third cause of delay was the stagnant mentality of the French Government administration. Airplane production suffered especially from the lack of understanding among the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance. They applied to aviation the sort of administrative methods that belonged to horse-and-buggy days. For example, in June 1937 the Air Ministry needed the authorization of the Ministry of Finance to order planes to be delivered in 1938. The Air Ministry asked for this authorization urgently. They received it only in October — and then with a reduction of fifty percent. All Americans who had occasion to deal with the French *fonctionnaires* in charge of purchasing war materials found their methods aggravatingly slow. Even after war actually began they stuck to their old habits.

Such were the real bottlenecks that prevented the rapid manufacture of planes. Naturally, there were many other causes for delay, notably the bad organization of French industry as a whole.

Back of all this, and aggravating all the difficulties I have emphasized, was the bad political and social climate which had long existed in France, and especially from 1934 to 1939. France

was a house divided against itself. Misunderstanding between employers and workers was aggravated by the opposition between what can roughly be called the Fascists and anti-Fascists, between the adversaries and defenders of democracy. This political fever reached a crisis stage with the famous Paris riot of February 6, 1934, and was intensified up to the time of the general strike in December 1938. It would be childish to imagine that German propaganda did not help create this agitation and did not use it to break down the moral strength of France.

It would lead us too far afield to try to examine here who was responsible for this social situation and for the consequent agitation. What we must try to do is to estimate its economic consequences. There can be no doubt that it hampered industrial production as a whole, including, of course, the manufacture of aircraft. Delays in deliveries of raw materials and tools increased the delays already being incurred in the delivery of engines and completed planes.

X. THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY

Nationalization of the aviation industry was not a cause for delay in production. I would like to emphasize that there was nothing revolutionary about the procedure. The State did not expel the owners and hand the factories over to the workers. Under a law which was passed almost unanimously by the French Parliament, the State bought a majority of the shares in certain industries. In the case of the aviation industry approximately 70 percent of the body manufacturers and 10 percent of the motor industry were so affected. The indemnities due the owners were paid by the Ministry of Finance and not by the Air Ministry. They had been fixed by independent arbitration commissions set up to safeguard private interests.

Nationalization brought some inconveniences. It also brought unmistakable advantages, among them these two:

It permitted the regrouping of the aviation industry. New factories were built, especially in the provinces and away from the large cities, thus assuring the dispersion of the industry. It also enabled the establishment of common purchasing programs (interchange of patents, allocation of key materials, etc.) and the organization of professional training for the workers in different parts of France.

It permitted the State to choose among the industrialists and

place the best men at the head of the vital national industries. Experience showed that the choice was good. The proof was negative as well as positive. Beginning with 1938, massive orders again were given to those industries which had been left out of the nationalization, notably the firms of Renault, Breguet and Amiot. The experience of French aviation with these three firms was highly disappointing. All our good planes (Potez, Bloch, Dewoitine) came from the plants which had been nationalized.

The fact is that nationalization was partial industrial mobilization, which put the ablest industrialists in charge of the plants and which permitted the State to undertake a regrouping of the industry and to institute new machine tools. Anyone who knows how outdated French machine tools were in 1936 will approve the efforts made to reorganize French industry under the plans for nationalization.

XI. THE CONDUCT OF AIR WARFARE

In spite of its inferiority the French air force could have resisted the German air force. The British were able to hold their own alone against the Germans after June 22, 1940. What the British air force achieved alone could have been achieved even better in union with the French air force.

As France and Britain lacked numerical superiority, or even equality, they needed a highly perfected aerial strategy. Their most important problem was to distribute the force at their disposal correctly and to use it intelligently. To accomplish this they needed a joint air command and a technical organization permitting rapid concentration and direction of available forces. Because of its mobility an air force lends itself particularly well to such concentrations. But for a thousand airplanes to be assembled at a given point at an hour's notice all the services of command, of liaison and of control have to be prepared in peacetime. In September 1939 these prerequisites did not exist on our side. They had existed in 1936-37, but they had been destroyed in 1938.

In 1936-1937 the General Staff of the French air force contained, under the direction of General Fequant, a brilliant group of young and audacious officers. These young men, among whom 43-year-old General Jauneaud was outstanding, created a small but modern army of the air, organized by air divisions and well adapted to the necessities of French military policy. One year

after the publication of the French Decrees which General Jauneaud had inspired, the Germans created the air divisions which later permitted them to act in great air formations in Norway, Holland, Belgium and France.

In 1938 General Fequant was replaced as Chief of the Air Staff by General Vuillemin, a popular officer with the Army because of his pluck in rising from the ranks without ever having gone through one of the great military schools. General Vuillemin was personally a very courageous man, but he disliked the ideas and personality of young, intelligent and ambitious General Jauneaud. He shunted Jauneaud aside into an administrative post, just as General de Gaulle was "disgraced" when he proposed and pressed for the creation of mechanized divisions. At the beginning of 1939 the *organisation Jauneaud* was suppressed. France gave up the French idea of the air divisions at the very moment Germany began to apply it.

Having committed these peacetime errors of organization, the General Staff needed only to fail in imagination in actual battle in order to ensure defeat.

XII. FAULTY DISTRIBUTION OF AIR UNITS

At the beginning of May 1940 the Germans had about 7,000 first-line planes. They concentrated for the air battle over France and the Low Countries practically all their forces and reserves, leaving in Norway and along their extended eastern frontiers only effectives of small importance. A total of approximately 6,000 planes were actually used in the attack on Holland, Belgium and France. Thanks to Germany's supply of reserve crews and machines, the number did not decrease throughout May and June.

France did the opposite. The French air forces remained dispersed and strung out. A thousand planes were left on the Mediterranean (approximately 600 in North Africa, at the disposal of the land forces, and 350 at the disposal of the Navy) and 400 planes were left in the Alps, facing Italy, not yet a belligerent. Germany attacked us with 80 percent of her total air force. We opposed it with only 40 percent of an already insufficient air force. This bad strategy produced a real catastrophe. The Vichy Government declares that on June 12 only 550 modern planes were left in France to oppose 5,000 German planes. This may be true, for thanks to the lack of prevision of the French General Staff our aviators had to fight one to five and

sometimes one to seven against the Germans, when it ought to have been possible for them to fight one against two. To the six thousand airplanes which Germany threw into the Battle of France the French and English could easily have opposed 3,000 airplanes. The British experience at Dunkerque in June and in their own isles in September proved that a proportion of one to two is sufficient for a good General Staff to organize an efficient resistance. We all know that the defensive needs fewer forces than the offensive. But what the British General Staff achieved by careful concentration and skilful utilization of their units the French General Staff was incapable of doing. Comment is superfluous on their decision to leave in North Africa a third of their air forces at a moment when the Nazis were attacking our metropolitan area with all their might.

XIII. PARACHUTE TROOPS

This analysis of French aviation in the war would be incomplete if no mention were made of the parachutists. German parachutists played an important rôle in the conquest of Holland, Belgium and France. But parachute troops could have been even more useful to the French than to the Germans. The German motorized units which rushed far ahead into enemy territory had great difficulties in maintaining liaison with the infantry divisions following after. French parachute troops could have worked havoc with this attenuated liaison. They also would have found ready help among the masses of the French and Belgian civilian population, whereas the Germans had to operate in unknown territory and amidst a hostile people.

The military use of parachutes is a Soviet invention. In 1935 the Red Army tried them out on a large scale (an entire brigade) during manœuvres in the Ukraine. In 1936 France created two groups of parachute troops and used them in the summer manœuvres of 1937. These two groups were commanded by a first-rate officer, Major Geille. It was decided to form three more groups in 1938; and as these were to be transformed into battalions, France could have had five battalions of parachutists (1,500 men) by the end of 1939. But in the course of 1938 a violent campaign was let loose against the idea of parachutists in the pro-Fascist organs of the French press. The parachute organization was ridiculed and the suggestion was made that it was a result of my policy of Franco-Soviet rapprochement. One im-

portant air force commander declared that "parachutists are good only for the circus." This became the official doctrine. The French General Staff turned their back on parachute troops just at the time that the German generals were taking the idea up.

During the early months of the war Major Geille and his men were distributed among infantry units. At the last minute, in the month of May, the Air Minister, M. Laurent Eynac, tried to correct the mistake of the French General Staff. It was too late. France, which had had parachute troops before Germany, was unable to reconstruct her units before the final defeat.

XIV. CONCLUSION

In short, the defeat of the French air force is to be considered the result of many mistakes — political, industrial and military. The most important seem to have been the following:

French industrial capacity and output were inadequate as a result of the wrong economic policy pursued by French governments from 1920 to 1939. France did not have an economic policy commensurate with her foreign policy.

French statesmen and the French General Staff underestimated the importance of aviation in modern warfare. They prepared for a war of position and refused to believe in the Blitzkrieg.

French strategy was unimaginative and hesitating while that of Germany was imaginative and audacious. Specifically in the air, the French Staff never used more than 60 percent of existing French aircraft.

Beyond this, however, let us remember that the collapse of France was not only a military collapse, it was also a political and moral collapse. What has happened in Britain proves that war is not only a matter of planes and of tanks, but that it also is a matter of will and of spirit. Too many people in France refused to fight against Hitler because they had lost their faith in democracy and no longer valued individual and national freedom.

In ending, I would like to pay homage to the courage of France's aviators. Always outnumbered, with too few machines, badly equipped and badly directed, they accomplished real wonders. Their gallantry deserved a better fate.

HOW EUROPE IS FIGHTING FAMINE

By Karl Brandt

NEWSPAPER headlines have assured us that famine stalks in Europe, but often the articles underneath consist mainly of conjectures based on supposed analogies with conditions during World War I or on out-of-date or fragmentary evidence. It is highly important for us, politically, to know whether the conquering, the conquered, and the few remaining neutrals of Europe are actually suffering from empty stomachs, or are likely to suffer in the near future, and whether there is anything they can do about it, and if so what. Let us therefore examine the facts in so far as we can learn them.

After knowing disastrous sweeps of famine for centuries, Europe finally succeeded in conquering hunger just as earlier she had banished the Black Death and other scourges. In Russia, India and China waves of hunger were, and still are, common. But in Europe they had disappeared, except in times of war. Among the measures which had brought about this result the more significant were an extensive storage policy; quick adjustments, when necessary, in the supply of grain set aside for the feeding of livestock; the reduction or expansion of livestock herds in view of the food and fodder situation; a readier access to overseas supplies; the accumulation of private reserves by ever-vigilant speculators; and, most important of all, the increased cultivation of high-yielding crops such as potatoes, sugar beets and fodder.

But though famine had disappeared as a phenomenon in Europe it remained a traditional fear. Children still are brought up never to waste a bit of food, because scarcity, if not famine itself, may be just around the corner. And Europeans are also aware from actual experience that war brings a scarcity of almost everything they eat and wear. As a result, consumers in European cities make more of a habit of keeping their pantry shelves well-stocked than Americans do. The farmers, too, as producers, are used to acting to forestall any threatened scarcity, for when crops are failing their governments instruct them to make adjustments long before any shortage becomes generally evident.

We can be sure that the Europeans have not been sitting idly by, twiddling their thumbs, until famine overtakes them or until charity from the United States or new supplies from Argentina or

some other exporting country come to their rescue. If aid should come they would welcome it. But they know that even then it could only supplement the adjustments they must make themselves. And even small adjustments, when applied to the food habits of 330 million people and the production habits of 120 million farmers, will obviously produce great results.

II

Rationing has two objects: to eke out supplies efficiently and to eke them out evenly. The mere fact that rationing exists in a country does not necessarily mean that there is famine there. On the contrary, it may indicate merely that the government is on the alert to avoid famine, to make certain that rising prices and fear of scarcity do not lead to speculation or to hoarding and gorging by the well-to-do at the expense of low-income groups. Rationing measures are quite as important for public morale as they are for the maintenance of the physical fitness of soldiers and laborers.

Today practically all the European countries, those that export food as well as those that import, have rationed at least some of the essential foodstuffs. Normally the whole Continent, excluding the British Isles, imports 6 percent of its carbohydrates (grain, potatoes, and sugar) and 20 to 25 percent of its edible fats and oils. With the outbreak of war, a major part of these imports, and especially the fats and oils, became inaccessible. Germany foresaw this, and long before she launched her attack on Poland she had scientifically prepared a streamlined rationing system to take care of the different requirements of various age groups and occupations. Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, the few remaining neutrals, besides Portugal and Spain, early introduced rationing schemes. And since then the other nations, belligerent or occupied, have followed suit. With typical thoroughness, Germany rationed every kind of food. Bread is not rationed in Switzerland, Portugal, Greece and Italy. Meat, bacon and fish are not rationed in Denmark and Norway. Potatoes are not rationed anywhere except in Germany, Belgium, and, recently Holland.

In April of this year the basic weekly bread ration for a "normal" consumer varied from 43 ounces or less in Spain, to 56 ounces in Belgium, 59 in occupied and unoccupied France, 80 in Denmark, and 85 in Germany. In addition to these basic bread rations for adults, special rations were granted professional groups

to meet the requirements of the physical work they perform. The rations of butter and fats range all the way from 2 ounces in Poland, 3 in occupied France and 5 in Bohemia and Moravia, to 7 ounces in Italy, 9 in Holland, $9\frac{1}{2}$ in Germany, 11 in Norway, and $12\frac{1}{2}$ in Denmark. Similarly, sugar rations vary from $2\frac{1}{4}$ ounces to 13 ounces and more.

To ascertain what these rations mean in terms of adequate nutrition is exceedingly difficult. To compare them with the average per capita consumption of 71 ounces of wheat-rye-corn bakery products in the United States¹ would be quite misleading, for reasons too complicated to explain here. Knowledge of normal peacetime food habits in each country is required, and these habits differ radically. In Poland, potatoes and rye bread have always formed the basic food. In France, it is wheat bread. Again, in some countries the rations change rapidly, while in others, such as Germany, they remain relatively stable. In countries with a large rural population much food evades public control. Hence comparisons must be made carefully and judgments must be cautious. Short rations in bread do not necessarily lead to under-nutrition in countries where potatoes remain plentiful (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark, and Holland). The same is true of short meat rations if there are ample supplies of fish, cheese, or dry peas, beans or lentils. Short rations of butter, lard, and margarine are not important so long as bacon, pork and sausages are available.

III

By this spring all the governments of Europe were in control of stocks and were regulating to some extent the consumption and distribution of all essential foods which were, or threatened to become, scarce. The various food administrations naturally have displayed different degrees of skill. Next to Germany it seems probable that Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have the most efficient food administrations. Their markets were organized on behalf of the farmers many years ago, and as a result the farmers are used to coöperation and discipline.

Some countries, anticipating coming emergencies, began accumulating "war reserves" in 1938 and 1939. In occupied areas like Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France, the German Army

¹ Figure calculated from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, January 1940.

has requisitioned large parts of these stores.² Some were released later in payment for political, military or industrial coöperation. But in the neutral countries which have so far escaped "protective custody" the reserves on hand helped avoid real stringency.

All countries with efficient administrations have readopted the food-saving methods developed during the first World War, along with the refinements worked out since by the German grain monopoly beginning in 1928. A higher ratio of flour to be extracted from wheat and rye has been fixed, and this has made it possible to increase by 15 or 20 percent the bread output from a given unit of grain. This procedure reduces the amount of bran and millfeed for animals. In other words, foodstuffs that once went into the manger are rerouted to the human dinner table. In countries compelled to be especially thrifty with grain, the millers are forced to extract 80 to 90 pounds of flour from 100 pounds of wheat instead of only 70 pounds. Hence they have only 10 or 15 pounds of bran and millfeed to sell to hog feeders and cattlemen instead of 30 or 40 pounds. Another step in the same direction is the compulsory admixture to wheat and rye flour of the flours obtained from barley and corn, or of starch from potatoes. Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway and Spain, and even wheat exporting countries like Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania, use these devices. In some areas in Spain the proportion of wheat in bread flour is reported to be only 50 percent, the rest being admixtures of corn meal, barley flour or bean meal.³

Similar techniques are applied to other foodstuffs. Whole milk is reserved primarily for children. Calves are cut off from whole milk except in their first weeks of life. All remaining milk is manufactured into butter, cheese or condensed milk; while skim milk, buttermilk, and even whey are saved for direct human consumption. Germany distributes a war food called "Migetti," consisting of whey-protein, potato starch, and several other mixtures. Soybeans grown in southeastern Europe, heretofore used exclusively for extraction of oil and animal feed, are now used for human food on a large scale, especially in the German army.

IV

One of the chief methods of food retrenchment is in connection with animal husbandry. Normally only 35 percent of the grain

² See General Goering's paper, the *National Zeitung*, Essen, January 7, 1941, p. 9.

³ *New York Times*, March 18, 1941, p. 3.

consumed in Europe is used for making bread. The remaining 65 percent is fed to animals. But it is better to eat less meat than to be short of bread. When farmers are called on to reduce their livestock they begin with chickens and pigs, because they are converters of grain and also because they can be replaced quickly when sufficient feed-grain supplies again become available. Denmark and Holland, whose vast exporting egg industries were formerly geared mainly to the British market, have reduced their chicken flocks materially. Denmark's flocks have shrunk from 15 to 7 million, and Holland's from 28 to 20 million. In Norway and Belgium the same thing has happened. Hogs are always raised for slaughter, and farmers are accustomed to adjusting the number they raise to the feed supplies available. The herds of pigs in countries dependent on large feed imports were heavily culled. Denmark sold live pigs to Germany until she had reduced her pig stock from 3.1 to 1.5 million. Holland and Sweden canned pork for reserves.

Cattle are more valuable and slow-growing, so action on them has been less drastic. Up to date nothing has occurred which would indicate any dangerous depletion in this great capital asset of Europe. Denmark culled 200,000 cows out of 1.6 million, and 200,000 heifers out of 650,000, so as to keep up dairy production in spite of the feed shortage.⁴ Holland reduced her cattle by 18 percent. The daily press has treated sensible adjustments like these in two prominent export agricultural countries as highly sensational. Actually, there are as yet no indications that the total productive livestock herd of Europe has been critically reduced. The period of active military operations on land was so short that, so far as is known, there was only insignificant destruction of farm animals. In France the war loss is said to have been the worst. Yet Pierre Caziot, Minister for Agriculture, stated late in May that from all causes France now has a "deficit" of 1.2 million head of cattle. As she had 15.6 million head of cattle in 1938, her stock is temporarily 8 percent below normal.⁵ The slaughter referred to above cannot be considered a net loss, because practically all the meat either was added to reserves or was currently consumed. How serious a shortage of animal products will ensue depends on many developments, none of which can be foretold with any certainty either by optimists or pessimists.

⁴ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 15, 1940; *Die Tat*, January 29, 1941, no. 24.

⁵ *New York Times*, May 25, 1941, p. 32.

However, a reduction in the number of farm animals is only one of the measures used to help solve the farmer's war problems. Next comes a change in the animals' bill of fare. They have to get along with less concentrated feed, such as protein-bearing oilcake and grain, and eke it out with more fishmeal and seafood scrap, more beet-sugar molasses, and more potatoes. In real emergencies, leaves from trees are harvested, dried, and compressed. Off the shores of Scandinavia quantities of certain sorts of seaweed are fished out and fed to the cattle.

Modern chemistry also comes to the rescue by producing cellulose-feed. In Norway, Finland and Sweden, all great wood-exporting countries, new cellulose-feed factories are in operation and are expanding. Cordwood is processed into a feed pulp with a digestible nutrient content equivalent to 85 percent of that of good feed grain. Norway let contracts for 100,000 tons of this pulp in 1940, and for 150,000 tons for the first six months of 1941, for domestic consumption.* Germany is constructing two large factories for processing feed cellulose out of pulp imported from Norway. The price of this processed feed is kept at the level of natural feeds of equal nutritive value. By-products are alcohol and feed yeast, rich in protein.

Since winter is the period of real worry, the European governments are acting to save all the perishable summer food possible. Southern France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany have set up numerous factories for drying vegetables. Since tin is scarce, and the supply of lacquered sheet-iron cans is short, quick freezing, cold storage, and salting are widely used.

Plans are being made, too, to draw on such potential but unused food resources as exist in Europe, especially in the east and south. Actually, however, the chance for large developments within the next year or so is not impressive. More can be expected from the intelligence and equipment of the farmers of densely populated countries like Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and France than by the development of the unused natural resources of more backward countries. Later on, however, if the need persists, these will come into new production.

On the whole, the hostilities in Western Europe, caused remarkably little destruction of farms, livestock and implements.

* *National Zeitung*, February 7, 1941.

Belgium was even able, last year, to grow and harvest an excellent sugar beet crop. Of 5,000 farm houses destroyed in Norway, 3,000 were rebuilt by the fall of 1940 or replaced with prefabricated structures shipped from Sweden. In many countries the fall seeding of 1940 considerably expanded the acreage of short crops. The spring seeding of 1941 has been intensified by emergency planning, the pressure of great publicity, and, in some countries, compulsory labor. In Holland, Denmark and Switzerland, which have had great experience in agricultural coöperation and planning, such methods present no new problems in principle. Holland has prohibited the cultivation of flower bulbs and seeds and has encouraged the use of flower gardens for raising small fruit and vegetables. Belgium's aim is to grow 60 percent more wheat and 20 percent more potatoes. In France, the Vichy Government has contracted with farmers to grow 500,000 acres of potatoes, and has put both premiums and penalties into the contracts.⁷ Contracts have also been let on a large scale for sugar beet production, for vegetables to go to the drying plants, and for oilseed. Special awards are offered for well-kept olive trees.

The famine-fighting crops *par excellence* are potatoes and sugar beets, for they produce several times as much energy per acre as do grain or grass. So all the European countries with any experience in them at all are going in for a maximum production. These hoe crops require labor, draft power and fertilizer in quantity; but none of these is scarce, except for phosphate fertilizer. The latter is being shipped in to some extent from Morocco and Russia, and even if a shortage persists it is doubtful whether it will curtail production in the years just ahead. Had agriculture been motorized to the same degree in Europe as in Soviet Russia, the shortage of motor fuels might have produced famine conditions by now. As it is, the farmers are complaining, but on the whole it seems that Europe's relatively small number of tractors is being supplied somehow or other, either with gasoline or with substitute fuels. Horses are again available in the conquered countries since the armies disbanded, and oxen fill some gaps.

Germany continues to intensify the cultivation of her own farms and of those in the annexed areas, mainly by plowing up pastures and turning them to sugar beets and potatoes. Favored by good weather, the 1940 potato crop totaled 53 million tons, compared to the average of 44 million tons in 1929-1933. This

⁷ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 21, 1941.

additional 9 million tons is the equivalent of 2,250,000 tons of grain. The acreage of sugar beets has doubled since 1932. It not only provides more sugar, but each acre yields from five to eight times as much cattle feed as it would if it were sown to grain.

Europe's real shortage, that in fats, will become less acute as the various re-arrangements become effective. Larger potato crops and more molasses and dried sugar beets will contribute feed for fattening more hogs. But the direct attack on the fat shortage is through increased cultivation of oilseeds. This represents a reversal of historical trends. In 1870 Europe grew most of its own oilseeds. But in the succeeding 70 years it turned more and more to less expensive tropical and marine sources of supply and utilized the freed acreage for better paying crops. Now in view of the scarcity of fats, European farmers once more have begun to cultivate the poppy, rape, mustard, sunflower, flax and hemp of their grandfathers. In 1940 Germany grew 918,840 acres of rapeseed, flax and hemp, compared with almost none seven years ago. Little Denmark is planting 889,200 acres of oilseeds, or 12 percent of her total cultivated area, in order to become independent in margarine raw materials by fall. Holland, Belgium and France are following suit. In all the Danubian countries, great subsidies are offered for growing more oilseeds, including sunflowers. Cotton and soybeans, that miraculous all-round foodstuff, are being grown in southeastern Europe also. Some of the changes are still in the blue-print stage, but most of them are on the way to becoming reality. The oilseeds help not only for their primary purpose but also to fill the protein feed gap, because the cake or residue left over after extraction of the oil has a high protein content.

In countries where cultivated land is scarce, especially Holland, Switzerland and Norway, energetic efforts are being made to find more acres that can be brought under cultivation. In Holland, the new Polders of the drained Zuider Zee are being plowed up ahead of schedule. Switzerland has broken in 100,000 acres of new land, and Norway is working along similar lines. Finland is clearing 740,000 acres of worthless woodlands with American bulldozers and resettling on them 40,000 farm families from the lost Karelian province. Of the new area, 75,000 acres will be put into barley, 50,000 acres into oats, and 120,000 acres into potatoes. These countries are also increasing their sheep flocks so as to utilize the scanty grazing facilities of the mountain

ranges to the limit. In all countries, urban populations are expanding their kitchen gardens.

The seas — “salt water deserts” to inlanders — have always been regarded by the seafaring nations as rich storehouses of both food and fodder; and in this emergency they naturally turned to them at once.

Until December last the Dutch and Belgian fishing fleets were kept at anchor by the British bombardment or by order of the Germans who feared sabotage or aid to Britain. Now to some extent they have begun steaming and sailing again. The Norwegians and Danes have continued doing so right along. Most of the adverse conditions confronting the Norwegian fishermen were soon mastered. Charcoal gas generators met the shortage of diesel oil, and extension of the coastal fishing zone to 30 miles offshore gave greater opportunities for a good catch. Offshore whaling, which had been forbidden, is now practiced and yields a considerable amount of oil. The Danes are expanding both their fishing ports and their fishing fleet.

As a result, since last summer both Norway and Denmark have been shipping fish in bulk to Germany, Holland, Belgium and elsewhere. In 1940 the Norwegians caught 1,070,000 tons of fish, as compared with 1,030,000 tons the preceding year.⁸ Their herring catch was the highest since the record catch of 1911. This was due partly to exceptionally strong runs of herring, partly to intensive fishing. Some fish are eaten locally, of course. But the bulk are shipped southward or else provide oil and a residue used as fishmeal or fertilizer.

Modern chemistry renders this crop from the sea even more valuable. Condensed fish preserves form a product similar to corned beef, and hydrogenated fish oil serves as raw material for margarine, shortening or salad oil. The sea also supplies valuable sea weed that can be used for cattle feed, for filling material in the manufacture of soap, and as a fishmeal concentrate for hogs and chickens.

Especial attention is paid by the various national food administrations to maintaining the supply of so-called “protective” foodstuffs, i.e. those rich in vitamins. Last winter Germany started distributing vitamin C doses free of charge to nursing mothers, children and coal miners. The army diet also is carefully stepped up with vitamins. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Den-

⁸ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 5, 1941.

mark and Norway also supply low-income groups with margarine fortified with vitamins A and D.

The foregoing illustrations are intended to show that the food situation in Europe is not to be viewed solely in the framework of a given set of facts, but as something that can be modified by human intelligence and energy. All the possible means of adjustment taken together do not solve the food problem or bring back the prewar status. However, in combination with rationing, they do make the situation bearable. Famine may strike particular localities that are overcrowded with refugees; but so far we have no reliable reports that this is the case. In some countries the situation is certainly stringent. It is worse where there is general disorganization and a lack of administrative efficiency, and particularly where, as in Spain, the effects of civil war have prevented the effective use of the various means of adjustment described above. In other areas, like the General Government of Poland, the adjustments fail to bring general relief because the whole population is kept under what might be called a permanent state of arrest.

VI

There is still another branch of the campaign against famine. This is under the command of foreign trade strategists, in close coöperation with the national banks and various departments of government. The changes in European trade since September 1939 are breath-taking, largely because the disappearance of customs barriers and the centralization of trade direction in German hands has resulted in more specialization in chosen "belts." Germany is hard at the job of rearranging all trade routes away from the oceans. The Reichsbank, through its Deutsche Verrechnungs Kasse, is the clearing center for the cobweb of German-controlled barter trade. Food, feed, fertilizer and industrial raw materials are given special attention. Where high prices are not sufficient to move commodities in the desired direction at the desired speed, political and military pressure are called into play. Trade becomes amazingly manœuvrable under the pressure of dire need and the coercion of an impatient tyrant.

Shipments inside the Continent, both north and south and east and west, are the most important; but a certain degree of relief also comes to Germany and German-dominated lands from

Soviet Russia. The British sea blockade cannot touch the 2,000-mile Russian border, and Moscow is accelerating her deliveries across it, partly at any rate because of her own need for industrial goods. German imports from Russia have soared from a low of 47 million marks, in 1938, to a peak of 436 million marks. Food-stuffs and feed used to hold a minor place in Russian exports to Germany, but this has been changed somewhat since the annexation of several food exporting regions — the three Baltic states, Bessarabia and part of Bukovina. Russia ships some grain to Finland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Germany, and also some oilseeds and butter.

Bulgaria receives fertilizer duty-free from Germany and in return ships corn, wheat, rapeseed, sunflower seeds and soybeans. Hungary and Rumania both trade mainly with Germany. Denmark and Italy have a barter agreement by which Italy ships rice, fruits, wine and tobacco, while Denmark ships eggs, bacon, dairy machinery and other machines. A Danish-Finnish trade agreement provides for shipments of sugar, salt pork, meat preserves and eggs by Denmark and of lumber and paper by Finland. In February 1941 Switzerland and Russia signed their first trade agreement since 1917. Under it Russia ships grain, timber, oil and cotton in return for Swiss boilers, turbines, hydraulic presses and precision instruments. But perhaps the best rod for measuring European intra-continental trade is the volume of German foreign trade. Following the outbreak of the war it was curtailed in almost all categories; by the end of 1940 it had attained the prewar level, and it is constantly rising.

Finally, some of the "real" though hard-pressed neutrals, such as Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal, as well as "mugwump" neutrals like unoccupied France and Spain, receive a certain amount of food from overseas under British navicerts. Switzerland has even chartered a small merchant marine which shuttles back and forth between Lisbon and Genoa. On one extreme rim of the continent, Finland receives food from Russia, Argentina and the United States; on the other side, Spain receives grain and other foodstuffs from Argentina. France has obtained grain shipments in considerable quantity from Morocco, Algeria and Tunis, and also from Argentina via Algeria.

All of this trade struggles with innumerable obstacles and hazards. Railroads, rivers, and canals are overburdened. Coastal shipping suffers from the effects of British bombardments, the

blockade, and a shortage of vessels and port facilities. Swiss newspapers record the Odysseys of the imports that come from Lisbon via the Mediterranean and Genoa, or overland from Lisbon.⁹ But the obstacles are not, under present circumstances, insurmountable. There is no general breakdown of transportation.

VII

By the time these words appear in print the critical season, from the food point of view, will have passed for this year. The new crop of vegetables and early fruit, and the dairy produce from cows returned to pasture, will relieve the greatest strain of the last months of the grain year. Towards the end of June and in July the first yield of the new grain will also become available. The shortage which will still persist can then be transferred to the spring of 1942. How much that shortage will be depends mainly on the size of the new crop. Thus far the crop reports have indicated generally favorable weather conditions.

The chances are, then, that Europe will be able in this Second World War to keep the wolf from the door, at least for another nine or ten months, and this despite the great initial strain of the food situation in Belgium, Central Poland and Spain. It was possible to bring the situation under control so rapidly because active hostilities were so brief. If the war drags along for another two or three years, and especially if the United States actively participates, the picture will change again. The transportation system will deteriorate under intensified aerial bombardment, and the spread of economic, social and political disorder will break down the careful systems of the food administrations. But so long as Europe is in the grip of a tyrant who can maintain physical order, and so long as the process of wresting his booty from him has not actually begun, there seems no reason to believe that the food situation will grow worse, and much to believe that it will improve. Only when the combined American and British output of war materials begins to overtake that of the Reich will the European food situation require a careful reappraisal. Unless crops fail badly, we can provisionally shelve discussion of it until next spring.

⁹ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 23, 1941.

SCANDINAVIA IN THE "NEW ORDER"

By Joachim Joesten

AFTER a year of tension, blitzkrieg and terror, Scandinavia seems to have reverted to its former rôle as the "quiet corner" of Europe. Mars, with his retinue of reporters, broadcasters and cameramen, has moved back to more familiar battlefields in the Balkans, the Near East and the Mediterranean. In the West, the crucial Battle of the Atlantic rages. Far from the headlines again, the conquered nations of the North are settling down to their new status as Germany's silent satellites in the great German living-space. It no longer is the dignified quiet of peace-loving, well-ordered nations. It is the stillness of the graveyard and the prison.

Hitler's sway over northern Europe is now firmly established. From Flensburg Firth to the North Cape, and beyond even to Spitzbergen, there is nothing to check his ambitions except perhaps Soviet Russia's influence in the eastern half of what Nazi geopoliticians call the Fenno-Scandian "Grossraum." British influence in this wide area has virtually ceased to exist. It would be foolish to delude ourselves on this basic, if unpleasant, fact. Too much importance has been given to the scattered raids which Allied naval units have lately carried out against Nazi-held territory in Norway. These were brave and heartening actions, but they do not in any way affect the present military balance.

The pattern of Nazi domination in Europe today is variegated, ranging from more or less voluntary alliances, enforced "neutrality," and "protection" in approved gangster style, down through various degrees of vassalage to the most abject serfdom. The Scandinavian nations before the war began were a happy community unified by geography, racial origins, history, language and very similar democratic institutions. Today, according to Alfred Rosenberg,¹ ideological monitor of the Great German Reich, they are united with Germany by a "community of fate." "Fate," he declared, "so willed it that the German Reich has taken under its protection the entire territory from which once the German peoples migrated." In exchange for their traditional mutual ties the Scandinavian nations have received a new common denominator — German "protection."

¹ Speaking in Berlin on July 9, 1940.

I. NORWAY

Unhappy Norway, because it dared resist German armed aggression, is being run on semi-colonial lines. No African governor-general ever held greater power or used it more ruthlessly against the natives than does Reichskommissar Josef Terboven, Hitler's local satrap.

On September 25, 1940, a *coup d'état* ended five months of fruitless negotiations between the occupying authorities and those elected representatives of the Norwegian people who had not accompanied King Haakon and the Government on their flight to London. Since then there is no law in Norway except Terboven's and that of his stooge, Vidkun Quisling. All constitutional guarantees have been suspended; the triple division of powers into legislative, executive and judicial, which is the hallmark of democratic administration, has been abolished; all legally appointed judges have been dismissed; and the authority of the Supreme Court is now subordinated to that of the Reichskommissar. Like workers in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, the Norwegian workers are forbidden to move from one place to another and are assigned dictatorially to jobs, at wages dictatorially fixed by the authorities. They have become practically serfs.

By the same stroke of the pen which put an end to half a century of progressive social legislation, Reichskommissar Terboven erased the traditional pattern of Norway's political life. All parties except Quisling's *Nasjonal Samling* were dissolved; King Haakon was declared to have forfeited his throne; and the Storting or parliament was abolished. The Administrative Council which had taken over the functions of government between April 9 and September 25, 1940, was sent home, and in its stead the Reichskommissar appointed thirteen "constituted cabinet ministers," all members of the *N.S.* or Nazi sympathizers, each with dictatorial powers in his domain.

Nasjonal Samling means National Union. The irony of this designation for Major Quisling's party of traitors, which could not succeed in electing even one representative to the Storting at the last election, was intensified after September 25. For with Hitler's aid Quisling really succeeded in bringing about a practically complete national union — against himself. Before the war, Norway was subject to intense party strife, though it seldom degenerated into violence. Today all the four great traditional

parties, the Conservatives (*Höire*), the Liberals (*Venstre*), the Agrarian Party (*Bondeforbundet*) and Labor (*Arbeiderpartiet*) are united in a fierce underground battle against Quisling and his usurpers, which at the most number five percent of the population.

At the moment of writing, Vidkun Quisling has not yet achieved his ambition of becoming Norway's head of state, but he has assumed the title "Förerer," an imitation of Führer and Duce, and of course he virtually directs the cabinet which is composed of his henchmen. This is by no means because Quisling shuns the responsibility of government, or that he has any consciousness of his own unimportance or inadequacies, but merely because during their year as Norway's unbidden guests, Reichskommissar Terboven and General von Falkenhorst have had opportunities to take the measure of Quisling and to test Norwegian feelings regarding him. They have not wished to complicate their thankless task further by openly investing him with the trappings of government.

This has led to a long-drawn-out and as yet unsettled tug-of-war between Berlin, where Quisling, through his personal ties with Hitler and Goering, is still highly regarded, and Oslo, where the leaders in the German civil and military administration know that he is the most hated and despised man in Norway. Probably the issue will be decided, one way or another, during the coming summer or fall.

Meanwhile, however, the *N.S.* and its storm troops, the *hird*, have had a free hand to deal with all opponents of the present Nazi régime. The dissolution of the Administrative Council marked the end of all moderation and compromise. There followed a ruthless terror, not less ferocious than anything which has happened on the Continent. A whole book could be filled with the bare outlines of the tragic fate that has overtaken thousands of Norwegian patriots — jailed, tortured, shot or sent to concentration camps. Oslo alone has now three jails for political prisoners, guarded jointly by German soldiers and *hirdmenn*. The worst of them is "Møllergaten 19," where all sorts of atrocities have been committed.

In spite of all, Norway fights on. Neither the bitterness of defeat nor present sufferings have been able to crush the spirit of this gallant nation. And today, a year after the cessation of hostilities on Norwegian soil, the Norse stand out as one of Britain's

strongest and most determined allies. In England, the legal Norwegian Government, headed by King Haakon and Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, has far from negligible forces at its disposal. Its biggest asset, of course, is the great Norwegian merchant fleet, which on March 1, 1941, still totalled some 900 vessels, with a gross tonnage of 3,600,000 tons, manned by 25,000 sailors. Contrary to current assumption, this fleet has not been turned over to, nor seized by, the British. It sails under the Norwegian flag and for Norwegian account, naturally in full coöperation with the British ally. The revenue from it, together with the proceeds of the gold reserve of the Bank of Norway which was rescued from the invasion, serves to finance the Norwegian war budget and to cover interest and sinking funds on foreign loans. Meanwhile, across the sea, at Toronto, Canada — "Little Norway" — a bigger air force than Norway has ever had in peacetime is being trained and equipped under the able command of Major Ole Reistad. It is eager to come to grips again with the enemy, and will in the near future.

II. DENMARK

Two years ago Denmark and Norway were, geography aside, very similar. Their kings were brothers, their political systems and social institutions were cast in much the same mold, and their languages were almost as like as are the English and American idioms. Today their lot is very different. Norway, which refused to follow Nazi instructions, has been duly chastised; Denmark, which entered docilely into Hitler's kindergarten, leads a happy life under German protection. Such, at least, is the Nazi picture currently presented to foreign correspondents, whether at press conferences in Berlin or on conducted tours through Copenhagen. On one such occasion, early last April, Dr. Joseph Goebbels said (according to the Stockholm daily, *Svenska Dagbladet*): "Denmark is not an occupied country. We have not been at war with Denmark, but we have concluded with that country an agreement for the cession of military bases. Denmark's sovereignty and her political independence are intact."

It is an equivocation to say that Denmark is not occupied, yet Dr. Goebbels was right in drawing a line between Denmark and countries which were occupied only after being conquered. Denmark refrained from resisting the invader, and in return has been spared many of the hardships imposed on other invaded nations.

Outward and evident changes in Denmark have been, indeed, surprisingly few. There is as yet no Reichskommissar in Copenhagen, and no Nazi puppet führer has been put in charge by the German military commander. Denmark still has a legitimate King, a constitutional parliament, a Socialist Prime Minister, a powerful Trade Unions Council and a Communist daily paper. The King and the Premier have held their posts for, respectively, twenty-nine and twelve years, not a bad showing in these times.

And yet, Denmark has nothing to be happy about. The Danes know that if the Nazis have so far seemed to spare their country, it is because they needed a Potemkin village to use in impressing other victims faced with the choice of surrender or resistance. But the list of small countries open to German invasion is about used up, and no more pretence of treating Denmark nicely is required. On scrutiny, too, we find that the half of Denmark's supposed privileges which are not destined to be short-lived are already a sham. The future outlook for Denmark is quite as black under Germany as it is for Norway, France, and Poland.

Many samples could be given of the real extent of Danish "independence" and of German "non-interference" in Danish internal political affairs. One or two will suffice. One day last November, the Minister of Commerce, long-time leader of the Danish Conservative Party, Christmas Möller, expressed some doubts about the chance that the country will ever collect a penny of the huge debt (then approaching the billion-kroner mark) owed to Denmark by Germany for requisitioned food and other supplies.² The German Minister in Copenhagen, Herr von Renthe-Fink — who is virtually a Reichskommissar for occupied Denmark — at once forced Minister Möller to resign, and according to latest reports he is practically a prisoner in the hands of the Gestapo. The recent sudden recall of Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Minister to the United States, is another example. Free Danes everywhere in the world gave unstinted applause to his act in signing the Greenland Pact with the American Government, and we may suppose that in King Christian's heart it met with the deepest approval. But the Copenhagen Government hastened to depose the Minister and indicted him on a charge of high treason and for violating the Nazi-inspired "spy law" that came into force last January. Shortly afterwards, the three Danish consuls-

² Under the latest Danish-German trade agreement, the Reich is not supposed to pay this debt until after the final victory.

general in New York, Chicago and San Francisco, who had agreed with the Minister and who refused to return to Denmark, were similarly dismissed.

But it is in the economic field that the true nature of Denmark's "better fate" becomes most apparent. There is no exaggeration in stating that the Germans have systematically looted the country of all its resources and reserves. The new economic order is a "*Raubwirtschaft*," catering to the immediate needs of the occupying country without any regard for the future needs of the victim.

For nearly three-quarters of a century the economy of Denmark was based on livestock. It was large and scientifically handled, and it provided the chief staple products of the country — butter, bacon, eggs, cheese. These commodities were principally sold on the British market. All other countries together, including Germany, in normal years took less than one-fourth of Denmark's farming produce. Since the invasion, however, Germany is absorbing not only all of the produce that used to go to Great Britain, but much more, to such a point that since last November even butter and milk have been rationed in Denmark. This sounds about as though coal were rationed in Newcastle or oil in Texas. But, we are told, this means real boom times for the Danish farmers, for the German buyers nominally pay more for Danish produce than the British used to do.

The whole transaction is a mirage. In the first place, it is not the Germans who really pay for the goods, but the Danes themselves. Everything bought by the occupation authorities is paid for not in marks but in kroner. The Danish National Bank is forced to advance these kroner on behalf of the Reichsbank, which is supposed to settle the account after the war. An analysis of the Bank's latest statement to reach the United States shows that on February 28, 1941, Germany's open debt, on the clearing account, amounted to 488,000,000 kroner. Another item in the same statement lists "various debtors" as owing the Bank 536,000,000 kroner. Informed Danish sources assert that the latter figure represents another hidden German account, 400,000,000 kroner of it representing a forced loan which the Danish National Bank was compelled to make to the German High Command just after the invasion, to cover the costs of occupation. At the past rate of increase of about 70,000,000 kroner a month, it is reasonable to add another 280,000,000 kroner to the total of the Bank's debt since the above statement was issued. It thus becomes ap-

parent that Germany at present owes nearly one and a half billion kroner to the Danish National Bank. Some observers put the figure very much higher.

Secondly, with the money the Danish farmer gets he can no longer purchase essential raw materials. Artificial fertilizers are indispensable for his fields and fodder concentrates for his cows and pigs and hens. Both were principally imported from overseas; but Denmark now is hermetically shut off by the blockade. As a result, the Danish farmers would have had to reduce their livestock even if it had not been systematically bought up and carried away by the Germans.³ According to latest reports, Denmark's stock of pigs has already been reduced by 50 percent, her cattle by 12 percent and her chickens by 60 percent.

Whatever the final outcome of the war, then, Denmark is a certain loser. In exchange for her livestock, the foundation and the pride of Danish economy, she is getting German I.O.U.s. If Germany wins the war, her past record in such matters makes the chances that the debt will ever be paid look slight. If Germany loses, Denmark is hardly likely to collect a mark from a country against which the whole world will have prior claims.

III. SWEDEN

Sweden's status in the New Order is not easy to define and hence it continues to be the subject of lively controversy. Official Swedish spokesmen both at home and abroad naturally repudiate suggestions that during the past year their country, too, has been integrated into Germany's *Lebensraum*. They claim emphatically that Sweden, while naturally forced to adapt her policies to the new conditions in northern Europe, has not waived her neutrality nor lost any of her independence.

It will be noted that this claim does not coincide with the official German view as expressed in the statement by Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, already quoted above. He said that the German Reich had taken under its protection the *entire* territory from which the German peoples once migrated. This obviously includes Sweden. His statement was made only four days after the Swedish Government, in an official communiqué dated July 5, 1940, made public the famous "transit agreement" under which Germany was authorized to move both troops and "all kinds of goods,"

³ A few months ago, some 25,000 head of Danish cattle were transferred to the new Nazi settlers in occupied Lorraine.

including war material, across Swedish territory on the way to and from Norway.

There also have been several indications that Washington is no longer able to regard Sweden as a country enjoying full freedom of action and maintaining a strict neutrality in the present conflict. Thus in October of last year an executive order barred delivery to Sweden of some 110 modern aircraft built in this country on orders placed more than a year ago. Shortly afterwards, President Roosevelt in a fireside chat let drop the remark that it would be no more "un-neutral" for the United States to aid Britain than it was for Russia and Sweden to place their economic resources at Germany's disposal. More recently word came from Washington that Secretary Morgenthau and the Securities Exchange Commission were suggesting that Swedish (and Swiss) balances in the United States be frozen in order to "prevent their manipulation by the Axis Powers."

Actually, a number of restrictions which the United States currently applies to trade with the Axis and Axis-controlled countries are already in operation against Sweden as well. At a lunch of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in New York, on March 25, 1941, the Swedish Minister, Mr. Wollmar F. Boström, said: "The American export control system has, I regret to say, recently caused us a great deal of worry. Swedish industries which have for years relied on the United States for their supply of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods have been denied licenses, even when it is hard to see that the export would interfere with the American defense program." ⁴

There can be little question that Sweden, economically speaking, now forms an integral part of the German living space. Practically the entire Swedish output of iron-ore, timber and woodpulp, and a great part of the foodstuffs produced in Sweden, are now going to Germany or to German-occupied countries. This is a logical consequence, of course, of last year's military events in northern Europe, and no one will blame the Swedes for adjusting their economy to existing conditions. Conversely, Sweden does not seem to have any right to object if other countries act in the same spirit and adapt their trade policy to the realities of Sweden's present economic status.

More open to debate than Sweden's economic orientation is the question where she now stands politically and militarily. Many

⁴ "American Swedish Monthly," April 1941.

people in other countries cling to the hope that she may be counted on at least as a potential ally against Germany; others consider this an illusion.

Sweden today is a tragically split personality. Her soul is torn between an inmost desire to preserve her age-old democratic institutions and ideals on one side, and the postulates of "political realism" on the other. There can be absolutely no question that at least 80 percent of the Swedish population pray for a German defeat. They know that only this would permit the survival of the traditional Swedish way of life and bring liberation to Danes and Norwegians, for whom the Swedes naturally have deep sympathy. But it is equally certain that Premier Hansson and Foreign Minister Günther are determined to pursue their present course, which means preserving the status quo and safeguarding Swedish interests through coöperation, within certain limits, with the dominant Power on the Continent, Nazi Germany.

The question arises whether Germany is likely to occupy Sweden in the near future, and, if so, what Sweden's chances are of resisting. An answer on both scores was given by Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels in the same press interview already quoted above. He said: "We have had no reason, nor are we interested, in occupying these countries [Sweden and Switzerland], or in seeking bases there. Nor do we harbor any plans for such action. But one need not know much about Germany's strength and her resources to realize that it would be a trifling matter [*eine Bagatelle*] for our army to occupy both Sweden and Switzerland."

German protestations of peaceful intentions towards this or that country often herald aggression against it, but in this instance Dr. Goebbels probably spoke the truth. The same four reasons which last summer prevented Germany from rounding off her other Scandinavian conquests by occupying Sweden still stand today. They are: (a) unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden does not lie in the Anglo-German combat zone, hence invasion is not necessary for purely military reasons; (b) Soviet Russia has consistently opposed any change in the status of Sweden; (c) the concessions which the Swedish Government has made to Germany as regards foreign trade, the transit of German troops, and restrictions imposed upon the Swedish press have been considered sufficient in Berlin; (d) if the Swedes chose to offer armed resistance, occupation of their country might well prove costly, as the Swedish Army is well trained and excellently equipped.

The last point — the size and equipment of the Swedish Army — gives the Swedes a bargaining asset, but hardly more. The wish to maintain some sort of leverage may be the reason why Sweden has sacrificed so much, in recent years, on a huge rearmament program. Four years ago her military budget was 148,000,000 kronor. For the current fiscal year it is 2,500,000,000 kronor. While a large part of the money has been raised through multiplication of taxes and duties, no less than 1,500,000,000 kronor have been voluntarily subscribed by the Swedish nation, on two defense loans, in the course of just over one year.

Nevertheless it would be a serious mistake to assume, as many casual observers do, that Sweden's tremendous defense effort is primarily aimed at fighting off a possible German invasion. The principal reason why Sweden is arming to the teeth is because she knows that sooner or later the day will come when the present Nazi-Soviet friendship will break. The ensuing Armageddon will undoubtedly engulf all northern Europe. In that situation the Swedish Government will face a peremptory demand from Germany either to join up and throw the whole weight of Sweden's armed forces into the battle or to bear the brunt of a German onslaught from three sides. All the indications are that Sweden is already preparing for such a contingency. As to the choice which the Swedish Government is likely to make, a good clue seems to be provided by the location and character of the recent army manœuvres, the biggest ever held in Sweden. They were held not along the Norwegian border but in the far north, around the powerful fortress of Boden, built by Sweden during the last war with an eye on Russia.

This is not unnatural. The Swedes, as a nation, nourish a traditional fear of their historical enemies, the Russians. For the last two decades this fear has been reinforced, in the large majority of cases, by an equally strong aversion for Bolshevism. The two emotions combine to make the Swedes feel much more strongly about the Soviet Union than they do about Nazi Germany. For though it is true that Swedes have developed an ideological opposition towards Nazism, this is largely offset by their traditional friendship for the German people. The result of this process of addition and subtraction is to leave Nazi Germany, in the eyes of most Swedes, as the lesser of two evils.

GOLD: MASTER OR SERVANT?

By William Adams Brown, Jr.

"Man-hours are the only real wealth and the only real capital. Gold is worth nothing anyhow, — as the financial writer of one of our greatest newspapers, greatly daring, pointed out, some weeks ago. We spend millions of man-hours digging it out of the ground, refining it, transporting it, and then in burying it underground again in vaults which cost man-hours to dig and make proof against assault. And if an earthquake swallowed the lot nobody would be any the worse if the controlling financiers kept the knowledge to themselves."
— *The Airplane*, London, October 4, 1940.

CHANCELLOR HITLER and his Finance Minister have loudly proclaimed that the German reichsmark, being based on productive labor, is a far sounder form of money than the American dollar backed by all the American gold. In the "New Order" gold will have no place, and the gold hoard of the United States will lose its value. Such statements have been branded by the American Economists' National Committee on Monetary Policy as a typical totalitarian attempt to destroy the confidence of people in democratic countries in their major social institutions. This Committee asserts that Germany cannot impair, much less destroy, the value of the gold stock of the United States, and declares that even if a victorious Germany should refuse to accept our gold, "our currency would still be more valuable because it is secured by gold as an asset than it would be in the absence of such security." This view is in harmony with a common American belief that the dollar is in some way strengthened because it is "backed" by great quantities of gold. We read, for example, in the last Annual Report of the Chairman of the Chase National Bank to its stockholders that, "Our financial strength is *supported* by three-quarters of the world's gold." Yet it is apparent that the present value of an ounce of gold is wholly determined by the fact that it can always be exchanged at the United States Treasury for thirty-five American dollars.

Clearly the debate over "the gold problem" has come to grips with ultimate issues. It now centers around the most fundamental question that can be asked about gold: "Has it become an obsolete form of money?" This question cannot be dismissed with a resounding "No" based on tradition and emotion, nor by a resounding "Yes" backed up by pointing to the record of the past six years. It must be recognized as an open question to be debated

in the light of the historical record and of the alternative policies with respect to gold which will be open to the Powers after this war.

Professors Graham and Whittlesey, who have described the inflow of gold into the United States during the past six years with great ability in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*¹ and elsewhere, have performed the ecclesiastical office of baptism for this phenomenon, and have given it a name, "the golden avalanche." An avalanche is rarely recognized as serving any useful purpose and never seems to stop before it reaches bottom and destroys everything that stands in its way. "The golden avalanche," however, differs from its natural prototype in several important respects. It has performed a number of useful functions, and it may not prove to be irreversible, uncontrollable and destructive. In trying to estimate its future behavior let us look at the past. In the last quarter-century the United States has been a party to seven different methods of international gold distribution. A summary description of all seven — rather than merely of the last three which fall within the period 1934-1941 — will help to sift out possible and probable uses of gold in the future from those which are impossible or improbable.

SEVEN WAYS OF DISTRIBUTING GOLD INTERNATIONALLY

1. Before the first World War gold was a limiting factor regulating in a general way the expansion and contraction of credit in most countries. Gold movements were in general responsive to the ebb and flow of trade and to the needs of the world's banking and currency systems. In the short run they were useful in maintaining exchange stability; and in the long run they enabled rapidly developing countries to satisfy their expanding currency requirements without frequent and violent checks due to inadequacy of gold reserves.

This system of international gold distribution was dominated by London. It was profoundly influenced by the way in which British capital exports were controlled, and countries which shared in its advantages found that they frequently had to make economic adjustments under British pressure. Under this system the United States was a member of what was in effect a worldwide sterling exchange standard. We bought and sold gold at a fixed price in order to share with other countries the advantages

¹ "Has Gold a Future?" April 1939.

of a confident international movement of long-term capital; in order to enjoy the benefits of an efficient and cheap machinery for financing international trade provided by Great Britain; and in order to avoid the dislocations incident to violent departures in the course of our prices from trends established elsewhere.

2. During the first World War the foundations of this system were destroyed. Its refined techniques were abandoned. Gold moved and credit was extended in total disregard of long-run consequences. Until our entry into the War in April 1917 our purchases of gold were in part connected with our effort to supply war materials to belligerents without breaking down the previously existing system of exchange rates. The sharp distinction previously existing between the movement of gold and goods in international exchange was blurred. This was a misuse of gold, for gold ceased to be a purely financial instrument facilitating trade, and became part of trade itself. The aberration was regarded, however, as temporary, to be succeeded after the war by a restoration of the old order.

3. After the war the world faced economic adjustments made necessary by the distortion of world trade, a major change in the foreign investments of the Great Powers, the creation of large intergovernmental political debts, and an entirely new dispersion of price levels. The gold content of the various standard monetary units as defined by prewar law ceased to have current significance. But so strong was the hold of tradition on men's minds that statesmen and bankers did not think in terms of replacing an obsolete international convention by a new one more suited to existing conditions. Instead of seeking to establish by international agreement some new system of exchange rates they embarked on a struggle to return to "Par with Gold."

In the early stages of this struggle the United States became the sole effective buyer of gold for monetary purposes. For four years we exchanged goods for gold on an unprecedentedly large scale. Yet these transactions did have primarily a financial and monetary significance, for they were part of a nearly world-wide effort to find a new basis for exchange stability conforming approximately to the prewar model. All countries except the United States hoped that the attainment of this objective would be made easier by gold inflation in the United States. But then, as now, our power to absorb gold was exceptionally great, and the inflation was delayed.

4. After 1924 this country ceased to be the residual buyer of gold in the London market. The general "return to gold" brought other buyers at fixed prices and for unlimited amounts into the market, with bids competitive with ours. Our selling price once more took on international significance, and when the dollar was strong in the exchanges we were able once more to take gold from other central banks. But the United States did not occupy, after 1924, the same position in the international distribution of gold that it did prior to 1914. *For the first time*, the world had to solve the problem of managing a true *international gold standard*. The former nearly world-wide sterling exchange standard had shrunk to a segment of the whole. A "sterling area" now existed within the framework of the international gold standard; an important "dollar area" had come into existence; and in addition, France, after 1926, attained a temporary position of great power in the whole system. The relative importance of London in influencing the world distribution of gold was much reduced, the exchanges were supported by a new type of international lending, and the "rules" governing the old gold-standard system were disregarded.

The international movement of long-term capital was at this time dictated by the needs of one creditor country preoccupied with the necessity of defending a basically weak exchange — Great Britain; one creditor country utterly disillusioned by defaults on almost all of its prewar long-term foreign loans — France; and one creditor country seeking outlets under the compulsion of a delayed gold inflation and the necessities of an export trade overexpanded in relation to its willingness to accept imports — the United States. Consequently, in the 1924 to 1929 period, the world's international financial machinery, rudely torn from the matrix of a gradually developing world economy and deprived of its former powerful and centralized control, was used to postpone rather than to facilitate radical and even revolutionary adjustments which were bound to come sooner or later. This was most clearly shown by the gold redistribution policy of 1927 and its consequences. The defense of the gold standard in England was largely dependent on the American capital market and the pound sterling was exposed to "danger" whenever America was "under-lending." When the support given to the whole system of exchange rates of the gold standard world by American foreign lending began to be withdrawn in 1928, some solution

of the basic economic problems other than postponement to a distant date had to be found.

From 1929 to 1931 a rearguard action was fought in defense of the newly reestablished system. But with Britain's abandonment of the gold standard this was replaced by a fierce battle to shift economic burdens both within and between countries. The weapons used in this battle were: exchange depreciation, total and fractional; exchange control in its Protean aspects; deflation, as exemplified by the Bruening policy in Germany; repudiation of debt, domestic and international, private and political; destruction of world markets for commodities; tariff warfare; bilateral and barter trade; and devaluation in gold by some countries, while others continued to make sacrifices to Par.

5. The use of this last weapon of economic warfare established the characteristic relationship of the United States to the international distribution of gold from the autumn of 1933 to September 1936. The general aim of the devaluation of the American dollar in 1934 and of the gold purchase policy which preceded it was to break the vicious circle of declining prices, to raise farm prices relative to other prices, and to cancel the advantages of British relative to American exports assumed to have followed the British abandonment of the gold standard and the decline of sterling in terms of dollars. This aim was to some extent accomplished because the American action forced a radical change in the world's system of exchange rates.

The belief of the so-called gold-bloc countries at this time that the number of grains of gold in their monetary units was in itself something important was the lever by which America was able to replace a system of exchange rates which we did not like by one which we did like. These countries were subject to an unlimited drain of gold until their exchange rates on New York conformed to the new gold parities established by our devaluation. More important by far was the fact that sterling also was forced to appreciate in dollars. Sterling had to adjust itself to the new position of the gold-bloc currencies, and the power of the British authorities to check the rise in sterling was limited by American policy. The United States, though buying gold freely at its new price, would sell only to the central banks of gold standard countries, and consequently sterling could not be held down by British purchases of gold in America.

The use of gold in this way as an instrument of economic war-

fare, however justifiable as tactics in the battle for immediate advantage, had grave defects as strategy in the campaign for lasting economic stability and peace. It started the golden avalanche, first by making gold imports the technical means for forcing the new system of exchange rates into existence, second by adding to the internal difficulties of France the element of grave uncertainty concerning the future of the currency, and third by providing the greatest stimulus to increased gold production in history. A crisis in French finance was not long in coming, and it provided the occasion for the sixth stage in the evolution of America's relationship to the international distribution of gold.

6. In the summer and autumn of 1936 the United States took advantage of a series of capital flights from France to obtain British consent to a French devaluation without retaliatory action on the part of England and the United States. In exchange Britain acquired a new and flexible exchange stabilization agreement under which she was given access to American gold. A tripartite agreement was negotiated, avoiding permanent commitments to any given system of rates. One of the main contracting parties, Great Britain, was not in any formal sense a gold standard country. The American authorities who negotiated the Agreement, from the President down, were hostile to the gold standard and did not regard the new arrangements as a return to gold. Yet there was a sense in which the stabilization was dependent on gold, for without the buying and selling of gold it would not have been technically workable.

The essence of a multilateral exchange stabilization agreement between countries which do not use rigid exchange control methods is that all countries adhering to such an agreement undertake to support their own currencies when they are weak in terms of the other currencies in the group, and to support any of these other currencies when their own currency is strong. There are three ways by which such a policy can be carried out. The financial authorities of the country with a weak exchange may have a long position, built up at some previous time, in the currencies of the countries with strong exchanges, and may sell these currencies in the market to strengthen the demand for their own currency; they may persuade the financial authorities in the countries with strong exchanges to take a long position in the weak currencies; or they may sell them some generally acceptable asset, provided that they can agree upon a price. Under the

Tripartite Agreement it was taken for granted that gold was such an asset. Accordingly long positions in the foreign exchanges taken in execution of the coöperative arrangements were, as a matter of routine, liquidated by conversion into gold within twenty-four hours. Given the rates within which the fluctuations of the sterling dollar exchange were to be held, and the rate at which the French franc was to be stabilized in terms of dollars, and also given a fixed price of gold in the United States, the prices at which the French should buy and sell gold in francs and the prices at which the British should buy and sell gold in sterling were indicated. This principle could be extended, and later was, to include Belgium, Holland and Switzerland.

Such arrangements provided for an international distribution of gold responsive to the requirements of short-term exchange stability as between its members, leaving them, however, to work out special clearing arrangements with countries practising rigid exchange control. They also provided a very large area of free exchanges by the use of which multilateral trade between the countries members of the group, and even between the members of the group and other countries using the milder forms of exchange control, could be carried out with a minimum of difficulty. Since the alternative to this Agreement was for France to join the ranks of the exchange control countries and for the relations between the pound and the dollar to remain indeterminate and subject to a renewal of currency warfare, the Agreement was important. Because of its flexibility and the now extremely loose connection between gold movements and internal banking policy, it differed profoundly from the familiar gold standard arrangements of the past. If a readjustment of exchange rates were later agreed upon, in response to a new set of conditions, the system could be kept in full operation by appropriate changes in the buying and selling prices of gold of the various members. This was most easily accomplished by a change in the British sterling price for gold, because that was subject to the discretion of the managers of the Exchange Equalization Account. It was least easily accomplished by changes in the French, Belgian, Dutch and Swiss gold prices, for such changes involved a formal act of devaluation. The position of the United States was intermediate. The Secretary of the Treasury had power to buy and sell gold at any price he determined upon, and the President had power to alter the number of grains of gold in the dollar within certain

limits. These, however, were really reserve powers not intended to be used, but useful in making sure that any adjustment in the system of exchange rates by changes in the gold price of other countries should really be made with our consent.

Under this system the United States continued to receive gold for three years at the rate of about one billion and a half dollars a year. Yet America had not returned to the position of residual buyer of the world's gold which she occupied from 1919 to 1924. For under the 1936 system there were many bids and offers in the gold market; but so long as at the chosen stabilization levels there was persistent pressure for the dollar to appreciate, these bids did not become effective. The situation of 1919 to 1924 seemed to be reestablished.

The causes of the gold inflow which brought to this country seven and a half billions in gold at the new valuation of \$35 an ounce from 1934 to the outbreak of the crises immediately preceding the present war have often been enumerated. Under our legal arrangements this gold was not needed by our banking system. Its amount bore no relation to changes in the amount of money work to be done in this country. It may to some extent have stimulated productive effort in the making of export goods which might otherwise not have been called forth. And it fitted in well with the philosophy of our government in providing cheap and abundant supplies of money. On the other hand, it unquestionably gave rise to difficult banking problems and was a potential inflationary threat. We gave up our foreign investments and our goods and went into debt to foreigners to whom we gave bank balances and to whom we sold our own securities. For all this we received gold. On the face of it this was not an advantageous exchange, but in reality we bought gold in preference to sacrificing other values. We had become the central cog in a machine that maintained, in a period of unexampled crisis, a very considerable degree of stability in exchange rates and preserved free exchanges in a large part of the world. We made it possible for very large movements of capital to take place without disrupting this system of rates to a point where, for example, our trade agreements program would have had to be abandoned. Finally, we helped to undo some of the damage caused by our original dollar devaluation by permitting successive adjustment in the exchanges to be made in an orderly manner. Had this time of chronic crisis been followed by peace rather than by war, gold

might have resumed its useful service as a balancing item in international exchanges under the mechanism then in force. But it was not, and we entered the seventh stage of our relationship to the international distribution of gold.

7. We recently have been buying gold chiefly because it is something which Great Britain could offer us in exchange for war materials. After the gold supplies of Japan had been exhausted, we could conveniently continue this policy without legal discrimination and also without the embarrassment of helping the totalitarian Powers. The securities which we sold to the British and the balances which we gave them in earlier years are now being used to buy war materials. Though a considerable part of our exceptionally large gold imports in 1939 and 1940 was sent to us for safekeeping and is held under earmark, the golden avalanche is, in the main, resolving itself into a gigantic exchange of goods for gold. Gold has once more, for the time being, lost its character of a financial instrument in international trade. It has become just a type of merchandise which we are willing to accept at a certain price on grounds of high national policy, as part of the tactics of an undeclared war. Yet we still treat this gold in our banking system according to existing rules and allow it to create bank reserves and bank deposits.

When the economic stagnation which permitted us to absorb great additions to our money supply without inflationary consequences began to give way to the activity of a war boom, our monetary authorities recognized the danger and proposed strong counter-measures. These took the form of the abortive Eccles proposals concerning gold sterilization, increased reserve ratios and sale of government bonds to others than banks. Such proposals, however, do not go to the root of the matter. If we continue to take all the gold that other countries can send us, we shall run out of palliatives and shall have to admit that gold is an anachronism in our monetary system.

AN EIGHTH WAY OF DISTRIBUTING GOLD

No one imagines that the conditions of the nineteenth century can be reëstablished, but the historical record from 1914 to 1940 shows the dangers of failing to integrate the international distribution of gold with credit and commercial policy. The question now to be resolved is: "In the world as it is likely to be organized after this war, will gold be able to perform a genuine service as

money that no other means can render as well or better?" Since no one knows how the war will end, this question cannot be given a categorical answer. Yet we can establish in general terms the conditions under which the answer would be in the affirmative, and if we do so it will be found that much more will be required of the United States than a mere willingness to continue buying all the gold offered to us at a fixed price.

With the end of this war will end also the era of postponing radical solutions to economic problems. Voluntarily or involuntarily, the United States will have to accept the fact that in international affairs the policy of exchanging goods for gold can no longer serve a useful purpose, and indeed is merely the economic equivalent of giving goods away. Gold will no longer be a *deus ex machina* to solve the problems of our trade relations with the rest of the world by postponing to some distant date the establishment of a real international economic equilibrium. The world will be impoverished and there will be, as after the last war, an insistent demand for all sorts of things which America can supply. In addition there will be in full operation a nearly world-wide system of exchange controls covering both goods and capital transactions. The essence of these controls is that exporters are obliged to surrender the proceeds of their exports to government authorities, who distribute them to importers in the order of the urgency of their imports. The dollar will probably still be what is known as a free exchange, but it will be free only in a limited sense. It will be in great demand, and Americans who possess dollars will be able to purchase goods and services in almost every country, but the dollars that American importers give up will not reappear on a free exchange market. The character and amount of American exports will be determined, not by the quality and price of the services which we can render, but by the decisions of governmental authorities elsewhere. The pressure for the expansion of American exports will be extremely great, but the question of payment will be very difficult. The exporters of this and certain other countries will proceed to sell foodstuffs and other urgently required goods abroad. They thus will come into possession of claims on foreign countries which they can liquidate only by finding purchasers who in turn wish to buy goods either in those countries or in the economic areas which they control or with which they have multilateral clearing agreements.

The economic difficulties arising from this situation will prob-

ably be met in part by the formation of larger economic units than those defined by prewar national boundaries. If Germany wins the war, the continental multilateral clearing system now in process of formation, with the reichsmark as the settling unit, will be further developed, probably to include the entire area of German political and economic domination. If Britain wins, there will probably also be larger economic units. They might be composed of groups of countries, including possibly colonial areas with complementary economies, having in effect a single currency and without tariff barriers. The negotiations between the governments-in-exile of Poland and Czechoslovakia are harbingers of such a development. In either case there will be less basis for small and restrictive clearing and compensation agreements within the larger units and for blocked accounts awaiting settlement between the smaller political entities.

If Great Britain does not win but nevertheless survives then there is likely to exist, side by side with a multilateral continental clearing system focussed on Berlin, a large multilateral sterling clearing system like that at present existing within the orbit of British exchange control. The United States and its economic dependencies may be another such system; Russia and its dependencies another; and there may be a yen bloc as well. Some important countries like the Argentine will not fall naturally within any such group, and will depend for their economic welfare on their ability to offset credits in one group against debits in another. This will be true in less degree of every country having, or capable of having, a general international trade. Unless each country or area within these larger groups is forced to regulate its dealings with countries in other groups on a strictly bilateral clearing basis, there will be trade between the large currency areas in all directions. This trade is not likely to be free, in the sense that it will be governed solely by price and quality considerations. It will be controlled and the rule will be applied that those who will not buy cannot sell. Nevertheless, exchange controls, especially if chiefly confined to the non-merchandise items in the balance of payments, *can* still be used to promote mutually advantageous trade; and there is some ground for hoping that if they are so used they can gradually be relaxed.

From a long-run point of view it will be to the interest of all countries to substitute for the detailed control of individual items entering into international trade a more flexible and more general

type of exchange control. This will have the effect of releasing the individual importer as much as possible from a rigid system of priorities, and the individual exporter from uncertainty as to his ability to convert the proceeds of his shipments into his own currency. Gold clearing between the large economic units is an appropriate instrument for accomplishing such a purpose. The techniques worked out from 1934 to 1938 can probably be adapted to provide it if the nations decide that exchange stability between the larger currencies at agreed rates is preferable to official control over the proceeds of exports or to violently fluctuating exchanges. There will then be a technical place for gold in the financing of international trade; for a general stabilization of exchange would be extremely difficult unless the control authorities were able to convert foreign credit balances into some generally acceptable asset.

Such a system, however, would entail some sacrifices of national sovereignty as regards domestic credit policy. More important from our point of view, it would mean establishing a proper relationship between exports and imports. Some such limitations of national sovereignty are implicit in any system which is both peaceful and international. Americans would be apt, however, to resist them. There will be pressure for large credits to finance the transition to a peacetime economy by expanding export markets. But if we are interested in establishing permanent and advantageous trading relationships, the first consideration governing foreign loans should not be how much immediate relief they will give to the borrowers but how they are to be repaid.

This does not mean that we should adopt a hard and brutal attitude towards European reconstruction after the war. But it does imply that we do something which we and other countries have not done in the period since the World War — have a careful and well-thought-out coördination between monetary, credit and commercial policy. In this scheme, we should aim to increase our total trade, but to allow our imports to grow faster than our exports. We should not lend to countries which do not have a reasonable prospect for making repayment in the form of goods, directly to us or indirectly through other countries. Unless we accept this radical readjustment in our point of view the proceeds of our exports and the funds which accumulate abroad for the repayment of our loans and advances will merely be impounded

in blocked mark, blocked sterling and blocked yen accounts. The experience of all countries trading with Germany in recent years has demonstrated what advantages accrue to debtors under a system of blocked exchanges. We can, of course, accept gold in exchange for accumulated credits, up to the limit of the world's annual new gold production. But if we do so we shall not be contributing to a constructive system of international gold distribution, but simply exchanging goods for gold as a permanent policy. In that case, whether we admit the fact or not, gold will have become in truth an obsolete form of money.

If after winning the war of arms Germany should then elect to continue the economic war by offering very favorable barter terms of trade to all countries in which our exports compete, and should attempt to force a destructive competition in our own markets by the use of export subsidies raised by levies on the whole subject economy of Europe, it would not be peace. For us, under such circumstances, to give goods in exchange for the gold obtained by Germany from conquered countries, and to follow that up by entering into the trap of accumulating credit balances in blocked marks in order to serve the short-run interests of our export trade, would be to show ourselves lacking in the most elementary economic as well as political intelligence.

THE VALUE OF OUR GOLD STOCK

Nothing has been said so far as to the value of our great accumulated stock of gold. As long as we continue to purchase gold at \$35 an ounce there can be no change in the nominal dollar value of this stock; and as long as we continue to buy gold at this rate and as long as American dollars are universally in demand gold will always be acceptable elsewhere. This does not mean that if we were to cease to pay this price gold would become quite valueless, for in great areas of the world there is a feeling about gold as a desirable commodity which would be sufficient to give it value. This makes it conceivable that even if all present and prospective monetary controls were to break down some new world monetary system might be reconstructed on the basis of gold.

But these are distant speculations. What does concern us now is the value, in terms of foreign currencies, of that portion of our gold stock which we shall wish to use in the settlement of balances arising in the future from our international transactions. This will depend on the rates of exchange which are established, the

presence of other buyers in the gold markets, and the prices that these other buyers will pay for gold. We are also urgently concerned with the dangers of inflation which face us because we choose to treat each ounce of gold held in the form of gold certificates by our central banks as \$35 in reserve funds. We have inherited a dangerous banking position from the misuse of gold in the past and the failure of all countries, including ourselves, to find a commercial policy which would restore a balanced international trade and a proper utilization of the world's productive resources. We do not, however, need to be greatly preoccupied with the nominal dollar value of our existing stock.

The only reason why the total value of the stock of anything is important to the holders is that they wish to be able to exchange it for other things. The United States does not wish or intend ever to purchase twenty-two billion dollars' worth of other things with its stock of gold. Some part of this may be redistributed when peace comes, either in order to repatriate foreign capital or to form a basis for setting up a new system of gold distribution. The great bulk of our gold, however, has come to stay. It has done its work, whether for good or ill. Should its dollar value decline as a result of some future international agreement, we could, if we wished to, substitute government bonds for gold certificates among the assets of the Federal Reserve banks, just as the Issue Department of the Bank of England has substituted government bonds for its entire gold reserve, without important consequences for the national welfare. Even complete demonetization of gold would not confront us with anything much more than an accounting problem; the loss (shared with others) of a useful mechanism for international settlements; and unemployed gold mines.

If we consider the gold problem as only one of the many facets of our economic foreign policy, and if we deal intelligently with the domestic problems arising out of whatever decisions we make concerning it, gold may once more become our servant and the servant of the world economy. If, however, we insist under all circumstances on paying \$35 an ounce for gold, regardless of whether it is being used constructively to promote international trade or not, and regardless of the internal banking problems it creates for us, then gold will be our master.



THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN INDIA

By B. Shiva Rao

WHAT is India's future? The problem is rapidly assuming a significance which no one could have foreseen at the commencement of the war. The foundations of India's political structure have been so shaken by the events of the last twenty months that it seems unlikely they can ever regain their old stability. A prompt and generous fulfilment of the promises made by Britain during the last war would have seen India — as an equal partner with the other Dominions in the Commonwealth — willing and prepared in 1939 to shoulder her responsibilities in the fight against Nazism. But the period from Versailles to Munich was marked in India by two main characteristics: a phenomenal mass awakening under Gandhi's leadership; and a sense of acute frustration on the part of the political intelligentsia as a result of the cynical disregard for past commitments by successive Conservative Cabinets in Britain.

Two major political parties in the country, the Congress and the Moslem League, are committed to the goal of complete independence. There have been discussions among political leaders whether independence necessarily means a severance of the British connection, or is compatible with the status of a self-governing Dominion, especially since the adoption of the Statute of Westminster. It is significant that Mahatma Gandhi and the older politicians in the Congress have preferred the Indian term *purna swaraj*, the precise meaning of which is full self-government, or freedom. Mr. Gandhi has never concealed his personal view that if Britain and India could remain together as equal partners, without any coercion being implied in such association, these two would form the nucleus of a real League of Nations of the future. There is no political party in India which would accept anything less than full Dominion Status.

Stripped of superficialities, the Indian problem has two aspects: an external one in relation to the British Commonwealth and the rest of the world; and an internal one concerning the details of a new administrative and political structure.

Until the spring of 1940, before the dramatic collapse of Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France, the almost universally accepted view in India was that despite the inevitable vicissitudes

of war, the ultimate result would undoubtedly be a British victory. This assumption was rudely shaken by France's surrender and again after the Nazi victories in the Balkans and North Africa. The British position is now viewed with considerable anxiety in India, while Germany's moves in the Near East and those of Japan in the Far East are regarded as threats to India's own security. This uncertainty has had a curious but noticeable effect on the outlook and tactics of the different political parties in India.

It is significant that the bitterest criticisms against Britain (particularly since the war began) concentrate on her short-sighted policy of refusing Indians adequate opportunities for taking their legitimate part in the defense of the country. There is deep resentment against the normal peacetime policy of excluding Indians from the officer ranks of the defense forces (except in grossly inadequate numbers) and against the unpreparedness of the country for any major attack. This feeling is shared by all classes, including even a large section of the Congress which was willing to coöperate actively in strengthening the defenses of India through a National Government. The significance of such an offer was missed by the British Cabinet. The offer represented a great sacrifice for the Congress, for it meant a breaking away from Gandhi's leadership by pledging active assistance in a united stand against the totalitarian Powers.

Though the Congress still adheres to the demand for independence, and the application to India of the principle of self-determination at the end of the war, its emphasis, since the summer of 1940, has been on the immediate present. Many of its leaders do not rule out the possibility that the British Empire will so change its basic structure in the process of fighting the war that it will be beyond recognition afterwards.

Pandit Nehru committed the Congress to the creed of complete independence in 1927. Today he cherishes the conviction that unless the present conflict has a revolutionary aim of ending the present order and substituting one based on freedom and coöperation, it will merely lead to more wars and violence and destruction. He has lately been giving much thought to the new world order that will follow the war. His ideal is world-wide international coöperation, political and economic. But "a world federation," he has said, "seems a far-off ideal in this world of war today." An intermediate stage may well be the rise of several

groups of nations, regional or otherwise. The British Empire, in Nehru's view, is bound to disappear at the end of the war. He thinks that Britain herself, and some of the units of the Commonwealth (Canada and Australia in particular), may be absorbed into the United States, or seek a loose type of federation with it. Continental Europe, without Soviet Russia, may form yet another group.

Regarding India and the East, Nehru is emphatic that they could not "be just hangers-on or dependent entities of these major groups." In common with other Congress leaders, he has been bitterly disappointed with the persistent refusal of British Cabinet Ministers to look beyond Europe in their definition of Britain's war aims. "Do the advocates of a European Federation," he recently asked, "imagine that Asia and Africa will continue as they are, more or less under the leadership of Europe? So far as we are concerned, we will oppose all these attempts to federate the Western world to the exclusion of the Eastern. A federated Europe, or Europe and America taken together, will exploit Eastern nations and delay their freedom." Therefore, he argues, "we must look forward for the present, and till such time as a real world union takes place, to an Asiatic Federation of Nations." Regarding the constitution of this Federation, India and China will, in his view, take the initiative in inviting Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Nepal, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies to enter the Federation. But he sees no reason why Iran, 'Iraq and Thailand also should not consider the desirability of joining it. This Eastern Federation would have the friendliest relations with the Anglo-American federation and the Soviet Union.

There are, as yet, few indications as to the views held by other Asiatic countries on this interesting theme. Nehru was at Chungking in August 1939, and his visit helped bring India and China closer together. In the last two years there have been good-will missions to India from China, Thailand and Ceylon. The suggestion of an Asiatic federation (without Japan) is a new conception in the modern world. Much propaganda will be necessary, especially in the Moslem bloc of countries to the west of India, to win sympathy and support for it. India so far has had singularly little contact with even her next-door neighbors — if an exception be made of Amanullah, who had an enthusiastic reception at several places in India while he was still King of Afghanistan. Even India's relations with Ceylon, Burma and the Malay States

are not encouraging for those seeking an Asiatic Federation.

No other Indian party has applied its mind so seriously to the question of the country's external relationships as the Congress. Like the Congress, the Moslem League has accepted the creed of independence, but more as a sentimental concession to its younger and more radical elements than out of any conviction that Indian interests demand a severance of the connection with Britain. Other organizations have been content with the offer of Dominion status, their only criticism being on the score of its vagueness and because Britain has taken no measures that would impress India with her sincerity.

The Moslems and the Princes have shown considerable anxiety in regard to their respective positions in a free and possibly independent India. Step by step, the Moslems in several parts of India have committed themselves to the "Pakistan Movement." Though at first it was not taken seriously by other elements, skillful and energetic propaganda under Mr. Jinnah's leadership has now made it prominent and provided it with a slogan which is proving attractive to Moslems and to the rural masses.

Briefly, Pakistan implies the creation of a Moslem-controlled state comprising the provinces of Sind, the Punjab and the North-Western Frontier, the Indian State of Kashmir and (though it has never been definitely mentioned) Afghanistan. Such a state would possess the seaport of Karachi and control the entire Indus basin (including such vital strategic points on the Indo-Afghan border as the Khyber Pass). The creation of such a state would not mark an innovation in India's chequered history. More than once the regions in question have been controlled by a single authority — under the Buddhist Empire, which spread the new gospel of the Lord Gautama Buddha far to the west and northwest of India, and later in the early days of Moghul rule.

Mr. Jinnah's main concern in borrowing this plan has been to refute the charge that he has no positive solution to offer for the Hindu-Moslem problem. His psychological approach is simple. Moslems in India number approximately 90 million out of a total population of about 400 million. A minority even of this size cannot logically hold up all progress, but must be content with safeguards for its protection in an all-India structure. The only escape from the dilemma lies, therefore, in a division of the country into two regions; one in which the Hindus would be the predominant party, and the other under Moslem control.

But Mr. Jinnah, seeking a formula which would enable him to avoid the logical consequences of a minority position for the Moslems, has roused fierce antagonisms among the Hindus and the Sikhs, the latter a martial race with a strong pro-Hindu affinity. The Hindus have condemned the proposal for "the vivisection of India" on sentimental and political grounds. To the Nationalist movement the suggestion of breaking up the country into two regions has naturally come as a profound shock.

But sentiment is not the only factor. There is a growing fear that the creation of Pakistan might endanger the security of the rest of India. All through the ages, before the advent of the European Powers, foreign conquerors poured into India through the passes on the northwest. The transfer of those regions to a state not controlled from Delhi would increase many-fold the vulnerability of the Ganges plains. Commending his scheme to a Moslem audience nearly three years ago, Mr. Jinnah referred to the action of the Sudeten Germans in seeking the aid of the Reich against Czech excesses. But the analogy has a lurid significance for India. The loss of the Khyber Pass, the Northwest Frontier Province and the Punjab would place the rest of India at the mercy of an aggressor even more decisively than the loss of the Sudetenland put Czech territory at the mercy of the Nazis.

The Sikhs' point of view is very different. They are a minority in the Punjab, constituting less than a fifth of the population. Yet before the British conquest of the Punjab less than a hundred years ago, the Sikhs ruled the greater part of the area now included in Pakistan. They knew the art of enforcing their authority on the frontier and among the trans-frontier tribes with a firmness that has not been emulated by their successors. The "Khalistan Movement" — the Khalsa being the symbol of Sikh power — is based on the idea that the Punjab, should it pass out of British hands, must revert to the control of the Sikhs. It has rapidly achieved formidable proportions. The fear of a major clash between the Moslems and the Sikhs and the Hindus has had a sobering effect on the more practical Moslem leaders of the province like Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, the present Premier. He has learned that the division of India on the basis of Pakistan must involve the Punjab in a civil war which would threaten the security of the entire country. Nor is he alone in opposing Mr. Jinnah's movement. The Shias, who form an influential minority among the Moslems, to the number of between 25 to 30 million,

do not subscribe to the two-nations theory and would prefer a friendly settlement with the Hindus.

What are the Princes thinking about? Here it is more difficult to be precise. The last ten years have seen some startling changes. At first, the Princes seemed keen about an all-India federation and at the Round Table Conferences ten years ago they demanded only Dominion status as the condition of their entry into it. But subsequent discussions, which showed that a number of their privileges and treaty rights would be abridged, cooled their enthusiasm. Later still, the Congress movement in favor of democratic forms of government — in itself a direct result of the federal idea — created a revulsion against federation, particularly in the more backward of the so-called "Native" States. The British Government, after having laid down the dictum in 1928 that its "paramountcy must remain paramount" (in other words, that the States could not claim treaty "rights" but only concessions), suddenly became ardent supporters of the Princely Order. And by a process of reasoning natural enough under the circumstances, the Princes convinced themselves that the Viceroy could be better trusted to safeguard their interests than the members of his executive drawn from British India. Every constitutional precaution was adopted in advance, therefore, to prevent the democratic upsurge in British India from swamping the States. The British frankly intended that the nominees of the States would act as checks on the radical tendencies of the Congress, the best organized party in British India. They therefore fashioned the federal scheme in a manner that would have prevented the formation of any radical or even progressive Cabinet.

The general elections in India early in 1937 proved, however, that the hold of the Congress on the 35 million newly enfranchised voters far surpassed the estimates of its opponents, or even those of its own leaders. The Princes were alarmed that the numerous safeguards provided in the Constitution might prove insufficient to protect their treaty rights. The conduct of the provincial Governors between 1937 and 1939, and their failure (from the Princes' standpoint) to interfere with the policies of the Congress Ministries, confirmed the Princes' apprehensions as to what methods the Viceroy might follow on the inauguration of federation. They feared that appeasement of the Congress might be the Indian counterpart of the Chamberlain Government's foreign policy.

The commencement of the war saw the sudden suspension of

federation, to the immediate relief of everyone — the Congress, the Moslem League, the Princes, and (one cannot help suspecting) the British as well. But more recent developments have modified in some degree these first reactions on the part of at least two parties. Among a number of Congress leaders there is a growing realization that, with all its obvious limitations, federation would, at any rate, have guaranteed the basic conception of all-India unity and brought all the divergent elements under a single administration. The more farsighted Princes now know that the terms for entering federation, which they rejected before the war in the hope of securing further concessions, will never be renewed. The Moslems alone have shown little proof of regret.

In the early stages of the internal crisis that took place during the closing months of 1939, a settlement with the Congress seemed possible along somewhat the following lines: (1) a declaration by the British Government that at the end of the war India's elected representatives would be free to draft their own Constitution on the basis of complete self-government, subject to certain transitional conditions covering defense, British commercial and financial interests and the Indian States; (2) these conditions to be embodied in a prior agreement (or a treaty) between the representatives of the two countries; (3) safeguards for minority interests, acceptable to the minorities themselves. Gandhi was willing to accept this program and in April 1940 even suggested a joint Committee of Indians and Britons to evolve a suitable formula and to outline the procedure.

Such a declaration would have enabled the Congress to resume office in the seven provinces where it had withdrawn its Ministries a few weeks after the declaration of war, and it would have permitted the country to offer its full coöperation in the prosecution of the war. Gandhi's personal support would have been only moral. But, as he explained to me in an interview, he would have wished Britain success — "a Britain which has played the game by India." Other Congress leaders would go still further than Gandhi. For instance, Pandit Nehru has denied with vehemence the suggestion that the Congress Party's attitude towards the war is helpful to Hitler. He claims that few persons in India have so consistently raised their voices against Fascism and Nazism as he has done; and indeed his severest critics cannot deny that ever since the invasion of Manchuria, and during subsequent events in Ethiopia, Central Europe, Spain and China,

he has been a determined opponent of the policy of appeasement.

The tragic irony of the present conflict in India is that the radical elements in the Congress, now in prison, are sincerely and uncompromisingly anti-totalitarian. In fact, their complaint is that the British, while fighting Hitlerism in Europe, are seeking alliances in India with the autocratic Princes and those Moslem leaders who not only denounce democracy as unsuitable to India but have no faith in democracy anywhere.

The situation has deteriorated with Mr. Gandhi's decision to embark on civil disobedience on a limited scale. But even after six months of the struggle, he refuses to be hustled by his followers into converting it into a mass movement, or to relax the conditions for enrolling volunteers. There is, in consequence, a certain amount of discontent in the Congress Party, because while Gandhi receives no credit from the British for his restraining influence, the movement cannot profit from the spectacle of prisons filled to overflowing. The question is how long the British will allow the deadlock to continue. Significantly, all parties with any influence in the country, including the Congress and the Moslem League, have charged Britain with "unwillingness to part with power." Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, one of the most constructive statesmen in India, recently declared that he has never known in his forty years of political life a Government of India so isolated from the main currents of public opinion.

As for the Princes, they are busily occupied with the war effort. Since the suspension of federation, questions like the safeguarding of their treaty rights have been relegated to the background. But it would be a mistake to assume that they do not concern themselves with the future. A significant movement has lately sprung up in favor of returning large slices of British India to the premier Moslem State of Hyderabad. In other words, the Princes are wondering whether they should not claim back the territories that until 100 or 150 years ago belonged to them but which now form parts of British India.

In effect, the last two years have witnessed a process of general dismantling of India's political superstructure. Provincial autonomy has been withdrawn from over the greater part of India because of the refusal of the Congress majorities in the legislatures to accept the responsibility of administration. All-India Federation is in suspense, for the duration of the war, and may never again be revived. The country is being governed under a system

which, in the majority of the provinces, was in vogue about forty years ago; and at the center by an autocratic Viceroy with an out-of-date executive council dominated by the permanent officials.

What, then, remains of the Constitution enacted in 1935 after eight years of elaborate discussions in India and in London? Statements recently made by Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, suggest that the Churchill Cabinet does not regard even the underlying principles of that Constitution as beyond challenge after the war. He has given tacit but powerful support to the idea, always popular and now gaining ground among the Moslems and the Princes, that even in an all-India federation (should a revival of the scheme seem practicable after the war) the list of federal subjects may be cut to a minimum in order to give provinces and States the fullest freedom from central control. Such a scheme already has the active support of the Moslem Premier of the Punjab and some of the leading Princes.

Other suggestions of Mr. Amery's have had an unsettling effect on India — those for an irremovable executive and for the substitution of functional for territorial representation. Both proposals, seemingly constructive in their nature, are regarded by a large section of the Indian people as inspired by a desire to prevent democracy and parliamentary institutions, as understood in Britain, from functioning in India. The Nationalists, whether in the Congress Party or outside, have been educated to look upon British forms of government as those most suitable for India; and any departure from them is resented as derogatory to their claim to full self-government.

Indian tension is now attaining formidable proportions and can be relieved only by a far-reaching settlement in which each principal political element makes a positive contribution. The British must decide in favor of an immediate transfer of control to the Indian people on the basis of complete Dominion status. And in doing so, they must resist the temptation of using the Princes, the Moslems and the other minorities as arguments for loading the new Constitution with reservations and anomalies which would compromise the democratic principle.

Once the British have irrevocably made this decision, the various parties in India will settle down to discuss the constitution in an atmosphere free from prejudice and suspicion. The approach will be positive instead of, as hitherto, negative. All but the extreme left-wingers in the Congress will accept a firm

offer of full Dominion status, while the number of Moslems who insist with Mr. Jinnah on a division of India into two regions will be found to be in a minority. The Princes, too, will cease to raise impossible conundrums about treaty rights which have no relation to the realities of the modern world.

What is the alternative? So long as the British refuse to come to terms, the manœuvring for position will continue. The Congress will demand independence, Mr. Jinnah will clamor for Pakistan, the Sikhs for Khalistan, and the other elements for their partisan rights and privileges. The sooner these tendencies are discouraged, the better for India's security. The National movement is virile and idealistic. But its main strength is derived from opposition to British domination rather than from any positive realization of an identity of interests among the various elements in the country.

The entire complex of Indo-British relationships is moving in a terribly vicious circle. It must be broken if disaster is to be averted. Nationalist India will not coöperate in the war effort until Britain includes India's freedom in her war aims; Britain refuses to move forward until India's assistance is wholehearted and full. Mr. Churchill, the most determined opponent of the Baldwin Government's India policy until 1935, is silent in regard to India. Generous recognition of India's equality with Britain and the self-governing Dominions would transform the situation. Many thoughtful observers have asked why the British Prime Minister should feel unable to offer India an Anglo-Indian union of the same sort he offered France on the eve of her capitulation.

Furthermore, the immediate recognition of India as a Dominion would guarantee her representation at the Peace Conference through a delegation of her own choice. At Versailles there were two delegates from India, Lord Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner; but they were there only as members of the British Empire team. At the next peace conference India expects independent representation, so that her leaders may make their own contribution to the building of a new world order and thus prevent the formation of regional federations based on distinctions of race and color.

BRITAIN'S DEBT TO KING FAROUK

By Pierre Crabitès

AN imperative need to secure sources of high grade oil, the possibility of arousing the Moslem world against England, and the moral and strategic value of controlling the Suez Canal have brought Hitler to the Near East.

The Rumanian oil fields did not satisfy the requirements of the Nazi mechanized forces for an abundant supply of high grade lubricants. Without them Hitler cannot invade England, and he therefore had to make 'Iraq a major objective.

Hitler seems to act with nerve-destroying suddenness. Actually the groundwork for his movements is prepared long in advance with German thoroughness. Thus he has had his agents at work for months stirring up Islamic resentment against England. He hopes to be able to capitalize among the Moslems his position as the world's greatest Jew-baiter, and to turn to his advantage the enmity between Zionism and the Arabs which revolves around British policy in Palestine. He hopes in this way to facilitate his conquest of the 'Iraq oil fields.

The Suez Canal is so often referred to as a British life line that Hitler would like to seize it, not so much for what it is actually worth to England but in order to deal British prestige a staggering blow. As British shipping to India, Australia and the Far East is now routed via the Cape, he would be merely closing an inlet and outlet that have not been used in an important way for many weeks. But the prestige value of its capture would be high, especially for propaganda purposes among the Arabs.

As the Suez Canal traverses Egyptian territory, the part it has played in the relations between Britain and Egypt is well worth considering at this juncture. The sovereign of Egypt is today the world's most influential Moslem ruler. Now that Hitler is manifestly endeavoring to arouse all Moslems against Britain the attitude of King Farouk towards that country is a question of major importance. Probably the best way to get a proper insight into it is to inquire into the King's feeling about the control of the Suez Canal. This requires that the pages of history be turned back to February 1922.

This date is chosen because it was then that Britain renounced her Protectorate over Egypt. The British Occupation, which be-

gan in 1882, had been converted into a Protectorate in December 1914. Through both these régimes Great Britain maintained complete control over the strategy of the Suez Canal. When she issued her unilateral declaration of February 28, 1922, she incorporated in it a proviso to the effect that "until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto . . . the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt" would remain in English hands.

It took the British and the Egyptians from February 1922 to August 1936 to come to an understanding concerning "the independence with reservations" granted to Egypt. Personalities are often a deciding factor in determining policy in the Near East. In 1930, when a settlement appeared to be imminent, they were the rock upon which it broke. The dynamic driving power of the late Lord Lloyd, then British High Commissioner, and the memory of the rugged individualism of Saad Zaghlul Pasha, whose dominance over Egyptian politics was actually strengthened by his death, defeated all chance of an agreement.

But in 1936 things were different. Lord Lloyd had been replaced by Sir Miles Lampson, after the contrast between them had already been lessened by Sir Percy Loraine's short stay at the Residency. The new High Commissioner, in Professor Arnold J. Toynbee's words, "played the part of the good genius in the Anglo-Egyptian drama of 1935-1936." He is a big man, a *charmeur*, a conversationalist, whereas his predecessor was a small man, a doer of things and an orator. Lord Lloyd impressed everybody with the fact that time is precious and that bargaining is a waste of time. Sir Miles Lampson loves to linger and therefore is able to do business in the East.

If Sir Miles Lampson was a good genius, Signor Mussolini could be described in the terms in which Mephistopheles introduces himself to Faust, as —

"Part of that Power which would
The Evil ever do and always does the Good."

What is meant by this is that when Fascism revealed, in the latter part of 1935, that it contemplated the spoliation of Ethiopia, both British and Egyptian statesmanship realized that the time had come when considerations of *amour propre* had to give way before the realities of life. Mussolini's designs upon Ethiopia presented an issue which directly affected both countries. They

involved a challenge to Britain's position in the Sudan and impinged upon her hegemony in the Red Sea. They gave Egyptians, whether Moslems or Copts, grave concern regarding the safety of the headwaters of the Blue Nile; and they were an affront to the spiritual sway exercised by Egypt in Ethiopia through the Patriarch of the Coptic Church, who was an Egyptian.

With Mussolini hotfoot on his African warpath, the Egyptian people became aware that the irksome connection with Great Britain had at least the negative merit of ruling out a still more disagreeable alternative. It kept Mussolini from invading Egypt. It assured the safety of an adequate supply of life-giving sediment from the Blue Nile. The Nile Valley became anti-Fascist from one end to the other. The Egyptian authorities realized that the hour had sounded for them to take out insurance against Italian aggression by meeting Britain in the spirit of that "friendly accommodation on both sides" referred to in the unilateral declaration of February 28, 1922.

Though this general antagonism to Italy inspired the Egyptians to do their utmost to come to terms with Britain, the Anglo-Egyptian conversations of 1936 opened in a spirit of pessimism on both sides. This was not unnatural. The negotiations of 1930 had broken down over the Sudan after the military questions had been settled. The Italian menace to British Imperial communications through the Suez Canal, which arose after 1930, had caused English technical experts to make larger demands in 1936 than their predecessors had advanced in 1930. The issue revolved around the ability of Sir Miles Lampson, British High Commissioner, to persuade the Egyptians that his country was not wantonly raising the price of complete independence but was merely forced to ask for more because the defense of the Suez Canal had meanwhile become immeasurably more difficult.

The alterations in the technical military situation which had brought about the startling increase in the demands of the British experts were two — Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, and the rapid extension of the range of warfare, particularly in the air. Limited *places d'armes* like Gibraltar, Malta and Aden were dwarfed in the new geographical scale which wartime operations had begun to assume. "In 1936," Professor Toynbee asserts, "it would hardly have been an exaggeration to say that the strategist's first and last requirement was elbowroom."

British experts saw that Malta was overshadowed by Italy's

manœuvring ground in Sicily and Libya, and that Aden was being overshadowed by Italy's new empire in East Africa. They insisted that their means of defending the Suez Canal, which they then thought was Britain's life line, should suit the new technical conditions. As a result, the diplomacy of Sir Miles Lampson was directed toward demonstrating to the Egyptians:

(1) That "the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt," that is to say, the safety of the Suez Canal, really was a matter of vital importance to Britain.

(2) That the problem with which the British and Egyptian Governments were confronted was to provide the British armed forces in Egypt with the elbowroom they would need in the event of war or the threat of war.

(3) That if Egypt desired complete independence and Britain's backing against Italian spoliation she would have to pay the price of giving Britain a free hand in protecting the Suez Canal.

Together, Mussolini's Mephistophelean touch and Sir Miles Lampson's diplomacy succeeded, and an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed on August 26, 1936. By it, the British air force in Egypt was given leave, even in peacetime, to range freely not only over the Canal Zone but through all the air over Egypt. In the second place, the British Navy in Mediterranean waters was to have the use of the harbor of Alexandria for a period of years. In the third place, the British Army in Egypt was assured of being able to command the technical means of deploying, at a moment's notice, from its narrow peacetime quarters in the Canal Zone over the remainder of the territory of Egypt, right up to Marsah Matruh, a point on the north coast of Egypt about half-way between Alexandria and the Egypto-Italian frontier.

Though Britain considered that the safety of the Suez Canal was vital to her interests, she in no way called upon Egypt to help her fight to maintain its inviolability. What she asked was to be given elbowroom in Egyptian territory for the defense of Imperial communications. Article VII of the Treaty is specific on this score. It reads in part:

The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty the King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of communication.

The rôle thus dictated to Egypt by Britain as the price of Egyptian independence was deliberately that of a passive ally.

During the reign of Khedive Ismail, 1863-1879, Egypt had had a fighting force that carried the Star and Crescent to the heart of Central Africa. It was led by such intrepid Americans as General Charles P. Stone of Massachusetts, Colonel Charles Chaillé-Long of Maryland and Colonel Alexander McComb Mason of Virginia — not to speak of the 48 other American officers who, from 1868 to 1878, gave Egypt as powerful an army as almost any secondary Power in the world. Europe frowned upon this American-led Egyptian army, and one of the causes that contributed to Ismail's enforced abdication was European resentment that he had turned to America for military experts. When he was forced into exile, in June 1879, British and French policy in the Valley of the Nile tended to bring about the complete effacement of the Egyptian Army. This policy led to the defeat and death of General Gordon. It necessitated the complete withdrawal of Egypt from the Sudan, until Kitchener began the campaign that culminated in the victory at Omdurman on September 2, 1898.

Thus it came about that Egypt had virtually no army, and certainly no effectively armed army, when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed August 26, 1936. And the corollary to these conditions, created by Britain, was that she deliberately decided it would not be profitable to make Egypt an active ally, given the fact that an Egyptian army could not be improvised overnight. She preferred complete freedom of action.

No discussion ever arose regarding the loyalty with which Egypt carried out the Treaty under Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, who was Premier just before the war began. When imminent death caused him to resign, his successor, Aly Maher Pasha, co-operated with Great Britain in a way no friend of the democracies has ever criticized. When he in turn retired from office in June 1940, the Italian propaganda machine intensified a campaign of mendacity against King Farouk and his new Prime Minister, Hassan Sabry Pasha. The strategy employed was simple. Fifth columnists started whispering that he was pro-Italian. They invented tales of intrigues and cabals to give a background to their calumnies. And they were able to get many innocent people, both English and American, to repeat these stories and to embellish them, with the aim of angering the young monarch and sowing mutual suspicion between him and the British authorities.

If the procedure succeeded in causing King Farouk to break with Great Britain, Fascism and Nazism would have gained a powerful ally who might eventually have swung all North Africa, Syria, 'Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Moslem India to their banners. If, on the other hand, it precipitated him into turning his alliance with Britain from passive support to active aid, his subjects would resent being called on to fight on behalf of the nation which they considered was committed to turning over their Islamic Holy Places to the Jews. This might readily have caused a revolution and endangered the safety of the Suez Canal. Not merely have some friends of Britain failed to understand how wise the Egyptian sovereign was not to fall into the trap laid for him, but unfortunately certain Egyptians have joined in the sinister campaign against him. Many of them were hostile to the young King's father, the late King Fuad. They enjoyed a brief spell of glory during the Regency. They have not been able to forgive King Farouk for having attained his majority.

There was an effective means of converting some Englishmen and supporters of England into hostile critics of King Farouk. They simply pointed out that the Axis Powers had invaded Egypt, and that Egyptian troops were not in the battle line, and from this implied that the King was pro-Italian. This increased the difficulties of King Farouk in adhering to the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The fact that he nevertheless has done so is evidence of his honesty.

There were other reasons, connected with general British policy in the Near East, why King Farouk found difficulty in adhering to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. They included:

(1) Mohammedan resentment at England's attempt to convert the Holy Land into a National Home for the Jews.

(2) The circumstance that the right-about-face executed by Britain in Palestine on May 17, 1939, when she brushed aside the Balfour Declaration, did not satisfy the Mohammedan world, but instead was looked upon by Islam as a manœuvre taken on the eve of open hostilities and intended to be effective solely "for the duration."

(3) The tirades launched against Haj Amin El Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, after May 17, 1939, by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the British Colonial Secretary.

Statistics demonstrate that Egypt is an overwhelmingly Mohammedan country, but they do not give an adequate insight

into the intensity of the religious fervor of Moslems. And it is because Palestine is as much the Holy Land of the Mohammedan as it is of the Jew or the Christian that he so deeply resents Britain's attempt to convert it into a National Home for the Jews. He is prepared to die rather than surrender to Zionism this sacred Islamic soil.

The fact that the British Government said in its White Paper of May 17, 1939, that the framers of the Balfour Declaration "could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country" failed to allay this resentment. Too much Mohammedan blood had been shed in Britain's effort to impose a contrary interpretation. The new tack seemed to synchronize suspiciously with the imminence of war. Confirmation that it was merely a war measure appeared to be given by statements like that made by Selieg Brodetsky, head of the Jewish Agency's political department, that "Palestine is bound to become the chief channel for the resettlement of Jews who will have to leave Europe because of postwar conditions." And though the Balfour Declaration is repudiated in London, this repudiation has never received Washington's sanction. The Moslem world fears that American Zionism will try to force Britain to reapply the Balfour Declaration as soon as the war is won. And it knows how influential America will be after helping to bring about a common victory.

It is conditions of this character that are confronting King Farouk. His people are anti-Fascist. He is anti-Fascist. He knows, and his people know, what the Italians did in Ethiopia. He knows, and his people know, that the Blue Nile cannot be handed over to Italian control. Their interests are anti-Italian. But they are torn emotionally when they hear an American Senator say that Palestine must be converted into a Jewish National Home as "a vital part of the just world order when the present conflict is over."

Here the personal equation also comes in. Before 1914 Palestine did not present any racial or religious problem. When the First World War broke out all the lands where Arabs formed the majority were under the government of the Turkish Empire. The Allies, knowing the restiveness of the Arabs and being desperately in need of their help, encouraged a revolt, promising that freedom for them would follow an Allied victory. But similar commitments in favor of the Jews were also given the Zionist

organization. The ensuing trouble, which led to bloodshed in Jerusalem on Easter Sunday, 1920, was at first looked upon by the Mohammedan world as a local Palestinian issue. It was Haj Amin El Hasseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who made Islam conscious of the fact that it was not. It was he who persuaded the more than 150,000,000 Mohammedans under British and French rule to serve notice on the home governments that they would not have the support of Islam in the war then in the offing if the Balfour Declaration was not recalled.

When Mr. Neville Chamberlain decided to appease Islam he did not take a consistent course. He had his Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, announce that the Balfour Declaration "did not mean a Jewish State in Palestine against the wishes of the Arab population." But he also announced that the anathema against the Mufti of Jerusalem remained in force. The reason advanced for this procedure was the assertion that Haj Amin El Husseini was an assassin and a brigand, whose offenses were so heinous that Great Britain could not condone them.

No attempt will here be made to pass upon the correctness of these charges. Suffice it to say that 250,000,000 Moslems look upon the man in question as the personification of their claim to their Holy Places in Palestine and that like other people they are prone to personify causes. The fact that even since the present war began the ban against the Mufti of Jerusalem has not been lifted emphasizes how tactful King Farouk has had to be to prevent his devout Mohammedan subjects from turning their sympathies to the Axis Powers. This does not mean that Egyptian Mohammedans are rallying around Haj Amin El Husseini as the leader of Islam, but that the treatment to which he has been subjected by Britain has made him a symbol of Mohammedanism's claim to the Holy Land.

It requires not only a sense of loyalty, but also tact, forbearance and mastery of the niceties of psychology, for King Farouk to be able to adhere to the Anglo-Egyptian accord of August 26, 1939, when there is bound to be an undercurrent around him attempting to force him into the arms of the Axis. We may assume that Moslem extremists continually tell him that he should capitalize the well-known antagonism of Fascism and Nazism to Jewry in order to join forces with them to assure the preservation for Islam of Islam's Holy Places. But he has not listened to such counsels. He has lived up to his Treaty obligations with

Britain in a way which should win for him the esteem of Englishmen and their American friends. If they knew the facts they would cease asking, as one American writer did recently, "whether the time for patience has not about run out and whether the choice of sides in this war can be postponed by the Egyptian Government indefinitely." They would see, on the contrary, that:

(1) The British military experts who dictated the dominant clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Accord of August 26, 1939, deliberately elected, contrary to Egyptian *amour propre*, to make Egypt a passive ally and not an active one.

(2) The attention of these British military experts was centered upon safeguarding "the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt" — that is to say, the inviolability of the Suez Canal — and that unimpaired freedom of action seemed to them more important in this connection than permitting Egypt to become Britain's active ally.

(3) Great Britain has been given, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Pact, all the elbowroom in Egypt desired by the British military experts and complete control over the harbor of Alexandria.

(4) Moslem feeling in Egypt is so resentful of British policy in Palestine, and so fearful of the present attitude of the United States as regards a "just world order when the present conflict is over," that it might be hazardous to attempt to enlarge the terms of the Treaty, even if British experts should change their minds as to what is the best rôle for Egypt.

(5) In view of Egypt's position in the Mohammedan world there is no telling how wide might be the repercussions of any unrest starting in the Valley of the Nile.

(6) King Farouk's unchallenged position as a devout Mohammedan, and as a man whom the Moslem leaders throughout the world trust, makes his loyalty to his Treaty obligations a matter of outstanding importance not only for the defense of the Suez Canal but in preventing uprisings in favor of the anti-Jewish Axis Powers throughout the entire Near East, North Africa, Moslem India and other lands.

ROUTES TO ALASKA

By Vilhjalmur Stefansson

AS the northern anchor of America's ramparts in the Pacific, Alaska is destined to play a stellar strategic rôle in the defense of this hemisphere.¹ Present plans call for the expenditure of some \$50,000,000 to create or enlarge Army air fields, naval air bases, submarine bases and other military installations in various parts of the Territory. Of this sum, \$34,325,000 has already been appropriated, \$17,200,000 for the Army and \$17,125,000 for the Navy. But these preparations will be of little value unless Alaska is connected with the States by dependable means of transport easily defensible and available all the year round. Practically everything consumed by the Territory's inhabitants, whether civilian or military, is now being imported; and this condition is bound to continue, at least as far as arms, munitions and general military supplies are concerned. The problem of improving and making secure our lines of communications with Alaska is therefore one of great importance and urgency.

At present, all traffic between the United States and Alaska must go by sea — except for such mail, freight and passengers as are carried from Seattle by Pan American Airways or from Edmonton and Vancouver by Yukon Southern.

II

The north coast of Alaska may be considered open for navigation during three months — July, August and September. In only some ten of the fifty-odd years since 1889 have vessels been able to round Point Barrow before July 1; while in two or three of those years the ice either entirely failed to move away from Barrow or moved so late that ships had ceased trying to get through. The coast southwest from Barrow to Point Hope usually opens a little earlier and closes a little later.

At Nome, on the west coast south of the Bering Strait, the first ordinary steamers arrive sometime during May and the last ones usually leave between October 25 and November 5. But Nome is only an open roadstead. The harbor of Port Clarence — spacious enough to accommodate the entire United States Fleet, but almost too spacious since the sea in it is occasionally rough — opens later than Nome and closes earlier. At the head of Port Clarence the excellent little harbor at Teller, usable only by small vessels, has a still shorter active season. St. Michael, farther south, is open for about the same period as Nome — unless use is made of special methods, about which more will be said shortly. St. Michael is the port nearest the mouth of the Yukon River. This stream enjoys a slightly longer season than its southern neighbor, the Kuskokwim, because of the heat which its water has accumulated in its vast basin where summer temperatures frequently run above 90° in the shade, and sometimes even reach 100°. The delta of the Yukon generally freezes over during the first week of October, two or three weeks before the main stream above the delta.

All these facts are important, for by showing that the north and west coasts of Alaska are readily accessible by steamer during only a few months of the

¹ See William M. Franklin: "Alaska, Outpost of American Defense," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS* October 1940, p. 245-250.

year they indicate the serious problems involved in supplying a considerable part of the Territory. One way to alleviate this difficulty is to use the "special methods" alluded to above.

The Soviets have developed a system by which numerous shore observatories along polar coasts work in conjunction with planes that scout the sea in order to report the condition and movement of ice. In Alaskan waters vessels could be similarly directed and redirected constantly so as to take advantage of thin or loose ice or of the widest available gaps in the pack. The season for northern Alaskan water-borne commerce might thus be extended at the same time that the safety of navigation was increased. The Soviets also use powerful icebreakers to accompany fleets of transport ships, and this helps still further to lengthen the navigation season and to assure safety. Such special ships would be useful principally in the waters to the south of Point Hope, and their usefulness would increase as one went south. They would thus be most important south of the Yukon, where places now closed for several months each winter might perhaps be made accessible for the entire year.

The chief harbors of southern Alaska are, with one exception, little troubled by ice. At Skagway, Juneau, Cordova, Seward and, of course, the ports in the Panhandle, there is no trouble at all. It is unfortunately the chief harbor of Alaska, Anchorage, that lies idle through several winter months because of ice. Anchorage is located at the head of Cook Inlet, where the tides are among the highest in the world. These currents keep the ice in such a state of agitation that the port at Anchorage is useless for nearly half the year. However, some observers believe that by using modern methods Anchorage could be kept open the year round.

In any event, Seward, 80 miles south of Anchorage on the Gulf of Alaska, has since the construction of the Alaska Railroad been the winter port for Anchorage. But Seward too has drawbacks. Along the railroad just north of it the heavy snows have been a serious problem in winter, the very time when that port must carry the burden of traffic. Furthermore, this stretch of track contains high wooden trestles which military experts regard as vulnerable to attack or sabotage. Both railway and Army experts have therefore been urging the construction of a cutoff. Recent reports indicate that preparations are now being made to convert Portage Bay, on the east side of Kenai Peninsula, into a harbor that will replace Seward.

For the time being, however, Anchorage is the most important city in Alaska. Just back of it is Fort Richardson, chief military establishment in the Territory. From Anchorage runs the government railroad northward across the high Alaska Range to the Tanana-Yukon basin at Fairbanks; and from it will soon run a branch road up through the Matanuska Valley to tie in with the Richardson Highway which extends from Valdez to Fairbanks.

III

This brings us to the question of what facilities exist for connecting the ports of Alaska with the interior. First of all there is, as already mentioned, the Seward-Fairbanks railroad. Its main line covers a distance of 470 miles and is open for freight and passenger service the year round. Besides carrying through traffic from the Yukon basin to the coast, its branch lines serve the Matanuska Valley farming area as well as several coal fields.


The railroad from Cordova inland along the Copper River ceased operation in 1938, but might be reopened. More important is the railway from Skagway across White Pass to Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory. From Whitehorse goods and passengers proceed by boat down the Yukon River to Dawson and to the great interior basin of Alaska. Like the Alaska Railroad, the White Pass line is open throughout the year.

There is only one road worthy of the name leading from the coast into the interior of Alaska — the 371-mile Richardson Highway from Valdez to Fairbanks. This has a narrow, winding roadway and is not surfaced. Parts of the highway are closed each winter by snow, especially in the passes; but with the use of modern snow-removal machinery the road could doubtless be kept open in all except the worst weather. There is also a respectable road from Fairbanks to Circle — the Steese Highway. The snow is drier and smaller in quantity in the interior than it is south of the Alaska Range, and for this reason it is easier to keep roads open in the Yukon Basin than on the southern coast. Indeed, Alaska blizzards, except those along the Bering Sea and the Arctic Coast, do not cause as much trouble as those of Minnesota and the Dakotas. Many roads, or trails, wind through various parts of the forested interior, and these are open in the winter when the ground is frozen. In the summer, however, when the mud and swamps turn into jelly, they become impassable. Hence it is upon aviation that much of Alaska must rely for transportation facilities.

In Alaska planes are used, both for freight and passengers, in a higher per capita ratio than anywhere in the world except in the Canadian and Soviet Far North. In 1938 the approximately 30,000 permanent white residents of Alaska purchased about 30,000 separate airplane passages. In the same year, Alaskan airways carried as much freight as all the airlines in the United States. There are three ways of flying to Alaska: Pan American Airways from Seattle and the two routes of Yukon Southern (subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway), one from Vancouver and one from Edmonton. From Seattle-Vancouver, Pan American and Yukon Southern cooperate to make up a seven-times-a-week schedule, four days from Seattle by Pan American and three from Vancouver by Yukon Southern. These Alaska services have so coordinated their schedules with the transcontinental airlines that it is possible to reach Fairbanks from New York City in 20 hours. In another three hours of flying one may reach the frontier between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in Bering Strait between Little and Big Diomed Islands.

In 1939 there were in Alaska about 175 airplanes doing scheduled runs, many of them available in their spare time for charter service. By now the number is undoubtedly higher. These planes operate not only out of "big cities" in Alaska, but sometimes out of villages. With them one can go to any part of the mainland territory and to some of the neighboring islands.

Of supreme importance to Alaska's forested interior basin, greater in area than all the seaboard states from Maine to Georgia, are the two large rivers, the Yukon and the Kuskokwim. The Yukon, third largest stream on the North American continent, has been navigated by flat-bottomed steamers with a draft up to six feet, from its mouth to Dawson, a distance of 1,100 miles, and by steamers of shallower draft another 300 miles to Whitehorse, terminal of the White Pass railway. The Kuskokwim is navigable for the 330 miles from McGrath to the sea. Both streams are open from May to October.



It has been suggested that the value of these two waterways as arteries of commerce would be greatly enhanced by joining them at a point near the Bering Sea where the portage between them is about 20 miles wide and 20 feet high. To dig such a canal would be simple and cheap, and would contribute to Alaska's defensibility by improving its interior lines of transportation.

Another suggestion, made with the same objective in mind, is to broaden and improve the road which runs across where the head of Lake Iliamna is less than 20 miles from Cook Inlet. Such a road, used in conjunction with steamers on Iliamna and its outlet to the Bering Sea, would represent a valuable cutoff for traffic from Bristol Bay to points on the Gulf of Alaska.

The most vulnerable link in the Territory's chain of communications is that connecting it with the United States by sea. Vessels from Puget Sound bound for ports in the Panhandle, naturally take the Inside Passage, the tortuous and spectacular route that threads its way through a maze of rugged islands along the fjord-like coast of British Columbia and Alaska. This is the most important tourist route to Alaska. Ships headed for all other ports in Alaska generally take the open sea, and in time of war they would therefore be liable to attack from hostile naval units operating in the North Pacific. Even those ships which followed the Inside Passage would by no means be entirely safe from attack by surface or submarine raiders lying in ambush in the countless hideaways which this deeply indented coast affords.

Summarizing, one can say that the various transport services to and within Alaska are fairly adequate for the peacetime needs of the Territory's 70,000 whites and natives. But they are pathetically inadequate to provide for the probable requirements of war conditions. In the event of an American naval defeat in the Pacific, commerce between Alaska and the States would be severed and Alaskans would become prisoners within Alaska, except those who could fly out. Those left would starve, since the food-producing potentialities of the Territory have scarcely been developed at all. These facts explain the necessity for the construction — at the earliest possible moment — of a modern highway across Western Canada to the interior of Alaska.

IV

Various routes have been suggested for this proposed highway. Those most discussed are four in number, designated as Routes A, B, C and D.

The most publicized of the four is Route A, which runs north from Seattle and Vancouver through Prince George and Hazelton to Whitehorse and Fairbanks. About a third of this road, from Seattle to Hazelton, is already in place, but only a part of it is in a state fit to carry the heavy military traffic of modern war.

Route A is picturesque, with many attractions for the tourist; but its steep grades and numerous curves would entail relatively heavy construction costs. It lies in general far enough inland to escape the heavy snows deposited by the moist winds of the North Pacific; keeping it open in winter would thus be relatively easy. Yet it is near enough to the coast to allow a number of feeder highways to be run up to it from tidewater. This would permit the road to be built from several intermediate points simultaneously, rather than merely from the termini, thereby reducing both the time and cost of construction. After the road had been finished these feeders would make it easier to furnish

traffic on it with fuel and other supplies, and they would also serve as outlets for coastal communities now accessible only by sea.

Mr. Donald MacDonald, chief proponent of Route A, says it can be built from 60 foci in 18 months at a cost of \$25,000,000. Hon. Anthony J. Dimond, Delegate to Congress from Alaska, puts the cost at \$30,000,000. Either set of figures puts both a time limit and a price limit equal to only a third of the requirements for building a battleship. And, say the highway advocates, battleships sometimes go on rocks and in any case grow obsolete in ten years, whereas a road constantly increases in value and importance, in peace as well as in war. But some critics maintain that its proximity to the coast is a fatal military weakness of Route A, for it would expose the road to aerial raids from the North Pacific, and might even be cut by a hostile force if the United States were to lose, even temporarily, control over those waters. To this MacDonald replies that military units could easily be stationed along the highway, in addition to the chain of air bases already being set up along its route.

Route B is the same as Route A as far north as Prince George. Beyond that point Route B follows a course considerably farther inland. Since it passes through less rugged country, it might be cheaper to build, though its construction would take longer for it lacks the coastal feeders which are a feature of Route A. Furthermore, this same lack of feeders would increase the difficulty of supplying fuel along Highway B after it had been completed.

Routes A and B have their southern termini on the Pacific, and to many observers this is a serious drawback, for most of the manufactured goods — especially defense apparatus — which would be carried over a highway to Yukon Territory and Alaska would originate in the industrial areas of southeastern Canada and in the States east of the Mississippi. If this highway were to be built along either Routes A or B, it would mean, for instance, that a truck being delivered to Fairbanks from Detroit would have to go around two sides of a triangle. This is one of the reasons why some commentators feel that the highway should run direct from Chicago, the Twin Cities and Winnipeg northwestward across the prairies, keeping east of the Rockies till near the Arctic, thus making a beeline between the eastern industrial centers and Alaska.

There are, in fact, two proposals for such a direct highway: Routes C and D. Both of these may be thought of as starting from Edmonton where they would connect with well-established highways radiating south and eastward. They both follow the same route north from Edmonton as far as the town of Peace River. Here they divide, Route C following a more westerly course by way of Fort St. John and Fort Nelson. As the reader will note from the accompanying map, beyond Fort Nelson two courses are suggested, one to connect with Route B at Frances Lake, the other to connect at Whitehorse with Route A.

Either of these two Routes C, being fairly direct and passing through more level country, would, as compared to either A or B, represent a substantial saving in construction costs as well as in mileage between eastern American cities and the interior of Alaska. The backers of this proposal dwell on the fact that Route C runs through oil country in Alberta, and perhaps in British

Columbia, and that this would greatly simplify the fuel problem. Oil has been produced for many years in the fields south and east of Calgary, while the Abasand Oil Company's plant near McMurray, 250 miles north of Edmonton and scheduled to enter production shortly, will produce Diesel oil, automobile gas and road-surfacing material "in any quantity desired." The oil sands of this field are estimated to contain 100 billion barrels of oil.

But Route C has the same drawback as B in that it would lack feeders and would therefore have to be constructed in long segments — an expensive and time-consuming process. This brings us to Route D. Though a little longer than Route C — perhaps 1,400 miles as against 1,300, measured from the railhead at Peace River to Fairbanks — Route D offers better chances for rapid and cheap construction than any other highway yet suggested, for reasons which will be explained shortly.

From Peace River, D runs north across a low divide of rolling hills into the Hay River valley, and then to Providence on the Mackenzie River just below the outlet of Great Slave Lake. This segment would pass through one of the finest wheat and mixed-farming regions in Canada, as yet only in small part developed. A heavy-trucking road for use in winter (when both ground and waterways are frozen) was completed through this section two years ago from Notikewin (at the end of the all-year highway 40 miles north of Peace River) to the west end of Great Slave Lake.

Beyond Providence Route D parallels the Mackenzie, second largest river in North America, down as far as the mouth of Keele River, some 30 miles upstream from Norman. Here the Mackenzie is just over 300 crow-flight miles from the nearest point on the Alaska-Yukon road system at Mayo. By following the Keele and its branches, crossing a rather swampy tableland and then descending along a fork of the Stewart River to Mayo, Route D avoids any real mountaineering problems, for at no point would it have an altitude much over 3,000 feet. According to the report of the one known flight over the Keele-Stewart route, the canyons are not serious; but, according to the one available report of a journey made on foot, they are bad. However, all authorities agree that the Mackenzie-Yukon divide in this region is low and not particularly rough.

The section of Highway D from the Mackenzie to Mayo would be the most difficult to build, for it could be constructed only from its two termini. But southward from the point where it meets the Mackenzie River, Highway D could be built simultaneously from many points, since it would almost everywhere be parallel to railways, makeshift wagon roads or navigable rivers. Supplies for construction could thus be set down at enough places to permit the highway to be completed in less time than it would take to finish any of the other three proposed roads. Also, Highway D would cost less to build. Mr. W. A. Fallow, Minister of Public Works in the Province of Alberta, has put the cost at \$12,000,000; other proponents estimate it at \$15,000,000.

The question of fuel — for use both during and after construction — is also important. Road D, like Road C, would utilize the oil produced in Southern Alberta and at McMurray. In addition, the northern part of Road D could be supplied from the plant of the Imperial Oil Company of Canada on the Lower Mackenzie near Norman. Imperial Oil drilled its first producing well in the Norman fields in 1920; but local demand did not justify production until

1936, at which time a steam still began providing ordinary gasoline and Diesel oil, consumed locally by river steamers and by the heavy machinery used in the gold, radium and other mining industries that have developed so spectacularly in the region of Great Bear Lake during the last decade. In 1939 a modern unit was installed, with a capacity of 840 barrels of crude oil a day and capable of producing gasoline, light and heavy Diesel oil, and bunker oil. In this plant it is now possible to make aviation gasolines of somewhat better than 80 octane by the use of tetra ethyl lead. In 1940, 87 octane was being made with an imported blending fluid. In 1938 Imperial produced 27,697 barrels around Norman. This field has never been classified as one of the world's greatest, like the McMurray sands; but it is known to be large in area, and the impression prevails that with two or three years of energetic and well-financed drilling there is at least an even chance of finding a supply there that would produce several million barrels per year, enough to satisfy the commercial and military needs of both the Yukon Territory and the interior of Alaska.

As far as Highway D is concerned, the products of the Norman field would serve not only to build the road quickly and cheaply, but once built would supply traffic along it with a constant source of ready and inexpensive fuel. Furthermore, by means of its northern leg from the Mackenzie River to Dawson, Road C could keep the Yukon Territory and Alaska supplied with oil products at prices greatly below those now prevailing there. The champions of Route D point out that Alaska's oil supply, coming as it does entirely by sea from the United States proper, might be cut off, or greatly curtailed, by an enterprising enemy in time of war. The construction of an all-weather road from Fairbanks to the Mackenzie near Norman would be, they claim, one of the most important steps toward making Alaska defensible. It has also been suggested that a pipeline might be laid from Norman to the head of navigation on the Yukon River system.

Route D is, of course, less exposed to attack from the Pacific than any of the other three. It would also be less subject to blocking in winter because the amount of trouble caused by snow decreases as one goes inland from the ocean. Route A would thus have the most difficulties in this respect, and Route D the least. As far as the latter is concerned, the thousand miles from Chicago to the Peace River would suffer more from snow than the stretch from the Peace River to Fairbanks, since the strong winds which produce drifts on the prairies do not occur in the northern forest.

VI

Air communication between the United States and Alaska is assured by Pan American Airways from Seattle to Juneau, Whitehorse, Fairbanks and Nome, with a branch to Bethel. At Whitehorse, Pan American connects with the Yukon Southern lines running to Vancouver and Edmonton. There is also a regular airline from Edmonton down the Mackenzie to its mouth at Aklavik, with a branch running to Coppermine. However, the facilities — fields, hangars, repair shops, etc. — employed by these commercial lines are of little value for defense purposes. The Army and Navy are therefore building bases of their own. The Navy, for instance, is developing patrol-plane bases at Sitka, Kodiak Island and Dutch Harbor; while the Army is constructing one of its major air bases at Anchorage, the southern gateway to the interior, and an

advanced base, especially adapted for experimentation in cold-weather flying, at Fairbanks.

What the Army Air Corps needs, then, is what the Army itself needs — an overland route across Canada. For the Air Corps this would mean one or more chains of large, well-equipped and well-defended air fields, located preferably east of the Rockies. Both the Canadian and American Governments are now improving the ground facilities of some of the existing fields so that they can handle large-scale military traffic. For bombers the problem is simple since they can take off in the United States and fly non-stop to their destinations in Alaska. It is the fighter planes that are a problem because of their short flying range.

As a matter of fact, the Canadian Air Minister, Mr. C. G. Power, revealed in the middle of last February that the Dominion Government was going to spend \$9,000,000 on the construction of seven air fields between Edmonton and Whitehorse, and that when completed in the summer of 1941 these fields were to be open to both the commercial and military planes of the United States. A month later, on March 15, the Canadian Air Ministry and the Transport Department issued a joint statement officially announcing that work had already commenced on the construction of a series of "airdromes" running northward from both Edmonton and Vancouver. This announcement would appear to mean that existing fields at Grand Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson and Watson Lake — all of them located along the more southerly route proposed for Highway C — are to be improved sufficiently to carry military traffic. Between Vancouver and Fort St. John, where the two lines join, "airdromes" are being developed at Kamloops, Williams Lake and Prince George, with a field also at Smithers en route to Prince Rupert. Presumably the work on these fields will be supplemented by the enlargement of the fields at Whitehorse, Dawson and elsewhere in order to complete the chain to Fairbanks, and perhaps eventually to Nome.

According to reports these fields now being developed will have landing strips 4,000 feet long and 500 feet wide, complete lighting equipment for night flying, and all the necessary radio apparatus for guiding aircraft in any kind of weather. To move fighter squadrons to Alaska in winter would be a simple undertaking, for in an emergency wheeled planes can descend upon the ice of lakes and of rivers, just as commercial aircraft have been doing for some time. When the fields just listed have been expanded and completed, it will be as easy to move Canadian and American fighter squadrons to Alaska in summer as in winter.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

VERSAILLES TWENTY YEARS AFTER. BY PAUL BIRDSALL. New York: Reynal, 1941, 350 p. \$3.00.

An objective and very readable reconstruction of the 1919 peace negotiations, by a professor of history at Williams College. Dr. Birdsall feels that Woodrow Wilson was remarkably successful at Paris in imposing his own views in spite of the bitter fight waged against him and his ideals by most of the other delegates and by many of his own countrymen. The book closes with a call for the revival of Wilsonian principles.

PREPARE FOR PEACE! BY HENRY M. WRISTON. New York: Harper, 1941, 275 p. \$2.50.

The author, President of Brown University, has written this thought-provoking book on the theory that in time of war prepare for peace. Drawing on his wide range of historical knowledge, he shows how easy it is for victors in war to lose the ensuing peace through their failure to organize it on a sane and durable basis. He therefore urges that these lessons of the past be taken to heart by the men who will be responsible for making and keeping the new peace, however and whenever it comes.

THE REDEMPTION OF DEMOCRACY. BY HERMANN RAUSCHNING. New York: Alliance, 1941, 243 p. \$3.00.

Dr. Rauschning, having been high in Hitler's confidence, is an unexcelled authority on the aims and methods of Nazi Germany — though what he has to say on this subject in his present work will be found in large part in his previous books. But when he enters the field of prophecy and calls for a sort of "Pax Anglo-Americana" to rule "the coming Atlantic Empire" he is not so convincing. Never having believed in democracy, he is not well equipped to understand its fundamental qualities and predict its future.

THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE. BY ANNE MORROW LINDBERGH. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 41 p. \$1.00.

This is one of the most controversial books to appear in recent years, and one of the most difficult to appraise. In substance, Mrs. Lindbergh's thesis is that the great fact of history, the law of life, is eternal and inexorable change, that we are now in one of the great periods of rapid and profound change, and that it is therefore the better part of wisdom — for Americans as well as for all other peoples — to accept this process, whatever it may be, and not to fight against it. The "wave of the future," as it presents itself to Mrs. Lindbergh, is totalitarian, and in her eyes there is no use in our trying, Canute-like, to stem it. The net effect of Mrs. Lindbergh's book, perhaps unintentional, is even more destructive than the mechanistic approach to life expounded by her husband because it furnishes a sort of *vade mecum* for the defeatists. One of the most disturbing things about this sincere, and in some respects courageous, little volume is its evasion of some of the real issues, particularly the moral ones. It carries the subtitle "A Confession of Faith," but it is precisely faith that the author seems to lack.

LET NO WAVE ENGULF US. BY Frank Altschul. New York: Duell, 1941, 60 p. \$1.00.

Mr. Altschul, senior partner of Lazard Frères, feels with Mrs. Lindbergh that drastic

social and economic reforms are called for, but unlike her he wants them effected by strengthening democratic processes and ideals, not by surrendering supinely to the new barbarism. Mr. Altschul believes that the salvation of sanity and decency lies with the moderates and he calls upon all who belong to that way of thinking to rally behind President Roosevelt.

WHY FREEDOM MATTERS. BY SIR NORMAN ANGELL. New York: Penguin, 1940, 134 p. 25 cents.

A cogent tract for the times.

THE WAVE OF THE PAST. BY R. H. MARKHAM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941, 55 p. \$1.00.

A simple expression of a religious faith in democracy, by a former European correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

FREEDOM: ITS MEANING. EDITED BY RUTH NANDA ANSHEN. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 686 p. \$4.00.

Essays by forty-two scholars and scientists of many nationalities.

THE MORAL BASIS OF DEMOCRACY. BY ELEANOR ROOSEVELT. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1940, 82 p. \$1.50.

The wife of the President emphasizes the Christian content of true democracy.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MORE STABLE WORLD ORDER. EDITED BY WALTER H. C. LAVES. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 193 p. \$2.00.

Six lectures delivered at the Harris Institute of the University of Chicago in 1940.

DAS ENDE DES EUROPÄISCHEN GLEICHGEWICHTS. BY GERHART JENTSCH. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940, 72 p. M 1.80.

The Balance of Power idea suited only Britain, and now it has been abolished by historical processes of which the Axis is the culmination.

TERROR IN OUR TIME. BY RICHARD WILMER ROWAN. New York: Longmans, 1941, 438 p. \$3.00.

The amazing history of espionage and fifth-columnism in Europe and Asia between the two World Wars.

POLITICAL PROPAGANDA. BY F. C. BARTLETT. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 158 p. \$1.25.

A scientific and comprehensive survey by a psychologist at Cambridge University.

MAJORITY RULE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. BY CROMWELL A. RICHES. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940, 322 p. \$2.75.

A scholarly study of the trend from unanimity to majority decision, by an associate professor of political science in Goucher College.

LEAGUE REFORM. BY S. ENGEL. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1940, 282 p. 40 cents.

"An analysis of official proposals and discussions, 1936-1939."

GEOGRAPHY IN HUMAN DESTINY. BY RODERICK PEATTIE. New York: Stewart, 1940, 323 p. \$3.00.

Illuminating and readable essays on the effect geographic forces have had on the development of mankind.

CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW. BY MATTHEW M. CROMWELL. Washington: The Catholic University, 1940, 233 p. \$2.00.

A scholarly and timely study of "The Legal Limitations on the Acquisition of Territory by Conquest."

DE LA GUERRE À LA PAIX. BY GEORGES KAECKENBEECK. Geneva: Naville, 1940, 103 p. Fr. 2.

Lectures on the legal problems involved in the transition from war to peace by a Dutch jurist.

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE. BY GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 179 p. \$2.00.

The first English translation of a now famous book, originally published in France in 1934, in which de Gaulle, then only a captain, laid down the pattern for mechanized warfare — a pattern ignored by his own countrymen but applied by the Germans.

MODERN ARCTIC EXPLORATION. BY GUNNAR SEIDENFADEN. Boston: Hale, 1940, 189 p. \$2.50.

An illustrated review of methods, aims and achievements.

GREENLAND LIES NORTH. BY WILLIAM S. CARLSON. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 306 p. \$3.00.

An entertaining account of a winter spent in northern Greenland by two American scientists, instructive as to native life in that region.

THE WORLD OVER IN 1940. EDITED BY LEON BRYCE BLOCH AND LAMAR MIDDLETON. New York: Living Age Press, 1941, 914 p. \$4.00.

The third annual volume of this chronology and interpretation of world-wide events.

General: Economic and Social

BARRIERS TO WORLD TRADE. BY MARGARET S. GORDON. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 530 p. \$4.00.

A systematic study of the manifold restrictions that grew up around world trade during the last decade. This book is published under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College.

THE CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS. BY COLIN CLARK. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 504 p. \$5.00.

An important work synthesizing present technical and statistical data concerning the question of national income and allied problems in the world's principal countries.

THE DEFEAT OF CHAOS. BY SIR GEORGE PAISH. New York: Appleton-Century, 1941, 122 p. \$1.00.

A British economist holds that a new era of international economic coöperation, reviving the golden age of free trade, will follow the defeat of Hitler. However, he seems unaware of the necessity of establishing new international political institutions, and he gives no indication of sympathy with those who, like the late Lord Lothian, proclaim the necessity of social reconstruction.

A PROGRAMME FOR PROGRESS. BY JOHN STRACHEY. New York: Random House, 1940, 303 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Strachey, having forsaken Communism, now favors a sort of Popular Front Socialism. In this book he outlines a "new economic policy for the democracies."

STUDIES IN ECONOMIC WARFARE. BY D. T. JACK. New York: Chemical Publishing Co., 1941, 178 p. \$4.00.

An historical study covering the period since the latter part of the eighteenth century and devoted largely to maritime warfare.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR. BY A. C. PIGOU. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 169 p. \$1.50.

A revision of a general study first published in 1921. The author is professor of political economy at Cambridge.

THE INTERNATIONAL GOLD STANDARD REINTERPRETED, 1914-1934. BY WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, JR. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940, 2 v. \$12.00.

An exhaustive history of one of the most important phases of the economic history of the last 25 years. The author of this monumental work is professor of economics at Brown University. An article by him appears in the present issue of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*.

IL SISTEMA AUREO. BY ATTILIO CABIATI. Turin: Einaudi, 1940, 324 p. L. 25.

An historical and technical treatise on the gold standard and the Exchange Equalisation Account, by a recognized Italian authority.

VALYUTNYE OGRANICHENIYA I KLIRINGI. BY L. I. FREY. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1940, 291 p. \$1.75.

A study of international currency restrictions and clearing agreements.

LE PÉTROLE DANS LE MONDE. BY VICTOR FORBIN. Paris: Payot, 1940, 240 p. Fr. 27.

Oil production considered as a technical and a politico-military problem.

COMPETITION AMONG GRAINS. BY N. JASNY. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1940, 606 p. \$4.00.

A thorough examination of the world-wide manifestations of the competition for both production and consumption between corn, wheat, rye, barley and oats.

TIDES IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN. BY EDGAR LAWRENCE SMITH. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 178 p. \$2.00.

An attempt to correlate meteorology and economics.

WORLD-WIDE INFLUENCES OF THE CINEMA. BY JOHN EUGENE HARLEY. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1940, 320 p. \$2.00.

"A study of official censorship and the international cultural aspects of motion pictures."

SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS. BY JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 248 p. \$2.00.

This meaty little book by the eminent French Catholic philosopher is based on nine lectures he delivered at the University of Chicago.

FREEDOM UNDER GOD. BY FULTON J. SHEEN. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1940, 265 p. \$2.25.

An exposition of Catholic doctrine in which a prominent churchman carries on his war against Communism.

The Second World War

THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II. BY ALFRED VON WEGENER. New York: Smith, 1941, 128 p. \$1.50.

An expanded and revised version of an article presenting the German point of view which appeared in the July 1940 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

L'HÉRÉSIE ÉCONOMIQUE ALLEMANDE CAUSE DE LA GUERRE. BY PAUL MAQUENNE. Paris: Union Latine d'Éditions, 1940, 408 p. Fr. 70.

A former attaché of the French commercial mission in Germany discusses Nazi economics in understandable terms.

WAR BY REVOLUTION. BY FRANCIS WILLIAMS. New York: Viking, 1941, 158 p. \$1.50.

Mr. Williams' argument, aimed primarily at an English audience, is that the defeat of Hitler cannot be attained by military measures alone and that therefore an indispensable means to victory must be the organization of democratic revolutionary movements in Nazi-controlled Europe. Some critics will feel that Mr. Williams has leaned over too far in underestimating the military factor.

HOW TO WIN THE WAR. BY AN ENGLISHMAN. New York: Knopf, 1941, 145 p. \$1.50.

The thesis of this little volume is somewhat parallel to that of Francis Williams' book — that Britain cannot win by arms alone but must be aided by revolts among the continental peoples now subject to the Nazis. The anonymous author analyzes the

antediluvian methods and mentality that rule Britain's Foreign Office, Ministry of Information and Home Office, and shows that these must be made efficient and democratic-minded before Britain can pose as the savior of European peoples.

THE COMMON SENSE OF WAR AND PEACE. BY H. G. WELLS. New York: Penguin, 1940, 116 p. 25 cents.

Peace can be restored only by a world revolution for which the famous English novelist gives the specifications.

WAYS AND MEANS OF WAR. BY GEOFFREY CROWTHER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 184 p. \$1.25.

A brief but rather comprehensive survey of the various economic problems involved in fighting the war, by the editor of the *Economist* of London.

LA MARINA MERCANTILE E LA SECONDA GUERRA MONDIALE. BY BRUNO MINOLETTI. Turin: Einaudi, 1940, 225 p. L. 18.

The effect of the war upon the merchant marines of both belligerents and neutrals. **ENGLAND SPEAKS.** BY A. P. HERBERT AND OTHERS. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 222 p. \$1.75.

Essays on the implications of this war by eight British writers including A. A. Milne, C. E. M. Joad and Harold Laski.

LABOUR IN THE WAR. BY JOHN PRICE. New York: Penguin, 1940, 176 p. 25 cents.

A discussion of the attitude of British organized labor towards the war and of the contribution it is making to the national effort through its trade unions.

SQUADRONS UP! BY NOEL MONKS. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 260 p. \$2.50.

An exciting account of the operations of the R. A. F. fighter squadrons of the Advanced Air Striking Force in France from September 1939 to June 1940.

THEIR FINEST HOUR. EDITED BY ALLAN A. MICHIE AND WALTER GRAEBNER. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 226 p. \$2.50.

Graphic "first-hand narratives" of how England is fighting this war, by some of the men and women, in and out of uniform, who are fighting it.

I SAW ENGLAND. BY BEN ROBERTSON. New York: Knopf, 1941, 213 p. \$2.00.

An excellent piece of reporting by the London correspondent of *PM* of New York. **THE WOUNDED DON'T CRY.** BY QUENTIN REYNOLDS. New York: Dutton, 1941, 253 p. \$2.50.

One of the more vivid books to come out of the Blitzkrieg, which the author witnessed as correspondent for *Collier's*. The scene covers both France and Britain, and the approach is personal rather than comprehensive.

ENGLAND'S HOUR. BY VERA BRITTAIN. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 230 p. \$2.50.

How the British civilian is "standing up to Hitler."

BRITISH WOMEN IN WAR. BY PEGGY SCOTT. London: Hutchinson, 1940, 329 p. 7/6.

An illustrated book covering many fields of activity, military and civil.

CANADA FIGHTS. EDITED BY JOHN W. DAFOE. New York: Farrar, 1941, 280 p. \$2.00.

Chapters on Canada's part in the war, by six Canadian scholars and journalists.

FRANCE SPEAKING. BY ROBERT DE SAINT JEAN. New York: Dutton, 1941, 335 p. \$2.50.

The author, formerly a foreign correspondent of the *Paris-Soir*, served as an official in the French Ministry of Information before the collapse of France. The title is a bit misleading. Actually the book consists of passages taken from the author's diary between October 9, 1939, and June 17, 1940. It throws a great deal of light both on the inside story behind events and on the reaction of the man-in-the-street to those events.

J'ACCUSE! By ANDRÉ SIMONE. New York: Dial Press, 1940, 354 p. \$2.50.

This book, by a French journalist writing under a pseudonym, was admittedly set down in the "white heat of anger," and therefore is not to be taken too literally as the gospel truth, in spite of Carleton Beals' glowing tribute to its exactness in his introduction. Many of the author's charges against the ruling men of the Third Republic are no doubt only too well justified. But many others are, to say the least, "not proven."

FRANCE MY COUNTRY. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Longmans, 1941, 117 p. \$1.25.

A leading French Catholic philosopher examines the causes of his country's downfall. He is very critical of the political parties of both Right and Left, but less severe with the military men. At heart a democrat he wants French Catholics to rally against Hitler.

LA FRANCE EN GUERRE. By C. J. GIGNOUX AND OTHERS. Paris: Plon, 1940, 315 p. Fr. 24.

The impact of the war on the French people, their economy and their culture described in a book written before the débâcle.

FINANCES DE GUERRE. By PAUL REYNAUD. Paris: Flammarion, 1940, 228 p. Fr. 18.

This book covers the period from July 29, 1939, to February 29, 1940.

LE ROI DES BELGES, A-T-IL TRAH? By ROBERT GOFFIN. New York: Éditions de la Maison Française, 1940, 291 p. \$1.50.

A Belgian lawyer, after reconstructing the events of the Blitzkrieg, decides that if there was treason, it was not by the King but by his Minister, Henry de Man.

L'ECONOMIE ALLEMANDE À L'ÉPREUVE DE LA GUERRE. By HENRY LAUFENBURGER. Paris: Médicis, 1940, 270 p. Fr. 50.

A treatise by a professor of economics at the University of Strasbourg.

FLIGHT FROM POLAND. By CEDRIC SALTER. London: Faber, 1940, 226 p. 7/6.

A journalist's adventures in Poland and the Balkans.

UNDER THE IRON HEEL. By LARS MOËN. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 350 p. \$2.75.

An American scientist, caught in Antwerp by the Blitzkrieg, reports on what he saw and heard in Nazi-occupied Belgium from May to October 1940. His story is important, not only because it is one of the very few to come out of the conquered countries, but because of its unemotional and factual nature. Mr. Moën reports, for instance, that none of the Belgians he talked to really believed Belgium "could be fed without a great deal, and perhaps the lion's share, going to their new masters."

INVASION IN THE SNOW. By JOHN LANGDON-DAVIES. Boston: Houghton, 1941, 202 p. \$2.50.

A first-hand account of the Soviet-Finnish War and a critique of its strategy.

The United States

WOODROW WILSON, THE FIFTEENTH POINT. By DAVID LOTH. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 365 p. \$3.00.

A sound and readable biography of Wilson, sympathetic but not uncritical. Mr. Loth has read the pertinent literature and documents, including Wilson's private papers, and has woven their substance into a consistent and well-proportioned fabric. He gives particular attention to reconstructing the Paris peace negotiations and the impact upon them of Wilson's character — "the fifteenth point" — on which humanity rested its hopes for a better future.

UNION NOW WITH BRITAIN. By CLARENCE K. STREIT. New York: Harper, 1941, 234 p. \$1.75.

Mr. Streit has revised his original proposals for a union among the democracies to

take account of the present world situation. His federal bloc would now include only the United States and the six states of the British Commonwealth. He assures us that only by such a union *now* can Hitler be stopped.

OUR WAR AND OUR PEACE. BY JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Farrar, 1941, 227 p. \$1.75.

Forthright and "tough-minded" essays, addresses, etc., by an American financial expert who thinks nothing is to be gained by trying to live in the dream-world of isolationism.

ALL OUT! HOW DEMOCRACY WILL DEFEND AMERICA. BY SAMUEL GRAF-TON. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 104 p. \$1.00.

The remedy for our ailing democracy is more democracy, says a young American columnist after reviewing the recent experience of France and Britain.

FIVEFOLD AID TO BRITAIN. BY FRITZ STERNBERG. New York: Day, 1941, 76 p. \$1.00.

In simple terms, and with the aid of statistics, Dr. Sternberg shows how the United States must drastically increase its aid to Britain if the latter is to win.

AMERICA CAN WIN. BY MAJOR MALCOLM WHEELER-NICHOLSON. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 246 p. \$1.75.

A hard-hitting, clear-thinking demonstration that if Hitler is to be defeated the United States must enter the war — at once and with all its forces.

UNITED WE STAND! BY HANSON W. BALDWIN. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 364 p. \$3.00.

A clear, readable and authoritative picture of the problems involved in Hemisphere Defense, of the present state of our military and naval establishments, and of the task still lying ahead. The author, who is the military and naval expert for the *New York Times*, is at his best when treating technical matters, less convincing when he discusses questions of diplomacy, politics and public opinion.

STRATEGY OF THE AMERICAS. BY FLEMING MACLIESH AND CUSHMAN REYNOLDS. New York: Duell, 1941, 247 p. \$2.50.

A brief survey of the problems involved in Hemisphere Defense and an attempt, far from successful, to demonstrate that an invasion of the United States would be difficult if not impossible. Like so many other "experts," the authors either ignore or undervalue the psychological effect on the American will-to-resist of an Axis conquest of Europe, Africa and Asia.

APPROACH TO BATTLE. BY MAJOR LEONARD H. NASON. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 113 p. \$1.50.

A pessimistic picture of the state of American defense.

AMERICA AND TOTAL WAR. BY FLETCHER PRATT. New York: Smith and Durrell, 1941, 318 p. \$3.00.

A journalistic survey of the technique of modern warfare and of the relative unpreparedness of the United States. The author is an American military writer and commentator.

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY. BY BURNHAM FINNEY. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 284 p. \$2.50.

A good source of information for the layman about the industrial side of the defense program, by the editor of *The American Machinist*.

INVASION. BY HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 203 p. \$2.00.

An imaginative account of a Nazi attack on the United States.

I FIND TREASON. BY RICHARD ROLLINS. New York: Morrow, 1941, 291 p. \$3.00.

Amazing revelations, including documentary evidence, concerning the ramifications of the Nazi movement in this country.

AMERICA IS WORTH SAVING. By THEODORE DREISER. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 292 p. \$2.50.

The major part of this book, the first published in ten years by the well-known American novelist, is a garrulous and intemperate attack on England.

REPORT ON AMERICA. By ROBERT WAITHMAN. London: Muller, 1940, 384 p. 12/6.

This book, by the American correspondent of the London *News Chronicle*, though better than the average British "report" on this country, shows how difficult it is for even a very observing and intelligent foreigner really to know the United States except after years of residence and wide travel.

RECENT AMERICA. By HENRY BAMFORD PARKES. New York: Crowell, 1941, 664 p. \$4.50.

A review of four decades of American history, useful to student and layman alike. The author, born in England and educated at Oxford, is now a professor of history at New York University.

MY NATIVE LAND. By ANNA LOUISE STRONG. New York: Viking, 1940, 299 p. \$2.75.

A coast-to-coast report on the American social scene by a well-known Stalinist writer.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN OUR TRADE POLICY. By WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1941, 174 p. \$2.00.

After examining the successes and failures of the Hull program, the author demonstrates its basic incompatibility with wartime needs as proved by the impact of belligerent and neutral trade controls on the principal agreements made under it. The new measures of commercial policy introduced in this country are described, and the possibilities of shaping a unified trade policy consistent with our foreign policy as a whole are discussed in some detail.

AMERICAN BUSINESS IN A CHANGING WORLD. By A. W. ZELOMEK AND ROBERT C. SHOOK. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 264 p. \$2.50.

A rather comprehensive survey, intended primarily for the layman, of America's economic position in a chaotic world, by the president and research director of the International Statistical Bureau.

THE OUTPUT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: 1899-1937. By SOLOMON FABRICANT. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940, 685 p. \$4.50.

A statistical analysis covering a wide variety of American industries. Besides numerous tables there are 24 charts.

THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. By DANIEL T. SELKO. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 606 p. \$3.50.

A description of such processes as budget-making, revenue administration, treasury management and accounting. This scholarly book is an important contribution to the morphology and physiology of American government.

MY COUNTRY 'TIS OF THEE. By LUCY SPRAGUE MITCHELL AND OTHERS. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 335 p. \$3.50.

A thoughtful, readable survey of what America has done both to waste and to conserve its natural resources.

GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURE. By DONALD C. BLAISDELL. New York: Farrar, 1940, 217 p. \$1.50.

The functions and organization of the United States Department of Agriculture comprehensively described.

FOR GOD AND DEMOCRACY. By JAMES A. MAGNER. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 158 p. \$1.50.

This book by an American Catholic priest and teacher is a useful antidote to the anti-democratic publications disseminated by certain of the forces within the Roman Catholic Church in the United States.

DIPLOMATICALLY SPEAKING. BY LLOYD C. GRISCOM. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940, 476 p. \$3.50.

The entertaining and often enlightening memoirs of an American who enjoyed quite a career as diplomat in various parts of the world before and during the last World War.

THE MINGLING OF THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN PEOPLES. VOLUME I. BY MARCUS LEE HANSEN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 274 p. \$3.00.

An historical treatise on the movement of population between the two countries during the last two centuries.

Western Europe

GOVERNMENTS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE. EDITED BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 1092 p. \$4.50.

This text gives the historical background and the present status (as of 1940) of government in the following countries: "France and the Low Countries," by R. K. Gooch; "Germany and Central Europe," by Karl Loewenstein; "Italy and Switzerland," by Arnold J. Zurcher; "Soviet Russia," by Michael T. Florinsky; and "The Scandinavian Countries," by Nils Herlitz and John H. Wuorinen.

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. BY DAVID THOMSON. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 136 p. \$1.25.

Essays interpreting 250 years of history.

D'UNE GUERRE À L'AUTRE. VOLUME I. BY BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1940, 416 p. Fr. 40.

A decade of European history interpreted by a French writer identified with the Right.

EUROPE IN CHAINS. BY PAUL EINZIG. New York: Penguin, 1940, 127 p. 25 cents.

A factual survey of the manner in which the Nazis are exploiting the conquered lands and degrading the standard of living of their inhabitants.

BRIAND. VOLUME IV. BY GEORGES SUAREZ. Paris: Plon, 1940, 480 p. Fr. 52.

Another volume in a series already described. This one covers the years 1916-1918.

HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE DE LA FRANCE PENDANT LA GRANDE GUERRE. VOLUME III. BY ALBERT PINGAUD. Paris: Alsatia, 1940, Fr. 65.

The author of this competent work was formerly director of the archives at the French Foreign Office.

HE MIGHT HAVE SAVED FRANCE. BY MARGUERITE JOSEPH-MAGINOT. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 310 p. \$3.00.

A biography of André Maginot by his sister. Only the last two chapters refer to his postwar political and administrative career, when he devoted himself to a vain effort to make France "secure."

NOUS AUTRES FRANÇAIS. BY GEORGES BERNANOS. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1939, 290 p. Fr. 20.

The author of this polemical volume will be remembered for his attack on Franco Spain — "Les Grands Cimetières sous la Lune." In the present book he pleads, from his new home in Brazil, for a Christian Monarchy in France.

"ALL GAUL IS DIVIDED. . ." New York: Greystone, 1941, 94 p. \$1.00.

Sixteen poignant letters from a family in occupied France. The foreword was written by Elizabeth Morrow.

A HISTORY OF FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICIES. BY FRANK ARNOLD HAIGHT. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 285 p. \$2.50.

An historical summary devoted largely to the period since 1914.

AMBASSADOR DODD'S DIARY. EDITED BY WILLIAM E. DODD, JR., AND MARTHA DODD. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 464 p. \$3.50.

As a professional historian, Mr. Dodd was well-equipped to place the Nazi movement in its proper perspective and to understand its implications ahead of some of his flashier colleagues and more superficial contemporaries. Unlike Sir Nevile Henderson, to mention only one, Mr. Dodd went to Germany (in the summer of 1933) already disliking the Nazi régime. He may not have been a great success as an Ambassador according to the conventional standards of the career service; but there can be no complaint that he failed in his reports home to portray the true character of the government to which he was accredited and of the men who ran it.

GUILLAUME II. BY MAURICE MURET. Paris: Fayard, 1940, 400 p. Fr. 25.

A serious-minded biography of the former Kaiser by a member of the *Institut*.

GERMANY: JEKYL AND HYDE. BY SEBASTIAN HAFFNER. New York: Dutton, 1941, 318 p. \$2.50.

A socio-psychological analysis of the German people under Hitler. The author, a German lawyer, escaped from Germany after working there for six years under Nazi rule.

THE DARK INVADER. BY CAPTAIN VON RINTELEN. New York: Penguin, 1940, 214 p. 25 cents.

The amazing reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer who engaged widely in espionage and sabotage during the last war.

THE CANKER OF GERMANY. BY ERNST G. PREUSS. London: Williams and Norgate, 1940, 302 p. 7/6.

An analysis of German politics and postwar history by an industrialist who is the son of Hugo Preuss, the lawyer largely responsible for drafting the Weimar Constitution.

RIDDLE OF THE REICH. BY WYTHE WILLIAMS AND ALBERT PARRY. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941, 351 p. \$2.75.

A picture of what is going on in Germany, deduced not only from published sources but from secret information smuggled out of the country by anti-Nazis.

I LOVED GERMANY. BY EVELYN WRENCH. London: Michael Joseph, 1940, 287 p. 12/6.

The progressive disillusionment of a humanitarian and optimist, who hopes that after the war Germany will again become her true self.

GÖRING. BY KURT SINGER. London: Hutchinson, 1940, 283 p. 8/6.

An undress biography of "Germany's most dangerous man."

GESTAPO: L'ORGANISATION. BY PIERRE DEHILLOTTE. Paris: Payot, 1940, 213 p. Fr. 20.

A sound and factual description of how it works at home and abroad. Between 1932 and 1938 the author served as correspondent of the *Journal des Débats* in Berlin, Vienna and Prague.

EXCHANGE CONTROL IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BY HOWARD S. ELLIS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 413 p. \$4.00.

A technical study covering the last decade in Germany, Austria and Hungary.

AFTER HITLER. BY AXEL HEYST. London: Minerva, 1940, 228 p. 6/.

Rambling chapters showing an eclectic rather than an original mind.

LE "FRECCIE NERE" NELLA GUERRA DI SPAGNA (1937-1939). BY SANDRO PIAZZONI. Rome: Edizioni "Nazione Militare," 1939, 254 p.

An Italian general records the feats of one of the "legionary" divisions that fought in Spain on behalf of Fascist "non-intervention."

MY SHADOW IN THE SUN. BY FRANCES DAVIS. New York: Carrick and Evans (Lippincott), 1940, 318 p. \$2.75.

Against a background of the Spanish Civil War a young American newspaperwoman writes a moving chronicle that may take its place as one of the more important journalistic "Personal Histories" of our day.

FRANCO BEFREIT SPANIEN. BY DAGOBERT VON MIKUSCH. Leipzig: List, 1939, 301 p. M. 6.50.

Spain's recent history interpreted for Nazi consumption.

LO QUE VI EN ESPAÑA. BY BLANCA LYDIA TREJO. Mexico City: Polis, 1940, 142 p. Personal reminiscences of the Civil War.

Eastern Europe

WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER LENIN. BY MANYA GORDON. New York: Dutton, 1941, 524 p. \$4.00.

In a day when good books on Russia are becoming increasingly rare it is a pleasure to welcome this sound piece of diligent research and objective interpretation. Making full use of Soviet statistics, the author shows how in the field of wages, living standards, social services and education the actual standards at present are not only far below official Soviet claims but inferior to those that prevailed under the Tsars.

BIOGRAFIYA V. I. LENINA. BY E. YAROSLAVSKY. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 214 p. 60 cents.

A biography of Lenin by an authoritative Party historian.

STALINE ET LA GUERRE. BY NICOLAS BASSÈCHES. Paris: Payot, 1940, 248 p. Fr. 32.

An important book on the objectives of Soviet policy, by an Austrian journalist many years resident in Moscow as representative of the *Neue Freie Presse*, the *Manchester Guardian* and several Swiss and American papers. In 1937 he was expelled from Russia for publishing two articles predicting the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

BOLSHEVIKI V GODY IMPERIALISTICHESKOI VOINY 1914-FEVRAL 1917. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 220 p. 50 cents.

Documents illustrating the activity of local Bolshevik organizations in Russia from the outbreak of the war in 1914 to the revolution of March 1917.

FORTY YEARS WITH RUSSIANS. BY ETHAN T. COLTON. New York: Association Press, 1940, 192 p. \$2.00.

An account of Y. M. C. A. work in Russia since 1900.

THE UKRAINE. BY W. E. D. ALLEN. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1940, 404 p. \$4.50.

A scholarly treatise going from Slavic origins to the present day.

TADZHIKISTAN. BY V. M. BARDIER. Edited by G. N. Cherdantsev. Tashkent: Izdatelstvo Tadzhikistana, 1940, 102 p. 50 cents.

The development of Taikistan, especially under Soviet rule.

FINLAND FOREVER. BY HUDSON STRODE. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 443 p. \$3.50.

An admirer of the courage and culture of the Finnish people writes glowingly of them and their country.

LA FINLANDE EN GUERRE. BY JEAN-LOUIS PERRET. Paris: Payot, 1940, 224 p. Fr. 24.

A review of the last quarter century of Finnish history by a Swiss professor at the University of Helsinki.

LA BALTIQUE. BY LOUIS TISSOT. Paris: Payot, 1940, 272 p. Fr. 36.

A former professor in Memel describes the economic and strategic situation of the Baltic countries.

GERMANY'S "DEATH SPACE." By FRANCIS ALDOR. London: Aldor, 1940, 261 p. 5/.

Supposedly authoritative reports on Germany's behavior in conquered Poland.

PILSUDSKI. By ALEXANDRA PILSUDSKA. New York: Dodd, 1941, 352 p. \$3.00.

An intimate biography of the late Marshal by his wife.

WHITHER EUROPE? By ARNOLD LUNN. New York: Sheed, 1940, 270 p. \$3.00.

Impressions gained on a trip through southern and southeastern Europe early last year.

KING CAROL OF ROMANIA. By BARONESS HELENA VON DER HOVEN. London: Hutchinson, 1940, 288 p. 16/.

Described as an "official biography," this somewhat sentimental book is better on personal than on political matters.

THIS IS GREECE. New York: Hastings House, 1941, 127 p. \$2.50.

Photographs of Greece and its people.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS. By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. New York: Putnam, 1941, 462 p. \$3.00.

Speeches delivered between May 1938 and February 1941.

LABOR'S AIMS IN WAR AND PEACE. By C. R. ATTLEE AND OTHERS. New York: Rand School Press, 1940, 153 p. \$1.75.

Statements by eight of the Labor Party's leading political and intellectual lights.

WAR COMES TO BRITAIN. London: Gollancz, 1940, 256 p. 9/.

The speeches of Major Attlee, Leader of the Opposition from 1933 to 1939, edited by John Dugdale.

ALLENBY: A STUDY IN GREATNESS. By GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 312 p. \$3.00.

The military career of Allenby in South Africa, France and the Near East, recited *con amore* by the present commander of the British forces in the Near East.

GREAT BRITAIN UNDER PROTECTION. By FREDERIC BENHAM. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 271 p. \$2.50.

A history of how the British Government controlled the country's foreign trade from 1932 to 1939.

THE IRISH FREE STATE AND ITS SENATE. By DONAL O'SULLIVAN. London: Faber, 1940, 697 p. 25/.

Recent Irish history and constitutional development interpreted, on the whole objectively, by the Secretary of the Senate.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By F. H. SOWARD AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 343 p. \$3.25.

This is the first of a new series in which it is planned to publish a volume every two years. The present work deals with the political, economic and diplomatic problems of Canada during the last years before the present war.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. By F. R. SCOTT. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941, 77 p. 50 cents.

A concise, comprehensive and readable bird's-eye view of American-Canadian relations in the present crisis by a professor of law at McGill University.

THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF CANADA. By C. P. STACEY. Toronto: Ryerson, 1940, 184 p. \$2.50.

A history of Canadian defense policy, with a concluding chapter on the Dominion's present war effort. The author is assistant professor of history at Princeton University.

CANADA GETS THE NEWS. BY CARLETON McNAUGHT. Toronto: Ryerson, 1940, 271 p. \$3.50.

An examination of the way foreign news is handled by the Canadian press and radio, prepared under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

THE WORKING CONSTITUTION IN INDIA. BY S. M. BOSE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 689 p. \$1.00.

An expert and detailed commentary on the Government of India Act of 1935, the text of which is given. The author is one of India's leading lawyers.

THE NEW BURMA. BY W. J. GRANT. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 159 p. \$2.00.

An informative book on life in Burma, but with no reference to events taking place in the rest of the world.

The Near East

DER NAHE OSTEN RÜCKT NÄHER. BY WERNER-OTTO VON HENTIG. Leipzig: List, 1940, 117 p. M. 1.80.

How the Near and Middle East are fast becoming Europeanized, as explained by one of Hitler's principal agents in that part of the world.

TURKEY. BY EMIL LENGYEL. New York: Random House, 1941, 474 p. \$3.75.

The country, the people and their history entertainingly described by the author of "The Danube."

ES WETTERLEUCHTET ZWISCHEN NIL UND TIGRIS. BY REINHARD HÜBER. Berlin: Drei-Säulen-Verlag, 1940, 378 p. M. 9.60.

A survey of the conflict between local nationalism and European imperialism in the Arab countries.

THE JEWISH WAR FRONT. BY V. JABOTINSKY. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 255 p. 7/6.

The late leader of Revisionist Zionism declares that only the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine and the mass emigration of the Jews to it from Central Europe can solve the Jewish problem. He also calls for the creation of a Jewish Army to serve on the Allied fronts.

THE HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN. BY SIR PERCY SYKES. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 2 v. \$10.00.

Sir Percy Sykes first visited Central Asia some fifty years ago. Since then he has devoted constant study to that remote but strategically important part of the world, where from time to time he has held official appointments. The result is the first adequate treatise we have of the whole sweep of the history of Afghanistan from pre-historic times down to the present. There are several appendices, a bibliography, a detailed index and a large map in colors of Iran and Afghanistan folded in on the cover of volume two.

Africa

NORTH OF SAHARA. BY MATTIE JOHNS UTTING. Boston: Christopher, 1940, 133 p. \$1.50.

Meanderings in the Madeiras and North Africa.

L'AFRIQUE BLANCHE. BY E. F. GAUTIER. Paris: Fayard, 1939, 353 p. Fr. 35.

A readable survey of the geography and ethnography of North and Northeast Africa.

BEHIND GOD'S BACK. BY NEGLEY FARSON. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 555 p. \$3.50.

In this highly informative book the author of "The Way of a Transgressor" records his experiences and impressions gained on a trip through several parts of Africa which

he made shortly before the present war. Starting in Southwest Africa, Mr. Farson visited the Union of South Africa, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, the Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons and the Gold Coast. His book does not pretend to be a systematic treatise on those places; but in spite of its episodic and personal character it manages to tell a great deal about the political and economic problems of sub-Saharan Africa.

FOCUS ON AFRICA. BY RICHARD UPJOHN LIGHT. New York: American Geographical Society, 1941, 228 p. \$5.00.

Though the author of this fascinating book belongs to the medical profession, he has demonstrated himself to be a geographer of no mean proportions. With his wife as co-pilot and photographer, he flew his own plane from Capetown to the Mediterranean via East Africa, making numerous detours and stopovers on the way. His text is more than a news chronicle, for it makes a serious attempt to interpret the everchanging landscape in relation not only to natural but to human factors. The book is enriched by over 300 photographs, mostly air views, and a number of maps. These will prove useful aids to those who read Negley Farson's book, mentioned above.

MY VANISHED AFRICA. BY PETER RAINIER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 307 p. \$2.75.

The autobiographical record of an adventurous career in South Africa during and after the First World War.

DAS PORTUGIESISCHE KOLONIALREICH. BY ERNST GERHARD JACOB. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1940, 142 p. M. 2.85.

A history emphasizing the recent revival of colonial activities under the Salazar government.

DAS RASSENRECHT IN SÜDWESTAFRIKA. BY H. KRIEGER. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1940, 137 p. M. 6.80.

A comparison of native legislation under German rule and under the South African mandate. The author concludes that *when* the colony returns to Germany a policy of strict racial superiority for the whites must be pursued.

The Far East

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN'S NEW ORDER. BY WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 392 p. \$3.00.

This painstaking survey investigates the effects of the Sino-Japanese War on American rights and interests in China and on our general Far Eastern policy. The book is published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

1940-41 WHO'S WHO IN JAPAN WITH MANCHOUKUO AND CHINA. EDITED BY TSUNESABURO KAMESAKA. South Pasadena: Perkins, 1940, 867 p. \$7.00.

Some 4,000 short biographies of Japanese and Chinese, as well as of numerous Europeans and Americans resident in the Japanese Empire.

JAPAN UNMASKED. BY HALLETT ABEND. New York: Ives Washburn, 1941, 322 p. \$3.00.

On his return from Shanghai, where for eleven years he had covered China and the Far East for the *New York Times*, Mr. Abend visited Hong Kong, Thailand, the Malay States, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines — on each of which he gives us his impressions. His concluding chapters deal with various aspects of the Sino-Japanese War.

THE BATTLE FOR ASIA. BY EDGAR SNOW. New York: Random House, 1941, 431 p. \$3.75.

A continuation of the author's "Red Star Over China" carrying the story of his

reportorial wanderings in the Far East down to 1940. As in his previous book, Mr. Snow devotes much of his space and sympathies to the Chinese Communists.

CHUNG-KUO CHIN PO-NIEN SHIH CHIAO-CHENG. BY CHIEN-FU CHANG. Kweilin: Cultural Service, 1940, 349 p. \$1.80.

A history of China during the last century.

CHINA SHALL RISE AGAIN. BY MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK. New York: Harper, 1941, 356 p. \$3.00.

The wife of the Generalissimo describes China's war effort in many of its diverse aspects. She does not hesitate to subject the "democratic Powers" and the Chinese themselves to searching criticism.

IN CHINA NOW. BY WINIFRED GALBRAITH. New York: Morrow, 1941, 285 p. \$2.50.

A collection of very human sketches of life in unoccupied China.

INTO CHINA. BY EILEEN BIGLAND. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 298 p. \$3.00.

The vivid and highly personal narrative of a trip to Chungking via the Burma Road.

MONGOL JOURNEYS. BY OWEN LATTIMORE. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 324 p. \$4.00.

An account of wide travels in the country of the Mongols by one of the outstanding authorities on China.

A FRENCH VIEW OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES. BY G. H. BOUSQUET. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 133 p. \$1.50.

A study in comparative colonial policy.

ORPHANS OF THE PACIFIC. BY FLORENCE HORN. New York: Reynal, 1941, 316 p. \$3.50.

A readable report on the present state of Philippine politics, economics, public opinion, social and other problems, by a member of the staff of *Fortune* magazine.

LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC MANDATES. BY JOHN ALVIN DECKER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 246 p. \$2.75.

Deals almost entirely with British and Dominion mandates.

Latin America

HANDS OFF. BY DEXTER PERKINS. Boston: Little, Brown, 1941, 455 p. \$3.50.

Professor Perkins is the recognized authority on the history of the Monroe Doctrine, and in this book he has distilled the essence of a lifetime of scholarship. Though obviously intended primarily to give the general reader a comprehensive and comprehensible picture of the origins and growth of the Doctrine, it is equipped with some of the apparatus of the historian's trade in the form of notes and a bibliography.

A NEW DOCTRINE FOR THE AMERICAS. BY CHARLES WERTENBAKER. New York: Viking, 1941, 211 p. \$2.00.

A somewhat breezy survey of the Good Neighbor Policy in action and an appraisal of its chances to survive in the future, by the foreign news editor of *Time*.

AXIS AMERICA. BY ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ. New York: Putnam, 1941, 274 p. \$2.50.

By quoting copiously from Nazi pronouncements and doctrinal treatises, the author reveals the pattern of the Nazi attack upon America and its ultimate objectives. This is required reading for those who think Hitler has no designs on this hemisphere.

NUESTRA AMERICA Y LA GUERRA. BY MANUEL SEOANE. Santiago: Ercilla, 1940, 210 p. Pesos 15.

A discussion of the part which Latin America can and should play in the present world crisis. The author, an *Aprista* exiled from his native Peru, though anti-imperialist, is prepared on certain conditions to ally with the United States.

WAR AND THE AMERICAS. EDITED BY J. V. GARLAND. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1941, 564 p. \$2.00.

Many pertinent articles and speeches condensed and arranged for ready reference.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE. COMPILED BY EGBERT RAY NICHOLS. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1941, 398 p. \$1.25.

Another work along similar lines.

INTERAMERICAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1940. EDITED BY RAÚL C. MIGONE. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 612 p. \$6.00.

This valuable addition to the shelf of statistical annals is published under the auspices of the Argentine Commission of the International Studies Conference. The data in it cover population, production, industry, commerce, social questions, transport and communications, banking and currency, public finance, education, military and naval affairs, health, and international coöperation. The information is given in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French.

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A comprehensive analysis of the world's ideological, economic and political disorganization and a proposal for Pan American confederation.

CENTRAL AMERICA. By CHARLES MORROW WILSON. New York: Holt, 1941, 293 p. \$3.00.

A man who has written widely on agricultural problems surveys the resources and economic potentialities of the Central American Republics, as well as of Colombia, Cuba and Jamaica. He is enthusiastic about these countries and their suitability as reservoirs of foodstuffs and raw materials for the United States and as prospective markets for our manufactured goods.

REPORTAGE ON MEXICO. By VIRGINIA PREWETT. New York: Dutton, 1941, 322 p. \$3.00.

Mexico's recent history and current politics realistically summarized by an enterprising young American newspaperwoman.

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Essays with a Leftist slant.

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A factual description of the history, organization and present state of Cuba's principal industry.

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The tenor of this book can be surmised from the fact that it is taken from a larger, and as yet unpublished, work entitled "El Crimen de Wilson en Santo Domingo."

VENEZUELA'S PLACE IN THE SUN. By NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT. New York: Round Table, 1940, 87 p. \$1.00.

A brief handbook emphasizing the country's economic progress.

QUIÉN ES QUIÉN EN LA ARGENTINA. Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1941, 685 p. Pesos 5.75.

Short biographical sketches of some two thousand prominent Argentines.



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1. An American looks at the British empire, by James Truslow Adams. 32 p. 2. War for power and power for freedom, by Lionel Gelber and Robert K. Gooch. 32 p. 3. The faith of an American, by Walter Millis. 32 p. 4. Where do Catholics stand? by William Agar. 32 p. 5. Why . . . edited by Henry F. Pringle. 48 p. (A question-answer discussion of preparedness, aid to Britain, etc.) 6. A summons to the free, by Stephen Vincent Benét. 32 p. 7. The Monroe doctrine today, by Grayson Kirk. 32 p. 8. Germany then and now, by Alonzo F. Taylor. 32 p. 9. America's Maginot lines, by Helen Hill. 28 p. 10. Aircraft production and national defense, by T. P. Wright. 32 p. 11. The isolationist illusion and world peace, by James P. Warburg. 32 p. 12. German youth and the Nazi dream of victory, by E. Y. Hartshorne. 32 p. 13. Food or freedom: the vital blockade, by William Agar. 32 p.

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